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Michael Bergmann [66]Michael Abram Bergmann [1]
  1. Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  2.  37
    Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition.Michael Bergmann - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish (...)
  3. Defeaters and higher-level requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the (...)
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  4. Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
    * Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.
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  5. Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  6. Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
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  7. Skeptical theism and the problem of evil.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Thomas P. Flint & Michael Rea (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 374--99.
    The most interesting thing about sceptical theism is its sceptical component. When sceptical theists use that component in responding to arguments from evil, they think it is reasonable for their non-theistic interlocutors to accept it, even if they don't expect them to accept their theism. This article focuses on that sceptical component. The first section explains more precisely what the sceptical theist's scepticism amounts to and how it is used in response to various sorts of arguments from evil. The next (...)
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  8. Internalism, externalism and the no-defeater condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  9. Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
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  10. In defence of sceptical theism: a reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241-251.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...)
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  11. A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity).Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:357-386.
    Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as “Socrates is wise” are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be (...)
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  12. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 154.
    In previous work I have argued against internalism by means of a dilemma intended to force all internalists to accept one of two undesirable options: either their internalism is unmotivated or it is saddled with vicious regress problems. Recently it has been argued that Phenomenal Conservatism—a theory of justification according to which justification depends on seemings—is a kind of internalism that can escape this dilemma. In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism cannot escape my dilemma for internalism. In order (...)
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  13. (Serious) actualism and (serious) presentism.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):118-132.
    Actualism is the thesis that necessarily, everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily, no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. Let's call the claim that actualism entails serious actualism the Entailment Thesis (ET). In this paper I will improve upon a previous argument of mine for (ET). I will then consider the prospects for defending a similar thesis in the temporal realm—the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism.
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  14. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  15.  26
    Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.Michael Bergmann - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6:21-57.
    This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to demoting (...)
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  16. A new argument from actualism to serious actualism.Michael Bergmann - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):356-359.
    Actualism is the thesis that necessarily everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. In this paper I present a new argument from actualism to serious actualism.
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  17. Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  18. Externalism and skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
    Internalists and externalists in epistemology continue to disagree about how best to understand epistemic concepts such as justification or warrant or knowledge. But there has been some movement towards agreement. Two of the most prominent rationales for the internalist position have been subjected to severe criticism by externalists: the idea that justification should be understood deontologically and the thought that justification consists in having a reason in the form of another belief. It would not be accurate to say that all (...)
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  19.  60
    Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:19-43.
    Religious disagreement is, quite understandably, viewed as a problem for religious belief. In this paper, I consider why religious disagreement is a problem—why it is a potential defeater for religious belief—and I propose a way of dealing with this sort of potential defeater. I begin by focusing elsewhere—on arguments for radical skepticism. In section 1, I consider skeptical arguments proposed as potential defeaters for all of our perceptual and memory beliefs and explain what I think the rational response is to (...)
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  20.  12
    Rational Religious Belief without Arguments.Michael Bergmann - 2014 - In Michael C. Rea & Louis P. Pojman (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 7th edition. Stamford, CT: Cengage. pp. 534-549.
    It is commonly thought that belief in God couldn’t be rational unless it is held on the basis of arguments. But is that right? Could there be rational religious belief without arguments? For the past few decades, a prominent position within the philosophy of religion literature is that belief in God can be rational even if it isn’t based on any arguments. This position is often called ‘Reformed Epistemology’ to signify its roots in the writings of John Calvin (1509-64), the (...)
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  21.  44
    Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
    It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat---a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge---guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that (...)
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  22. Deontology and defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
    It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat---a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge---guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that (...)
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  23.  87
    Externalist responses to skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 504-32.
    In this paper I will be setting aside contextualists and closure-deniers and focusing solely on neo-Moorean versions of externalist responses to skepticism. I will be focusing on two prominent theses about externalist responses to skepticism, one positive and one negative. The positive thesis announces an alleged virtue of externalism: that externalism alone avoids skepticism. The negative thesis identifies an alleged defect of externalism: that externalism implausibly avoids skepticism. I will be critical of both theses, though I will try to uncover (...)
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  24. Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom.Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.
    Adherents of traditional western Theism have espoused CONJUNCTION: God is essentially perfectly good and God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs. But suppose that (i) God’s essential perfect goodness prevents his good acts from being free, and that (ii) God is not thankworthy for an act that wasn’t freely performed. Together these entail the denial of CONJUNCTION. The most natural strategy for defenders of CONJUNCTION is to deny (i). We develop an argument for (i), and then identify two (...)
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  25. Reidian externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  26. Divine Evil?: The Moral Character of the God of Abraham.Michael Bergmann, Michael J. Murray & Michael C. Rea (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Adherents of the Abrahamic religions have traditionally held that God is morally perfect and unconditionally deserving of devotion, obedience, love, and worship. The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scriptures tell us that God is compassionate, merciful, and just. As is well-known, however, these same scriptures contain passages that portray God as wrathful, severely punitive, and jealous. Critics furthermore argue that the God of these scriptures commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and demands the adoption of unjust laws-for example, laws that (...)
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  27. What’s Not Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  28. An exchange on the problem of evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann & William Rowe - 2001 - In William L. Rowe (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil. Blackwell. pp. 124--158.
  29. Externalist justification without reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
    Externalist analyses of justification typically include some sort of reliability requirement. But the fact that the beliefs of a demon victim can be justified despite their being formed in completely unreliable ways suggests that reliability isn’t required for justification. In this paper, I propose an analysis of justification in terms of proper function that enables us to hang on to the externalism without the reliability requirement. As an added bonus, the proposed analysis of justification yields an account of the elusive (...)
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  30. Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense.Michael Bergmann - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):462-478.
    Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) has recently come under attack by those who argue that the success of that sort of counterexample depends on the falsity of incompatibilism. In response, I argue that, given one controversial assumption, there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP that don't take the falsity of incompatibilism for granted. The controversial assumption is the Molinist one that something like middle knowledge is possible. I then show how the falsity of PAP causes (...)
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  31. Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
    When one depends on a belief source in sustaining a belief that that very belief source is trustworthy, then that belief is an epistemically circular belief. A number of philosophers have objected to externalism in epistemology on the grounds that it commits one to thinking EC-beliefs can be justified, something they view as an unhappy consequence for externalism. In my 2004, I defend externalism against this sort of charge by explaining why this consequence needn’t be an unhappy one. In the (...)
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  32. Bonjour’s Dilemma.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
    For many years now, much of BonJour’s work has focused on ways of developing a dilemma he finds in the work of Wilfred Sellars. In his earlier work, BonJour argued against internalist foundationalism using this Sellarsian dilemma. But he has since switched his allegiance and now wants to offer a solution to this dilemma on behalf of internalist foundationalism. He believes that if his solution fails, internalist foundationalism is in serious trouble. I agree with that conditional and my aim in (...)
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  33.  58
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    This article introduces the volume, "Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution," which contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists addressing the following three challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution: Can one reasonably maintain one’s moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society’s moral (...)
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  34. Commonsense Skeptical Theism.Michael Bergmann - 2011 - In Clark Kelly James & Rea Michael C. (eds.), Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press. pp. 9-30.
    Commonsensism takes commonsense starting points seriously in responding to and rejecting radical skepticism. Skeptical theism endorses a sort of skepticism that, according to some, has radical skeptical implications. This suggests that there is a tension between commonsensism and skeptical theism that makes it difficult for a person rationally to hold both. In this paper I explain why there is no tension between those two positions. This explanation is then used to respond to several recent objections to skeptical theism. Along the (...)
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  35. Reply to Rowe.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann - 2003 - In Michael Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell.
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. In this article, we reply to Bill Rowe's "Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 2003).
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  36.  65
    Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):336-351.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) employs the following proposition as a premise:◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy.(The notion of transworld untrustworthiness is the might-counterfactual counterpart to Plantinga’s would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity.) I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, (...)
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  37. Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - In William James Abraham & Frederick D. Aquino (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 253-73.
    Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to foundationalism. Section III (...)
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  38.  23
    Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain.Michael Bergmann - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):140-181.
    These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and (...)
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  39. Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  40.  21
    Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition.Michael Bergmann - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):91-94.
    In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part (...)
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  41. Grounds for belief in God aside, does evil make atheism more reasonable than theism?Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann - 2003 - In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. pp. 140--55.
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on (...)
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  42. Agent Causation and Responsibility.Michael Bergmann - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
    In my “Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense” (Faith and Philosophy 2002) I argued that if we help ourselves to Molinism, we can give a counterexample—one avoiding the usual difficulties—to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: -/- PAP. A person is morally responsible for performing a given act only if she could have acted otherwise. -/- In his “On Behalf of the PAP-ists: A Reply to Bergmann” (Faith and Philosophy 2002) Thomas Flint proposes three objections to my counterexample. In (...)
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  43.  49
    Modest Molinism.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).
    Molinism, which says that God has middle knowledge, offers one of the most impressive and popular ways of combining libertarian creaturely freedom with full providential control by God. The aim of this paper is to explain, motivate, and defend a heretofore overlooked version of Molinism that I call ‘Modest Molinism’. In Section 1, I explain Modest Molinism and make an initial case for it. Then, in Sections 2 and 3, I defend Modest Molinism against Dean Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument, which is (...)
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  44. Lessons from Commonsensism for Religious Epistemology.Michael Bergmann - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 271-86.
    This paper argues that commonsense responses to radical skepticism can provide helpful lessons for religious epistemology—in particular, for thinking about how best to defend, and respond to, religious skepticism. Section 1 briefly summarizes of some of the main elements of the Reid-inspired epistemic-intuition-based commonsense response to radical skepticism developed in my 2021 book, "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition" and highlights the role (in our thinking about radical skepticism) of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings about epistemic value in much the same (...)
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  45.  25
    Replies to Nagel, Neta and Pritchard.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):725-737.
    I have long admired the work of Jennifer Nagel, Ram Neta, and Duncan Pritchard. Each of them is an extremely impressive philosopher from whom I’ve learned much over the years. To have the three of them participating in this symposium on my book, "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition", is a great honor as well as a delight. Many thanks to each of them for taking the time to read my book and to write up such excellent, challenging, and helpful comments. (...)
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  46.  42
    Concerns about Lycan's commonsensism.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):573-582.
    Despite wholeheartedly endorsing Lycan's commonsensism on display in On Evidence in Philosophy, this paper raises concerns about three views Lycan defends in that book. The first view is compatibilism about free will and determinism. The paper argues that Lycan's Moorean defense of compatibilism fails and that it is plausible for commonsensists to think that, in their dispute with incompatibilists, the burden of proof is on compatibilists. The second view is Lycan's Principle of Humility, offered as an account of the conditions (...)
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  47.  19
    Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):695-697.
    "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition" is about radical skepticism, which is extreme insofar as it involves serious doubts about large swaths of beliefs that almost everyone takes for granted. The book’s main task is to develop and defend an account of what, in my view, is the best response to radical skepticism—one that is inspired by the great 18th century commonsense philosopher, Thomas Reid, and that consciously relies heavily on epistemic intuitions, which are intuitions about the requirements for and the (...)
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  48. The God of Eth and the God of Earth.Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower - 2007 - Think 5 (14):33-38.
    Stephen Law has recently argued (Think, Vol 5, Issue 9), using a dialogue set on the fictional planet Eth, that traditional belief in God is 'silly'. Bergmann and Brower argue that theists on Earth should not be convinced.
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  49. Temporal Parts Unmotivated Michael С Rea.Darren Belousek Balashov, Michael Bergmann & J. B. Hud Hudson - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.
     
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  50. A Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 137-77.
    This paper presents a dilemma for internalism in epistemology—a view according to which a person’s belief is justified only if that person is aware (or potentially aware) of something that contributes to that belief’s justification. The dilemma says that either this required awareness involves conceiving of the object of awareness as contributing to the relevant belief’s justification or it does not. If it does, then internalism is saddled with vicious regress problems; if it does not, then internalism falls prey to (...)
     
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