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  1.  42
    Internal identity is (partly) dispositional identity.Michael Bruckner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.
    ‘Semantic externalism’ is the view that the thought and speech of internally identical subjects can have different contents, depending on facts about their environments. ‘Semantic internalism’ is the negation of this view. The details of these two views depend on the definition of ‘internal identity’. Katalin Farkas has shown that the traditional definition of internal identity as physical identity is too permissive: it misclassifies certain bodily states as internal. She has proposed defining internal identity as phenomenal identity instead. In the (...)
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  2.  7
    Biozentrismus.Michael Bruckner & Angela Kallhoff - 2018 - In Johann S. Ach & Dagmar Borchers (eds.), Handbuch Tierethik: Grundlagen – Kontexte – Perspektiven. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 161-166.
    Als biozentrisch werden Positionen der ökologischen Ethik bezeichnet, in denen für eine moralische Anerkennung aller Lebewesen gestritten wird. Mit seiner Lehre von der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben wird Albert Schweitzer als erster Repräsentant eines systematischen Biozentrismus in Anspruch genommen. Während sich bei Schweitzer vor allem Mahnungen zu einer Achtung der belebten Natur finden, hat sich in der ökologischen Ethik eine Debatte um den Biozentrismus als eine systematische Variante einer an den Interessen natürlicher Lebewesen orientierten Ethik entwickelt. In der Familie tierethischer (...)
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  3.  46
    Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View.Michael Bruckner - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-22.
    Pragmatic theories of epistemic normativity ground norms of belief formation in true belief’s instrumental value as a means to promoting our desires. I argue that advocates of this view face a dilemma: either they agree that epistemic norms prescribe truth-conducive procedures of belief formation, which is untenable against the backdrop of their theory, or they dismiss the truth-conduciveness criterion and thereby render themselves incapable of explaining an intuition that most of us share: in cases where false beliefs generate the same (...)
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