The recent publication of Heidegger’s 1936 lectures on Schelling’s essay on human freedom reveals yet another point of transition along the way from Being and Time to the later works on language and poetry. It brings to light an influence on Heidegger almost as weighty as his reading of Hölderlin and Nietzsche in that same decade, an influence hitherto only hinted at in published works. It now appears that Heidegger’s essays on identity, on grounding, on being, all bear the imprint (...) of a dialogue with Schelling, that he discovered in the latter thinker a valuable prototype of his notion of being. If the reader is not aware of the direction of Heidegger’s own thought, the 1936 lectures on their own reveal little of the dialogue. Schelling’s Investigations is a difficult and obscure work, and Heidegger confines himself to close textual work, with care and insight bringing even the most obscure passages out of allegory into lucid philosophical statement. The lectures are a triumph of pedagogy, the most careful attempt to date to read Schelling as an ontological thinker. Yet their smooth surface, scholarly poise, and objectivity leave hidden a question of real interest: Why should Schelling, commonly thought a weak link to Hegel or the first symptom of “existentialist” anti-Hegelian reaction, be of interest to Heidegger the philosopher? And why, in particular, should this most exotic of Schelling’s works, touched by the influence of theosophists like Boehme, be accepted by Heidegger as one of the crucial moments of the West’s historical thinking through of being? (shrink)
_Makes Schelling’s dialogue Bruno readily accessible to the English-language reader, with valuable commentary on the work itself, which details Schelling’s account of his differences from Fichte._.
The history of Hegel’s philosophical maturation has itself been a matter of tumult and sharp polemic since Rosenkranz laid down his pen. Less than two decades after Kimmerle’s revision of the chronology of the Jena writings, working with either scant or refractory materials, Henry Harris has managed to fashion an account of these vital years in Hegel’s development that is both historically convincing and philosophically articulate. He has, as he intended, here lashed together the crossbeams of history and philosophical consciousness (...) and proved himself capable of the next and final act, a full critical interpretation of the Phenomenology. (shrink)
As one of the bare handful of scholars working on Schelling, I should heartily like to accept Professor Harris's argument, for all these black cows hang around one's neck more heavily than did the albatross on the ancient mariner's. I find myself obliged, however, to closely test his argument. I regret that, viewed in the context of the whole of the Phenomenology's Preface, Harris's argument is not fully convincing. I shall argue that, since the Preface's plain intent is to contrast (...) the vitalism of a method of thought that is spirit's coming into its own with all styles of fixated propositional thinking, the “formalism” Hegel attacks is a loose aggregate of the philosophical styles of Fichte, Schelling, Reinhold and Bardili. Hegel is content to leave the label loose and unspecified and not to name names. It is not strictly fair to let the scope of the term resonate upon Schelling's “first scientific grasp of the idea”, at least not for an author who knew Schelling's work so well. But as Harris points out, it is not fair to Hegel for his public to read him with the sole, simplistic question of what positions he supports and what positions he rejects. (shrink)
The famed author of Systematic Theology, the vast synthesis of philosophy of culture and existentialist anthropology, of the history of religions and of the Christian Churches’ dogmatics, often acknowledged his debt to the philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling. With the translation of these his Schelling dissertations, his philosophy thesis at Breslau in 1910 and his theology thesis at Halle in 1912 respectively, the American scholar will be able to better assess Tillich’s rehabilitation of the post-Kantian idealists’ notion of ‘philosophical (...) religion.’ In these early works, one sees Tillich formulating notions that will remain central to his thought, viz. revelation as an historical process, mediated through mythology and the history of religions; being and revelation as a progression of stages or ‘potencies’; and the concept of human spirituality as a dialectic of freedom and being, in which freedom is meant to definitively win out over the unfreedom of nature and take command over being. (shrink)
The 1790’s were a time of upheaval, and every thinker in Europe was moved by the events of France, by the measure of fear or of promise they offered. In Germany the reaction to the political tumult was intense; the seeds of French radicalism found a ground nurtured by idealistic moral ideology, on the one hand, and actual political backwardness on the other. The cultural result of the completed Kantian philosophy was - as Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education testify - (...) a preoccupation with the notion of freedom and its paradoxical invisibility. If one could not touch upon freedom to violate it, neither could one grasp it in order to nurture, establish or institutionalize it. This proved a quandary not for theoretical or philosophic reason alone. History had taken up the Kantian problematic, and as the progress of the Revolution through ‘the Terror’ indicated, made its solution most urgent. (shrink)
The 1790’s were a time of upheaval, and every thinker in Europe was moved by the events of France, by the measure of fear or of promise they offered. In Germany the reaction to the political tumult was intense; the seeds of French radicalism found a ground nurtured by idealistic moral ideology, on the one hand, and actual political backwardness on the other. The cultural result of the completed Kantian philosophy was - as Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education testify - (...) a preoccupation with the notion of freedom and its paradoxical invisibility. If one could not touch upon freedom to violate it, neither could one grasp it in order to nurture, establish or institutionalize it. This proved a quandary not for theoretical or philosophic reason alone. History had taken up the Kantian problematic, and as the progress of the Revolution through ‘the Terror’ indicated, made its solution most urgent. (shrink)
Doctor Marti is to be commended for compressing such a rich variety of historical reminders and flashes of philosophical insight within the scope of his brief and suggestive paper. Among the important reminders culled from the tradition are, first of all, the pivotal importance of St. Augustine’s fusion of philosophical inwardness and Christian doctrine, then a correct and careful estimation of Kant’s location of the ethically active self within the noumenal order, and finally a lucid synthesis of Schelling’s insights into (...) the possibility of a philosophical religion. Marti understands that to repeat the tradition philosophically is to renew and restore it. But he also brings novel insights to bear upon the Kantian-Hegelian tradition, the most striking of which are the assertions that the work of ratiocination is guesswork, and that obligation becomes objective only in and with the act of taking responsibility. Each of these gems deserves to be cut, polished, and set within its own extended treatment. (shrink)
The tendency in recent Schelling studies has been toward massive, all-encompassing interpretations, e.g. Harold Holz’ Spekulation und Faktizität, J.-P. Marquet’s Liberté et existence, and M. Veto’s Le Fondement selon Schelling. Werner Marx, in the three essays collected here, chooses to focus on two important turning points in Schelling’s speculative career - the System of Transcendental Idealism of 1800 and the 1809 Essay on Human Freedom. The narrow focus is motivated not by historical interest alone, but by Marx’s assessment of the (...) situation of philosophy today. Says Marx. (shrink)
This volume contains the papers delivered at the International Schelling Conference in Zürich, 1979, on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of Schelling’s death. The theme of the conference, as enunciated by the editor, was “taking Schelling seriously.” It is Hasler’s view that our age, which has learned by experience that both idealism and materialism are dead-end world-views, has much to learn from the philosopher who early in his career insisted that the human is just as much a natural being (...) as a spiritual one, and who late in his career attempted to make human freedom the determinative power in history, both on a human and on a cosmic scale. Accordingly, the conference was organized around two themes, nature and history, and was divided into three colloquia, the first considering Schelling’s early philosophy of nature, its relation to empirical science, and its philosophical significance. The second colloquium considered the large theme of Schelling’s view of history, and discovered three crucial transitions in his career-long meditation on that theme, a turn from the interpretation of freedom as human reason to a scheme wherein freedom pertains to divine history, the territory of mythology and revelation, a turn from an idealistic approach to history towards a materialistic one, and a general transition from absolute philosophy to a philosophy of finitude. A third colloquium, devoted to Schelling’s political philosophy, confined itself to the period of his collaboration with Hegel in Jena. While Hasler acknowledges the superiority of Hegel’s political philosophy, especially in his concrete grasp of economics, jurisprudence and politics, he notes that both philosophers entered upon the path of philosophy through their respective attempts to criticize religion as an ideological power. I will mention here only those articles which state new views in Schelling scholarship or which would be particularly of interest to students of Hegel. (shrink)
This volume contains the papers delivered at the International Schelling Conference in Zürich, 1979, on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of Schelling’s death. The theme of the conference, as enunciated by the editor, was “taking Schelling seriously.” It is Hasler’s view that our age, which has learned by experience that both idealism and materialism are dead-end world-views, has much to learn from the philosopher who early in his career insisted that the human is just as much a natural being (...) as a spiritual one, and who late in his career attempted to make human freedom the determinative power in history, both on a human and on a cosmic scale. Accordingly, the conference was organized around two themes, nature and history, and was divided into three colloquia, the first considering Schelling’s early philosophy of nature, its relation to empirical science, and its philosophical significance. The second colloquium considered the large theme of Schelling’s view of history, and discovered three crucial transitions in his career-long meditation on that theme, a turn from the interpretation of freedom as human reason to a scheme wherein freedom pertains to divine history, the territory of mythology and revelation, a turn from an idealistic approach to history towards a materialistic one, and a general transition from absolute philosophy to a philosophy of finitude. A third colloquium, devoted to Schelling’s political philosophy, confined itself to the period of his collaboration with Hegel in Jena. While Hasler acknowledges the superiority of Hegel’s political philosophy, especially in his concrete grasp of economics, jurisprudence and politics, he notes that both philosophers entered upon the path of philosophy through their respective attempts to criticize religion as an ideological power. I will mention here only those articles which state new views in Schelling scholarship or which would be particularly of interest to students of Hegel. (shrink)
Schelling used the word ›construction‹ to indicate an account that located a phenomenon within the whole, and thus explained it from the whole. This paper considers the place of nature within Fichte’s original system - as expounded in the 1794 Foundations of the Whole Theory of Science and the 1795 Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Theory of Science - and raises the question of the explanatory function of nature within transcendental idealism. Nature is deduced, or ›constructed‹ in Schelling’s (...) term, in section four of the Foundations, the theoretical part of the Theory of Science. That deduction furnishes us the concept of nature as necessary and independent of us, but shows how it is permeated by lawfulness, which is the work of mind. Nature is the object correlated with intelligence, the I as dependent on the not-I. (shrink)
Schelling used the word ›construction‹ to indicate an account that located a phenomenon within the whole, and thus explained it from the whole. This paper considers the place of nature within Fichte’s original system - as expounded in the 1794 Foundations of the Whole Theory of Science and the 1795 Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Theory of Science - and raises the question of the explanatory function of nature within transcendental idealism. Nature is deduced, or ›constructed‹ in Schelling’s (...) term, in section four of the Foundations, the theoretical part of the Theory of Science. That deduction furnishes us the concept of nature as necessary and independent of us, but shows how it is permeated by lawfulness, which is the work of mind. Nature is the object correlated with intelligence, the I as dependent on the not-I. (shrink)
