Contents: PART I: AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE: QUESTIONS. Francis SPARSHOTT: The Aesthetics of Architecture and the Politics of Space. Arnold BERLEANT: Architecture and the Aesthetics of Continuity. Stephen DAVIES: Is Architecture Art? PART II: NATURE OF ARCHITECTURE. B.R. TILGHMAN: Architecture, Expression, and the Understanding of a Culture. David NOVITZ: Architectural Brilliance and the Constraints of Time. Michael H. MITIAS: Expression in Architecture. Ralf WEBER: The Myth of Meaningful Forms. Michael H. MITIAS: Is Meaning in Architecture a Myth? A Response to Ralf (...) Weber. PART III: AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE. Allen CARLSON: Existence, Location, and Function: The Appreciation of Architecture. Martin DONOUGHO: Spaced Out or Folded In? Trends in Architectural Choreography. Tom LEDDY: Dialogical Architecture. Roy T. DECKER: Tactility and Imagination: Considerations of Aesthetic Experience in Architecture. Robert GINSBERG: Aesthetics in Hiroshima. The Architecture of Remembrance. (shrink)
Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, (...) modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing. (shrink)
This book is an in-depth discussion that seeks to answer two main questions: what is the nature of romantic love? What is the meaning of human life? The author argues that the longing for romantic love is part of the quest for meaningful life and human fulfillment.
Anatomy of an Argument Michael H. Mitias. FOUR LOVE AS THE BASIS OF THE FAMILY Let us grant, for the sake of argument, my critic would object, that Hegel has made a distinction between a universal or natural law and a human law, ...
The majority of aestheticians have focused their attention during the past three decades on the identity, or essential nature, of art: can 'art' be defined? What makes an object a work of art? Under what conditions can we characterize in a classificatory sense an object as an art work? The debate, and at times controversy, over these questions proved to be constructive, intellectually stimulating, and in many cases suggestive of new ideas. I hope this debate continues in its momentum and (...) creative outcome. The time is, however, ripe to direct our attention to another important, yet neglected, concept - viz. , 'aesthetic experience' - which occupies a prominent place in the philosohpy of art. We do not only create art; we also enjoy, i. e. , experience, and evaluate it. How can we theorize about the nature of art in general and the art work in particular, and about what makes an object a good work of art, if we do not experience it? For example, how can we identify an object as an art work and distinguish it from other types of objects unless we first perceive it, that is in a critical, educated manner? Again, how can we judge a work as good, elegant, melodramatic, or beautiful unless we first perceive it and recognize its artistic aspect? It seems to me that experiencing art works is a necessary condition for any reasonable theory on the nature of art and artistic criticism. (shrink)
Precision, lucidity, richness of insight, and critical, objective judgment are, I think, some of the essential features of good philosophical thought. This book exemplifies, to a good extent, these features. In it the author tries to achieve two main goals: first, to distinguish what still “lives” in Croce’s philosophy “from what may be advantageously discarded, that is, the idealistic implications that he drew from his tenet that historical knowledge is self-knowledge.” Here Moss argues that “Croce’s idealist epistemological assumptions along with (...) the coherence theory of truth that he derived from them, are not viable. Nevertheless his categorical conception of error provides a genuine contribution to contemporary philosophical thought.” Second, “Croce’s view that philosophy amounted to methodology and that the philosopher’s task was to delineate “categories of the real” is indeed consistent with the historical nature of reality.”. (shrink)
Oleg Grabar has argued that there was not a system of visual symbols in Islamic culture; consequently it is difflcult to hold that an Islamic architecture exists; that is, if we were to stand before a mosque and try to experience it aesthetically or see what kind of building it is we would not be able to say that it is a mosque. In this paper we argue against this proposition. We, first, present a brief analysis of Grabar's view. Second, (...) we critically evaluate this view. Third, we explicate how the mosque as an architectural type embodies uniquely Islamic symbols. We shall illustrate this point by an analysis of one basic Islamic symbol: the Mihrab. The thesis we defend is that there are basic Islamic symbols and that these symbols inhere in the mosque. It is this fact that lends credibility to the claim that an Islamic architecture exists. /// Oleg Grabar defendeu a tese de que não existe um sistema de símbolos visuais na cultura islâmica; consequentemente, é difícil defender a existência de uma arquitectura islâmica; ou seja, se estivéssemos diante de uma mesquita e tentássemos fazer uma experiência estética da mesma ou analisar que tipo de edifício se trata, não seríamos capazes de dizer que se trata de uma mesquita. No presente artigo, os autores argumentam contra esta proposição. Em primeiro lugar, os autores começam por apresentar uma breve análise do ponto de vista de Grabar. Em segundo lugar, avaliam criticamente esta posição. Em terceiro lugar tentam explicar até que ponto a mesquita como tipo arquitectónico apenas incorpora símbolos islâmicos. Os autores exemplificam este ponto mediante a análise de um dos símbolos básicos do Islamismo: o Mihrab. O artigo defende, portanto, a tese de que existem símbolos islâmicos básicos e de que estes símbolos estão presentes na mesquita. Ora é precisamente este facto que dá credibilidade à afirmação de que existe uma arquitectura islâmica propriamente dita. (shrink)
In this article I offer an account of what it means for Universalism to be a metaphilosophy. I first argue that traditional philosophical systems and views suffer from two main defects. First, they are closed, in the sense that they have made their final judgment on what the world is like. Second, they are mostly Eurocentric; regardless of their attempt to be objective and universalist in their orientation, they express the European values, beliefs, and world views. As a metaphilosophy, Universalism (...) is an open concept. It recognizes that our knowledge of the world is an on-going process of discovery. It does not attempt to synthesize or reject the variety of religious, ideological, and philosophical views and approaches; on the contrary, it seeks to provide a universal conceptual framework within which these views and approaches can thrive and dialogue with each other. The structure of this framework is made up of the universal features of nature and human nature. Accordingly the universal is not an ideal or natural or metaphysical essence of some kind. The universal is made, and it is made collectively by scholars from the different academic disciplines. This is why Universalism aspires to articulate the most comprehensive vision of the world. In this attempt it tries to grasp the highest fruits of all the achievements of the human spirit in religion, ideology, philosophy, and culture. I also discuss two more important features of Universalism as a metaphilosophy: co-creation and metanoia. (shrink)
This insightful and meticulous book is composed of two major parts. In the first part Brumbaugh argues that the classical concepts of space, time, and causality underlie contemporary understanding of the meaning and aims of education. But these concepts, like the Cartesian concept of “insular space,” are one-sided. Human beings are viewed as self-enclosed entities, as external to each other. Though rejected nowadays, this idea shapes educational thinking. We still consider the student as a kind of mental box which needs (...) to be filled. Education is a process of filling this box with ideas, images, and feelings. But Brumbaugh wonders if the growing student is a self-enclosed entity. How are we to explain social life if society is a mere conglomeration of discrete individuals? (shrink)
This essay is an attempt to stress the need to understand and evaluate the human issues or values, which are implicit in business, on the one hand, and which arise in the course of business activity, on the other: e.g., freedom, responsibility, and human well-being. Business is a social institution; as such, it affects and is affected by our values as a cultured society.
We are told by its author that Art and the Absolute is a study of Hegel’s Aesthetics, but it is not; it is mainly an attempt to elucidate certain principles and categories in Hegel’s aesthetic theory and show their relevance and importance—or more concretely, the relevance and importance of Hegel’s aesthetic insight—in analyzing some of the central questions and issues in contemporary philosophy of art.
This paper is a critical analysis of the conditions under which a decent world order is possible, an order in which the different peoples of the world can thrive under the conditions of peace, cooperation, freedom, justice, and prosperity. This analysis is done from the standpoint of Janusz Kuczyński’s philosophy of universalism as a metaphilosophy. More than any other in the contemporary period, this philosophy has advanced a focused, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of these conditions on the basis of a (...) universal vision of nature, human nature, and the meaning of human life and destiny. The paper is composed of three parts. The first part is devoted to a short overview of activism in the history of philosophy. The second part is devoted to an analysis of the main elements of universalism as a metaphilosophy, especially the theoretical conditions of establishing a decent world order. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the practical steps that should be taken to establish a decent world order. (shrink)
The proposition I elucidates and defend in this paper is that the Transcendent can be an object of genuine knowledge and that the knowledge the philosophical mystic claims of it is symbolic in nature. In my endeavor to achieve this aim I rely on Małgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth as a model of explanation. I am inclined to think that, as a model of explanation, this conception sheds ample light on the possibility of having a cognitive experience of the (...) Transcendent. The paper is composed of four parts. The first part raises the question of the Transcendent as an object of knowledge. The second part advances a brief analysis of the main elements of Czarnozka’s conception of symbolic truth with special emphasis on her view of human nature. The third part explicates the sense in which the conception of symbolic truth functions as a model of explanation. The fourth part analyzes the conditions under which the Transcendent can be an object of knowledge. (shrink)
Some philosophers and theologians have argued that God-centeredness cannot be a condition of inter-religious dialogue for at least four reasons. First, it is an existential fact that all religions tend to view the truth of their beliefs and values as absolute. Second, all religions are embedded in radically different cultural contexts; this kind of difference undercuts the possibility of inter-religious dialogue. Third, grounding all the religions in a transcendent reality relativizes their beliefs and values. Moreover, people worship “their” God, not (...) a neutral reality. Fourth, it is difficult to ground all the religions in a transcendent, neutral realty. This paper critically evaluates these arguments and defends the proposition that the mystical experience provides a justifiable basis for the claim that the transcendent is not only a wealth of being but also an infinite wealth of being and that the same transcendent is “revealed” in the mystical experience which underlies all the major religions. The transcendent is the common ground on which all the religions stand in inter-religious dialogue qua religions. (shrink)
In this paper the author explores the conditions under which inter-religious dialogue can be a transformative process not only of the interlocutor’s understanding of the beliefs and values of the religiously different other but also her attitude toward him or her. The proposition elucidated and defended is that, to be transformative, the dialogue should be God-centered, objective, empathic, and it should be grounded in the values of equality, respect, and toleration. The paper is composed of two parts. The first is (...) devoted to an analysis of the concept of dialogue in general and of inter-religious dialogue in particular: What are the structural elements of dialogue between individuals and religious communities? The second part is devoted to an analysis of the conditions under which inter-religious dialogue can be a transformative process. The focus in this analysis is on the following question: What does it take for a person who has grown up in a certain religion, who understands herself and in fact lives from the standpoint that religion, to discern the religious truth proclaimed by another religion, to comprehend it, appreciate it, assent to it, and incorporate it in the structure of her mind or worldview? We may construct a formidable strategy, one that wins the blessing of reason, still, the question remains: How can a community, which tends to be exclusivist in its religious orientation, change its understanding of God or attitude toward the religious different other? (shrink)
A large number of scholars have argued that a) Islamic architecture is hidden, in the sense that its interior is not articulated on the basis of its exterior; b) the form of Islamic buildings neither expresses nor embodies its function; and c) Islamic architecture is not tectonic or structural, but iconic in character. In this paper, we use Ernst Grube’s analysis of these three claims and focus our attention on the design of the congregational mosques. This paper presents informed arguments (...) against these claims. We begin the discussion with a clarification of the meaning of ‘form follows function’. A clear understanding of the relationship between these two concepts is indispensable for evaluating the claims that Grube makes in his analyses. Then we argue that the form of the congregational mosque embodies its function in a significant manner. Finally, the paper explains in some detail how the function of a mosque is the basis on which its formal structure is designed. The proposition that we defend in this paper is that Islamic architecture exists and expresses the spirit of Islamic culture. (shrink)