ABSTRACTThis article begins with a detailed analysis of Althusser's criticism of Feuerbach as an “ideologue” of the body. Althusser concentrates on the mirror structure of the subject and the object and on empiricism, which represents the ideological discourse. I argue that Althusser overlooked Feuerbach's decisive revelations: a bodily materiality which corresponds to Adorno's non-identical inner nature, and the ontological condensation of the human being; a process which generates the “living reality” of the body. I show Feuerbach's breakthrough reinterpretation of the (...) Ground in Schelling's concept of the object that was identified with nature and represents the non-identical limitation of the subject. This limitation, which is connected to death, creates the difference between the “living reality” of the body and bodily materiality as subjected by ideological discourses. I conclude that Feuerbach revealed a non-identical materiality of the body that evades both Althusserian interpellations and Foucauldian regulative practices. (shrink)

I propose to depict the relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and mathematics as a three-layered model. Philosophy as metaontology creates a metastructure, mathematics as ontology in the form of a condition of philosophy constitutes its situation, and mathematics as a multiple universe of all given axioms, theorems, techniques, interpretations, and systems is an inconsistent multiplicity. So, we can interpret the relationship between philosophy and mathematics as the one between a metastructure and a situation. By using Easton’s theorem, we come to realise (...) that philosophical concepts in the metastructure “quantitatively” exceed the elements that belong to mathematics as ontology. Therefore, philosophy as metaontology shows the limits of mathematics as ontology. (shrink)