103 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Michael Huemer (University of Colorado, Boulder)
  1. Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, Part 1.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 1 discusses the suffering caused by factory farming, and how one's intelligence affects the badness of suffering.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, Part 2.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 2 discusses miscellaneous defenses of meat-eating. These include the claim that the consumer is not responsible for wrongs committed by farm workers, that a single individual cannot have any effect on the meat industry, that farm animals are better off living on factory farms than never existing at (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, Part 3.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 3 discusses the idea that creatures have different degrees of consciousness, the sense that certain animal welfare positions "sound crazy", and the role of empathy in moral judgment.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, Part 4.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    A four-part series of dialogues between two philosophy students, M and V. The question: is it wrong to eat meat? M and V review the standard arguments plus a few new ones. Part 4 discusses what products one should renounce, the value of abstract theory, why people who accept the arguments often fail to change their behavior, and how vegans should react to non-vegans.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. The Right to Move Versus the Right to Exclude: A Principled Defense of Open Borders.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   79 citations  
  8. Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   81 citations  
  9. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external..
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   97 citations  
  10. In Praise of the Lawless Jury.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    Jury nullification is justified by the principle that individuals are prima facie ethically obligated to avoid causing unjust harms. Safeguarding justice against unjust laws and punishments of the government is the central function of the jury.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism.Michael Huemer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Is Wealth Redistribution a Rights Violation?Michael Huemer - manuscript
    I argue that taxation for redistributive purposes is a property rights violation, responding to arguments (due to Nagel, Murphy, Sunstein, and Holmes) claiming that individuals lack ownership of their pretax incomes.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Duty to Disregard the Law.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    In the practice of jury nullification, a jury votes to acquit a defendant in disregard of the factual evidence, on the grounds that a conviction would result in injustice, either because the law itself is unjust or because its application in the particular case would be unjust. The practice is widely condemned by courts, which strenuously attempt to prevent it. Nevertheless, the arguments against jury nullification are surprisingly weak. I argue that, pursuant to the general ethical duty to avoid causing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Devil’s Advocates: On the Ethics of Unjust Legal Advocacy.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    I argue that it is morally wrong for a lawyer to pursue a legal outcome that he knows to be unjust, such as the acquittal of a guilty client or the triumph of the wrong side in a lawsuit.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
    Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  16. Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  17. When is Parsimony a Virtue?Michael Huemer - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
    Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  18. Epistemic Possibility.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):119-142.
    Seven proposed accounts of epistemic possibility are criticized, and a new account is proposed, making use of the notion of having justification for dismissing a proposition. The new account explains intuitions about otherwise puzzling cases, upholds plausible general principles about epistemic possibility, and explains the practical import of epistemic modality judgements. It is suggested that judgements about epistemic possibility function to assess which propositions are worthy of further inquiry.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  19. Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):741-748.
  20.  78
    Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles.Michael Huemer - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 328.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  21.  50
    A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skeptics: The Empirical Case for Realism.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1983-2010.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. In Defence of Repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.
    I defend the 'Repugnant' Conclusion that for any possible population of happy people, a population containing a sufficient number of people with lives barely worth living would be better. Four lines of argument converge on this conclusion, and the conclusion has a simple, natural theoretical explanation. The opposition to the Repugnant Conclusion rests on a bare appeal to intuition. This intuition is open to charges of being influenced by multiple distorting factors. Several theories of population ethics have been devised to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  23. The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.
    Moore’s paradox supports the principle of “metacoherence”, i.e., that if one categorically believes that P, one is committed to accepting that one knows that P. The principle raises puzzles about how, when one has justification for P, one also has justification for the claim that one knows P. I reject a skeptical answer as well as a bootstrapping answer, and I suggest that we typically have independent justification for the claim that we know P.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  24. Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous.Michael Huemer & Ben Kovitz - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):556–565.
    We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  25. Does Probability Theory Refute Coherentism?Michael Huemer - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):35-54.
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on the coherence theory of justification, allegedly showing that coherence cannot produce justification for beliefs in the absence of foundational justification, and that there can be no measure of coherence on which coherence is generally truth-conducive. I argue that the coherentist can reject some of the assumptions on which these theorems depend. Coherence can then be held to produce justification on its own, and truth-conducive measures of coherence can be constructed.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  26.  90
    Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
    A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  27. Serious Theories and Skeptical Theories: Why You Are Probably Not a Brain in a Vat.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1031-1052.
    Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Is There a Right to Immigrate?Michael Huemer - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (3):429-461.
    Immigration restrictions violate the prima facie right of potential immigrants not to be subject to harmful coercion. This prima facie right is not neutralized or outweighed by the economic, fiscal, or cultural effects of immigration, nor by the state’s special duties to its own citizens, or to its poorest citizens. Nor does the state have a right to control citizenship conditions in the same way that private clubs may control their membership conditions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  29.  68
    Mental Files and Belief: A Cognitive Theory of How Children Represent Belief and its Intensionality.Josef Perner, Michael Huemer & Brian Leahy - 2015 - Cognition 145:77-88.
    We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from box 1, the child (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30.  79
    Weak Bayesian Coherentism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):337-346.
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  31. The Problem of Memory Knowledge.Michael Huemer - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):346–357.
    both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories. This view captures our intuitions about justification in several cases, while none of the alternative views can.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  32. Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):397-413.
    The brain-in-a-vat argument for skepticism is best formulated, not using the closure principle, but using the “Preference Principle,” which states that in order to be justified in believing H on the basis of E, one must have grounds for preferring H over each alternative explanation of E. When the argument is formulated this way, Dretske’s and Klein’s responses to it fail. However, the strengthened argument can be refuted using a direct realist account of perception. For the direct realist, refuting the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  33. Probability and Coherence Justification.Michael Huemer - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):463-472.
    In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge , Laurence BonJour argues that coherence among a set of empirical beliefs can provide justification for those beliefs, in the sense of rendering them likely to be true. He also repudiates all forms of foundationalism for empirical beliefs, including what he calls "weak foundationalism" (the weakest form of foundationalism he can find). In the following, I will argue that coherence cannot provide any justification for our beliefs in the manner BonJour suggests unless some form (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  34. Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  35.  28
    Confessions of a Utopophobe.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Social Philosophy and Policy 33 (1-2):214-234.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal Conservatism Phenomenal Conservatism is a theory in epistemology that seeks, roughly, to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds a belief. The theory fits with an internalistic form of foundationalism—that is, the view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially (not on the basis of other beliefs), and that […].
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
    Peter van Inwagen ’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that....” I show that, given van Inwagen ’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  38.  69
    Logical Properties of Warrant.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171-182.
    Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39.  31
    Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms.Michael Huemer - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
    Agent-centered epistemic norms direct thinkers to attach different significance to their own epistemically relevant states than they attach to the similar states of others. Thus, if S and T both know, for certain, that S has the intuition that P, this might justify S in believing that P, yet fail to justify T in believing that P. I defend agent-centeredness and explain how an agent-centered theory can accommodate intuitions that seem to favor agent-neutrality.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  40. An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):259-279.
    The essay argues that while there is no general agreement on whether moral realism is true, there is general agreement on at least some of the moral obligations that we have if moral realism is true. Given that moral realism might be true, and given that we know some of the things we ought to do if it is true, we have a reason to do those things. Furthermore, this reason is itself an objective moral reason. Thus, if moral realism (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe.Michael Huemer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
    John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Apology of a Modest Intuitionist. [REVIEW]Michael Huemer - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):222-236.
  43.  61
    A Defense of the Given.Michael Huemer & Evan Fales - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):128.
  44.  81
    Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Ethics 123 (2):318-345.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. America's Unjust Drug War.Michael Huemer - 2004 - In Bill Masters (ed.), The New Prohibition. Accurate Press.
    Should the recreational use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and LSD, be prohibited by law? Prohibitionists answer yes. They usually argue that drug use is extremely harmful both to drug users and to society in general, and possibly even immoral, and they believe that these facts provide sufficient reasons for prohibition. Legalizers answer no. They usually give one or more of three arguments: First, some argue that drug use is not as harmful as prohibitionists believe, and even that (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Why People Are Irrational About Politics.Michael Huemer - manuscript
    I look for explanations for the phenomenon of widespread, strong, and persistent disagreements about political issues. The best explanation is provided by the hypothesis that most people are irrational about politics and not, for example, that political issues are particularly difficult or that we lack sufficient evidence for resolving them. I discuss how this irrationality works and why people are especially irrational about politics.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Free Will and Determinism in the World of Minority Report.Michael Huemer - 2009 - In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 103.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. The Problem of Defeasible Justification.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397.
    The problem of induction and the problem of Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism have much in common. Both are instances of a general problem of defeasible justification . I use the term "defeasible justification" to refer to a relation between a piece of evidence.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49. The Drug Laws Don't Work.Michael Huemer - 2008 - The Philosophers' Magazine (41):71-75.
    Illegal drugs are not inherently unclean, any more than alcohol, tobacco, or canola oil. All of these are simply chemicals that people choose to ingest for enjoyment, and that can harm our health if used to excess. Most of the sordid associations we have with illegal drugs are actually the product of the drug laws: it is because of the laws that drugs are sold on the black market, that Latin American crime bosses are made rich, that government officials are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Is There a Right to Own a Gun?Michael Huemer - 2003 - Social Theory and Practice 29 (2):297-324.
    Individuals have a prima facie right to own firearms. This right is significant in view both of the role that such ownership plays in the lives of firearms enthusiasts and of the self-defense value of firearms. Nor is this right overridden by the social harms of private gun ownership. These harms have been greatly exaggerated and are probably considerably smaller than the benefits of private gun ownership. And I argue that the harms would have to be at least several times (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 103