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Michael J. Cholbi [3]Michael John Cholbi [1]
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Profile: Michael Cholbi (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)
  1.  37
    Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham.Michael J. Cholbi - 2003 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
    Ockham appeared to maintain that God necessarily knows all true propositions, including future contingent propositions, despite the fact that such propositions have determinate truth values. While some commentators believe that Ockham’s attempt to reconcile divine omniscience with the contingency of true future propositions amounts to little more than a simple-minded assertion of Ockham’s Christian faith, I argue that Ockham’s position is more sophisticated than this and rests on attributing to God a dual knowledge property: God not only knows every true (...)
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  2.  16
    Dialectical Refutation as a Paradigm of Socratic Punishment.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:371-379.
    Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance —is in fact (...)
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  3. Dialectical Refutation as a Paradigm of Socratic Punishment.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:371-379.
    Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance—is in fact a (...)
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