Abstract Since their inception, distributional models of semantics have been criticized as inadequate cognitive theories of human semantic learning and representation. A principal challenge is that the representations derived by distributional models are purely symbolic and are not grounded in perception and action; this challenge has led many to favor feature-based models of semantic representation. We argue that the amount of perceptual and other semantic information that can be learned from purely distributional statistics has been underappreciated. We compare the representations (...) of three feature-based and nine distributional models using a semantic clustering task. Several distributional models demonstrated semantic clustering comparable with clustering-based on feature-based representations. Furthermore, when trained on child-directed speech, the same distributional models perform as well as sensorimotor-based feature representations of children’s lexical semantic knowledge. These results suggest that, to a large extent, information relevant for extracting semantic categories is redundantly coded in perceptual and linguistic experience. Detailed analyses of the semantic clusters of the feature-based and distributional models also reveal that the models make use of complementary cues to semantic organization from the two data streams. Rather than conceptualizing feature-based and distributional models as competing theories, we argue that future focus should be on understanding the cognitive mechanisms humans use to integrate the two sources. (shrink)
The literature contains a disconnect between accounts of how humans learn lexical semantic representations for words. Theories generally propose that lexical semantics are learned either through perceptual experience or through exposure to regularities in language. We propose here a model to integrate these two information sources. Specifically, the model uses the global structure of memory to exploit the redundancy between language and perception in order to generate inferred perceptual representations for words with which the model has no perceptual experience. We (...) test the model on a variety of different datasets from grounded cognition experiments and demonstrate that this diverse set of results can be explained as perceptual simulation (cf. Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003) within a global memory model. (shrink)
When searching for concepts in memory—as in the verbal fluency task of naming all the animals one can think of—people appear to explore internal mental representations in much the same way that animals forage in physical space: searching locally within patches of information before transitioning globally between patches. However, the definition of the patches being searched in mental space is not well specified. Do we search by activating explicit predefined categories and recall items from within that category, or do we (...) activate and recall a connected sequence of individual items without using categorical information, with each item recalled leading to the retrieval of an associated item in a stream, or both? Using semantic representations in a search of associative memory framework and data from the animal fluency task, we tested competing hypotheses based on associative and categorical search models. Associative, but not categorical, patch transitions took longer to make than position-matched productions, suggesting that categorical transitions were not true transitions. There was also clear evidence of associative search even within categorical patch boundaries. Furthermore, most individuals' behavior was best explained by an associative search model without the addition of categorical information. Thus, our results support a search process that does not use categorical information, but for which patch boundaries shift with each recall and local search is well described by a random walk in semantic space, with switches to new regions of the semantic space when the current region is depleted. (shrink)
The words in children's language learning environments are strongly predictive of cognitive development and school achievement. But how do we measure language environments and do so at the scale of the many words that children hear day in, day out? The quantity and quality of words in a child's input are typically measured in terms of total amount of talk and the lexical diversity in that talk. There are disagreements in the literature whether amount or diversity is the more critical (...) measure of the input. Here we analyze the properties of a large corpus of speech to children and simulate learning environments that differ in amount of talk per unit time, lexical diversity, and the contexts of talk. The central conclusion is that what researchers need to theoretically understand, measure, and change is not the total amount of words, or the diversity of words, but the function that relates total words to the diversity of words, and how that function changes across different contexts of talk. (shrink)
We compared the ability of three different contextual models of lexical semantic memory and of a simple associative model to predict the properties of semantic networks derived from word association norms. None of the semantic models were able to accurately predict all of the network properties. All three contextual models over-predicted clustering in the norms, whereas the associative model under-predicted clustering. Only a hybrid model that assumed that some of the responses were based on a contextual model and others on (...) an associative network successfully predicted all of the network properties and predicted a word's top five associates as well as or better than the better of the two constituent models. The results suggest that participants switch between a contextual representation and an associative network when generating free associations. We discuss the role that each of these representations may play in lexical semantic memory. Concordant with recent multicomponent theories of semantic memory, the associative network may encode coordinate relations between concepts, and contextual representations may be used to process information about more abstract concepts. (shrink)
Mircea Eliade, the renowned scholar of Romanian origin, wrote that Lucian Blaga was the greatest Romanian philosopher of all time. Blaga was intensely interested in both culture and religion as areas of philosophical investigation. Blaga’s philosophy proposes a metaphysics that explains the origin of culture and its unrivaled significance to humanity. His philosophy also endeavors to explicate the relationship between culture and religion. Blaga finds that religion is a cultural product, but does not view this as a detriment to religion. (...) On the contrary, according to Blaga, it is the very fact that religion is an expression of cultural creativity that gives religion its beauty. This article will introduce Blaga’s philosophy of culture and his philosophy of religion, explain the relationship between them, and show that Blaga accorded high honor to both. (shrink)
In his article, «In Defense of Reason in Religion,» Jones reacts to current trends to minimize the role of reason in religion by attempting to show that if religionists desire their religious beliefs to correspond to knowledge, the noetic tool most likely to achieve this goal is reason. This he does by reviewing the leading epistemological ap- proaches to metaphysical knowledge, and showing that each relies to some extent on reason. He further argues that all of them must utilize reason (...) if they wish to at- tempt to critically verify their findings. Then he argues that religious knowledge is a type of metaphysical knowl- edge. He shows that the leading approaches to obtaining religious knowledge parallel the various approaches to metaphysical knowledge, and have similar reliance on reason. Even in the case of supernatural revelation, rea- son is used in identifying and interpreting the revelation. Therefore, Jones concludes, «reason is the primary mechanism for obtaining religious knowledge.». (shrink)
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Lucian Blaga, probably the greatest Romanian philosopher to date, is the author of a philosophy of culture that is creative, broad, and integrated into a comprehensive philosophical system. However, Blaga''s philosophy of culture has not received the recognition that might be expected. One of the reasons for this is that it is widely perceived as being a mere adoption or adaptation of Oswald Spengler''s philosophy of culture. This article endeavors to restore Blaga''s philosophy to its rightful place by showing that (...) Blaga''s philosophy of culture is more than a mere adaptation of Spengler''s philosophy. This it does by detailing 5 types of differences between Spengler''s and Blaga''s philosophies of culture: 1. Differences of style, method, and detail, 2. Differences of issues addressed, 3. Differences of conclusions, 4. Systematic differences, and 5. Systemic differences. The article concludes that, while Spengler and Blaga can be considered to be in the same school of thought, Blaga''s philosophy is more than a mere adaptation of Spenglers philosophy: it is a new, deeper, more sophisticated, more complete, more systematic and more lasting philosophy of culture. (shrink)
Culture affects how we interpret our experiences and the way we construct our world. It also affects our ability to communicate with one another. The late Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga developed a systematic philosophy of culture that explores and explains how culture challenges and at the same time facilitates interideological communication. This article introduces and explains these aspects of Blaga's philosophy and then applies them to the issue of interreligious dialogue. It concludes that Blaga's philosophy of culture promotes a high (...) regard for culture and cultural distinctness and at the same time vindicates, enables, and promotes efforts at interreligious understanding. (shrink)
Carl E. Braaten, No Other Gospel! Christianity among the World's Religions Minneapolis, USA: Fortress Press, 1992. Paperback: 146 pp. including endnotes and index.
The question of the morality of abortion has long been the subject of intense, sometimes acrimonious debate. Even people within the same religious or philosophical tradition often disagree on the issue. For example, there are Christians who are “pro- choice” and there are Christians who are “pro-life.” Both sides marshal biblical, theological, and philosophical arguments in support of their positions. The substance of the abortion debate seems to reduce to one tricky question: when does personhood begin? Christian experts in various (...) fields, such as theology, biblical studies, ethics, and philosophy, have protracted disagreements over this question. In this article we will apply insights from the current literature on epistemic peer disagreement to the abortion issue. We will assume that there is only one correct answer to the abortion question. However, after making a crucial distinction between rationality as understood by internalists versus externalists, we will argue that there is more than one rational answer to the abortion question, since there is more than one rational way to weight evidence. We will conclude that, in a case of disagreement between two Christians who are epistemic peers with regards to the morality of abortion, both parties can be rational in adhering to their respective positions, but that this does not entail or even support ethical relativism. (shrink)
We’ve all heard the familiar saying, “ignorance is bliss.” It may also be true that “ignorance is intolerant.” But it seems to be at least sometimes true that intolerance is produced by something else: overconfidence in the truthfulness of one’s own opinions. Awareness of and avoidance of such overconfidence may be a path towards tolerating those with whom one disagrees. And this could be true in religion as well as in other areas of belief. In his 2005 article “On Religious (...) Diversity and Tolerance,” Philip L. Quinn argues that awareness of religious diversity, coupled with various other considerations, leads to a degree of modesty about the truth claims of one’s religion, and that such modesty leads to tolerance of other religions. However, in his 2007 paper “Is Uncertainty a Sound Foundation for Religious Tolerance,” William Lane Craig takes issue with Quinn’s position, arguing that Quinn’s “radical skepticism” about religious beliefs is not warranted and that “doubt” is not a sound foundation for tolerance. In this paper I contend that cognitive humility is warranted, that it is not a form of skepticism, that it does not entail doubt, and that it may contribute significantly to religious tolerance. I defend Quinn’s thesis by offering a version that is based on certain epistemic considerations that help the reader to see Quinn’s argument in a new and strengthened light. I then argue that Quinn’s approach to tolerance has at least one significant advantage over the approach proposed by Craig: acceptability to all religious traditions. (shrink)
In this essay, the author, an evangelical Christian, seeks to analyze the arguments for and against evangelical participation in interreligious dialogue. He finds that, while the arguments against evangelical participation in dialogue suggest some important boundaries for dialogue, they do not completely militate against it. Conversely, the arguments for dialogue form a persuasive case for evangelical participation.
"Man does not live by bread alone ... " Human life embraces more than just 'living' (material survival); the human soul thrives on many ambiguous metaphysical elements. One of these elements is beauty. The question motivating this article is the ubiquitous 'why'; why do people find beauty in various elements of their environment? Put another way, what is it that enables one to appreciate beauty? The thesis of this article is that a person's ability to appreciate beauty is a result (...) of being created in the image of God. (shrink)
In this article Christian ethicist Michael S. Jones introduces the work of Princeton University ethicist Thomas Pogge on the areas of global poverty and global justice. He then applies Pogge’s ideas to an ethical issue of continuing importance: racism. He discusses the history of racism in the United States and Romania, pointing out numerous parallels both historical and contemporary. He discusses the appropriate attitude for Christians to adopt on the issue, arguing that while Christian sources are not univocal on the (...) subject, there is an egalitarianism at the heart of Christianity that rules out racism as a Christian attitude. He concludes that Christians can contribute significantly to overcoming racism in the U.S. and Romania by addressing the underlying attitudinal problem from the podium and the pulpit, with the pen, and through their daily interactions with each other. (shrink)
