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Michael Pitman
University of the Witwatersrand
  1.  27
    Freedom, Indeterminism and Imagination.Michael M. Pitman - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):369-383.
    A suspicion about libertarian free will is that freedom is undermined, rather than supported, by the positing of indeterminism within processes of volition. In response, this paper presents a way in which moments of indeterminism can enhance freedom, by showing how such moments can genuinely belong to the agent. The key idea is that of putting the imagination to work in the service of free agency. The suggestion is that indeterministic processes of imaginative generativity can both belong to an agent, (...)
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  2.  32
    Mental States, Processes, and Conscious Intent in Libet's Experiments.Michael M. Pitman - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):71-89.
    The meaning and significance of Benjamin Libet’s studies on the timing of conscious will have been widely discussed, especially by those wishing to draw sceptical conclusions about conscious agency and free will. However, certain important correctives for thinking about mental states and processes undermine the apparent simplicity and logic of Libet’s data. The appropriateness, relevance and ecological validity of Libet’s methods are further undermined by considerations of how we ought to characterise intentional actions, conscious intention, and what it means to (...)
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  3.  99
    Eliminative Materialism and the Integrity of Science.Michael M. Pitman - 2003 - South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.
    Eliminative Materialism holds that propositional attitude folk psychology is a radically false theory of human, cognition, communication and behaviour. The paper reviews the argument that Eliminative Materialism is self-defeating. Although the argument is unsuccessful, it is argued that Eliminative Materialism ought to be considered epistemically self-undermining. Eliminative Materialism's truth would undermine the epistemic warrant of the theories (from cognitive neuroscience) typically taken as motivating the eliminativist thesis. Eliminative materialism fails to recognise that, in the psychological sciences, the mind is both (...)
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