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Michael McKenna [70]Michael S. McKenna [15]Michael Stuart Mckenna [1]
  1.  79
    Conversation & Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P.F. Strawson.
  2. Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
    In this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning--agent meaning--just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is (...)
     
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  3. A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
  4. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
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  5.  17
    John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza: Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):93-100.
  6. Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.
    Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does (...)
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  7. Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):169-192.
  8. Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  9.  27
    The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255.
    A familiar claim in the free will debate is that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In this paper, I seek a rationale for this claim, offer an explanation of basic desert, and then argue that the free will debate can persist even when divorced from basic desert.
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  10. Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
    In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free (...)
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  11.  73
    Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):299 - 314.
  12.  51
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Michael McKenna - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):415.
    This is an excellent book. It is innovative in scope and carefully argued throughout. The book recasts the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists as a normative debate about the conditions under which it is fair to hold a person morally responsible. Wallace’s strategy is to explain moral agency by examining the stance of holding morally responsible. On Wallace’s account, moral agency does not require the ability to do otherwise; this would invite legitimate incompatibilist suspicions about free will and determinism. Rather, (...)
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  13.  77
    Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Michael S. McKenna - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.
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  14. Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael McKenna & Derk Pereboom - 2014 - Routledge.
    If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do? The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral (...)
     
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  15. Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37.
    In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, (...)
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  16. Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation.Brandon Warmke & Michael McKenna - 2013 - In Ishtiyaque Haji Justin Caouette (ed.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 189-2-11.
    In this paper, we explore how a conversational theory of moral responsibility can provide illuminating resources for building a theory about the nature and norms of moral forgiveness.
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  17.  58
    A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):83-105.
    Is moral responsibility essentially historical? Consider two agents qualitatively identical with respect to all of their nonhistorical properties just prior to the act of A-ing. Is it possible that, due only to differences in their respective histories, when each A-s only one A-s freely and is morally responsible for doing so? Nonhistorical theorists say “no.” Historical theorists say “yes.” Elsewhere, I have argued on behalf of philosophers like Harry G. Frankfurt that nonhistorical theorists can resist the historical theorists’ case against (...)
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  18. Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard‐Liner Takes It on the Chin.Michael McKenna - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):467-484.
  19. Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will.Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3-13.
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be (...)
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  20. Frankfurt's Argument Against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.
    Harry Frankfurt dramatically shaped the debates over freedom and responsibility by arguing that the sort of freedom germane to responsibility does not involve the freedom to do otherwise. His argument turns upon an example meant to disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Debate over Frankfurt's argument has turned almost exclusively on the success of the example meant to defeat it. But there is more (...)
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  21.  54
    Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.
  22. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.Michael Mckenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.
  23.  17
    Basically Deserved Blame and its Value.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3).
    How should we understand basic desert as a justification for blaming? Many philosophers account for free will by reference to the sort of moral responsibility that involves a blameworthy person deserving blame in a basic sense of desert; free will just is the control condition for this sort of moral responsibility. But what precisely does basic desert come to, and what is it about blame that makes it the thing that a blameworthy person deserves? As it turns out, there are (...)
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  24. Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.
  25. The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael S. McKenna - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (2):123-142.
    P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson''s compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson''s theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson''s theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also argues that the reactive (...)
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  26. Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
    Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this (...)
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  27.  9
    A Hard‐Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
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  28.  75
    Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory.Michael Mckenna - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.
    The article presents the nature of shared intentions and collective responsibility in simultaneous discussion of individualism, which views that collective agents and shared intentions are to be analyzed in relation between individual agents who are members of the collectives. It discusses as well the agent meaning theory that states that an agent moves against the interpretive background of action evaluation shared by the agent and the moral community.
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  29.  37
    Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives.Michael McKenna - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 201--217.
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  30.  77
    Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.
    In this paper I critically assess Derk Pereboom’s book, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. In it, I resist Pereboom’s manipulation argument for incompatibilism and his indictment of desert-based accounts of moral responsibility.
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  31.  83
    Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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  32.  41
    Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):657-678.
    Patrick Todd has recently fashioned a novel argument for incompatibilism, the Moral-Standing Zygote Argument. Todd considers much-discussed cases in which a manipulator causes an agent in a deterministic scenario to act morally wrongly from compatibilist-friendly conditions for freedom and moral responsibility. The manipulator, Todd contends, does not have the standing to blame the manipulated agent, and the best explanation for this is that incompatibilism is true. This is why the manipulated agent is not blameworthy. In this paper, I counter Todd (...)
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  33.  41
    Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (7):363-372.
  34. The Relationship Between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency.Michael McKenna - 2005 - In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 205--34.
  35.  10
    Automation-Induced Complacency Potential: Development and Validation of a New Scale.Stephanie M. Merritt, Alicia Ako-Brew, William J. Bryant, Amy Staley, Michael McKenna, Austin Leone & Lei Shirase - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  36.  82
    Whose Argumentative Burden, Which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.
    Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical (...)
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  37.  71
    Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.
    The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise to questions regarding free will (...)
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  38. Ultimacy and Sweet Jane.Michael McKenna - unknown
    Some people, they like to go out dancing And other peoples, they have to work And there’s even some evil mothers Well they’re gonna tell you that everything is just dirt You know, that women, never really faint And that villains always blink their eyes And that, children are the only ones who really blush And that, life is just to die. And, everyone who had a heart, They wouldn’t turn around and break it And that everyone who played a (...)
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  39.  25
    Further Reflections on The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert: A Reply to Nelkin and Pereboom.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (3):277-290.
    In my “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert,” I argued that against a familiar claim in the free will debate: that the freedom in dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists is limited to the type required for an agent to deserve blame for moral wrongdoing, and to deserve it in a sense that is basic. In that earlier paper, I sought a rationale for this claim, offered an explanation of basic desert, and then argued that the free will debate can (...)
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  40.  2
    Where Strawson and Frankfurt Meet.Michael Mckenna - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.
  41.  44
    Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers1.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):264-280.
  42.  37
    Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 36 The situationist movement in social psychology has caused a considerable stir in philosophy. Much of this was prompted by the work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. Both contended that familiar philosophical assumptions about the role of character in the explanation of action were not supported by experimental results. Most of the ensuing philosophical controversy has focused upon issues related to moral psychology and ethical theory. More recently, the influence of situationism has also given rise (...)
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  43.  55
    Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas.Michael McKenna - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):243-263.
    In this paper, I defend my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to three critics: Julia Driver, David Shoemaker, and Manuel Vargas. Driver raises questions about my account of private blame. Shoemaker finds problems with my account of quality of will. And Vargas questions the conversational nature of my account.
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  44.  94
    The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.
  45.  45
    Responsibility and Control.Michael McKenna - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):93-100.
  46.  13
    Responsibility & Globally Manipulated Agents1.Michael McKenna - 2013 - In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oup Usa. pp. 342.
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  47.  61
    Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.Michael McKenna - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):73-84.
    In this paper, I defend the central arguments of my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.
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  48.  11
    Moral Responsibility: The Next Generation.Michael McKenna - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):1-5.
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  49.  5
    Introduction.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 12 (1):2-2.
    The Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World wishes to devote this special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary World to themes in the philosophy of Michael Krausz. This is only fitting. For years now, Michael Krausz has been at the heart of our society’s liveliest exchanges. At many of our conferences, our group meetings, and in the pages of this journal, Krausz’s keen insights, probing challenges, supportive suggestions, and inspiring theses have helped us to shape our own views. More (...)
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  50.  1
    Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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