There are at least twelve major virtues of good theories: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, unification, durability, fruitfulness, and applicability. These virtues are best classified into four classes: evidential, coherential, aesthetic, and diachronic. Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive disclosure and expansion. Systematizing the theoretical virtues in this manner clarifies each virtue and suggests how they might have a coordinated and cumulative (...) role in theory formation and evaluation across the disciplines—with allowance for discipline specific modification. An informal and flexible logic of theory choice is in the making here. Evidential accuracy, according to my systematization, is not a largely isolated trait of good theories, as some have made it out to be. Rather, it bears multifaceted relationships, constituting significant epistemic entanglements, with other theoretical virtues. (shrink)

In the course of developing these historical points, this book also shows that Herder and his tradition are in many ways superior to dominant trends in more ...

Johann Gottfried Herder is a towering figure in modern thought, but one who has hitherto been severely underappreciated. Michael Forster seeks to rectify that situation by exploring the full range of his ideas, and showing their enormous impact in philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and comparative literature.

Discrediting 'mystical' or 'psychical' interpretations of out-of-body and near-death experiences, Michael Marsh demonstrates how these phenomena are explicable in terms of brain neurophysiology and its neuropathological disturbances, and discusses the theological and philosophical implications of his hypotheses.

In Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit, Michael N. Forster advances an original reading of the work.

This paper concerns a surprisingly sharp disagreement about the nature of ancient Pyrrhonism which first emerges clearly in Kant and Hegel, but which continues in contemporary interpretations. The paper begins by explaining the character of this disagreement, then attempts to adjudicate it in the light of the ancient texts.

Der Band "Idealismus und Romantik in Jena" nimmt die Jenaer Blütezeit zwischen 1794 und 1807 in den Blick und interpretiert sie als ein Neben- und Gegeneinander der beiden einflussreichsten Geistesströmungen um 1800. In Jena entstehen zwischen 1794 und 1807 zwei geistesgeschichtliche Strömungen von Weltgeltung: der Idealismus und die Romantik. Die rasante Entwicklung immer neuer Ideen ist durch eine beträchtliche Anzahl junger, kreativer Geister geprägt, die in fruchtbarem Austausch und gegenseitiger Kritik um ein neues, angemessenes Verständnis der Moderne ringen. Im Fokus (...) des Bandes stehen Fragen zu einzelnen Autoren genauso wie zum Verhältnis beider Strömungen zueinander. The volume Idealism and Romanticism in Jena focuses on the period between 1794 and 1807 in which creative and original minds developed new ideas for understanding the modern world. The contributions examine the relationship between German Idealism and Early Romanticism: What distinguishes/combines Idealism and Romanticism? What common aspects, synergies and goals arise? And what does the opposition between the two movements means for the question of modernity? (shrink)

This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic (...) a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism. (shrink)

Forster demonstrates that Hegel did not in fact ignore epistemology, but on the contrary he fought a tireless and subtle campaign to defeat the threat of skepticism. Forster's work should dispel once and for all the view that Hegel was naive or careless in epistemological matters. Along the way, Forster makes much that has hither to remained obscure in Hegel's texts intelligible for the first time.

What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks (...) to reconcile Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in another. Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic understanding or access. Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not only to philosophers but also to students of the human sciences, for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance. (shrink)

New brain-computer interface and neuroimaging techniques are making differentiation less ambiguous and more accurate between unresponsive wakefulness syndrome patients and patients with higher cognitive function and awareness. As research into these areas continues to progress, new ethical issues will face physicians of patients suffering from total locked-in syndrome, characterized by complete loss of voluntary muscle control, with retention of cognitive function and awareness detectable only with neuroimaging and brain-computer interfaces. Physicians, researchers, ethicists and hospital ethics committees should be aware of (...) and prepared to handle ethical issues unique to these totally locked-in patients. Several thought experiments are discussed, to highlight potential ethical dilemmas surrounding surrogate decision-making, autonomy, end-of-life care, and pediatric care, which will be unique to total LIS patients. These, along with other ethical problems especially relevant to total LIS patients, merit further discussion among physicians, researchers, ethicists and hospital ethics committees, to facilitate consensus regarding these issues, and improve patient care. (shrink)

This book not only sets the historical record straight but also champions the Herderian tradition for its philosophical depth and breadth.

Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later works often implies commitment to a doctrine of the autonomy or arbitrariness of grammar. This chapter discusses the conception of grammar that is presupposed in this doctrine and then explains the doctrine itself. The chapter also explains a sense in which grammar is not autonomous or arbitrary for Wittgenstein and discusses some possible criticisms of the doctrine. It should be noted at the outset that this whole area of exegetical concern is one in which the (...) fairly widespread conception in the secondary literature that the later Wittgenstein is a complete “quietist” in philosophy ‐ i.e., someone who advances no positive doctrines of his own, although encouraged by some of his own statements, seems impossible to sustain. Wittgenstein's doctrine of the autonomy or arbitrariness of grammar presupposes a highly distinctive conception of grammar, one which at least prima facie has little to do with our everyday conception of grammar. (shrink)

It has become very popular among philosophers to attempt to discredit, or at least set severe limits to, the thesis that there exist conceptual schemes radically different from ours. This fashion is misconceived. Philosophers have attempted to justify it in two main ways: by means of arguments which are a priorist relative to the relevant linguistic and textual evidence (and either independent of or based upon positive theories of meaning, understanding, and interpretation); and by means of arguments which are a (...) posteriorist relative to that evidence. The former approach is misconceived, not only in that its particular arguments fail, but also in principle. The latter approach, while in general the right sort of approach to adopt to the question, arrives at its conclusion only through faulty execution, through misinterpretation of the evidence. Though quite unjustified, philosophers' hostility to the thesis of radically different conceptual schemes is easily explained, namely, in terms of a number of psychologically powerful motives which it subserves. These motives cannot step in to provide the missing justification, however. Instead, they reveal such hostility in an even shadier light. (shrink)

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism, but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation (...) causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder, and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Foucault famously employ a philosophical method of “genealogy” and apply it to the realm of morality in particular. In this article I would like to do two main things: I will begin by offering a contribution toward a sort of “genealogy of genealogy,” that is, toward an account of how the method emerged historically. I will then give an explanation of how the method is supposed to work. In a subsequent, companion article in this journal, “Genealogy and Morality,” (...) I will discuss the method’s application to morality in some concrete ways. (shrink)

A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE that Herder is the founder not only of the modern philosophy of language but also of the modern philosophy of interpretation and translation and that he has many things to say on these subjects from which we may still learn today. This essay will not attempt to make such a case, but it will be concerned with some aspects of Herder’s position that would be central to it: three fundamental principles in his philosophy of (...) language which also play fundamental roles in his theory of interpretation and translation. The essay’s aim is also threefold: first, to describe the principles in question and their roles in this theory; second, to explain their emergence in a way which helps to make clearer the nature of Herder’s contribution ; and third, to give at least a sense of their philosophical subtlety and defensibility. (shrink)

This article explains a new ‘foreignizing’ approach to translation that was invented in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, especially by Herder and Schleiermacher, and that has since become the predominant approach in translation theory. The article argues that despite the great virtues of this approach, it was based on an unduly narrow restriction to Indo-European languages, which leaves considerable room for further improvement. Greater attention to Hebrew has since made up this deficit to a certain extent. But Chinese (...) holds the potential for even more important refinements of the original theory. The article explains the original theorists’ failure to exploit this case in terms of a certain prejudice against Chinese language and culture that had arisen at the time, and for which these theorists were themselves partly responsible. It then tries to show in some detail how deeply enriching for the theory a consideration of Chinese can be. (shrink)

In the future, human destiny may depend on our ethics. In particular, biotechnology and expansion in space can transform life, raising profound questions. Guidance may be found in Life-centered ethics, as biotic ethics that value the basic patterns of organic gene/protein life, and as panbiotic ethics that always seek to expand life. These life-centered principles can be based on scientific insights into the unique place of life in nature, and the biological unity of all life. Belonging to life then implies (...) a human purpose: to safeguard and propagate life. Expansion in space will advance this purpose but will also raise basic questions. Should we expand all life or only intelligent life? Should we aim to create populations of trillions? Should we seed other solar systems? How far can we change but still preserve the human species, and life itself? The future of all life may be in our hands, and it can depend on our guiding ethics whether life will fulfil its full potentials. Given such profound powers, life-centered ethics can best secure future generations. Our descendants may then understand nature more deeply, and seek to extend life indefinitely. In that future, our human existence can find a cosmic purpose. (shrink)

In a previous article in this journal, “Genealogy,” I offered a sort of “genealogy of genealogy,” an account of the method’s development, according to which it mainly grew, not from English or French antecedents, but out of a German tradition that began with Herder and then continued with Hegel before eventually culminating in Nietzsche himself. [...] Presupposing this account of the method of genealogy, the present article will consider the method in relation to one of its most important areas of (...) application: morality. (shrink)

This paper surveys central justifications and approaches adopted by educators interested in incorporating history of mathematics into mathematics teaching and learning. This interest itself has historical roots and different historical manifestations; these roots are examined as well in the paper. The paper also asks what it means for history of mathematics to be treated as genuine historical knowledge rather than a tool for teaching other kinds of mathematical knowledge. If, however, history of mathematics is not subordinated to the ideas and (...) methods at the heart of the usual mathematical curriculum – algebraic equations, functions, derivatives, analytic geometry – if it becomes an essential subject for mathematics, then the attempt to find a place for history of mathematics requires refining our understanding of the nature of mathematics education itself. Thus, the paper asks not only how can history of mathematics be incorporated into mathematics education but also how the idea of mathematics education may need to be adjusted to accommodate history. (shrink)

Prehistoric archaeology, which in the American academic structure is part of anthropology, has always included and continues to include the study of social aspects of technology, particularly of technological innovation. Despite early calls for their inclusion in the field of science, technology, and society, however, archaeologists and their research have not, by and large, been integrated into this new discipline. This article is a renewed appeal for the use of archaeology in studying issues of technology and society. An example drawn (...) from prehistoric Europe illustrates how archaeology can provide a fresh perspective on social aspects of technological innovation, as well as specific data for cross-cultural comparison. (shrink)

Men who spend a greater proportion of time apart from their female partner since the couple’s last copulation are at greater “objective” sperm competition risk. We propose a novel cue to sperm competition risk: the time she spends with her male friends. Four hundred and twenty men in a committed, heterosexual, sexual relationship completed a questionnaire. The results indicate that men at greater objective sperm competition risk report less time desired until the couple’s next copulation, greater interest in copulating with (...) their partner, and greater anger, frustration, and upset in response to their partner’s sexual rejection, but only among men whose partner spends more time with her male friends. These results remain after controlling statistically for the participant’s age and their partner’s age. We discuss limitations of the current research, and discuss how research in human sperm competition can inform social issues, including men’s partner-directed sexual coercion. (shrink)

This very short introduction will first outline how ontological investigations and questions of practice go together. The second section will bring in the next pole of this entire book, history of mathematics. How do ontology, practice, and history go together? Is this a forced marriage or one born in true love? That is, do these three belong together in some very basic way? One chapter in the section argues that the philosophy of mathematical practice intersects with the history of mathematics (...) essentially. If the first section of this introduction is persuasive that will also show that the history of mathematics intersects with ontological questions as well, specifically, that historical questions are very much about the ontological commitments of past mathematicians. The last section will take up what might seem a very different theme, namely, how these things matter to mathematics education. This section is connected closely to the second section since mathematics education has taken an interest in the role of history of mathematics in mathematics education, and much insight can be gained by seeing the issues in relation to the ontology-practice-history triad. The question of education is also important since teachers must consider what it is exactly that they are teaching, or, to adapt the title of Reuben Hersh’s well-known book, “What is mathematics really about?” And the “aboutness” of mathematics is really the ontological question. (shrink)

This chapter examines certain claims made for near‐death and out‐of‐body experiences (ND/OBE), adding neuro‐physiological and theological insights. ND/OBE aredecidedly this‐worldly events and have nothing to do with supposed journeys to spiritualized or nonphysical realms, nor amalgamations with so‐called cosmic consciousness. Classical spiritual encounters were discussed by William James, and by William P. Alston. The chapter compares classic examples of divine disclosure with those given by NDE subjects. Considering the “spiritual” properties of NDE reports, one might be somewhat reluctant to credit (...) them with any serious divine import, or, like some of the otherreports, of enlightening revelatory content. The chapter also summarizes author's analysis that offers arguments against any serious import to NDE phenomenology, other than deriving from stored material in brains of subjects reporting. It continues in critically examining the notion of afterlife, as envisioned throughout the NDE literature, compared with Christian precepts of the creedal “Life Everlasting”. (shrink)