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Michael P. Lynch [59]Michael Patrick Lynch [3]
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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut
  1. Truth as One and Many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
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  2. Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data.Michael P. Lynch - 2016 - New York, NY, USA: WW Norton.
    An investigation into the way in which information technology has shaped how and what we know, from "Google-knowing" to privacy and social media.
     
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  3. Rewrighting Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  4.  31
    Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity.Michael P. Lynch - 1998 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues (...)
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  5.  87
    The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives.Michael P. Lynch (ed.) - 2001 - MIT Press.
    These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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  6. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability.Michael P. Lynch - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:262--77.
  7. Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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  8. Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
  9. The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42.
     
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  10. A Functionalist Theory of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2001 - In The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. pp. 723--750.
  11.  25
    After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism.Michael P. Lynch - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):248-259.
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  12.  52
    Three Questions for Truth Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 21.
  13.  10
    Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - forthcoming - Topoi.
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  14. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement.Michael P. Lynch - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Truth and Realism.Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  16.  41
    Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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  17. Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
    In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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  18.  66
    Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):299-313.
    Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something we (...)
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  19. Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth: A Reply to Cory Wright.Michael P. Lynch - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):29-43.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
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  20.  50
    In Praise of Reason.Michael P. Lynch - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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  21. A Coherent Moral Relativism.David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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  22. The Impossibility of Superdupervenience.Michael P. Lynch & Joshua Glasgow - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):201-221.
    Supervenience has provided a way for nonreductive materialists to explain how the mental can be physically irreducible but still physically respectable. In recent years, doubts about this research program have emerged from a number of quarters. Consequently, Terence Horgan has argued that nonreductive materialists must appeal to an upgraded "superdupervenience," if supervenience is to do any materialist work. We argue that nonreductive materialism cannot meet this challenge. Superdupervenience is impossible.
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  23.  9
    Truth, Value, and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
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  24.  23
    Trusting Intuitions.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 227--238.
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  25.  94
    Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence, and the Universality of Reason.Michael P. Lynch - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  26.  62
    The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
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  27. Expressivism and Plural Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  28. Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):37-58.
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some (...)
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  29. Three Models of Conceptual Schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.
    Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune from Davidsonian objections to (...)
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  30.  89
    Truth and Naturalism.Filippo Ferrari, Michael P. Lynch & Douglas Edwards - 2015 - In Kelly J. Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In (...)
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  31.  2
    ReWrighting Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  32.  86
    The Knowers in Charge.Michael P. Lynch & Nathan Sheff - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):53-63.
    _ Source: _Page Count 11 Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiii +279. isbn 978–0–19–993647–2.
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  33.  42
    Hume and the Limits of Reason.Michael P. Lynch - 1996 - Hume Studies 22 (1):89-104.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel (...)
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  34.  21
    Truth in Ethics.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  35.  79
    Sensations and Pain Processes.Kenneth J. Sufka & Michael P. Lynch - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):299-311.
    This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowledge regarding the neuroanatomy and physiology (...)
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  36. The Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - forthcoming - In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism.
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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  37.  92
    Relativity of Fact and Content.Michael P. Lynch - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.
    A common strategy amongst realists grants relativism at the level of language or thought but denies it at the level of fact. Their point is that even if our concept of an object is relative to a conceptual scheme, it doesn't follow that objects themselves are relative to conceptual schemes. This is a sensible point. But in this paper I present a simple argument for the conclusion that it is false. According to what I call the T-argument, relativism about content (...)
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  38.  58
    Minimal Realism or Realistic Minimalism.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):512-518.
  39.  69
    Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-Aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
    In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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  40.  20
    Summary.Michael P. Lynch - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):289-291.
  41.  25
    And What of Human Musicality?Michael P. Lynch - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):788-788.
  42.  33
    Relativism and Truth: A Reply to Steven Rappaport.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):417-421.
  43.  4
    Relativism and Truth: A Reply to Steven Rappaport.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):417-421.
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  44. Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston.Heather D. Battaly & Michael P. Lynch - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (4):750-751.
    One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
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  45. Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston.Heather D. Battaly & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) - 2005 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
     
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  46.  54
    After Truth Gives Way. [REVIEW]Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):400-409.
    At first glance, Mark Richard's recent book When Truth Gives Out appears, in the most commendable sense of the word, ‘old-fashioned’. Its central thesis is that truth is sometimes the wrong standard to use when assessing the judgements we make about the world. Not all correct judgements are true, and not all incorrect ones are false. They can all be measured, but they cannot all be measured in the same way. -/- Many of the heroes of old, ensconced in philosophical (...)
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  47.  42
    Beyond the Walls of Reason.Michael P. Lynch - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):529-536.
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  48.  27
    Coherence, Truth and Knowledge.Michael P. Lynch - 1998 - Social Epistemology 12 (3):217 – 225.
  49.  19
    Empiricus, Sextus. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines Oj Pyrrhonism.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 50 (4):886-887.
  50.  15
    Les Fake News Et L’Avenir de la Vérité.Michael P. Lynch & Pascal Engel - 2018 - Diogène 1:5.
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