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Michael Pelczar [17]Michael W. Pelczar [4]
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Michael Pelczar
National University of Singapore
  1. Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents.Michael Pelczar - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    How does the modern scientific conception of time constrain the project of assigning the mind its proper place in nature? On the scientific conception, it makes no sense to speak of the duration of a pain, or the simultaneity of sensations occurring in different parts of the brain. Such considerations led Henri Poincaré, one of the founders of the modern conception, to conclude that consciousness does not exist in spacetime, but serves as the basic material out of which we must (...)
     
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  2.  57
    Modal Arguments Against Materialism.Michael Pelczar - forthcoming - Noûs.
  3. Descartes’ Dualism and Contemporary Dualism.Cecilia Wee & Michael Pelczar - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):145-160.
    After drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism and modal dualism —we argue that Descartes is a numericaldualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes’ views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
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  4.  37
    Defending Phenomenalism.Michael Pelczar - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):574-597.
    According to phenomenalism, physical things are a certain kind of possibility for experience. This paper clarifies the phenomenalist position and addresses some main objections to it, with the aim of showing that phenomenalism is a live option that merits a place alongside dualism and materialism in contemporary metaphysical debate.
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  5. Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances?Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (...)
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  6.  64
    Wittgensteinian Semantics.Michael Pelczar - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):483–516.
    Wittgenstein emphasizes two points concerning his notion of family resemblance. One is that the use of a family resemblance expression resists characterization by certain kinds of rules; the other is that due to the prevalence of family resemblance in the philosophical lexicon, philosophical inquiry must in many cases proceed differently from how it traditionally has. This paper develops an interpretation of family resemblance that seeks to do justice to these claims. I argue that what is characteristic about family resemblance expressions (...)
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  7. Presentism, Eternalism, and Phenomenal Change.Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):275 - 290.
    Normally, when we notice a change taking place, our conscious experience has a corresponding quality of phenomenal change. Here it is argued that one's experience can have this quality at or during a time when there is no change in which phenomenal properties one instantiates. This undermines a number of otherwise forceful arguments against leading metaphysical theories of change, but also requires these theories to construe change as a secondary quality, akin to color.
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  8. Forms and Objects of Thought.Michael W. Pelczar - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.
    It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.
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  9. On an Argument for Functional Invariance.Michael Pelczar - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):373-377.
    The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of (...)
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  10. Content Internalism About Indexical Thought.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):95 - 104.
    Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated (...)
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  11. The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.
    Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...)
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  12.  80
    Enlightening the Fully Informed.Michael Pelczar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56.
    This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information , and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound.
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  13.  57
    The Indispensability of Farbung.Michael W. Pelczar - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):49 - 77.
    I offer a theory of propositional attitudeascriptions that reconciles a number of independently plausiblesemantic principles. At the heart of the theory lies the claim thatpsychological verbs (such as ``to believe'' and ``to doubt'') vary incontent indexically. After defending this claim and explaining how itrenders the aforementioned principles mutually compatible, I arguethat my account is superior to currently popular hidden indexicaltheories of attitude ascription. To conclude I indicate a number oframifications that the proposed theory has for issues in epistemology,philosophy of mind, (...)
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  14.  28
    Summary.Michael Pelczar - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):449-453.
  15. Author's Summary, and Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW]Michael Pelczar - forthcoming - Analysis.
  16.  41
    Words Without Meaning.Michael Pelczar - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):480-483.
    Words without Meaning is part of an ongoing effort by Christopher Gauker to give discursive norms pride of place over traditional relations of intentionality, representation, and meaning. In this book, he has a negative goal and a positive one. Negatively, he aims “to instill a sense of despair concerning the prospects” for making sense of the idea that brain states have propositional content. “The received view” is his collective term for theories that do treat beliefs as something like brain states (...)
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  17.  13
    Replies.Michael Pelczar - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):479-501.
  18.  29
    Discussion.Michael W. Pelczar - 1996 - Philosophical Investigations 19 (2):159-163.
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  19.  15
    Focal Complexity in Aristotle and Wittgenstein.Michael W. Pelczar - 2004 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2):131 - 150.
  20. What is Time?Michael Pelczar - forthcoming - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
     
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