Edited by Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch & Christopher Zurn. This volume collects original, cutting-edge essays on the philosophy of recognition by international scholars eminent in the field. By considering the topic of recognition as addressed by both classical and contemporary authors, the volume explores the connections between historical and contemporary recognition research and makes substantive contributions to the further development of contemporary theories of recognition.
: Debates on precedent autonomy and some forms of paternalistic interventions, which are related to questions of personal identity, are analyzed. The discussion is based on the distinction between personal identity as persistence and as biographical identity. It first is shown that categorical objections to advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are based on false assumptions about personal identity that conflate persistence and biographical identity. Therefore, advance directives and "Ulysses contracts" are ethically acceptable tools for prolonging one's autonomy. The notions of (...) personality and biographical identity are used to analyze the ethically relevant features. Thereby, it is shown that these concepts are operative in and useful for thinking in biomedical ethics. The overall conclusion is that categorical arguments against precedent autonomy or "Ulysses contracts" are based on misleading theories of personal identity and that advance directives are an ethically respectable tool for prolonging individuals' autonomy in cases of dementia and mental illness. (shrink)
Michael Quante focuses on what Hegel has to say about such central concepts as action, person and will, and then brings these views to bear on contemporary debates in analytic philosophy. This book enables professional analytic philosophers and their students to understand the significance of Hegel's philosophy to contemporary theory of action. As such, it will contribute to the ever-increasing erosion of the barrier between the continental and analytic approaches to philosophy.
In this paper the thesis that personal identity is essentially constituted by social relations is defended. To make this plausible the problem of personal identity is broken down into four interrelated sets of problems. Of these, the unity -- and the persistence -- problems cannot be resolved using the notion of a person and therefore personal identity in this sense is not socially constituted. But this paper argues that the conditions of personhood, and the structure of a human being's personality (...) -- which are the other two sets into which the problem of personal identity is dissolved -- are best understood as being constituted by social relations, especially relations of mutual. (shrink)
After presenting the current version of principlism, in the process repudiating a widespread deductivist misinterpretation, a fundamental metaethical disagreement is developed by outlining the deductivistic critique of principlism. Once the grounds for this critique have been understood, the dispute between casuistry, deductivism and principlism can be restructured, and the model of "application" proven to be the central difference. In the concluding section it is argued that principlism is the most attractive position, if the perceptual model of weak intuitionism is made (...) more explicit. (shrink)
In this paper it is shown that in his conception of value, published in the first volume of Capital, Marx relies on Hegel’s concept of pure recognition to organise the relations between use- and exchange-value on the one hand and the relation between the social relations between things (goods) and actors (sellers) on the other hand. Establishing this thesis is important in three respects: Firstly it demonstrates that there is a strong continuity in the philosophical thought of Karl Marx, making (...) visible an essential relation between his Economic-philosophical Manuscripts and his later writings. Secondly it helps to better understand Marx’s conception of value; and thirdly it shows that “recognition” is an important conception in his critique of political economy. (shrink)
An essential part of particularism as a systematic option in philosophical ethics is the structure of perception. In this paper, we defend perception as a central feature against the meta-ethical and meta-epistemological prejudices of rationalism.The insurmountable border between perception and justification, which is central to rationalist ethics, rests on three premises that are rejected by particularism: ethical knowledge is not exclusively inferential or discursive, ethical reflection is not solely deductive reasoning, and the bases of justified actions do not have to (...) be universal laws.Against rationalist ethics, we defend perception as a central and primary source of ethical knowledge, as a way of non-discursive reflection and as a genuine form of ethical justification. Ethical experience is not only reason but the complex responsiveness of persons that develops biographically as a result of situations in social and culturally contingent contexts. (shrink)
This article starts from two observations. The first is that some of the most prominent debates in social and political philosophy over the last few decades have been deeply obscured by the confusion of ontological/methodological and normative questions. And the second is that the renewed interest in Hegel's social philosophy has not yet yielded anything like a widely shared view as to whether it should be banned as a totalitarian or reappraised as a liberal account. The aim of this article (...) is first to specify systematically the ontological/methodological and normative dimensions of social philosophy by giving precise definitions of core concepts and paramount positions. Secondly, it is argued that Hegel's social philosophy can be characterized as combining what is called vertical holism with liberal communitarianism. This, thirdly, sheds new light both on the nature of fundamental questions in social philosophy and on the systematic relevance of Hegel's social philosophy. (shrink)
The "System of Pragmatic Idealism" is of special importance for Nicholas Rescher's philosophical work, because here he has presented the systematic approach at once. Dedicated to his 70th birthday a group of European and U.S-american philosophers discuss the main topics of Rescher's philosophical system. The contributions which are presented here for the first time and Nicholas Rescher's responses cover the most important topics of philosophy and give a deep anddetailed insight into the strenght of Rescher's pragmatic idealism. This volume is (...) of interest for philosophers studying Rescher's philosophy and for all those who are interested in systematic philosophy and the vividnes of pragmatism and idealism in present philosophy. (shrink)
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, first published in 1807, is a work with few equals in systematic integrity, philosophical originality and historical influence. This collection of essays, contributed by leading Hegel scholars, examines all aspects of the work, from its argumentative strategies to its continuing relevance to philosophical debates. The collection combines close analysis with wide-ranging coverage of the text, and also traces connections with debates extending beyond Hegel scholarship, including issues in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of (...) action, ethics, and philosophy of religion. In showing clearly that we have not yet exhausted the Phenomenology's insights, it demonstrates the need for contemporary philosophers to engage with Hegel. (shrink)
Ausgehend von Lockes Analyse personaler Identität wird in diesem Beitrag die These verteidigt, dass es keine spezifischen Bedingungen personaler Identität gibt. Die Wahrheitsbedingungen von Aussagen über die transtemporale Identität menschlicher Personen sind dem Begriff des Menschen zu entnehmen. Dieser Befund schließt jedoch nicht aus, dass die Kategorie der Person für unsere evaluativen Praxen fundamental ist.
Definition of the problem: In the debate on euthanasia descriptive differences as active vs. passive or as intended vs. foreseen are used as an ethically neutral basis for showing that there is a morally significant difference between killing a patient on the one hand and letting him die on the other hand. Based on the doctrine of the sanctity of human life many ethicists hold, that direct active euthanasia is wrong in principle, and that the intention to kill is incompatible (...) with the ethics implicit in the physician's actions. A main source for misunderstandings in the debate is that central terms (as “killing”) are used in a descriptive and ethical way simultaneously.Results/Conclusion: It is shown that the descriptive distinctions cannot give a solid foundation for the ethical difference between passive, indirect and direct active euthanasia. Then it is argued that there are no categorical ethical arguments against direct active euthanasia. The descriptive issues are separated from the ethical ones and the relevant aspects which have to be considered are used to distinguish different kinds of cases. The result is, that the ethical differences between passive, indirect and direct active euthanasia are gradual so that the strength of arguments needed for justification increases. (shrink)
Ontario’s Bill 178 proposing a Voluntary Blood Donations Act declares the offer or acceptance of payment for the donation of blood a legal offence and makes it subject to penalty. The bill reinvigorates a fundamental debate about the ethical problems associated with the payment of money for blood. Scarcity of blood donors is a recurring problem in most health systems, and monetary remuneration of the willingness to donate blood is regularly discussed—and sometimes practiced—as a means to overcome scarcity in blood. (...) However, making blood an object of economic exchange has long aroused ethical concerns that often refer to the specific meaning of blood. From the perspective of a modern understanding of money as a metric of economic value, the exchange of money for blood—shed or given—is seen as ethically troubling, because it appears to imply a commensurability of the value of human life and economic wealth. In this paper, we begin with a general taxonomy of the types of arguments that speak in favour or against compensating donors for giving blood. We then describe the context in which the discussion about payment for blood arises, and of the specific aims and concerns that are brought forward in this context. This is used to reconstruct the normative background that supports the rejection of payment for blood as it is envisaged in Bill 178 and the aims of the proposal. We then argue that while a payment indeed changes the nature of a blood donation in an ethically considerable way, we do not believe that decisive arguments against the monetary remuneration of blood donations can be substantiated, at least not independently of assuming specific societal circumstances. Thus it may be possible to establish a stable and safe blood supply through just gratification while at the same time taking strong provisions against social disconnection, injustice, exploitation or heteronomy. (shrink)
What does it mean to be a person? And in what way is this connected to our finitude, i.e. to the properly human aspect of our existence? By analyzing some of the core features of our form of life (personal identity, self-consciousness, freedom, autonomy, responsibility), Michael Quante answers these questions arguing that it is possible to be a person and lead an authentically human life only within social relationships of recognition: only in these relationships, it is possible to know oneself (...) and act autonomously and responsibly. Through a close examination of the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, on the one hand, and of the most recent debates on analytical ethics, on the other, Quante thus lays the foundations for a pragmatistic anthropology, that is, for a conception focused on the active nature of human existence. The volume is a revised version of the Lectures given by Michael Quante in 2017 at the PhD Course in Philosophy at the University of Padova. (shrink)