Asking ?What is the nature of fear??, ?How is it that fear and terror are amenable to being ?severed? or ?transcended???, and ?Why would it be advantageous to ?sever? fear??, this paper investigates the act of cutting-through fear via the Tibetan Buddhist meditative tradition known as ?gCod? (?chöd?). Through examining Mahayana philosophical notions of self and phenomena, as well as the psychological implications of subject-object reification at the heart of gCod, we elaborate on the interior cognitive and emotional dynamics of (...) gCod praxis. In order to elaborate on these contemplative dynamics, we reflect upon translated verses from one of the seminal texts of the gCod tradition, entitled The Essence of Enlightened Awareness: The Quintessence of the Profound Meaning of the Entirety of Expositions and Guidance on the Transcendent Wisdom that Cuts-Through. (shrink)
In the introduction to his account of the debate concerning religion between Cleanthes, Philo and Demea, Pamphilus remarks that ‘reasonable men may be allowed to differ where no one can reasonably be positive’. Pamphilus goes on to suggest that natural theology is an area that abounds with issues about which ‘no one can reasonably be positive’. Assuming that the beliefs of reasonable men are themselves reasonable, Pamphilus can be interpreted as holding that If no one is reasonably positive that the (...) proposition p is true or that it is false, a man might reasonably believe that p or might reasonably believe that not p. (shrink)
This new book by Michael Slater significantly extends the argument articulated in his earlier study of William James on Ethics and Faith, also published by Cambridge University Press. Slater was committed there as here to demonstrating the compatibility of pragmatism with some form of metaphysical realism. There as here he was interested in showing the affinities between James’s thought and certain ideas developed by contemporary analytical philosophers of religion. In Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion, however, the scope of (...) analysis is broadened from a focus on James to a consideration of pragmatism more generally conceived. Two early chapters on James are followed by chapters on Charles S. Peirce... (shrink)
Although Michael Kelly, in his article, “On the Mind’s Pronouncement of Time” (Proceedings of the ACPA 78 : 247–62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, I argue that the similarity does not lie where he thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl’s early period. Instead I locate the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which I find expressed at Parmenides 151e–152e. This essay shows how (...) the Neoplatonic conception of time, which I claim inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experimentfrom 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine. It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as “trapped” in the present. The point is a significant one if, as I conclude, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completedsuccession of nows, eternally fixed. (shrink)
This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.
Through an analysis and explication of William James’s writings, such as “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” and The Varieties of Religious Experience, Michael Slater successfully defends the argument “that on James’s view morality cannot be finally separated from religion, because there are moral goods that only religious faith—and in some cases, only the objects of religious faith—can plausibly bring about” (7). Slater advances this argument by making two significant claims concerning James’s work. First, James’s ethics require “the (...) possession of a morally strenuous attitude” (7). By emphasizing our attitudes and dispositions, rather than the calculations or consequences of our moral actions, Slater .. (shrink)
Keywords Islam - Comparative religion - Culture - Fundamentalism R. MICHAEL FEENER, ed., Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives. Oxford, UK: ABC-CLIO, 2004, 387pp., ISBN: 978-1576075166, hb.