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Michael D. Resnik [92]Michael David Resnik [26]Michael Resnik [10]
  1. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - Oxford, England: New York ;Oxford University Press.
    This book expounds a system of ideas about the nature of mathematics which Michael Resnik has been elaborating for a number of years. In calling mathematics a science he implies that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a defense of realism about the metaphysics of mathematics--the view that mathematics (...)
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  2. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael D. Resnik - 1987 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
  3.  33
    Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Michael D. Resnik - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (1):139-140.
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  4.  15
    Science Without Numbers.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):514-519.
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  5. Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference.Michael D. Resnik - 1981 - Noûs 15 (4):529-550.
  6. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael D. Resnik - 1980 - Cornell University Press.
  7. Second-Order Logic Still Wild.Michael D. Resnik - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):75-87.
  8. Explanation, Independence and Realism in Mathematics.Michael D. Resnik & David Kushner - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):141-158.
  9. Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument.Michael Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
    Penelope Maddy and Elliott Sober recently attacked the confirmational indispensability argument for mathematical realism. We cannot count on science to provide evidence for the truth of mathematics, they say, because either scientific testing fails to confirm mathematics (Sober) or too much mathematics occurs in false scientific theories (Maddy). I present a pragmatic indispensability argument immune to these objections, and show that this argument supports mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. Mathematical realism, it turns out, may be even more firmly established (...)
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  10.  97
    Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Epistemology.Michael D. Resnik - 1982 - Noûs 16 (1):95-105.
  11. Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):73-78.
     
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  12.  20
    Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW]Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):122-125.
  13. How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.
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  14.  20
    Frege in Perspective. [REVIEW]Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):893-895.
  15.  11
    Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Ellery Eells & Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):272.
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  16.  11
    Second-Order Logic Still Wild.Michael D. Resnik - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):75-87.
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  17.  91
    The Frege-Hilbert Controversy.Michael David Resnik - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):386-403.
  18. Immanent Truth.Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):405-424.
  19. Logic: Normative or Descriptive? The Ethics of Belief or a Branch of Psychology?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):221-238.
    By a logical theory I mean a formal system together with its semantics, meta-theory, and rules for translating ordinary language into its notation. Logical theories can be used descriptively (for example, to represent particular arguments or to depict the logical form of certain sentences). Here the logician uses the usual methods of empirical science to assess the correctness of his descriptions. However, the most important applications of logical theories are normative, and here, I argue, the epistemology is that of wide (...)
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  20.  77
    The Logic of Empirical Theories. [REVIEW]Michael Resnik - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):421-423.
    CONTENTS: 1 Introductory Remark; 2 Formalism of Empirical Theories; 3 Semantics of Formalized Languages; 4 Interpretation of Empirical Theories; 5 Interpretation of Observational Terms; 6 Interpretation of Theoretical Terms; 7 Main Types of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 8 Some Other Kinds of Meaning Postulates for Theoretical Terms; 9 Main Types of Statements in an Empirical Theory; 10 Towards a More Realistic Account; 11 Concluding Remarks; 12 Bibliographical Note.
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  21. Holistic Realism: A Response to Katz on Holism and Intuition.Michael D. Resnik & Nicoletta Orlandi - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):301-315.
  22.  7
    Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael D. Resnik - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):961-963.
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  23. Ought There to Be but One Logic.Michael Resnik - 1996 - In B. Jack Copeland (ed.), Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford University Press. pp. 489--517.
  24.  61
    Non-Ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.
    ABSTRACT Historical structuralist views have been ontological. They either deny that there are any mathematical objects or they maintain that mathematical objects are structures or positions in them. Non-ontological structuralism offers no account of the nature of mathematical objects. My own structuralism has evolved from an early sui generis version to a non-ontological version that embraces Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. In this paper I further develop and explain this view.
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  25.  49
    Mathematical Knowledge and Pattern Cognition.Michael D. Resnik - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):25 - 39.
    This paper is concerned with the genesis of mathematical knowledge. While some philosophers might argue that mathematics has no real subject matter and thus is not a body of knowledge, I will not try to dissuade them directly. I shall not attempt such a refutation because it seems clear to me that mathematicians do know such things as the Mean Value Theorem, The Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, Godel's Theorems, etc. Moreover, this is much more evident to me than any philosophical (...)
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  26.  69
    The Context Principle in Frege's Philosophy.Michael David Resnik - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (3):356-365.
  27.  97
    Structural Relativity.Michael Resnik - 1996 - Philosophia Mathematica 4 (2):83-99.
  28. Against Logical Realism.Michael D. Resnik - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):181-194.
    This paper argues against Logical Realism, in particular against the view that there are facts of matters of logic that obtain independently of us, our linguistic conventions and inferential practices. The paper challenges logical realists to provide a non-intuition based epistemology, one which would be compatible with the empiricist and naturalist convictions motivating much recent anti-realist philosophy of mathematics.
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  29.  52
    On the Philosophical Significance of Consistency Proofs.Michael D. Resnik - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):133 - 147.
    We have seen that despite Feferman's results Gödel's second theorem vitiates the use of Hilbert-type epistemological programs and consistency proofs as a response to mathematical skepticism. Thus consistency proofs fail to have the philosophical significance often attributed to them.This does not mean that consistency proofs are of no interest to philosophers. We know that a ‘non-pathological’ consistency proof for a system S will use methods which are not available in S. When S is as strong a system as we are (...)
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  30.  38
    On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic.Michael D. Resnik - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):266-269.
  31.  10
    Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics.Gottlob Frege.Michael D. Resnik & Hans D. Sluga - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):340-346.
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  32.  24
    Review of M. Przelecki, The Logic of Empirical Theories[REVIEW]Michael David Resnik - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):421-.
  33.  60
    On Skolem's Paradox.Michael David Resnik - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (15):425-438.
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  34.  55
    Recent Work in Philosophy of Mathematics: Review of P. Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics; S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology; M. Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Jamie Tappenden, Penelope Maddy, Stewart Shapiro & Michael Resnik - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):488.
  35.  54
    II. Frege as Idealist and Then Realist.Michael D. Resnik - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):350-357.
    Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated (...)
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  36.  16
    Frege.Michael D. Resnik - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):961-963.
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  37.  25
    Mathematics From the Structural Point of View.Michael D. Resnik - 1988 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42 (4):400-424.
    This paper is a nontechnical exposition of the author's view that mathematics is a science of patterns and that mathematical objects are positions in patterns. the new elements in this paper are epistemological, i.e., first steps towards a postulational theory of the genesis of our knowledge of patterns.
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  38.  62
    Computation and Mathematical Empiricism.Michael D. Resnik - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (2):129-144.
  39.  48
    A Naturalized Epistemology for a Platonist Mathematical Ontology.Michael D. Resnik - 1989 - Philosophica 43.
  40.  51
    Between Mathematics and Physics.Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:369 - 378.
    Nothing has been more central to philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between mathematical and physical objects. Yet consideration of quantum particles shows the inadequacy of the popular spacetime and causal characterizations of the distinction. It also raises problems for an assumption used recently by Field, Hellman and Horgan, namely, that the mathematical realm is metaphysically independent of the physical one.
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  41.  14
    Holistic Mathematics.Michael D. Resnik - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press. pp. 227--46.
  42.  15
    Review of J. Azzouni, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences[REVIEW]Michael D. Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  43.  39
    A Restriction on a Theorem of Harsanyi.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (4):309-320.
  44.  25
    More on Skolem's Paradox.Michael David Resnik - 1969 - Noûs 3 (2):185-196.
  45.  11
    Beyond Analytic Philosophy. Doing Justice to What We Know.Michael D. Resnik & Hao Wang - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1484.
  46.  72
    Ontology and Logic: Remarks on Hartry Field's Anti-Platonist Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209.
    In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic.
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  47.  35
    Realistic Rationalism.Michael D. Resnik - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):207-211.
  48.  40
    Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities.Michael David Resnik - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):329-341.
    This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities (...)
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  49.  20
    Logic and Scientific Methodology in the Writings of Mencius.Michael David Resnik - 1968 - International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):212-230.
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  50.  15
    Frege's Proof of Referentiality.Michael D. Resnik - 1986 - In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co.. pp. 177--195.
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