33 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Michael S. Brady [31]Michael Sean Brady [2]
  1. The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.
    A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  2. Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250.
    The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  3. Virtue, emotion and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  4. Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons.Michael S. Brady - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
  5.  41
    Virtue, emotion and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  6. Recalcitrant Emotions and Visual Illusions.Michael S. Brady - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):273 - 284.
  7. Moral and Epistemic Virtues.Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):1-11.
    This volume brings together papers by some of the leading figures working on virtue-theoretic accounts in both ethics and epistemology. A collection of cutting edge articles by leading figures in the field of virtue theory including Guy Axtell, Julia Driver, Antony Duff and Miranda Fricker. The first book to combine papers on both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Deals with key topics in recent epistemological and ethical debate.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  8.  71
    Feeling Bad and Seeing Bad.Michael S. Brady - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):403-416.
    The emotions of guilt, shame, disappointment and grief, and the bodily states of pain and suffering, have something in common, at least phenomenologically: they are all unpleasant, they feel bad. But how might we explain what it is for some state to feel bad or unpleasant? What, in other words, is the nature of negative affect? In this paper I want to consider the prospects for evaluativist theories, which seek to explain unpleasantness by appeal to negative evaluations or appraisals. In (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  9.  31
    The role of emotion in intellectual virtue.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. pp. 47-58.
    Emotions are important for virtue, both moral and intellectual. This chapter aims to explain the significance of emotion for intellectual virtue along two dimensions. The first claim is that epistemic emotions can motivate intellectual inquiry, and thereby constitute ways of 'being for' intellectual goods. As a result, such emotions can constitute the motivational components of intellectual virtue. The second claim is that other emotions, rather than motivating intellectual inquiry and questioning, instead play a vital role in the regulation and control (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Michael S. Brady - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):1-10.
    Abstract Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent's motives and character traits. One of the problems any such approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethics ultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. Value and Fitting Emotions.Michael S. Brady - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):465-475.
  12.  34
    Group Emotion and Group Understanding.Michael S. Brady - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the positive epistemic value that individual and group emotion can have. It explains how group emotion can help to bring about the highest epistemic good, namely group understanding. It is argues that this group good would be difficult to achieve, in very many cases, in the absence of group emotion. Even if group emotion sometimes—indeed often—leads us astray, we would be worse off, from the standpoint of achieving the highest epistemic good, without it. The chapter illustrates (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13.  83
    The Value of the Virtues.Michael Sean Brady - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):85-113.
    Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves knowledge. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  14. Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem.Michael S. Brady - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91 - 99.
  15.  93
    Skepticism, normativity, and practical identity.Michael S. Brady - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):403-412.
  16.  60
    Suffering in sport: why people willingly embrace negative emotional experiences.Michael S. Brady - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2):115-128.
    ABSTRACTNearly everyone agrees that physical pain is bad. Indeed, if anything merits the status of a platitude in our everyday thinking about value, the idea that pain is bad surely does. Equally,...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  25
    Learning from Adversity: Suffering and Wisdom.Michael S. Brady - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 197-214.
    It is commonplace, in philosophy and in everyday life, to think that suffering, understood as a kind of negative affective experience, is bad. Nevertheless, the case can be made that suffering, in certain instances and circumstances, has considerable value. Indeed, it seems plausible that we would be considerably worse off if we didn’t experience things like pain and remorse, hunger and shame. Those who are insensitive to pain don’t live very long, after all. And those who are incapable of feeling (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  37
    Why Suffering Is Essential to Wisdom.Michael S. Brady - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (3):467-469.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  61
    The Appropriateness of Pride.Michael S. Brady - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 13-30.
  20.  66
    Valuing, Desiring and Normative Priority.Michael S. Brady - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):231 - 242.
    Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of 'normative priority' over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also reject an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  93
    Some Worries about Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism.Michael S. Brady - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.
    In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of little (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  32
    Suffering as experiential—A response to Jennifer Corns.Michael S. Brady - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):24-30.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity.Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.) - 2019 - London: Routledge.
    A collection, edited by David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns, originating in our Value of Suffering Project. Table of Contents: Michael Wheeler - ‘How should affective phenomena be studied?’; Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni – ‘Pleasures, unpleasures, and emotions’; Hilla Jacobson – ‘The attitudinal representational theory of painfulness fleshed out’; Tim Schroeder – ‘What we represent when we represent the badness of getting hurt’; Hagit Benbaji – ‘A defence of the inner view of pain’; Olivier Massin – ‘Suffering pain’; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  80
    Can Epistemic Contextualism Avoid the Regress Problem?Michael S. Brady - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):317-328.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  51
    Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values, and Agency.Michael S. Brady - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):150-154.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  16
    Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber.Michael S. Brady - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):461-463.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  54
    Reasons and rational motivational access.Michael S. Brady - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):99–114.
    Practical Internalism holds that an agent's reasons for acting are entirely determined by his rational desires. This account is thought to be preferable to externalism, on the grounds that internalism alone can guarantee that agents have ‘rational motivational access’ (RMA) to their reasons. Rachel Cohon has recently argued that (i) internalism fails to ensure this, and (ii) an externalist account, akin to relativism, can guarantee RMA. I suggest that both of these claims are mistaken. I argue that relativism is best (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Rejecting Internalism.Michael Sean Brady - 1998 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    Internalism is the view that the truth of normative propositions depends solely upon elements which are internal to subjects. In this dissertation I argue that we should reject the primary rationale for taking an internalist line in various areas of normative assessment, namely a principle known as the Internalism Requirement. In the first part of the dissertation I focus on epistemology, and argue that we should reject the internalism requirement on epistemic reasons, i.e., the claim that reasons for believing must (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  23
    Suffering and punishment.Michael S. Brady - 2020 - In Amalia Amaya & Maksymilian Del Mar (eds.), Virtue, Emotion and Imagination in Law and Legal Reasoning. Chicago: Hart Publishing. pp. 139-156.
    This paper offers a defence of the Communicative Theory of Punishment against recent criticisms due to Matt Matravers. According to the Communicative Theory, the intentional imposition of suffering by the judiciary is justified because it is intrinsic to the condemnation and censure that an offender deserves as a result of wrongdoing. Matravers raises a number of worries about this idea – grounded in his thought that suffering isn’t necessary for censure, and as a consequence sometimes the imposition of suffering can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  33
    The Ethics of Care and Empathy, by Michael Slote.The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics, by Michael Slote.Michael S. Brady - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):980-988.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  5
    Virtue, emotion, and attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 115–131.
    This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 Acknowledgments References.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32.  18
    Editor's Introduction.Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):330-330.
  33.  22
    Ethics.Penelope Davies & Michael S. Brady - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (3):284-286.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark