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Michael Smith [126]Michael B. Smith [21]Michael A. Smith [12]Michael P. Smith [8]
Michael D. Smith [7]Michael Joseph Smith [5]Michael Llewellyn Smith [3]Michael E. Smith [3]

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Profile: Michael Smith (Princeton University, Monash University)
Profile: Michael Smith (Manchester Metropolitan University)
Profile: Michael B. Smith
Profile: Michael Smith (Aachen University of Technology)
Profile: Michael Smith (Australian National University)
Profile: Michael Smith
  1. The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  2. Minimalism, truth-aptitude and belief.Michael Smith - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):21-26.
  3. Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):93-109.
    The requirements of instrumental rationality are often thought to be normative conditions on choice or intention, but this is a mistake. Instrumental rationality is best understood as a requirement of coherence on an agent's non-instrumental desires and means-end beliefs. Since only a subset of an agent's means-end beliefs concern possible actions, the connection with intention is thus more oblique. This requirement of coherence can be satisfied either locally or more globally, it may be only one among a number of such (...)
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  4. Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the (...)
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  5. The Humean Theory of Motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  6. Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.
  7.  30
    The Moral Problem.Nicholas L. Sturgeon & Michael Smith - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):94.
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  8.  6
    The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
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  9. Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.Frank Jackson & Michael Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  10. Internal Reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
    The idea that there is such an analytic connection will hardly come as news. It amounts to no more and no less than an endorsement of the claim that all reasons are 'internal', as opposed to 'external', to use Bernard Williams's terms (Williams 1980). Or, to put things in the way Christine Korsgaard favours, it amounts to an endorsement of the 'internalism requirement' on reasons (Korsgaard 1986). But how exactly is the internalism requirement to be understood? What does it tell (...)
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  11.  77
    Ethical Particularism and Patterns.Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--99.
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  12. Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics.Michael Smith - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    Michael Smith has written a series of seminal essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith's essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons, Williams and Korsgaard on internal and (...)
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  13.  97
    Backgrounding Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  14. Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
    People ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to believe and certain things they ought not to believe. In supposing this to be so, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to desire and do and they make corresponding assumptions (...)
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  15.  56
    Neutral and Relative Value After Moore.Michael Smith - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):576-598.
  16. Global Consequentialism.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason & Dale Miller (eds.), Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.
  17. The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy.Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Oxford Handbooks offer authoritative and up-to-date surveys of original research in a particular subject area. Specially commissioned essays from leading figures in the discipline give critical examinations of the progress and direction of debates. Oxford Handbooks provide scholars and graduate students with compelling new perspectives upon a wide range of subjects in the humanities and social sciences. The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves (...)
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  18. Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies).Michael Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.
  19. Minimalism and Truth Aptness.Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.
    This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.
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  20. In Defense of "the Moral Problem": A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord.Michael Smith - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):84-119.
  21. Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty.Michael Smith - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 2006--133.
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  22.  62
    Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton.Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):160–168.
  23.  8
    Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
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  24. The Possibility of Philosophy of Action.Michael A. Smith - 1998 - In Jan Bransen & Stefaan Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--41.
    This article was conceived as a sequel to “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” The paper addresses various challenges to the standard account of the explanation of intentional action in terms of desire and means-end belief, challenges that didn’t occur to me when I wrote “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” I begin by suggesting that the attraction of the standard account lies in the way in which it allows us to unify a vast array of otherwise diverse types of action explanation. (...)
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  25.  83
    Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
    Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The (...)
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  26. Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason.Michael Smith - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):98-125.
    In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value-based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice (...)
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  27.  7
    The Magic of Constitutivism.Michael Smith - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):187-200.
    Constitutivism is the view that we can derive a substantive account of normative reasons for action—perhaps a Kantian account, perhaps a hedonistic account, perhaps a desire-fulfillment account, this is up for grabs—from abstract premises about the nature of action and agency. Constitutivists are thus bound together by their conviction that such a derivation is possible, not by their agreement about which substantive reasons can be derived, and not by agreement about the features of action and agency that permit the derivation. (...)
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  28. Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues.Michael J. Smith - 1998 - Ethics and International Affairs 12 (1):63–79.
    This essay analyzes the arguments justifying or opposing the notion of humanitarian intervention from realist and liberal perspectives and considers the difficulties of undertaking such interventions effectively and consistently.
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  29. Frog and Toad Lose Control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63–73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  30. Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
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  31. The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller.Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):175–184.
    Alexander Miller objects to the argument for moral judgement internalism that I provide in _The Moral Problem. Miller's objection suggests a misunderstanding of the argument. In this reply I take the opportunity to restate the argument in slightly different terms, and to explain why Miller's objection betrays a misunderstanding.
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  32.  64
    Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW]Michael Smith - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; no (...)
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  33. Kinds of Consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.
  34.  81
    Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth.Michael Smith - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):1 - 11.
  35.  60
    External Reasons.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2006 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 6--142.
  36.  36
    The Structure of Orthonomy.Michael Smith - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.
    According to the standard story of action, a story that can be traced back at least to David Hume , actions are those bodily movements that are caused and rationalized by a pair of mental states: a desire for some end, where ends can be thought of as ways the world could be, and a belief that something the agent can just do, namely, move her body in the way to be explained, has some suitable chance of making the world (...)
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  37. Synchronic Self-Control is Always Non-Actional.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123–131.
  38.  89
    Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics.Michael Smith - 2001 - Ratio 14 (2):93–115.
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  39. And Dearest Objection.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 237.
     
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  40.  48
    Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience.Michael Smith - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-256.
  41.  16
    Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
  42.  18
    The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing.Michael Smith - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 50.
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  43.  61
    Internalism's Wheel.Michael A. Smith - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):277-302.
    If an agent judges that she morally ought to PHI in certain circumstances C then, according to internalists, absent practical irrationality, she must be motivated, to some extent, to PHI in C. Internalists thus accept what I have elsewhere called the ‘practicality requirement on moral judgement’. There are many different theories about the nature and content of moral judgement that aspire to explain and capture the truth embodied in internalism, and these theories share little in common beyond that aspiration. Worse (...)
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  44. Reasons with Rationalism After All.Michael Smith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):521-530.
    Kieran Setiya begins Reasons Without Rationalism by outlining and arguing for a schema in terms of which he thinks we best understand the nature of normative reasons for action. This is: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has a collection of psychological states, C, such that the disposition to be moved to ϕ by C-and-the-belief-that-p is a good disposition of practical thought, and C contains no false beliefs. " As (...)
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  45.  11
    Two Kinds of Consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):257-272.
  46. Outside the Subject.Emmanuel Levinas & Michael B. Smith - 1995 - Human Studies 18 (4):439-446.
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  47. The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau.Michael Smith - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):254–266.
    Russ Schafer-Landau’s ‘Moral judgement and normative reasons’ is admirably clear and to the point (Schafer-Landau 1999). He presents his own version of the argument for the practicality requirement on moral judgement – that is, for the claim that those who have moral beliefs are either motivated or practically irrational – that I gave in The Moral Problem (Smith 1994), and he then proceeds to identify several crucial problems. In what follows I begin by making some comments about his presentation of (...)
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  48. Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
    When we say that a subject has attitudes that she is rationally required to have, does that entail that she has those attitudes for reasons? In other words, is there a deep nexus between being rational and responding to reasons? Many have argued that there is. For example, Derek Parfit tells us that 'to be rational is to respond to reasons '. But I am not so sure. I begin by considering this question in the domain of theoretical rationality. The (...)
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  49. Meta-Ethics.Michael Smith - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--30.
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    Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value.Michael Smith - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):329-347.
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