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  1. 'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
    Can known disagreement with our epistemic peers undermine or defeat the justification our beliefs enjoy? Much of the current literature argues for one of two extreme positions on this topic, either that the justification of each person's belief is (fully) defeated by the awareness of disagreement, or that no belief is defeated by this awareness. I steer a middle course and defend a principle describing when a disagreement yields a partial defeater, which results in a loss of some, but not (...)
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  2. Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
    Consider two people who disagree about some important claim (e.g. the future moral and political consequences of current U.S. economic policy are X). They each believe the other person is in possession of relevant evidence, is roughly equally competent to evaluate that evidence, etc. From the epistemic point of view, how should such recognized disagreement affect their doxastic attitude toward the original claim? Recent research on the epistemology of disagreement has converged upon three general ways of answering this question. The (...)
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  3. The Epistemological Limits of Experience-Based Exclusive Religious Belief.Erik Baldwin & Michael Thune - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (4):445-455.
    Alvin Plantinga and other philosophers have argued that exclusive religious belief can be rationally held in response to certain experiences – independently of inference to other beliefs, evidence, arguments, and the like – and thus can be 'properly basic'. We think that this is possible only until the believer acquires the defeater we develop in this paper, a defeater which arises from an awareness of certain salient features of religious pluralism. We argue that, as a consequence of this defeater, continued (...)
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    A Molinist-Style Response to Schellenberg.Michael Thune - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):33-41.
  5.  52
    Core Elements of Philosophy.Michael Thune & Jeff Wisdom - 2015 - Kendall-Hunt.
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  6.  12
    Disagreement, by Bryan Frances. [REVIEW]Michael Thune - 2015 - Teaching Philosophy 38 (4):485-488.
  7.  9
    God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism, by Robert T. Lehe.Michael Thune - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):407-413.
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  8.  15
    Naturalism, Hope, and Alethic Rationality.Michael Thune - 2006 - Philo 9 (1):5-11.
    In my “Plantinga Untouched,” I argued that James Beilby’s recent objection to Plantinga’s EAAN was unsuccessful. Beilby has sincereplied that a naturalist can grant the Inscrutability Thesis and yet be alethically rational in hoping for a high P(R/N and future developments of E) and, therefore, needn’t accept the alethic defeater for R. I argue that this is impossible, since a naturalist cannot consistently grant that thesis and meet Beilby’s own criteria for alethic hope. Consequently, Plantinga is (still) right in maintaining (...)
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  9. Paul K. Moser. The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press, 2008.Michael Thune - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2):242--247.
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  10.  40
    Paul K. Moser. The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press, 2008.Michael Thune - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (3):227-232.
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  11.  8
    Plantinga Untouched: A Response to Beilby on the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.Michael Thune - 2005 - Philosophia Christi 7 (1):157-168.
    In my "Plantinga Untouched: A Response to Beilby on the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (Philosophia Christi 7:1 [2005], pp. 157-67), I argue that James Beilby's (2003) objection to Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism" (EAAN) is unsuccessful. Along the way, I argue that the move to grant Plantinga's 'inscrutability thesis' - namely, that the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism and evolutionary theory [P(R/N&E)], is low or inscrutable - presents significant problems for the one who accepts N&E.
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