This article examines Kant′s use of the expression fact of reason by giving an analysis of the pseudo-mathematical method which Kant employs in the first part of the Critique of Practical Reason. It turns out that Kant′s use of this expression has nothing to do with appealing to a certain fact as being an obvious, self-evident truth. There is no need for such an appeal since the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason is a practical postulate which, like a postulate (...) in geometry, is unquestionably certain. In order to realize its validity it is sufficient to know what a practical law is and on what its validity depends. The fundamental law of pure practical reason needs, in Kant′s view, a deduction since it is a synthetic principle a priori. But its deduction cannot be a proof since postulates neither can nor need be proved. It has to be a justification which guarantees that the use of pure reason in giving practical laws is not transcendent, but immanent. This justification has, unlike Kant′s deduction of the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, the systematic form of a defence which invalidates possible objections by showing that they themselves necessarily rest on a transcendent use of reason. (shrink)
Kants Auflösung des Körper-Seele-Problems in den ersten beiden Auflagen der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ kann angemessen als ein transzendentaler Monismus beschrieben werden. Hegels Anthropologie ist im Wesentlichen eine Modifikation von Kants Ansicht.
Kant's theory of space includes the idea that straight lines and planes can be defined in Euclidean geometry by a concept which nowadays has been revived in the field of fractal geometry: the concept of self-similarity. Absolute self-similarity of straight lines and planes distinguishes Euclidean space from any other geometrical space. Einstein missed this fact in his attempt to refute Kant's theory of space in his article ‘Geometrie und Erfahrung’. Following Hilbert and Schlick he took it for granted, mistakenly, that (...) purely geometrical definitions of the concepts of straight line and plane are not feasible, except as “implicit definitions”. Therefore Einstein's criticism is not persuasive. (shrink)
Here I attempt to clarify the general sense of the question that forms the background of Hegel's section on contradiction: What is the essence of contradiction? To what extent does this question pose a philosophical problem for Hegel? By considering this problem can we come to understand contradiction as a relation pertaining to "objective logic"? Translated by Erin Flynn & Kenneth R. Westphal. Originally published as "Über Hegels Lehre vom Widerspruch," in: Dieter Henrich, ed., Probleme der Hegelschen Logik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, (...) 1986), 107-28. (shrink)
Using the behavioral agency model, we analyze how two compensation design characteristics, pay-performance sensitivity and duration of CEO compensation, affect corporate social performance. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay is negatively associated with poor social performance but also negatively affects strong social performance. These results suggest that pay-performance sensitivity increases the relevance of potential negative consequences of poor social performance. However, the ‘insurance’ benefits of strong social performance may also become less relevant. With respect to the duration (...) of CEO compensation, we find that it reduces poor social performance. This finding confirms arguments that a long-term compensation time horizon increases the perceived threat that the negative effects of poor social performance will become visible. With our findings, we integrate behavioral agency theory with the traditional stakeholder views. (shrink)
The ArgumentOne of the earliest arguments for Copernicanism was a widely accepted fact: that on a horizontal plane a body subject to no external resistance can be set in motion by the smallest of all possible forces. This fact was contrary to Aristotelian physics; but it was a physical argument for the possibility of the Copernican world system. For it would be explained if that system was true or at least possible.Galileo argued: only nonviolent motions can be caused by the (...) smallest of all possible forces; hence resistance-free horizontal motions are nonviolent; this confirms Copernicanism insofar as it designates the rotations of celestial spheres as nonviolent.Galileo's argument was compatible with the specific Copernican version of impetus mechanics; but it was also compatible with a principle of inertia. Thus it promoted decisively the transition from impetus mechanics to classical inertial mechanics. (shrink)
As is well known, § 6 of Kant’s Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right contains five paragraphs that do not belong there. The article shows that their correct location is at the end of § 16. This sheds some new light on Kant’s theory of property and its significance for Kant’s doctrine of cosmopolitan right.
This article defends the view that the logical vocabulary of syllogistic is sufficient for representing the logical form of rules and laws of non-syllogistic predicate logic. This representation requires replacement only of the descriptive vocabulary of syllogistic by non-syllogistic descriptive signs. The validity of rules and laws of modern predicate logic rests on the validity of rules and laws which can without exception be represented in the formal language of syllogistic. Expressions of this language are representations of logical form. Frege's (...) view that relationships between logical subjects and logical predicates can be „reduced“ to relationships between functions and arguments confuses logical and grammatical subjects as well as logical and grammatical predicates. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to explain the proofs Aristotle calls proofs "by exposition" and to find out the rules and principles these proofs rest on. The first part shows why previous attempts to explain Aristotle's method of "exposition" have failed. The second part develops a new explanation and reconstructs all of Aristotle's expository proofs on the basis of a few simple rules. The last part shows that the new interpretation of Aristotle's method has very important consequences regarding, firstly, (...) the extent to which Aristotle's logic is valid, secondly, the relationship between syllogistic and geometric exposition and, last but not least, the correct understanding of the principles underlying Aristotle's logical system and the correct understanding of what a "complete" syllogism is. Thus, the article solves a number of fundamental problems concerning the interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic. (shrink)
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia (...) additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant's view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle's view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant's logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 357-365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 199-213 (cf. Ebert's answer in the same issue pp. 215-231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2009) 40: 365-372). I shall argue, that Kant's principle 'nota notae est nota rei ipsius' and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant's logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. (shrink)
In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part  of the following article. I (...) want to show that (1) according to Aristotle's Prior Analytics perfect and imperfect syllogisms do not differ by their being evident, but by the reason for their being evident, (2) Aristotle uses the same words to denote proofs of the validity of perfect and imperfect syllogisms („apodeixis”, "deiknusthai" etc.), (3) accordingly, Aristotle defines perfect syllogisms not as being evident, but as "requiring nothing beyond the things taken in order to make the necessity evident", i.e. as not "requiring one or more things that are necessary because of the terms assumed, but that have not been taken among the propositions" (APr. I. 1), (4) the proofs by which the validity of perfect assertoric syllogisms can be shown according to APr. I. 4 are based on the Dictum de omni et nullo, (5) the fact that Aristotle describes these proofs only in rough outlines corresponds to the fact that his proofs of the validity of other fundamental rules are likewise produced in rough outlines, e.g. his proof of the validity of conversio simplex in APr. I. 2, which usually has been misunderstood (also by Ebert): (6) Aristotle does not prove the convertibility of E-sentences by presupposing the convertibility of I-sentences; only the reverse is true. (shrink)
Es läßt sich zeigen, daß die Gültigkeit der vollkommenen Syllogismen der Aristotelischen Modallogik auf der Gültigkeit eines Systems von Grundregeln beruhen, das ein genaues nicht-wahrheitsfunktionales Analogon zu dem um das Brouwersche Axiom erweiterten System T ist. Die Gültigkeit dieses Systems beruht auf Grundannahmen, die eine bestimmte Auffassung des assertorischen Satzes einschließen. Die Gründe, aus denen sich einsehen läßt, wie vorteilhaft in systematischer Hinsicht die Darstellung der Aristotelischen Syllogistik in einem ausschließlich nicht-wahrheitsfunktionalen logischen Vokabular und wie angemessen in historischer Hinsicht die (...) oben eingesetzte Methode der Gültigkeitsbeweise für vollkommene Syllogismen ist, habe ich meiner Abhandlung über die Prinzipien der Logik ausführlich dargestellt. (shrink)