Results for 'MichaelE Bratman'

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  1.  33
    Review Essay: Intention, Plans, and Practical ReasonIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Zimmerman & Michael E. Bratman - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1):189.
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  2.  13
    Michael Bratman’s Planning, Time, and Self-Governance.J. David Velleman - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):913-925.
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  3.  39
    Michael Bratman’s Planning, Time, and Self-Governance.J. David Velleman - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-13.
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  4.  17
    Michael Bratman.Taking Plans Seriously - 2001 - In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press.
  5.  37
    Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman.Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Michael Bratman's work has been unusually influential, with significance in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, computer science, law, and primatology.The essays in this volume engage with ideas and themes prominent in Bratman's work. The volume also includes a lengthy reply by Bratman that breaks new ground and deepens our understanding of the nature of action.
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  6. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe.Michael Brent - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):371-374.
  7.  42
    Review of Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays[REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).
  8.  7
    Shared Agency, Michael Bratman[REVIEW]Stephen J. White - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):816-821.
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  9. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. (...)
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  10.  90
    Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together[REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  11. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications (...)
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  12.  17
    Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael Bratman - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
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  13. L’Intenzione Come Autogoverno Attraverso Il Tempo: Michael Bratman E Il Problema Dell’Agency.Gianluca Verrucci - 2016 - Esercizi Filosofici 11 (1).
    The paper analyses Bratman’s planning theory of intention and action, trying to assess its merits in relation to contemporary debates about the constitution of agency. After discussing the limits of the so called belief-desire model in representing the agent’s standpoint, the paper focuses on how planning states can sustain an alternative view based on self-governing strategies allegedly capable of supporting a distinctive sense of personal continuity over time. It ends up with the discussion of some related concerns pertaining to (...)
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  14. Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.
    We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...)
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  15. Structures of Agency:Essays: Essays.Michael E. Bratman - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics (...)
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  16. Harry G. Frankfurt (Author), Christine Korsgaard (Commentary), Michael Bratman (Commentary), Meir Dan-Cohen (Commentary), Debra Satz (Editor), Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right. [REVIEW]J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):117-121.
    Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right is written in a manner that is accessible to all. Frankfurt’s arguments are, as usual, clear and persuasive. Korsgaard’s, Bratman’s, and Dan-Cohen’s comments are thought provoking. There are, however, two main areas in which Frankfurt’s arguments need clarification (the notion of wholehearted identification, and the concept of ambivalence), and there are misunderstandings of Frankfurt at work in Korsgaard’s (relationship between the self and the will, and concept of the will for Frankfurt) and (...)
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  17.  61
    Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman[REVIEW]Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3 (43).
  18.  18
    Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35.
    We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...)
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  19.  52
    Review of Faces of Intention by Michael Bratman[REVIEW]J. David Velleman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202).
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  20. Shared Cooperative Activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
  21.  29
    Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency Michael Bratman Cambridge Studies in Philosophy New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Xiii + 288 Pp., $59.95, $18.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Emer O’Hagan - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):393-.
  22. Shared Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
  23.  24
    Harry G. Frankfurt (Author), Christine Korsgaard (Commentary), Michael Bratman (Commentary), Meir Dan-Cohen (Commentary), Debra Satz (Editor), Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right.J. S. Swindell - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):117-121.
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  24. Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  25. Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
  26.  11
    Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality.Michael Bratman - 2018 - Oup Usa.
    Our capacity for planning agency is central to our human lives. These essays aim both to deepen our understanding of basic norms that guide our plan-infused thinking and to defend their status as norms of practical rationality. This defense appeals both to forms of pragmatic support and to the ways in which these norms track conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time.
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  27. Shared Agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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  28. Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self‐Governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.
  29. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  30. Intention,--Plans,--And--Practical--Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):632-634.
     
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  31. I Intend That We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.
  32. Time, Rationality and Self-Governance.Michael E. Bratman - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.
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  33. Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  34. Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):119-121.
     
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  35.  8
    Action, Intention, and Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 105 (4):927-930.
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  36.  12
    Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):586.
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  37.  32
    Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity : Comments on Bratman, Shared Agency, Planning Theory of Acting Together.Björn Petersson - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):27–37.
    Michael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within (...)
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  38.  44
    Review of Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Edited by Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  39. Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — (...)
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  40. Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.
    Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.
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  41. Valuing and the Will.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):249 - 265.
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  42. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In S. Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 29-61.
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  43. Structures of Agency. Essays.Michael Bratman - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):97-112.
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  44. Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1998 - In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59--83.
     
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  45.  70
    Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith.Michael E. Bratman - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):59-76.
    These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  46.  13
    Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.
    We are purposive agents; but we—adult humans in a broadly modern world—are more than that. We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features—to our reflectiveness, our planfulness, and our conception (...)
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  47. Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together: New York, Oxford University Press USA, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-190-933999-0, 240 Pages, £ 19.99.Andras Szigeti - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
    If you have ever had to move house, you will know this: the worst part is the sofa. You cannot do it alone. Nor will it be enough for me to just lift one end waiting for you to lift the other. We will have to work together to get the job done. If spaces are tight, we will even have to find a practical solution to a tantalizing mathematical puzzle: the moving sofa problem.Joint actions like that are part and (...)
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  48. Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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  49.  34
    Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. ISBN 9780199339990, $29.95, Pbk.Steven Weimer - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):489-493.
    In Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together, Michael Bratman refines, systematizes, and defends his “planning theory” of shared agency, various elements of which were sketched in a series of earlier essays on the topic. The book is analytically rigorous and fairly technical at points, but organized and written with extraordinary clarity. It represents a valuable contribution to the literature on shared intention and joint activity, and is essential reading for philosophers working in that area.Bratman takes as (...)
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  50. Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint.Michael E. Bratman - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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