This paper deals with the connection between the Boyle-Mariotte-law and the Van der Waals-law from the perspective of the Structuralist Theory Conception as well as the Pragmatic Idealization Concept. It was inspired by an interesting paper by Martti Kuokkanen and Timo Tuomivaara, recently published in this journal.1 One result of the Kuokkanen-Tuomivaara-paper is that the Boyle-Mariotte-law is not an idealized law and therefore not an idealized special case of the Van der Waals-law, but that its models can be expanded to (...) the models of an idealized special case of the Van der Waals-law. From the perspective of idealized diachronic theory-elements and -nets the second part of this result shall be questioned. (shrink)
Dans son étude sur le petit domaine de Triberg dépendant de la province habsbourgeoise de Vorderösterreich, situé dans le sud-ouest de l'Allemagne actuelle, l'historienne allemande Michaela Hohkamp, assistante à la Freie Universtität de Berlin, s'interroge sur le mouvement de centralisation de l'État que l'on a coutume d'observer à cette époque dans l'Europe entière. En dépit de son relatif isolement géographique au cœur de la Forêt Noire, Triberg, est toutefois touché par les vastes t..
The main focus of this article is little known in Poland political tolerance. The article aims to: reconstruct of Michael Walzer concept of the political tolerance; to place it in the typology of relativism – universalism; to make a first step towards the separation of political tolerance from personal tolerance for a general discussion of tolerance; demonstrate that tolerance is not only modern, liberal concept, associated with the individual freedom; show that the dispute about tolerance not only between the enemies (...) and the allies of tolerance, but also among the allies themselves. In an innovative way it defends that thesis that Poland is a tolerant state. (shrink)
Michael Polanyi’s philosophical ideas are interpret in various ways worldwide. In Poland the name remains (barely) listed among such philosophers of science as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whereas English or German authors regard him rather as a theorist of knowledge and place aside Gilbert Ryle, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The aim of the paper is to describe typical ways of how Polanyi’s ideas are being currently received and to report his main statements. It is proceeded (...) in four steps. After short biography of the author briefed in first point, second one sums up the content of all his main works, depicting thereby the evolution of his views. In third point receptions published in Polish, English and German literature are screened and discussed, focusing on issues of rationality, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge and tacit knowing. Fourth point states a problem of alleged holism and eclecticism as interpretative characteristics of Polanyi’s philosophical views. (shrink)
Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — (...) in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). (shrink)
Even his peers called Locke's political philosophy “The ABC of Politics“: not only does he clarify why one should exit the state of nature (government guarantees protection of life, freedom, and wealth) but also what a good government has to provide. A government should protect individuals from assaults of fellow citizens, other countries, and itself. Locke also shows how to put limits to the power of political institutions: by division of powers, by law, by neutral judges, and by making people (...) trust their government -- and having the right to revolt when their trust is betrayed. This book provides a cooperative commentary to all important topics of Locke's "Two Treatises". With entries by Wolfgang von Leyden, Bernd Ludwig, Peter Niesen, Francis Oakley, Birger P. Priddat, Michaela Rehm, Michael Schefczyk, Ludwig Siep, A. John Simmons, und Simone Zurbuchen. (shrink)
The paper is devoted to demonstrating the systematic value of the “Two Treatises of Government”. Even though their genesis is rooted in the political circumstances of Locke’s life-time, the “Treatises” are not simply a pamphlet designed to support the Whig cause, as Locke’s political ideas are derived from his theoretical philosophy and from his concept of natural law.
The paper discusses the foundation and genesis of the political society according to Locke, elaborating why the relationship between the civil society and the government is not defined in contractual terms, but by the notion of “trust”. Rehm argues against the view that Locke supports a liberal proceduralism, stressing that consent for him is indeed the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of legitimate political power: what needs to be added is action in accordance with the law of nature.
I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a (...) way to rule out theses like quantifier variance without appealing to fundamentality, grounding, or "levels" of reality. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to advance research on CSR beyond the stalemate of economic versus ethical models by providing an alternative perspective integrating existing views and allowing for more shared dialog and research in the field. It is suggested that we move beyond making a normative case for ethical models and practices of CSR by moving beyond the question of how to manage organizational self-interest toward the question of how accurate current conceptions of the organizational self seem to (...) be. Specifically, it is proposed that CSR is not a question of how self-interested the corporation should be, but how this self is defined. Economic and ethical models of CSR are not models of opposition but exist on a continuum between egoic and post-egoic, illusory and authentic conceptions of the organizational self. This means that moving from one to the other is not a question of adopting different paradigms but rather of moving from illusion and dysfunction to authenticity and functionality, from pathology to health. (shrink)
Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
We present an empirical investigation on how multiple stakeholders can influence and contribute to a standard development process. Based on the analysis of comments submitted by stakeholders developing ISO 26000 standard for social responsibility, we found no significant differences between the ratio of accepted and non-accepted comments among various stakeholder groups; however, we conclude that industry is the most influential stakeholder due to the volume of the comments. We also present a set of processes that stakeholders follow to influence and (...) contribute to standards development, namely to (1) eliminate issues that are controversial and undesirable; (2) link and integrate the standard into a network of other documents and ISO standards; (3) seek consensus by highlighting areas for further dialogue or by addressing their exclusion from the standards development, (4) reinforce issues that are important; and (5) improve the content of the new standard. In conclusion, we provide a set of propositions about multi-stakeholder standards development and compare multi-stakeholder involvement in standards developed through a new committee established in existing standards setting organization [i.e., Committees within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)] and through new standards setting organizations established for one specific task (i.e., Forest Stewardship Council). We envisage that our study will be a useful platform to monitor and evaluate future developments of ISO 26000 and other multi-stakeholder standards. (shrink)
This article is the result of an empirical research project analyzing the decision behaviour of Austrian managers in ethical dilemma situations. While neoclassical economic theory would suggest a pure economic rational basis for management decisions, the empirical study conducted by the authors put other concepts to a test, thereby analyzing their importance for managerial decision making: specific notions of fairness, reciprocal altruism, and commitment. After reviewing some of the theoretical literature dealing with such notions, the article shows the results of (...) an online survey working with scenarios depicting ethical dilemma situations. By judging such scenarios the respondents showed their preference for the named concepts, though with different degrees of confirmation. The results (with all limitations of an online survey in mind) support the theoretical work on the named concepts: Fairness elements (including Rawlsian principles of justice and an understanding of fairness as conceived by a reference transaction) play a major part in management decisions in ethical dilemma situations. Also, commitment as a behaviour that sticks to rules even if personal welfare is negatively touched, and reciprocal altruism as a cooperative behaviour that expects a reciprocal beneficial action from other persons have been concepts used by Austrian managers when analyzing ethical dilemmas. The article also tries to put the results into a comparative perspective by taking into account other studies on ethical decision factors conducted with, e.g. medical doctors or journalists, and by discussing intercultural implications of business ethics. (shrink)
The author offers a critical commentary on Rousseau’s chapter on civil religion in the “Social Contract”, book 4, chapter 8. It investigates Rousseau’s attempt to overcome the conflict between politics and religion by merging a civil religion that creates an emotional bond to the particular state without fostering superstition and intolerance, and it shows that this attempt fails. It is demonstrated that Rousseau’s concept of civil religion neither offers any doctrine of salvation transcending this life nor prescribes any content going (...) beyond moral norms. Civil religion for Rousseau is in service to politics and its instrumental character is desired by the citizens who are supposed autonomously to agree on the need of a secularized civil ethic. (shrink)
The paper is an analysis of Rousseau’s concept of property. It shows that Rousseau wants to draft a new system of politics that will not forbid private property but will limit its scale. It aims to clarify that Rousseau owes much to John Locke’s theory and even adopts Locke’s definition that it is a basic purpose of the social contract to protect the citizen’s property. It is argued that in spite of these similarities Rousseau’s account differs fundamentally from Locke’s. Having (...) a right of ownership to something for Locke means to be entitled to exclude anybody else from it: to say “this is mine” in Locke is synonymous to “it is not yours”. For Rousseau having a right of ownership to something implies a self-limitation by the proprietor: to say “this is mine” in Rousseau signifies “everything else is not mine”. While property rights in Locke have the purpose of legitimizing “pleonexia” and economic inequality, Rousseau tries to use them as restrictions to citizens’ desires and greed. (shrink)
The claim of this paper is to show that the “Discourse on the Arts and Sciences” does not propose a general critique of progress as such, but a critique of the idea of progress as promoted by the 18th century “philosophers”. It is argued that Rousseau is no proponent of a Counter-Enlightenment, on the contrary he aims to go further than other thinkers of his time by scrutinizing even progress itself, Enlightenment’s pet notion. In defining arts and sciences as the (...) very driving forces of progress, the “philosophers” according to Rousseau are fostering inequality, because only an elite will be able to succeed in them. By contrast, talking about progress in Rousseau’s view only makes sense if “progress” is defined in moral and political terms, as enabling all men to participate in the promotion of everybody’s well-being. The paper intends to show that Rousseau’s answer to the shortcomings of civilization is not a “return to nature”, but the advancement of artificial institutions: namely, the egalitarian republic. (shrink)
It appears that Rousseau has annulled the dichotomy between man and citizen for the benefit of the citizen – after all, the social contract implies the “total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community”. Does this not mean the individual is completely absorbed by the collectivity? The paper takes up the role of religion for politics in Rousseau’s work to show that even civil religion cannot help to re-establish the lost unity between man and (...) citizen, on the contrary, it only makes this division visible. As long as the individual is part of the body politic, he or she has to accept having a fragmented existence. The text aims to clarify that Rousseau blamed the protagonists of the established churches as well as his fellow Enlightenment philosophers for striving to overcome the contradictions of human existence, while Rousseau himself defended the distinction between “res privata” and “res publica” and the tensions it might cause in the individual. The paper therefore suggests a liberal reading of Rousseau. (shrink)