I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a (...) way to rule out theses like quantifier variance without appealing to fundamentality, grounding, or "levels" of reality. (shrink)
Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
The idea that similar selective processes operate in gene-based evolution, immunology, and operant psychology provides an intuitively appealing metaphor. This idea also isolates questions that operant psychologists should ask and makes some empirical predictions. However, the idea currently lacks the detail needed to precisely separate it from some plausible alternatives. This sort of thinking is the kind that operant psychologists should do if operant theorizing is to survive the competition among ideas.
Exploration of the import for theology of the thought of Michel Foucault has been growing steadily in recent years, principally in relation to the Christian tradition. This article traces the evolution of this dialogue with his work, with a view to assessing its current state of development, highlighting the critical issues involved, and suggesting likely lines of investigation going forward. Having surveyed applications of aspects of his work to a variety of theological questions, and the discussion of his work under (...) the rubric of 'postmodern theology', the article focuses upon the more in-depth theological engagement with his thought inaugurated by the work of James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette. It is proposed that one of the most critical issues in this debate, currently and going forward, concerns assessment of the kind of relation to theology, if any, that can be extrapolated from Foucault's deployment of notions like 'spirituality' and his engagement with various theological themes. (shrink)
This article rethinks Michel Foucault’s relation to religion by situating his engagement with the ‘death of God’ in relation to his ongoing efforts to frame critical discourse in consistently immanent terms. It argues that a certain, indirect ‘theological’ horizon is the paradoxical and problematic limit, for Foucault, of the possibility of a thoroughgoing immanent discourse in his earlier work, due to the paradoxes of the death of long-duration of God (and ‘man’). The relation of his work to religion thus emerges (...) less as a productive question, for Foucault, than as a problem to be resolved if his critical project is to be viable. The article argues that his later work is informed by a significant re-framing of his relation to religion, signalled in comments he makes at the end of his 1978 lecture, “What is Critique?” and performed in his engagements with Christian mysticism, the ‘political spirituality’ of the Iranian revolution and early Christian practices of the self. Foucault is shown to perform a complex openness to religion as ‘other,’ which negotiates the ‘religious problem’ haunting his early work, even as it must repeatedly risk undermining his project. It is concluded that the relation to religion in Foucault’s work, less reflects resonance with aspects of a religious worldview, than it stages and clarifies the challenge of thinking otherwise immanently after the death of God. (shrink)
In a recent article, Martin McQuillan has inaugurated a vigorous Derridean critique of a “violent tone” that has recently arisen in continental philosophy, exemplified by Slavoj Žižek’s attempt to retrieve Robespierre’s notion of “Terror. This article sets out to complicate such critique, opening a new perspective on the Derrida- Žižek debate on the question of politics. In particular, it examines Derrida’s and Žižek’s respective approaches to difference and violence as differing responses to a shared problematic of constructing a consistent politics (...) within the horizon of a finite world. It proceeds by elaborating Žižek’s critique of Derridean deconstruction, highlighting how Derrida’s attempt to minimise violence via maximal openness to difference, within the horizon of the future-to-come, inadvertently reinscribes a minimal but problematic ontotheological trace which ironically circumscribes deconstructive openness to difference. The article goes on to examine how Žižek’s alternative construal of a purified violence and self-difference ends up repeating in somewhat different terms these same problematic features of Derrida’s writings. The article concludes by arguing that each approach requires a theoretically-integrated ethos of ‘becoming other’ in which the unavoidable theoretical anticipation of difference is ruptured by the actual encounter with difference. (shrink)
Questions of cultural representation and contestation, central to political and ethical thinking after the so-called ‘cultural turn’ of recent decades, have if anything intensified in a twenty-first century of new media, globalization, migration, and ever renewed struggles over identity, memory, and cultural performance. At the same time, theoretical debate is increasingly marked by a concern to retrieve a properly political sphere of action as such. The essays collected in this interdisciplinary volume aim to break new ground by exploring the critical (...) space between the apparently enduring political vitality of cultural representation and contestation today, on the one hand, and the possible limits of a ‘cultural’ politics, on the other. Combining concrete researches and theoretical reflection, and including a final chapter exploring the issues raised by the essays, this volume will be of interest to those in the disciplines of cultural studies, sociology, political philosophy and ethics. (shrink)
In The Monstrosity of Christ, Slavoj Žižek cites the twins Claus and Lucas, from Agota Kristof’s The Notebook, as exemplars of the simultaneously naive and reflexive stance, which he considers to be crucial to a materialist ethics. This article argues, however, that the twins’ stance suffers from a ‘blindness’ as to the ethicality of their acts, shared by Žižek’s own ethics. It proposes that, by situating their actions within the trilogy to which The Notebook belongs, a richer three-fold ethics of (...) reflexive subjectivization emerges, in which reflexivity becomes the paradoxical condition of naivety, enabling Žižek to address this problem. Naive acts are granted consistency and significance by the construction of a new point de capiton, and a related interpretative framework, . However, insofar as this construction fails, acts are opened to the judgment of what is ‘other’ , constituting what in Žižek’s Beckettian terms may be called an ethics of ‘failing again, failing better’. The deeper significance of this proposal is demonstrated by uncovering a similar, but more problematically-realized three-fold reflexive-subjective relation to act within St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, with an appeal to authority taking the place of Kristof’s appeal to concrete historical judgment. It is further argued that insofar as Žižek largely does not attend to these dynamics, he tends to repeat this problematic Pauline solution in his own work. The article concludes that Kristof’s ethics of failure enables Žižek to avoid these problems, without compromising his distinctive ethical stance. (shrink)
Dans son étude sur le petit domaine de Triberg dépendant de la province habsbourgeoise de Vorderösterreich, situé dans le sud-ouest de l'Allemagne actuelle, l'historienne allemande Michaela Hohkamp, assistante à la Freie Universtität de Berlin, s'interroge sur le mouvement de centralisation de l'État que l'on a coutume d'observer à cette époque dans l'Europe entière. En dépit de son relatif isolement géographique au cœur de la Forêt Noire, Triberg, est toutefois touché par les vastes t..
The main focus of this article is little known in Poland political tolerance. The article aims to: reconstruct of Michael Walzer concept of the political tolerance; to place it in the typology of relativism – universalism; to make a first step towards the separation of political tolerance from personal tolerance for a general discussion of tolerance; demonstrate that tolerance is not only modern, liberal concept, associated with the individual freedom; show that the dispute about tolerance not only between the enemies (...) and the allies of tolerance, but also among the allies themselves. In an innovative way it defends that thesis that Poland is a tolerant state. (shrink)
Michael Polanyi’s philosophical ideas are interpret in various ways worldwide. In Poland the name remains (barely) listed among such philosophers of science as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whereas English or German authors regard him rather as a theorist of knowledge and place aside Gilbert Ryle, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The aim of the paper is to describe typical ways of how Polanyi’s ideas are being currently received and to report his main statements. It is proceeded (...) in four steps. After short biography of the author briefed in first point, second one sums up the content of all his main works, depicting thereby the evolution of his views. In third point receptions published in Polish, English and German literature are screened and discussed, focusing on issues of rationality, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge and tacit knowing. Fourth point states a problem of alleged holism and eclecticism as interpretative characteristics of Polanyi’s philosophical views. (shrink)
Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — (...) in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). (shrink)
Even his peers called Locke's political philosophy “The ABC of Politics“: not only does he clarify why one should exit the state of nature (government guarantees protection of life, freedom, and wealth) but also what a good government has to provide. A government should protect individuals from assaults of fellow citizens, other countries, and itself. Locke also shows how to put limits to the power of political institutions: by division of powers, by law, by neutral judges, and by making people (...) trust their government -- and having the right to revolt when their trust is betrayed. This book provides a cooperative commentary to all important topics of Locke's "Two Treatises". With entries by Wolfgang von Leyden, Bernd Ludwig, Peter Niesen, Francis Oakley, Birger P. Priddat, Michaela Rehm, Michael Schefczyk, Ludwig Siep, A. John Simmons, und Simone Zurbuchen. (shrink)
The paper discusses the foundation and genesis of the political society according to Locke, elaborating why the relationship between the civil society and the government is not defined in contractual terms, but by the notion of “trust”. Rehm argues against the view that Locke supports a liberal proceduralism, stressing that consent for him is indeed the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of legitimate political power: what needs to be added is action in accordance with the law of nature.
The paper is devoted to demonstrating the systematic value of the “Two Treatises of Government”. Even though their genesis is rooted in the political circumstances of Locke’s life-time, the “Treatises” are not simply a pamphlet designed to support the Whig cause, as Locke’s political ideas are derived from his theoretical philosophy and from his concept of natural law.
The present article deals with specific normative concepts of Spinoza’s ethical system and compares them to certain aspects of the theory of ethics of social consequences. At first, a way to approach the problem of normativity in Spinoza is presented, concentrating on the obligatory character of rational - or intellectual - motives. Then, theoretical evidence is presented which links Spinoza to normative-ethical consequentialism. The basis for a consequentialist model of Spinoza’s ethics is the concept of perfection, and on this basis (...) it seems possible to consider its compatibility with non-utilitarian forms of consequentialism, such as ethics of social consequences. Conclusively, the paper’s aim is to present the possibility of considering Spinozian consequentialism as a non-utilitarian consequentialism, while considering ethics of social consequences as a contemporary form of Spinozian consequentialism. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to advance research on CSR beyond the stalemate of economic versus ethical models by providing an alternative perspective integrating existing views and allowing for more shared dialog and research in the field. It is suggested that we move beyond making a normative case for ethical models and practices of CSR by moving beyond the question of how to manage organizational self-interest toward the question of how accurate current conceptions of the organizational self seem to (...) be. Specifically, it is proposed that CSR is not a question of how self-interested the corporation should be, but how this self is defined. Economic and ethical models of CSR are not models of opposition but exist on a continuum between egoic and post-egoic, illusory and authentic conceptions of the organizational self. This means that moving from one to the other is not a question of adopting different paradigms but rather of moving from illusion and dysfunction to authenticity and functionality, from pathology to health. (shrink)