This interview with Michal Ben-Naftali from March 2004 is one of Derrida's last. It begins with the question of the relationship between love, law, and justice and then moves on to discuss everything from the secret, hospitality, friendship, sacrifice, pardon and psychoanalysis to the relationship between deconstruction and melancholy.
The essay examines several scenes of love in deconstruction, in an attempt to understand why Derrida claims to have ‘an empty head on love in general’, as he says in a film dedicated to his work. Beginning with ‘Romeo and Juliet’ up to Abraham's sacrificial responsibility, the essay aims to interpret Derrida's withdrawal to silence about love as enacting the erotic literary space of his own writing.
The essay examines Scholem's letter-confession on the Hebrew language addressed to Rosenzweig from two perspectives hitherto ignored in the ongoing interpretative consideration of this document: Scholem's repression of the literary space and his consequent exclusion of madness. The essay follows several threads in Derrida's own ‘internal’ reading of the letter, and leans on other Derridean writings such as The Monolingualism of the Other, Schibboleth: For Paul Celan and ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’ in order to suggest two distinct encounters (...) between Derrida and Scholem: In the first encounter, Scholem reads Derrida and proves to be deconstructing his own notions of secular and profane Hebrew, while fighting in vain for his sanity by clinging to liturgical practices against the grain of an ongoing ‘actualization’, politicization or else fictionalization of the sacred language. In the second encounter, it is Derrida who reads Scholem. By transforming the particular conditions of possibility of Hebrew into general conditions of possibility of every language contaminated by a theological-political tension, Derrida contributes some important insights for contemporary Hebrew speakers. (shrink)
Levinas Faces Biblical Figures captures the drama of the encounter between a great philosopher and a text of primary importance. The book considers the ways in which Levinas's thoughts can open up the biblical text to requestioning, and how the biblical text can inform our reading of Levinas.
This paper describes the process of reception of Catholic Modernism in Poland as well as the Polish contribution to this movement. It shows the Polish antimodernist perspective on modernistic thought. The neglect of Polish modernism was caused by the nationalistic character of the Polish theology and has resulted in absence of historical studies of Polish Catholic Modernism. Based on the results of archival and literature research the paper presents a variety of Polish Catholic Modernists and non-Catholic supporters of the modernist (...) thought. A unique place among Polish modernists belongs to Marian Zdziechowski who was the only Polish participant of the international intellectual debate on the “modernisation” of Roman Catholicism. The paper analyses the development of Zdziechowski’s thought and shows that his main demand throughout the modernist debates was to create a new, more efficient apologetics, which would be grounded in the religious experience of the individual. (shrink)
Mill's most famous departure from Bentham is his distinction between higher and lower pleasures. This article argues that quality and quantity are independent and irreducible properties of pleasures that may be traded off against each other – as in the case of quality and quantity of wine. I argue that Mill is not committed to thinking that there are two distinct kinds of pleasure, or that ‘higher pleasures’ lexically dominate lower ones, and that the distinction is compatible with hedonism. I (...) show how this interpretation not only makes sense of Mill but allows him to respond to famous problems, such as Crisp's Haydn and the oyster and Nozick's experience machine. (shrink)
Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue – the moral significance of what I call ‘participation’ – in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he (...) calls ‘moral mathematics’. In my paper, I expose an inconsistency in Parfit's discussion of moral mathematics by showing how it gives conflicting answers to the question of whether participation matters. I conclude by showing how an appreciation of Parfit's error sheds some light on consequentialist thought generally, and on the debate between act- and rule-consequentialists specifically. (shrink)
This is the first volume in a new, definitive, seven-volume edition of the works of Michal Kalecki, one of the twentieth century's most distinguished economists. Kalecki was one of the three contemporary economists to arrive at the conclusions publicized by Keynes, although Kalecki arguably presented these views even earlier than Keynes. Volume I contains Kalecki's writings on the theory of the business cycle and full employment. His seminal Essay on the Business Cycle Theory is preceded by his earlier theoretical (...) studies and followed by publications which developed and defended its main concepts and ideas. This volume also contains the 1939 book Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations, the work which established his reputation. Also included are papers documenting his confrontation with Keynes's General Theory, including Kalecki's review of that work, and his various studies on the theory and policies relating to full employment, both the well known `Political Aspects of Full Employment' and `Three Ways to Full Employment', and those which have unfairly received less attention. The editorial comments and annexes at the end of the volume, besides giving valuable information on the background to the main texts, include illuminating exchanges of correspondence between Kalecki and Keynes, Joan Robinson, and others. (shrink)
The seventh volume of the Collected Works of Michal Kalecki, one of the twentieth century's preeminent economists, contains his empirical studies of the wartime and post-war economy in Britain and the USA, together with papers on the work of other economists and miscellanea.The first part of the book collects together his articles on the economic conditions of Britain during the Second World War, focusing on the rationing of consumption and war finance, and its post-war reconstructions. These articles are among (...) Kalecki's best known, and contributed significantly to his world renown as an economist. Part two contains studies of post-war America, comparing the economy with the situation before the War. Part three contains a group of articles under the title `Political economy and economists', and includes book reviews and essays on the study of economics. Part four collects essays on a variety of topics, including Polish economic planning, construction engineering, and the theory of numbers. As in previous volumes, editorial notes and annexes by Professor Osiaty'nski provide invaluable background information and explanatory glosses on the main text. Among other things, they reveal details of Kalecki's work for the United Nations.Since this is the final volume of the Collected Works, it concludes with a chronology of biographical information and a complete bibliography of Kalecki's writings from 1927 to 1987. (shrink)
The seven volumes will comprise the definitive scholarly edition of the works of Micha/l Kalecki, one of the most distinguished of twentieth-century economists and one of the trio who arrived at the conclusions promulgated by Keynes around the same time as - and in Kalecki's case, arguably earlier than - Keynes himself. Nearly half the material to appear in the seven volumes has never been previously published in English and includes revisions and additions made in the light of recent research, (...) including information about the relationship of Kalecki's ideas to the ideas of contemporary economic theory. This volume deals with the capitalist economy and contains Kalecki's studies on the theory of income distribution in oligopolistic capitalism and on its economic dynamics. Each part of the book consists of essays devoted to a similar topic and individual papers in each part are arranged in chronological order. The editorial comments and annexes at the end of the volume, besides giving valuable information on the background to the main texts, include illuminating exchanges of correspondence between Kalecki and Keynes, Joan Robinson, and others. (shrink)
This volume contains Kalecki's writings on the theory of growth of a socialist economy and the theory of economic efficiency of investment. These are supplemented by essays on some economic and social problems of People's Poland. Though quite theoretical in nature, both the Introduction to the Theory of Growth in a Socialist Economy and Kalecki's many studies in the theory of economic efficiency of investment projects are deeply rooted in his practical experience as an economic planner. It is only in (...) this light that the significance of his contributions to the theory of economic efficiency of investments can be assessed, and his ideas on socialist reproduction can be seen as a whole. Its central point is economic planning, which for Kalecki was the fundamental feature of a socialist economy. (shrink)
The sixth volume of the Collected Works of Micha/l Kalecki, one of the twentieth-century's pre-eminent economists, contains his empirical studies of the capitalist economy, published primarily in pre-war Poland. The first part of the book collects together reviews of business conditions in commodity markets, studies of the structure and operations of large companies and cartels, and articles on international economic relations. These studies, written between 1928 and 1935, demonstrate Kalecki's keen insight into the international consequences of the Great Crisis of (...) 1929-33, and into the developments in Nazi Germany. The second part contains Kalecki's papers on the methodological problems of examining business fluctuations and on constructing indicators of economic trends. Part 3 comprises, Kalecki's estimates of the national income in Poland and of its structure. These studies, conducted between 1931 and 1935, were unique at the time in taking into account the distribution of aggregate income between the main social classes. The editorial notes and annexes at the end of the volume not only provide invaluable background information and explanatory glosses on the main text, but also give invaluable insights into the development of Kalecki's thought. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to shed light on Hegel’s recurring comment that Spinoza’s philosophy lacks the ‘principle of individuality’. It shows that this criticism can have three distinct meanings: that Spinozism cannot account for the multiplicity of finite individuals; that Spinozism leads to a moral devaluation of the finite individual; the form of substance is indifferent and lacks a differentiating principle. It is shown that Hegel argued, somewhat incoherently, for all three.
Hegel has long been considered a major thinker of progress. This paper extends Hegel’s philosophy of progress into an outline of a philosophy of technology. It does this not by directly reading the little Hegel wrote on the subject, but by introducing six central Hegelian ideas that bear on the technological thought. It argues that, for Hegel, mankind is destined to change its destiny; that true change involved qualitative change; that true change is conceptual, and not material, change; that history (...) progresses immanently according to its own laws; that history progresses towards ever greater artificiality; and that artificiality is closely linked to freedom. These ideas cohere into a Hegelian metaphysics of technology, which is supportive of the technological enterprise. This paper is meant both to sketch a metaphysical understanding of the technological enterprise, and to trace the intellectual roots of contemporary technological utopianism. (shrink)
Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)
Is it possible for the state simultaneously to respect deep cultural differences and to protect the hard-won citizenship rights of vulnerable group members, particularly women? This 2001 book argues that it is not only theoretically needed, but also institutionally feasible. Rejecting prevalent normative and legal solutions to this 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', Multicultural Jurisdictions develops a powerful argument for enhancement of the jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities while at the same time providing viable legal-institutional solutions to the problem (...) of sanctioned intra-group rights violation. This new 'joint governance' approach is guided by an innovative principle that strives for the reduction of injustice between minority groups and the wider society, together with the enhancement of justice within them. This book will interest students of political and social theory, law, religion, institutional design, as well as cultural and gender studies. (shrink)
A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true. But in most contexts there is nothing strange at all about asserting indicative conditionals like ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did’. This paper argues that the only compelling explanation of these facts requires the resources of contextualism about knowledge.
In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman’s project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends judgment about (...) some matter if and only if one inquires into this matter. Subsequently, I use conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion to offer a tentative account: S suspends judgment about p iff S believes that she neither believes nor disbelieves that p, S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, and S intends to judge that p or not-p. (shrink)
In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...) showing how it can answer two important objections that have been made to it. First, the famous worry that there is no felt similarity to all pleasant (or unpleasant) experiences (sometimes called ‘the heterogeneity objection’). Second, what I call ‘Findlay’s objection’, the claim that it cannot explain the nature of our attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. (shrink)
The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top-down influences, we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking (...) a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus-control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind. (shrink)
This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.
This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence (...) that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well. (shrink)
The purpose of this study was to measure professional and personal values among nurses, and to identify the factors affecting these values. The participants were 323 Israeli nurses, who were asked about 36 personal values and 20 professional values. The three fundamental professional nursing values of human dignity, equality among patients, and prevention of suffering, were rated first. The top 10 rated values all concerned nurses' responsibility towards patients. Altruism and confidentiality were not highly rated, and health promotion and nursing (...) research were rated among the last three professional values. For personal (instrumental) values, honesty, responsibility and intelligence were rated first, while ambition and imagination were rated 14th and 16th respectively out of 18. Significant differences (P < 0.05) were found among some personal and professional values rated as functions of culture, education, professional seniority, position and field of expertise. The results may assist in understanding the motives of nurses with different characteristics and help to promote their work according to professional ethical values. (shrink)
This paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artiﬁcial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artiﬁ-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in ﬁrst-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, (...) that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artiﬁcial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artiﬁcial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies. (shrink)
Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved (...) faculty for moral judgement. (shrink)
We give a few results concerning the notions of causal completability and causal closedness of classical probability spaces . We prove that any classical probability space has a causally closed extension; any finite classical probability space with positive rational probabilities on the atoms of the event algebra can be extended to a causally up-to-three-closed finite space; and any classical probability space can be extended to a space in which all correlations between events that are logically independent modulo measure zero event (...) have a countably infinite common-cause system. Collectively, these results show that it is surprisingly easy to find Reichenbach-style ‘explanations' for correlations, underlining doubts as to whether this approach can yield a philosophically relevant account of causality. 1 Introduction2 Basic Definitions and Results in the Literature3 Causal Completability the Easy Way: ‘Splitting the Atom’4 Causal Completability of Classical Probability Spaces: The General Case5 Infinite Statistical Common-Cause Systems for Arbitrary Pairs6 ConclusionAppendix A. (shrink)
According to attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, what makes a given sensation count as a pleasure or a pain is just the attitudes of the experiencing agent toward it. In a previous article, I objected to such theories on the grounds that they cannot account for pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them at the time of experience. Recently, Chris Heathwood and Fred Feldman, the two leading contemporary defenders of attitudinal theories, have responded to this objection, (...) in very different ways. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate these responses. My conclusion is that neither response succeeds. (shrink)
National and international criminal law systems are continually seeking doctrinal and theoretical frameworks to help them impose individual liability on collective perpetrators of crime. The two systems move in parallel and draw on each other. Historically, it has been mostly international criminal law that leaned on domestic legal systems for its collective modes of liability. Currently, however, it is the emerging jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court that is at the forefront of innovation, with the doctrine of indirect co-perpetration taking (...) the lead in international prosecutions. The article assesses the potential contribution as well as the limits of this compound doctrine to domestic criminal law jurisprudence, particularly with regard to small-group criminality. Four modes of indirect co-perpetration are discussed, namely shared control, concerted control, controlling board, and flawed triangle perpetration. A doctrine of indirect co-perpetration would enable liability in these modes of perpetration, perhaps with the exception of the latter, which marks the limits of its applicability. (shrink)
Ben Fine traces the origins of social capital through the work of Becker, Bourdieu and Coleman and comprehensively reviews the literature across the social sciences. The text is uniquely critical of social capital, explaining how it avoids a proper confrontation with political economy and has become chaotic. This highly topical text addresses some major themes, including the shifting relationship between economics and other social sciences, the 'publish or perish' concept currently burdening scholarly integrity, and how a social science interdisciplinarity requires (...) a place for political economy together with cultural and social theory. (shrink)
In today's age of restrictionism, a growing number of countries are closing their gates of admission to most categories of would-be immigrants with one important exception. Governments increasingly seek to lure and attract “high value” migrants, especially those with access to large sums of capital. These individuals are offered golden visa programs that lead to fast-tracked naturalization in exchange for a hefty investment, in some cases without inhabiting or even setting foot in the passport-issuing country to which they now officially (...) belong. In the U.S. context, the contrast between the “Dreamers” and “Parachuters” helps to draw out this distinction between civic ties and credit lines as competing bases for membership acquisition. Drawing attention to these seldom-discussed citizenship-for-sale practices, this essay highlights their global surge and critically evaluates the legal, normative, and distributional quandaries they raise. I further argue that purchased membership goods cannot replicate or substitute the meaningful links to a political community that make citizenship valuable and worth upholding in the first place. (shrink)
A popular response to the Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that mental events depend on their physical bases in such a way that the causation of a physical effect by a mental event and its physical base needn’t generate any problematic form of causal overdetermination, even if mental events are numerically distinct from and irreducible to their physical bases. This paper presents and defends a form of dualism that implements this response by using a dispositional essentialist view of properties to (...) argue that the psychophysical laws linking mental events to their physical bases are metaphysically necessary. I show the advantages of such a position over an alternative form of dualism that merely places more “modal weight” on psychophysical laws than on physical laws. The position is then defended against the objection that it is inconsistent with dualism. Lastly, some suggestions are made as to how dualists might clarify the contribution that mental causes make to their physical effects. (shrink)
In this paper, Ayelet Shachar begins by restating the main idea of her important book The Birthright Lottery : Citizenship and Global Inequality and then goes on to address in a constructive spirit the main themes raised by the five preceding comments written by scholars in the fields of law, philosophy and political science.Dans cet article, Ayelet Shachar commence par rappeler l’idée centrale de son livre important The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality avant de répondre de manière (...) constructive aux cinq commentaires qui précèdent, rédigés par des experts dans les domaines du droit, de la philosophie et de la science politique. (shrink)