Bagehot wrote on the methodology of Ricardian political economy some years after the appearance of marginalism. The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate his methodological positions. Bagehot made some significant contributions concerning the nature of economic explanation, the relevance of economic assumptions and the limits of the validity of economic theories. His positions were strongly influenced by social anthropology and Darwinian evolutionism. Bagehot 's originality lies in his evolutionist view of the Ricardian political economy, a view that (...) led him to limit its validity and to reinforce its realisticness, at a time when economics was about to take an opposite direction. (shrink)
What is the relationship between phenomenology and material reality? What would be the place of phenomenology in a discourse about material reality? This paper tries to clarify the relationship between a type of knowledge and an ontological domain which at first sight seems foreign to it. It also contains the outline of a program for future research. We will show that the relationship between phenomenology and material reality is in some sense double. Hints to this duality may already be found (...) in Husserl’s Ideen II. Finally we will question a phenomenology that its author explicitly qualified as material: the philosophy of Michel Henry. We will investigate the possibility of a material phenomenology beyond Henry’s work in relation to material reality. (shrink)
Charney's target article convincingly demonstrates the need for the discipline of quantitative human behavior genetics to discard its false assumptions and to employ the techniques, assumptions, and research program characteristic of modern developmental psychobiology.
Paul Ricœur is rightly regarded as one of the greatest representants of the hermeneutical tradition, at the crossroads of epistemological filiation from Schleiermacher and Dilthey and the ontological filiation of Heidegger to Gadamer. Johann Michel's bias in this article is to explore a third way of hermeneutics under the guise of an interpretative anthropology. Before being a set of scholarly techniques applied to specific fields, hermeneutics derives originally from ordinary techniques of interpretation at work in the world of life. (...) The purpose of the contribution is to show how Ricoeur's hermeneutics can give serious directions for elaborating such an interpretive anthropology, in which case it also needs to be supplemented by other intellectual traditions to achieve this goal. (shrink)
La présente contribution explore la manière dont se pose la question du sens de l’être dans l’oeuvre de P. Ricoeur. Johann Michel montre que l’ontologie herméneutique ricoeurienne se présente comme fragmentée, disséminée dans des ouvrages épars sans jamais s’ériger dans un système clos et achevé. À travers ces fragments d’ontologie, J. Michel se risque cependant à dégager deux trames, l’une qui prend sa source dans La métaphore vive, l’autre qui trouve son point culminant dans Soi-même comme un autre. (...) Bien qu’ayant leur topos propre, chacune de ces trames ontologiques converge vers le même style de la «voie longue de l’herméneutique». (shrink)
L'œuvre de Michel Henry aura été de « recueillir » et développer le côté affectif de la phénoménologie, que Husserl, dans un passage clé de ses « Idées directrices », a délaissé au profit du côté intentionnel de la subjectivité - tout comme trois siècles plus tôt Descartes avait « recueilli » la subjectivité écartée par Galitée. Le texte qui suit compare le concept de soubassement, ou âme, chez Husserl avec celui de chair chez Michel Henry. On verra (...) que les deux philosophes parlent d'une couche sensible, qu'on peut d'une certaine manière situer entre corps et esprit, de deux points de vue diamétralement opposés. Au-delà de l'opposition entre les deux philosophies, cette recherche mène à une interprétation topologique du rapport ente corps, âme et esprit, tel que suggéré par le terme husserlien de soubassement, et propose un éclairage différent de la notion henryenne d'auto-affection. (shrink)
What makes it possible to affect one another, to move and be moved by another person? Why do some of our encounters transform us? The experience of moving one another points to the inter-affective in intersubjectivity. Inter-affection is hard to account for under a cognitivist banner, and has not received much attention in embodied work on intersubjectivity. I propose that understanding inter-affection needs a combination of insights into self-affection, embodiment, and interaction processes. I start from Michel Henry's radically immanent (...) idea of self-affection, and bring it into a contrastive dialogue with the enactive concepts of autonomy and (participatory) sense-making. I suggest that the latter ideas can open up Henry's idea of self-affection to inter-affection (something he aimed to do, but did not quite manage) and that, in turn, Henry's work can provide insights into underexplored elements of intersubjectivity, such as its ineffable and mysterious aspects, and erotic encounters. (shrink)
This essay explores the practical significance of Michel Henry’s “material phenomenology.” Commencing with an exposition of his most basic philosophical intuition, i.e., his insight that transcendental affectivity is the primordial mode of revelation of our selfhood, the essay then brings to light how this intuition also establishes our relation to both the world and others. Animated by a radical form of the phenomenological reduction, Henry’s material phenomenology brackets the exterior world in a bid to reach the concrete interior transcendental (...) experience at the base of all exteriority. The essay argues that this “counter reduction,” designed as a practical orientation to the world, suspends all traditional parameters of onto(theo)logical individuation in order to rethink subjectivity in terms of its transcendental corporeality, i.e., in terms of the invisible display of “affective flesh.” The development of this “metaphysics of the individual” anchors his “practical philosophy” as he developed it—under shifting accents—throughout his oeuvre. In particular, the essay brings into focus Henry’s reflections on modernity, the industry of mass culture and their “barbaric” movements. The essay briefly puts these cultural and political areas of Henry’s of thinking into contact with his late “theological turn,” i.e., his Christological account of Life and the (inter)subjective self-realization to which it gives rise. (shrink)
This paper provides an introduction and overview of Michel Henry's work, with particular emphasis on his understanding of auto-affectivity. It concludes by pointing to some objections or questions sympathetic phenomenologists may have for his work.
In this paper, I will reflect on the place of language within Michel Henry’s phenomenology. I will claim that Michel Henry’s position provokes an architectonic problem in his conception of phenomenology and I will discuss how he tried to solve it. At the end of the essay, I will try to clarify what I believe to be the ultimate root of that problem involving language.
This article makes a case for the capacity of "social practice" accounts of agency and freedom to criticize, resist, and transform systemic forms of power and domination from within the context of religious and political practices and institutions. I first examine criticisms that Michel Foucault's analysis of systemic power results in normative aimlessness, and then I contrast that account with the description of agency and innovative practice that pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom identifies as "expressive freedom." I argue that Brandom (...) can provide a normative trajectory for Foucault's diagnoses of power and domination, helping to resolve its apparent lack of ethical direction. I demonstrate that Foucault, in turn, presents Brandom with insights that might overcome the charges of abstraction and conservatism that his pragmatic inferentialism frequently encounters. The result is a vindication of social practice as an analytical lens for social criticism that is at once both immanent and radical. (shrink)
Neo-liberalism has become one of the boom concepts of our time. From its original reference point as a descriptor of the economics of the ‘Chicago School’ or authors such as Friedrich von Hayek, neo-liberalism has become an all-purpose concept, explanatory device and basis for social critique. This presentation evaluates Michel Foucault’s 1978–79 lectures, published as The Birth of Biopolitics, to consider how he used the term neo-liberalism, and how this equates with its current uses in critical social and cultural (...) theory. It will be argued that Foucault did not understand neo-liberalism as a dominant ideology in these lectures, but rather as marking a point of inflection in the historical evolution of liberal political philosophies of government. It will also be argued that his interpretation of neo-liberalism was more nuanced and more comparative than more recent contributions. The article points towards an attempt to theorize comparative historical models of liberal capitalism. (shrink)
Resumen: A partir de sus análisis en torno a la realidad económica y social en el pensamiento de Marx, el filósofo francés Michel Henry propone que el fundamento de la economía es la subjetividad, o más bien la vida, pues es el trabajo, en cuanto “praxis viviente”, lo que define la realidad. El trabajo viviente produce y mantiene en el ser a los otros elementos de la economía, es el único que produce valor. El trabajo de cada sujeto, bajo (...) esta concepción de la fenomenología de la vida, ya no es un agregado más, un elemento contingente, sino que constituye al sujeto en tanto tal. Por último, el descubrimiento del trabajo viviente como fundamento de la posibilidad de la economía lleva a Henry a proponer que una tarea fundamental de la filosofía puede ser la elucidación de la génesis trascendental de los conceptos de la ciencia y de allí su importancia epistemológica.: From his analysis of Marx’s thinking on economic and social reality, the French philosopher Michel Henry establishes that subjectivity, or more precisely life, is the ground of economy because work as “living praxis” defines reality. Living work produces and keeps in being; it is the only one that produces value. This conception of phenomenology of life considers work as a constitutive and necessary element of the subject itself, and not only a contingent and expendable one. Finally, showing living work as grounding the possibility of economics permits Henry to propose as a fundamental aim of philosophy the elucidation of the transcendental genesis of science’s concepts, and from this, its epistemological relevance. (shrink)
Reviews : C.L.R. James, World Revolution 1917-1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International ; Michel Beaud, Socialism in the Crucible of History ; Cornelius Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Volume 3, 1961- 1979 ; Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination—A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Tbeory.
This book is an important introduction to the critical interpretation of the work of the major French thinker Michel Foucault. Through comprehensive and detailed analyses of such important texts as The History of Madness in the Age of Reason, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Professor Gutting provides a lucid exposition of Foucault's 'archaeological' approach to the history of thought - a method for uncovering the 'unconscious' structures that set boundaries on (...) the thinking of a given epoch. The book also casts Foucault in a new light, relating his work to two major but neglected influences: Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science and Georges Canguilhem's history of science. This perspective yields a new and valuable understanding of science, balancing and complementing the more common view that he was primarily a social critic and theorist. An excellent guide for those first approaching Foucault's work, the book will also be a challenging interpretation and evaluation for those already familiar with his writings. (shrink)
This paper attempts to specify the force of Michel Henry?s concept of life. It suggests that the phenomenological clarity of Henry?s concept of life is nevertheless accompanied by a certain ambiguity about the relationship between phenomenological description of life, on the one hand, and the value or pathos which is attached to ?life? in Henry?s work, on the other. The article pursues this relationship by showing how Henry?s account of life?s value is developed through two subsidiary but important ideas (...) in Henry?s authorship: the notions of ?culture? and of ?barbarism?. It concludes that not even a material phenomenology can demonstrate that the attempt to find ?life? in ?the world? must always be (in Henry?s phrase) a ?ruinous confusion? (shrink)
In Voir l'invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired by, and critical of, Husserl) to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as non-objective experience, is essential not only to self-experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. Intentionality tempts us to experience objects merely from the 'outside', but aesthetic experience returns us to the inner life of objects as a lived experience. On the basis of an examination of Henry's (...) aesthetic theory in the light of Husserl's analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl's and Henry's approaches: Husserl's noema must be considered to be a lived-through experience, and non-objective lived-through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry's claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection and heteroaffection. (shrink)
One of the central methodological issues for contemporary practitioners of comparative ethics is how to conceptualize and relate to the "other" encountered in cross-cultural studies. A valuable resource for reflection on this problem is the work of the French historian and cultural theorist Michel de Certeau, whose diverse opus coheres around his notion of heterology--a "science of the other." In this article I explore perspectives on the cultural "other" emerging from Certeau's analyses of a series of "travel narratives" documenting (...) the European encounter with the peoples of the New World. Certeau's meditations on the metaphor of the voyage, the interplay of orality and literacy, the politics of ethnography, and the semiotics of the "return of the repressed" offer, I suggest, important insights for comparative ethicists. (shrink)
In this paper we examine the study of minerals from the Renaissance to the early nineteenth century in the light of the work of Michel Foucault on the history of systems of thought. In spite of a certain number of theoretical problems, Foucault's enterprise opens up to the historian of science a vast terrain for exploration. But this is the place neither for a general exegesis nor for a general criticism of his position; our aim here is the more (...) modest one of taking certain points from Foucault's study, The order of things, and seeing how far they can be extended into an area not explicitly considered in that work. (shrink)
In a variety of Michel Foucault's writings, one can recognize the fundamental influence that the work of Friedrich Nietzsche had on the method of the French philosopher and historian, even though Nietzsche is only rarely mentioned in direct references. The most obvious influence can be seen in Foucault's adaption of the genealogical method, which he theoretically explores in his essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Scholarship acknowledges this adaptation but otherwise restricts the application of Nietzschean concepts to Foucault's writings to central (...) notions of Nietzsche's late work. Keith Ansell-Pearson, for instance, writes that "Nietzsche influenced Foucault in a number of ways, but they can basically be .. (shrink)
Reviews : Clare O'Farrell, Foucault—Historian or Philosopher? ; James W. Bernauer, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought ; Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment ; Jonathon Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century.
In this paper, I will reflect on the place of language within Michel Henry’s phenomenology. I will claim that Michel Henry’s position provokes an architectonic problem in his conception of phenomenology and I will discuss how he tried to solve it. At the end of the essay, I will try to clarify what I believe to be the ultimate root of that problem involving language.
This paper takes its departure from Michel Henry’s criticism of a technological view that “extends its reign to the whole planet, sowing desolation and ruin everywhere” ( I am the Truth , 271). It argues that although Henry’s critique of technology is helpful and important, it does not go far enough, inasmuch as it excludes all non-human beings from the Truth of “Life” he advocates against the destructive truths of technology and therefore cannot fully articulate the way in which (...) technology does in fact cause “desolation and ruin” on the entire planet. At the same time I suggest that this strict division between human and non-human life is not essential to Henry’s project, which may well have resources for a more environmentally friendly proposal. The first part of the paper lays out Henry’s critique of technology in some detail, highlighting the ways in which it contains important insights for our contemporary situation. The second part of the paper explores the stark division Henry draws between human generation from the divine life and the creation of everything else, including his rejection of any identification of humans with “protozoa and honey bees,” which would seem to suggest a complete lack of concern for non-human life. The final part of the paper seeks to find a way beyond this dichotomy by showing how non-human life may be included in Henry’s proposal in a way that extends his critique of technology in environmentally conscious ways without losing his phenomenological insights about the human condition. (shrink)
Richard Rorty claims that philosophy can either be seen as a practice whose primary goal is to show the interrelationship between the different practices in our society or as a discipline whose main aim is to discover the essence of the objects we posit as well as the normative concepts we employ in different discourses. Michel Foucault’s works have usually been associated with the initial characterization of philosophy mentioned above. However, in what follows, I demonstrate how Foucault’s general theme, (...) what he dubs “the discourse of true and false,” intersects with the view that philosophy is the search for the nature of the normative notions we employ in different discourses. In a similar manner, I demonstrate how Foucault’s conception of truth conforms to minimalism’s schema for truth. Though his theme’s intersection with the characterization of philosophy as the search for universal categories and essences is in line with his criticism of how discourses dictate the ways of constituting, seeing and compartmentalizing an object, the manner in which his conception of truth conforms to minimalism’s schema for truth leads to a paradoxical situation for his conception of truth may also be seen as a byproduct of a discourse about truth itself. Keywords - Rorty, Foucault, truth, minimalism, deflationism, discourse of true and false. (shrink)
Ian Hacking sets out a parallel between Michel Foucault’s thought and that of Giulio Preti based on the debate between them that took place in 1971. This is the speech given at the award of the ‘Giulio Preti’ Prize in November 2008.
Michel Houellebecq has, I argue, changed significantly his portrayal of Islam: in earlier novels, he advances a hostile view of it premised on the secularist belief in the death of God and the inexorable decline of monotheism. Houellebecq sets capitalism against Islam, and advances a vision of a godless ‘religion positive’ better suited for capitalist modernity. In contrast, in his last novel and interventions, Houellebecq makes a post-secular turn largely driven by the radicalization of positivist ideas relying on evolutionary (...) biology. This turn is opposed to modernity and favourable to a reconsideration of Islam as the religion of submission and a remedy to personal crisis and Europe’s decline. I show that, evaluative differences notwithstanding, Houellebecq’s stereotyping of Islam has remained constant in his literary work. (shrink)
Michel Henry has renewed our understanding of life as immanent affectivity: life cannot be reduced to what can be made visible; it is – as immanent and as affectivity – radically invisible. However, if life (la vie) is radically immanent, the living (le vivant ) has nonetheless to relate to the world: it has to exist . But, since existence requires and includes intentional components, human reality – being both living and existing – implies that immanence and intentionality be (...) related to one another, even though they are conceived at the same time as radically distinct modes of appearing in Henry’s phenomenology of life. Following this line of thought, we are faced with at least two questions: First, what reality does immanent appearing have for us as existing and intentional beings? And second, from an ethical point of view, what does Henry’s opposition of “barbarism” and “second birth” mean in terms of existence? As will be shown, it follows from the standpoint of radical phenomenology itself that immanent affectivity has reality for us only insofar as it finds its expression or translation in the realm of the intentionally visible and that, with regard to ethics, both “barbarism” and its overcoming in “second birth” are effective only insofar as they are mediated through representations. Henry’s critique of representation and intentionality needs therefore to be revised, especially in the field of practical philosophy, where the essential role played by intentionality has to be acknowledged even by radical phenomenology. (shrink)
In the 1990s, the French phenomenologist philosopher Michel Henry gets interested in Christianity – but does not join the theological debate. Inspired by Marx – who is usually considered an atheist thinker – Henry develops a radical phenomenology of immanent self-affection. In this paper, I want to explore Henry’s writings on Marx to find out how Henry understands and constructs relations between Marx’ philosophy of reality on the one hand, and Christianity on the other.
Michel Foucault is known for his critiques of the intertwinement of empirical knowledge, perception and experience, and power. Within this general framework, this article focuses on a fairly unnoticed text of Foucault’s: his 1962 Introduction to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Dialogues . The article shows that Foucault’s Introduction is central for more than one reason: Firstly, it is apparently the first piece, in which Foucault focuses in detail on confession as an individualizing mode of power and truth-utterance. Secondly, in this text, (...) Foucault treats confession as an empirical, sensual and affective form of power. Thirdly, in this early text, Foucault presents what can be called his critique of phonocentrism, i.e., of the interrelated centrality of voice, hearing, authenticity and “presence.” We find out that Foucault elaborated this critique (from the starting point of his archaeology of knowledge), already before Jacques Derrida introduced the actual term “phonocentrism,” and made it generally known. Finally, we will see that Foucault’s seminal 1970s genealogies of confession, sexuality and pastoral power revisit as well as revise the earlier insights discovered in the Introduction. (shrink)
In this dissertation I claim that Michel Foucault is a pro-enlightenment philosopher. I argue that his critical history of thought cultivates a state of being autonomous in thought and action which is indicative of a kantian notion of maturity. In addition, I contend that, because he follows a nietzschean path to enlightenment, Foucault’s elaboration of freedom proceeds from his critique of who we are, which includes a rejection of humanism’s experiential limits. At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, (...) I also suggest that Foucault articulates a posthumanist conception of finitude and being. To begin with, I show that on humanism’s path to edghtenment, which is established by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and currently advocated by Rawls and Taylor, a philosophy of the autonomous subject who desires self-actualisation through recogrution precedes the epistemologcal and political critiques which generate humanism’s objective, normative and subjective axes of experience. On the basis of Foucault’s archzological, genealogical and, when they operate together, critical historical critiques of these conditions of possibility for autonomy and recogrution, I maintain that humanism fails to teach us how to think or act freelythat is, as critical thought that delivers enhghtenment-and that humanism’s knowledge of the world and its justice in politics necessitate the confined exclusion of those who are different and the submission of subjectivity of those who are normal. In response to the immaturity that is at the heart of humanism, I illustrate that Foucault deploys archeology, genealogy and critical history to excavate his posthumanist, enlightenment alternatives of savoir, pouvoir and ethico-morality. After he relocates an explanation of cause and effect in the human sciences from savioir to the relations between savoir and pouvoir, I explicate how Foucault reconceives, firstly, the way pouvoir is exercised by productive mechanisms, which discipline the body and regulate the citizen, and, secondly, the nature of pouvoir, which he characterises as governmentality, or one’s action upon the actions of others. He then retlunks freedom as the vis-a-vis of pouvoir/savoir, and I demonstrate how critical history reveals that, prior to the hermeneutic relation to self wluch is at the centre of humanism’s conception of moral identity, ethical subjectivity in antiquity is formed through an ascetic, agonistic freedom that is based on a practical relation to self. Foucault uses this as a blueprint for the present, in which an ethico-political state of being autonomous in thought and action is constituted over against our limits of pouvoir/savoir. I thus claim that Foucault’s portrayal as an anti-enlightenment philosopher, who proffers nothing but anormative critique and amoral freedom, represents the perspective of those for whom to be anti-humanism is akin to being antienlightenment. These criticisms are exposed as misguided by the thesis that I verify in this dissertation, which is that critical history qua critique, thence an ontology, namely, Foucault’s critical ontology, brings about maturity and endorses an ehghtenment that is both contra- and post-humanism. (shrink)
This study advances the claim that Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which drew its inspiration and guidelines from Cicero's De Natura Deorum, fulfills four basic elements of Michel Meyer's theory of problematology. In doing so, it is argued, the Dialogues contribute importantly to our understanding of the question-answer pair, and to the notion of rhetoric as a way of knowing.
In the final scene of Michel Tournier’s postcolonial novel La Goutte d’or, the protagonist, Idriss, shatters the glass of a Cristobal & Co. storefront window while operating a jackhammer in the working-class Parisian neighbourhood on the Rue de la Goutte d’or. Glass fragments fly everywhere as the Parisian police arrive. In La Goutte d’or, Tournier explores the identity construction of Idriss through a discussion of the role that visual images play in the development of a twentieth-century consciousness of the (...) “Other.” At the beginning of the novel, a French tourist takes a photograph of Idriss during her visit to the Sahara. The boy’s quest to reclaim his stolen image leads him from the Sahara to Marseille, and finally to the Rue de la Goutte d’or in Paris. The Rue de la Goutte d’or remains one the most cosmopolitan neighbourhoods of the city. In Tournier’s novel, the goutte d’or also corresponds to a symbolic object: a Berber jewel. It is the jewel that Idriss brings with him, but which he also subsequently loses upon his arrival in Marseille. From the very moment that the French tourist photographs him, a marginalization of Idriss’s identity occurs. Marginality, quite literally, refers to the spatial property of a location in which something is situated. Figuratively speaking, marginality suggests something that is on the edges or at the outer limits of social acceptability. In this essay, I explore the construction of the marginalized postcolonial self through an examination of the function of visual representation in the development of a postcolonial identity in La Goutte d’or. In the end, I conclude that the construction of a postcolonial identity is based upon fragmentation and marginalization, which ultimately leads its subject to create an identity based upon false constructions. (shrink)
Delivered at the Collège de France between January and March 1980, the lectures entitled On the Government of the Living (Du gouvernement des vivants) seem to be the missing piece in the Foucauldian puzzle. Still unpublished, those eleven lectures were intended to set the theoretical foundation for the book announced as the fourth and last volume of the History of Sexuality, under the title Confessions of the Flesh (Les aveux de la chair). This book, however, was never published, despite the (...) fact that his editor described it as the keystone for the entire History of Sexuality.1 The value of Michel…. (shrink)
De Coubertin developed the sport philosophy of Olympism and the Olympic Games as a response to social and political crisis to promote peace, fair play, and the development of Christian masculinity. The purpose of this paper is to examine how crisis discourse functions as an important shaper of contemporary understandings of Olympism and how conflicting discourses have mobilized crisis discourse to produce competing 'truths' in which to rationalize and understand the Olympic Games. In drawing from Foucault's work and de Certeau's (...) text, Heterologies: Discourse on the other, I argue that 'crisis' as the rationalization for Olympism and the Olympic Games has proven an unsuccessful venture for de Coubertin; as the Olympic Games have produced conservative outcomes based on a neoliberal agenda focused on elitism, professionalism, nationalism, and commercialism. This historical case raises important questions about the role of Olympism and its power to act as a catalyst for change. (shrink)
Intuition is surely a theme of singular importance to phenomenology, and Henry writes sometimes as if intuition should receive extensive attention from phenomenologists. However, he devotes relatively little attention to the problem of intuition himself. Instead he off ers a complex critique of intuition and the central place it enjoys in phenomenological speculation. This article reconstructs Henry’s critique and raises some questions for his counterintuitive theory of intuition. While Henry cannot make a place for the traditional sort of intuition given (...) his commitment to the primacy of life as the natural and spontaneous habitation of consciousness, an abode entirely outside the world, there nevertheless with some modification to Henry’s thinking could be a role for intuition to play in discerning the traces of life in the world. (shrink)
Foucault repeatedly argued that his work on techniques of the self were not a denial of his previous work on 18th- and 19th-century Europe, but a different way to make our present intelligible. Although Foucault explicitly associated modern techniques of the self with the Christian model, he never considered Christian techniques of the self in a comprehensive manner. The recent publication of his last two lectures at the Collège de France in 1983 and 1984 seems to fill this gap. Christian (...) techniques of the self are characterized by an ascetic of obedience, and are considered as antithetical to ethical, parrhesiastic techniques of the self. Foucault’s detailed analysis of Sophocles’ Oedipus and Euripides’ Ion in these lectures also provides valuable insights into the rationality that presides over the modern techniques of the self, and the logic that animates the Christian politics of obedience. (shrink)
How is it possible for Foucault to present the body at the same time as the foundation and the result of history, as condition and horizon of the theory that takes hold of it ? One has to pay attention to the various registers in which Foucault distributes the acceptations ordinarily confused with the general notion of the body : from "my body" (as it appears in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology) to "the body' (as it is understood by modern medicine) ; from (...) this body as an object for positive explanation and disciplinary, to the speaking and spoken body described in The Will of Knowledge ; and from those acceptations, which take place in an history of the individual body, to the plurality of bodies that intervene, as a background, in Foucault's ethics. (shrink)
Henry?s concept of transcendence is highly paradoxical. Most often it seems as though he had simply borrowed Husserl?s classical description of intentionality, as the act of aiming?at?something as an independent object, at something given or posited by consciousness outside itself, in the status of a worldly outwardness. This determination of transcendence belongs to Henry?s usual critique of what he calls the ?ontological monism? of classical metaphysics and ?historical phenomenology?. Nevertheless, when Henry endeavours to define the ontological difference between life itself (...) and the living incarnate ego within the sphere of radically subjective immanence, particularly in his last works on truth and on Christianity, he cannot but refer to another concept of transcendence, the theological and metaphysical one. This is a transcendence which claims absolute ontological exteriority, as the being?in?itself of the ?substance?, altogether free of any intentional dependence on the transcendental activity of consciousness. And he uses this last concept to assert, of course, that divine transcendence, as true to the Absolute, is none other than the most radical and deep immanence: the immanence of life itself. (shrink)
Cet article considère les concepts de la confession et de la parrêsia dans l’oeuvre de Michel Foucault et les applique à l’analyse de la construction du sujet femme. Il montre comment dans une perspective confessionnelle, la femme entretiendrait un rapport à ellemême et aux autres qui tend à un auto-assujettissement selon des catégories normatives essentialistes. À ce dire-vrai confessionnel, j’oppose le dire-vrai parrèsiastique, en m’interrogeant sur la possibilité d’attribuer un rôle émancipateur à l’identité « femme ». La parrêsia devient (...) alors le modèle d’un discours critique, qui se rapproche de la critique sociale caractérisant le féminisme. Je retrouve ainsi dans l’histoire du féminisme des témoignages de ce que Foucault redécouvre chez le Grecs comme parrêsia politique, éthique et cynique. (shrink)
Se examina la posición de M. Heidegger sobre el sentido ontológico de la corporalidad, como respuesta a la interpelación de aquello que se le presenta al Dasein debido a su constitución abierta al mundo. Esto lleva a preguntarse sobre la actuación corporal y técnica sobre el mundo, y sobre los otros, o al problema del cuerpo animal. Se confronta finalmente la perspectiva heideggeriana con la teoría del cuerpo subjetivo o trascendental de M. Henry, donde la apertura ontológica es reemplazada por (...) una fenomenología de la vida aplicada al cuerpo vivo como corporalidad encarnada. The article examines M. Heidegger's position regarding the ontological sense of corporality understood as an answer to the interpellation of that which presents itself to Dasein due to its constitution as being open to the world. This leads to questions regarding the corporal and technical action on the world and others, or the problem of the animal body. Finally, the article confronts Heidegger's perspective with M. Henry's theory of the subjective or transcendental body, in which the ontological openness is replaced by a phenomenology of life applied to the living body as an embodied corporality. (shrink)