Children's understanding of the human mind has been found to be related to many social and experiential factors such as interactions with peers (Astington & Jenkins, 1995), parental socioeconomic a...

This article introduces the 2012 Montréal FRAN-HOMA corpus, collected in the Francophone neighborhood of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, and how it relates to the heritage corpora of Montréal French collected since the 1970s. We discuss the methodological choices made regarding the composition of this corpus including the historical and demo-linguistic information that led to the selection of the Hochelaga-Maisonneuve neighborhood for fieldwork. A presentation of the socially stratified sample and criteria for participant selection is followed by a discussion on data collection and the (...) sociolinguistic interview. After a brief review of the transcription protocol and the advantages of audio-aligned transcription, we provide two illustrations of the revival of research on linguistic variation made possible by this new corpus. (shrink)

Moral or ethical questions are vital because they affect our daily lives: what is the best choice we can make, the best action to take in a given situation, and ultimately, the best way to live our lives? Health ethics has contributed to moving ethics toward a more experience-based and user-oriented theoretical and methodological stance but remains in our practice an incomplete lever for human development and flourishing. This context led us to envision and develop the stance of a “living (...) ethics”, described in this inaugural collective and programmatic paper as an effort to consolidate creative collaboration between a wide array of stakeholders. We engaged in a participatory discussion and collective writing process known as instrumentalist concept analysis. This process included initial local consultations, an exploratory literature review, the constitution of a working group of 21 co-authors, and 8 workshops supporting a collaborative thinking and writing process. First, a living ethics designates a stance attentive to human experience and the role played by morality in human existence. Second, a living ethics represents an ongoing effort to interrogate and scrutinize our moral experiences to facilitate adaptation of people and contexts. It promotes the active and inclusive engagement of both individuals and communities in envisioning and enacting scenarios which correspond to their flourishing as authentic ethical agents. Living ethics encourages meaningful participation of stakeholders because moral questions touch deeply upon who we are and who we want to be. We explain various aspects of a living ethics stance, including its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as some barriers to its enactment based on the reflections resulting from the collaborative thinking and writing process. (shrink)

Resumen: El espacio dramático de Michel Tremblay, “tesoro nacional” de Quebec, está poblado por personajes que se enfrentan casi siempre a la alienación y al deseo de encontrar, o incluso de crear, su propia identidad. Los héroes tremblayanos, cualquiera que sea su orientación sexual y posición en la sociedad, realizan un paso desde la inactividad hasta la acción para desgajarse del orden preestablecido. A veces incapaces de cambiar su situación, a veces felices al poder, por fin, contestar a (...) la pregunta “¿quién soy yo?”, los personajes del teatro de Tremblay siguen siendo representativos de la sociedad quebequense que, durante el período de la llamada Revolución tranquila, se vio sometida a unos profundos cambios identitarios. A lo largo de la evolución social del Quebec de los años sesenta y setenta del pasado siglo, se fueron estableciendo paralelismos entre la toma de conciencia identitaria de la sociedad y la de los personajes dramáticos de Trembley. Así, estos últimos se convertirían en alegorías de la estructura social en por lo menos dos dimensiones, moral y cultural, en el caso de Belles-Sœurs y À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou, donde se incuban las frustraciones propias de unas heroínas abrumadas por la cultura patriarcal (impotente en todos los ámbitos y ante todo el sexual), representada a su vez por la pieza Hosanna, a la que se la puede considerar como el símbolo de la expresión social de la homosexualidad y de la identidad sexual en general. En consecuencia, la finalidad de este artículo sería la reflexión misma acerca de unas (r)evoluciones teatrales que reflejarían las llevadas a cabo por la Revolución tranquila dentro de toda la sociedad. Abstract: Michel Tremblay's dramatic space, Quebec’s “national treasure”, is populated by characters who are almost always confronted with alienation and the desire to rediscover, and even to create, their own identity. The heroes of Tremblay, whatever their sexual orientation and social positions are, have the story of a passage from inaction till the act of tearing themselves away from the pre-established order. Sometimes incapable of changing their situation, sometimes happy to finally be able to answer the question “Who am I?”, the characters in the Tremblayan theatre are at all times representatives of the Quebec society, which, during the Quiet Revolution, suffered profound changes in identity. Throughout the social evolution in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s, the awareness of the identity of the society and that of the dramatic characters are two matters that coexist in parallel manner. Thus, the latter become allegories of the social structure on at least two levels: moral and cultural, in the case of the Belles-Sœurs and À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou representing several frustrations: of the heroines, overwhelmed by the powerless patriarchal culture; sexual, represented for example by Hosanna being the symbol of the social expression of homosexuality and sexual identity in general; and finally, actional, as in the case of Sainte Carmen de la Main, which constitutes a message to Québécois to take their destiny in their hands. The main objective of the article is to bring some reflections on theatrical (r)evolutions which reflected the changes of the Quiet Revolution within the entire society. (shrink)

"J’étais morte, mais pas enterrée, et c’est la philosophie qui m’a ramenée à la vie. Comme une mère, elle m’a non seulement donné la vie en me donnant accès à ma vie intérieure par l’élargissement de ma conscience, mais elle m’a également appris à vivre, c’est-à-dire comment agir au mieux dans la vie quotidienne. Tout au long de ses réflexions et de son témoignage, l’auteure affirme haut et fort que la philosophie peut sauver des vies, car elle rend possibles la (...) conversion du regard et la prise en charge de sa propre liberté."--Résumé de l'éditeur. (shrink)

Le mot anagogia, « anagogie » serait une mauvaise traduction latine du grec a. L'équivalent latin serait, selon les philologues, sursumductio. D'abord conçue comme un voyage, l'anagogie prendra le sens d'ascension, de montée. Le mot anagogie est plus fréquemment employé pour désigner le quatrième sens de l'Écriture, le terme s'inscrit dans l'histoire de l'exégèse sacrée et plus généralement de l'herméneutique.Les études qui composent cet ouvrage (sur l'obscénité, Alfred Jarry, Georges Bataille, René Daumal, Pierre Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Guyotat, Jean-Noël Vuarnet (...) ou Platon) traitent, de près ou de loin, de cette ascension, souvent entendue ici comme transgression : l'esprit sursoit aux limites de la matière, dont il ne s'émancipe jamais totalement, dans un mouvement vers le sommet (mort, rire divin, « communication », révélation, soleil). (shrink)

L'ouvrage présente, à partir d'une thèse empruntée à chacun, quinze auteurs qui ont contribué - et pour la plupart contribuent encore - au débat ...

Returning to the much-neglected work of George Herbert Mead, this book defines the self and links it to identity and collective action.

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's (...) theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s. (shrink)

On doit à l’économiste américain d’origine allemande, Richard A. Musgrave, la formulation des critères d’Équité Horizontale (ÉH) et d’Équité Verticale (ÉV). Étant donnée une base fiscale, l’ÉH veut que les égaux soient traités également, alors que l’ÉV exige que les inégaux soient traités inégalement (par exemple que les plus riches payent proportionnellement plus d’impôts). Musgrave opère en 1959 une redescription créative de considérations d’équité qui ont une longue histoire de Hobbes à Buchanan, en passant notamment par la fameuse maxime de (...) Adam Smith. La reconstruction généalogique montre que l’ÉV et l’ÉH relèvent de la justice distributive au sens aristotélicien du terme. Un critère purement formel, l’équité en matière d’impôt signifie l’égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des charges communes à tous les individus membres d’une communauté politique. À défaut d’un consensus théorique sur la manière de conceptualiser les contribuables, l’ÉH conserve tout de même une valeur de principe régulateur dans le cadre non idéal de débats de réforme fiscale.Codes JEL : H20, B11, B12, B20, B40, D63. (shrink)

In this article, we extend the research on the public interest to non-audit engagements performed by accounting firms and public accountants. Our thesis is that non-audit engagements, as private goods, require a distinct approach to the public interest than auditing. We suggest that a public value perspective can be used conceptually to provide substantial criteria for designing non-audit engagements conducive to public value creation and greater accountability. We illustrate the applicability and consequences of a public value perspective by analyzing and (...) contrasting the decision of two judicial opinions deciding whether Deloitte and the lead partner of a consulting engagement failed to act in the public interest in engineering the sale of collapsed British carmaker MG Rover. We advocate for a significant change in ethical codes of conduct by defining public interest obligations, not only in terms of professional attributes, but also in terms of outcomes. Our approach also suggests a requirement regarding planning a non-audit engagement, including establishing a public value proposition detailing the planned nature of the engagement, and extent of the assessment of the intended public value creation. We discuss the aspirational function of codes of conduct to provide accountability other than in terms of technical output, and to maintain the legitimacy and purpose of the profession. (shrink)

This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness (...) of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment. (shrink)

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

Beginning with the view that human consciousness is essentially embodied and that the way we consciously experience the world is structured by our bodily dynamics and surroundings, the book argues that emotions are a fundamental manifestation of our embodiment, and play a crucial role in self-consciousness, moral evaluation, and social cognition.

There is a tendency to take mounted dinosaur skeletons at face value, as the raw data on which the science of paleontology is founded. But the truth is that mounted dinosaur skeletons are substantially intention-dependent—they are artifacts. More importantly, I argue, they are also substantially imagination-dependent: their production is substantially causally reliant on preparators’ creative imaginations, and their proper reception is predicated on audiences’ recreative imaginations. My main goal here is to show that dinosaur skeletal mounts are plausible candidates for (...) art-status. But, what is more, I think they are artworks—specifically, sculptures. (shrink)

Translator's preface -- Introduction: The question of phenomenology -- Hyletic phenomenology and material phenomenology -- The phenomenological method -- Pathos-with reflections on Husserl's Fifth cartesian meditation -- For a phenomenology of community.

This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy (...) as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption. (shrink)

Using a new typology based on information available from the Labour Force Survey, the authors analyse how job quality evolved in Québec for both women and men over the last decade (1997-2007). Results show that family situation and educational attainment are two important factors in the determination of gender inequality in the labour market. The analysis emphasizes the very significant decline in gender differences with regard to job quality (from 23% to 35% according to groups), especially for persons without children (...) and individuals who achieved higher education. The changes represent a definite progress in the status of women in general, although some indicators also reveal degradation with respect to job quality in some of the sub-groups. (shrink)

Philosophical suspicions about the place of shame in the psychology of the mature moral agent are in tension with the commonplace assumption that to call a person shameless purports to mark a fault, arguably a moral fault. I shift philosophical suspicions away from shame and toward its absence in the shameless by focusing attention on phenomena of shamelessness. In redirecting our attention, I clarify the nature of the failing to which ascriptions of shamelessness might refer and defend the thought that, (...) as an evasion of moral self-censure, shamelessness can be morally pernicious. Far from foregoing shame, I conclude, we should be mindful of its moral importance and unapologetic in its defense. (shrink)

Yann Allard-Tremblay ,Aude Bandini | : Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive (...) de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique. | : Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay. (shrink)

Ce livre de Michel Freitag interpelle "tous ceux qui s'interrogent sur la place qu'ils tiennent ou le rôle qu'ils jouent dans l'aventure de l'Université contemporaine." (Georges Leroux, Spirale) Une des constantes des écrits contenus dans ce livre "réside dans la comparaison systématique que Michel Freitag établit entre les caractéristiques de la modernité et celles de la postmodernité et les conséquences de celle-ci sur le traitement des enjeux et des problèmes actuels." (Louis Guay, Anthropologie et société) "Dans une société (...) réduite au bavardage, à l'insignifiance, à la poursuite de petits bonheurs mesquins, le tout sous contrôle bureaucratique de plus en plus envahissant, une telle réflexion est devenue essentielle. Voici un livre de bonne foi qui n'attend que ses lecteurs, qu'on souhaite nombreux." (Robert Major, Voix et images). (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the history of the notion of essence in 20th century analytic philosophy, focusing on views held by influential analytic philosophers who discussed, or relied on essence or cognate notions in their works. It in particular covers Russell and Moore’s different approaches to essence before and after breaking with British idealism, the (pre- and post-)logical positivists’ critique of metaphysics and rejection of essence (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Schlick, Stebbing), the tendency to loosen the notion of logical necessity (...) to accommodate certain metaphysical truths in Wittgenstein and others, Quine’s logical rehabilitation of metaphysics and criticism of de re modality, the modal view of essence promoted by the development of quantified modal logic (C. I. Lewis, Barcan Marcus, Kripke) and direct reference theory (Barcan Marcus, Kripke, Putnam), and the emergence of the notion of metaphysical necessity (Kneale, Kripke), and finally Fine’s re-establishment of a Neo-Aristotelian, hyperintensional notion of essence in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This article argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political (...) decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The article presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The article then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to assist lower-level political units. (shrink)

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, (...) I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure. (shrink)

This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human rights norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last (...) part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognizably organized as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts do not (...) have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so (...) as to compare the two decision mechanisms. I go over four arguments for lottery voting and three arguments for majority voting that support their respective accuracy. Lottery voting is then shown to have, compared to majority voting, a decreased probability of discrimination. That is, I argue that with lottery voting it is less probable under conditions of normal politics that if the procedure selects X, X is reasonable. I then provide two case scenarios for each voting mechanism that illustrate my point. (shrink)

This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann’s article “Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems,” first published in 1937. In this article, Hartmann defends an interpretation of the Megarian conception of possibility, which found its clearest form in Diodorus Cronus’ expression of it and according to which “only what is actual is possible” or “something is possible only if it is actual.” Hartmann defends this interpretation against the then dominant Aristotelian conception of possibility, based (...) on the opposition between dynamis and energeia, and according to which there is always an open multiplicity of simultaneous “possibilities,” the outcome of which remains undetermined. Since, according to Hartmann, reality suffers no indetermination, the Megarian conception of possibility is an account of real possibility, whereas the Aristotelian one is merely an account of epistemic possibility. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann was one of the most prolific and original, yet sober, clear and rigorous, 20th century German philosophers. Hartmann was brought up as a Neo-Kantian, but soon turned his back on Kantianism to become one of the most important proponents of ontological realism. He developed what he calls the “new ontology”, on which relies a systematic opus dealing with all the main areas of philosophy. His work had major influences both in philosophy and in various scientific disciplines. The contributions (...) collected in this volume from an international group of Hartmann scholars and philosophers explore subjects such as Hartmann's philosophical development from Neo-Kantianism to ontological realism, the difference between the way he and Heidegger overcame Neo-Kantianism, his Platonism concerning eternal objects and his interpretation of Plato, his Aristotelianism, his theoretical relation to Wolff's ontology and Meinong's theory of objects, his treatment and use of the aporematic method, his metaphysics, his ethics and theory of values, his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of mathematics, as well as the influence he had on 20th century philosophical anthropology and biology. (shrink)