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Michelle Montague [27]Michelle Irmengard Montague [1]
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Profile: Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
  1.  23
    What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.
    _ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts (...)
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  2. The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  3. Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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  4.  42
    Perception and Cognitive Phenomenology.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2045-2062.
    In this paper I consider the uses to which certain psychological phenomena—e.g. cases of seeing as, and linguistic understanding—are put in the debate about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that we need clear definitions of the terms ‘sensory phenomenology’ and ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to understand the import of these phenomena. I make a suggestion about the best way to define these key terms, and, in the light of it, show how one influential argument against cognitive phenomenology fails.
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  5. Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  6.  13
    A Response to Martina and Wimmer’s Review of The Given.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):1013-1017.
    In this paper I respond to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given, focusing on their criticisms of the awareness of awareness thesis.
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  7.  95
    Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought.Michelle Montague - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2):1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  8.  18
    Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought.Michelle Montague - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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  9.  15
    A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):64-87.
    In this paper I consider Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano’s arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that ‘feeling and will’ are united into the (...)
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  10. Recent Work: Recent Work on Intentionality.Michelle Montague - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.
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  11. The Given: Experience and its Content.Michelle Montague - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What is given to us in conscious experience? The Given is an attempt to answer this question and in this way contribute to a general theory of mental content. The content of conscious experience is understood to be absolutely everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of an experience. Michelle Montague focuses on the analysis of conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and deploys three fundamental notions in addition to the fundamental notion of content: the notions (...)
     
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  12.  38
    The Phenomenology of Particularity.Michelle Montague - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 121--140.
  13.  27
    The Access Problem.Michelle Montague - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 27.
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  14. The Content of Perceptual Experience.Michelle Montague - 2009 - In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  15.  13
    The Metaphysics & Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience: A Reply to Conduct.Michelle Montague - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):737-739.
  16.  42
    The Objects of Thought by Tim Crane.Michelle Montague - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):335-339.
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  17. Non-Propositional Intentionality.Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.) - forthcoming
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  18. Brentano on Emotion and the Will.Michelle Montague - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 110-123.
    Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion is tightly bound up with many of his other central claims, in such a way that one has to work out how it relates to these other claims if one is to understand its distinctive character. There are two main axes of investigation. The first results from the fact that Brentano introduces his theory of emotion as part of his overall theory of mind, which consists of a number of closely interconnected theses concerning the nature (...)
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  19. Counterfactuals.Michelle Montague - 2006 - In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Macmillan.
     
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  20. Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd Edition.Michelle Montague - 2005 - Elesvier.
     
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  21. Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.Michelle Montague - 2013 - Sage Publications.
     
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  22. Evaluative Phenomenology.Michelle Montague - 2014 - In S. Roser C. Todd (ed.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 32-51.
  23. Intentionality.Michelle Montague - 2013 - In Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage Publications.
     
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  24. Interpreted Logical Forms.Michelle Montague - 2005 - In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd Edition. Elesvier.
     
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  25. Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition.Michelle Montague - 2006 - Macmillan.
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  26. The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience.Michelle Montague - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--73.
     
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  27. The Life of the Mind.Michelle Montague - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousnss. Oxford University Press.
     
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