This study examines Wal-Mart representatives' presentation to the community on their site plan and Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Given the ongoing controversy and criticisms from local residents, it is interesting to see Wal-Mart's strategies in attenuating these risks and negative impacts. The discursive practices found here are: formulating prior citizen complaints by a neutral-sounding, legalistic language which works euphemistically or as a gloss. Citizen concerns are fitted into a problem-solution format where the solutions involve engineering technology. The Wal-Mart representatives display (...) their expertise through describing these technological answers. Scientific documents or tests are presented which point to counter-intuitive results. They draw on a discourse of `facts' and `information', but use these to make arguments in support of their proposals. In addition to displaying scientific-technological expertise, they avow openness to dialogue and willingness to work with the town. The Wal-Mart representatives present themselves as both technical experts and trustworthy partners, but they also may be seen as rhetor in using facts, findings, and documents to make an argument for their project. (shrink)
Miguel Díaz has succeeded quite well not only in providing support for popular Hispanic religion through an analysis of ideas from Karl Rahner, but skillfully meets several possible objections or alternatives. Nonetheless, the more sophisticated forms of Hispanic theology must also be sustained, if only to address adequately the transcendental atheism that the current and subsequent generation of Latino/a college students will encounter.
This article describes how nurses can use the Q methodology to include head and neck cancer patients in research. These patients are often excluded from participating in research based on temporary or permanent voiceless, disfigurement, or impaired communication. Q methodology is defined as the method for the study of subjectivity and related procedures seem to facilitate the participation of head and neck cancer patients. As so, this inclusive dimension should be taken into consideration in research project design also as an (...) ethical aspect of the study, in particular when involving these patients or others in similar conditions. (shrink)
continent. 2.2 (2012): 76–81 Comments on Eugene Thacker’s “Cosmic Pessimism” Nicola Masciandaro Anything you look forward to will destroy you, as it already has. —Vernon Howard In pessimism, the first axiom is a long, low, funereal sigh. The cosmicity of the sigh resides in its profound negative singularity. Moving via endless auto-releasement, it achieves the remote. “ Oltre la spera che piú larga gira / passa ’l sospiro ch’esce del mio core ” [Beyond the sphere that circles widest / penetrates (...) the sigh that issues from my heart]. 1 The axiomatic sigh of the pessimist is in a way the pure word of philosophy, a thought that thinks without you, speaks where you are not. The live pneumatic form of the soul’s eventual exit from the dead body’s mouth, the sigh restores consciousness to the funeral of being, to the passing away that is existence. Pessimism speaks in piercing aphorisms because first it sighs. “Beyond the sphere passeth the arrow of our sigh. Hafiz! Silence.” 2 … pessimism is guilty of that most inexcusable of Occidental crimes—the crime of not pretending it’s for real. To the pessimist, the ‘real’ world—the world on whose behalf we are expected to wake up in the morning—is a ceaseless index of its own unreality. The pessimist’s day is not an illumined space for the advancement of experience and action, but a permanently and inescapably reflective zone, the vast interior of a mirror where each thing is only insofar as it is, at best, a false image of itself. Within this speculative situation, inside the doubleness of the mirror, pessimism splits into two paths, false and true, one that tries to fix pessimism (establish a relation with the mirror) and decides in favor of the apparent real, and another that totally falls for pessimism (enters the mirror) and communes with the greater reality of the unreal. These two paths are distinguished by their relation to pessimism’s guilt vis-à-vis the world’s reality-project. The first form, that which remains pessimism for the world and puts on a smiling face, stays guilty to itself (i.e. unconscious) and thus turns hypocritical, becoming at once the pessimism of the commoner who really just wants things to be better for himself and the pessimism of the elite who wants to critically refashion reality in his own image. The general form of this worldly, hypocritical pessimism is the impulse to ‘make the world a better place’, which is the global mask under which the world is diurnally made worse. The second form, that which follows pessimism away from the world and ceases to put on a smiling face, refuses guiltiness as itself theessential Occidental mode of pretense and turns honest, becoming at once the intelligent pessimism required of all ordinary action and the radical pessimism necessary for self-knowledge: seeing that no one is capable of doing good. The general form of this universal, honest pessimism is the impulse not to worry, to give up and embrace dereliction, which is the only real way the world is actually improved. Where worldly pessimism is the engine productive of interminably warring secular and sacred religions (good-projects), universal pessimism strives hopelessly for the paradise of a supremely instantiated pessimus: things are getting so bad that there is no longer any time for them to get worse; things are so constantly-instantly worst that this is BEST. Cosmic pessimism is the mode of universal pessimism which can yet discourse with the world, which has not chosen silence and can spread the inconceivably BAD NEWS in an orderly form ( kosmos ) that the world can understand (if it wanted to). … the result of a confusion between the world and a statement about the world. That is what the world is (the result of a confusion between the world and a statement about the world). … a generalized misanthropy without the anthropos. Pessimism crystallizes around this futility—it is its amor fati , rendered as musical form. Pessimism’s love of fate is a blind love, a love of the blindness of being human in a cosmos conceived around the human’s eclipse, a heavy levitation in the contradictory space between the inescapability of its having been and the impossibility of its will-be. Pessimism’s song of futility is a sensible way of loving fate, with a minimum of eros, by means of a kind of matrimonial love of the fatal. As music, pessimism stays open to the irreparable and the inexorable without the binding of affirmation, in the apparent absence of the radical, infinitely surplus will that absolute amor fati seems to require. Crying, laughing, sleeping—what other responses are adequate to a life that is so indifferent? “Unless a man aspires to the impossible, the possible that he achieves will scarcely be worth the trouble of his achieving it. We should aspire to the impossible, to absolute and infinite perfection [….] The apocatastasis is more than a mystical dream: it is a norm of action, it is a beacon for high deeds [….] For true charity is a species of invasion [….] It is not charity to rock and lull our fellow men to sleep in the inertia and heaviness of matter, but rather to arouse them to anguish and torment of spirit.” 3 … the impossibility of ever adequately accounting for one’s relationship to thought. “The paroxysm of interior experience leads you to regions where danger is absolute, because life which self-consciously actualizes its roots in experience can only negate itself [….] There are no arguments [….] On the heights of despair, the passion for the absurd is the only thing that can still throw a demonic light on chaos [….] I live because the mountains do not laugh and the worms do not sing .” 4 It took three attempts before she was fully decapitated, all the while she continued, perhaps miraculously, to sing. According to the earliest account of Cecilia’s martyrdom, the beheading turns out worse. After not severing her head in three strokes, “the cruel executioner left her half dead” (seminecem eam cruentus carnifex dereliquit). 5 Cecilia’s effortlessly powerful endurance of the three strokes—a fitting icon for pessimism as an art of dereliction—demonstrates the “passivity and absence of effort [….] in which divine transcendence is dissolved.” 6 There’s a ghost that grows inside of me, damaged in the making, and there’s a hunt sprung from necessity, elliptical and drowned. Where the moving quiet of our insomnia offers up each thought, there’s a luminous field of grey inertia, and obsidian dreams burnt all the way down. Like words from a pre-waking dream. There is no reason to think that they are not. NOTES 1. Dante Alighieri. Vita Nuova . ed. and trans. Dino S. Cervigni and Edward Vasta. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1995. 41:10. 2. Hafiz of Shiraz. The Divan . trans. H. Wilberforce Clarke. London: Octagon Press. 1974. 10.9. 3. Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations . trans. Anthony Kerrigan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1972. 305-6. 4. E.M. Cioran. On the Heights of Despair . trans. Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. 9-10. 5. Giacomo Laderchi. S. Caeciliae Virg[inis] et Mart[yris] Acta. . . Rome. 1723. 38. 6. Georges Bataille. On Nietzsche . trans. Bruce Boone. London: Continuum. 2004. 135. See Nicola Masciandaro. “ Half Dead: Parsing Cecilia .” A Commentary on Eugene Thacker’s "Cosmic Pessimism" Gary J. Shipley Pessimism is the refusal to seek distraction, the refusal to remodel failure into a platform for further (doomed) possibilities, the refusal of comfort, the acceptance of the sickness of healthy bodies, the cup of life overflowing with cold vomit. If, as Ligotti suggests when discussing Invasion of the Body Snatchers , 1 humans prefer the anxieties of their familiar human lives to the contentment of an alien one, then the pessimist, we could argue, represents some perverted combination of the two, preferring (presuming he has a choice) the defamiliarization of human life to the contentment of its unquestioned mundanity. The quasi-religious state of mind that Wittgenstein would mention on occasion, that of “feeling absolutely safe,” 2 is a state the pessimist could only imagine being approximated by death, or perhaps some annihilative opiate-induced stupor. This Wittgensteinian commingling of certainty and faith looks every bit the futile gesture, a mere rephrasing of collapse or partial collapse. The only certainty open to the pessimist is that of the toxic formula of life itself—a formula known and lacuna-free. Certainty, far from being the gateway to deliverance, becomes the definitive impediment; and the possibility of salvation, as long as it remains, becomes crucially reliant on postulations of ignorance, epistemic gaps, a perennial incompleteness: “the perfect safety of wooed death […] the warm bath of physical dissolution, the universal unknown engulfing the miniscule unknown.” 3 The height of Leibniz’s Panglossian insanity nurtured the idea that our knowing everything—via the universal calculus—could be accurately described a triumph, as opposed to a nightmare in which our every futility is laid bare. Stagnancy and boredom are perhaps two of the greatest ills of Western civilisation, and the most potent pessimism tells you that you’re stuck with both. The most we can hope for, by way of salvation, is to throw open our despair to the unknown. The fact that Schopenhauer’s pessimism stopped short of morality and allowed him to play the flute, as Nietzsche complained, highlights the predicament of a man who despite having adorned nothingness with a smiling face still found himself alive. The demand here is that it be felt: a cross-contamination of intellect and emotion. The safety net of numerous parentheses makes for a failed philosophy, rather than a philosophy of failure. Depressives make bad pessimists, because, unless they choose to die, living will always infect them with necessities of hope, forcing them to find something, anything (all the various “as ifs”) to make existence tolerable. For as Cioran observed, while “[d]epressions pay attention to life, they are the eyes of the devil, poisoned arrows which wound mortally any zest and love of life. Without them we know little, but with them, we cannot live.” 4 And even when cured of our depressions we’ll find ourselves consumed, eaten alive by the hyper-clinical (borderline autistic) mania that replaces them: a predicament captured all too clearly in the microscriptual fictions of Robert Walser, where spectral men and women stifle their depressive madness with protective comas of detail, their failed assimilations buried beneath thick crusts of remote data. Like Beckett’s Malone their stories may have ended, but cruelly their lives have not. Pessimism is an extraneous burden (a purposeless weight) that makes everything else harder to carry, while at the same time scooping it out and making it lighter. If pessimism had a sound it would be the harsh non-noise of tinnitus—the way that every person would hear themselves if they refused their distractions long enough to listen: a lungless scream from the extrasolar nothing of the self. The music of pessimism—if indeed we can imagine such a thing—is the reverberating echo of the world’s last sound, conjectured but never heard, audible only in its being listened for. The one consolation of this hollow paradox of audibility being, that “he will be least afraid of becoming nothing in death who has recognized that he is already nothing now.” 5 The pessimist suffers a derangement of the real, a labyrinthitis at the nucleus of his being: he’s the stumbling ghost relentlessly surprised that others can see him. If Cioran’s refusal is manifested in sleep (when even saying ‘no’ is too much of a commitment), then Pessoa’s resides in the dreams inside that sleep. Pessoa chooses to exploit the fact that he’s being “lived by some murmuring non-entity both shadowy and muddied” 6 by growing more voids to live him. His is a Gnostic breed of sleep, “sleeping as if the universe were a mistake,” 7 a sleep that dreams through Thacker’s cosmic pessimism (“a pessimism of the world-without-us.”, “the unhuman orientation of deep space and deep time” 8 ), through the critical error of there being anything at all when there could be nothing. The metaphysical pessimist is someone who, however well life treats them, still desires to wake from it, as from the poisonous air of a bad dream. Pessimism is a paradox of age, being simultaneously young and old; its youth residing in a refusal to accept the authority of existence (its rich history, its inherent beneficence), a refusal to “get over” the horror of what it sees with its perpetually fresh eyes, and its maturity in the unceremonious disposal of the philosophical playthings (those futile architectures) of adolescence. As Thacker remarks: “Pessimism abjures all pretenses towards system—towards the purity of analysis and the dignity of critique.” 9 A sentiment shared with Pessoa, who duly categorizes those that choose to enact this futile struggle: “The creators of metaphysical systems and of psychological explanations are still in the primary stage of suffering.” 10 If the pessimist has shared a womb with anyone, it’s with the mystic and not the philosopher. As Schopenhauer tells us: “The mystic is opposed to the philosopher by the fact that he begins from within, whereas the philosopher begins from without. […] But nothing of this is communicable except the assertions that we have to accept on his word; consequently he is unable to convince.” 11 The crucial difference between the mystic and the pessimist is not the latter’s impassivity and defeatism, but his unwillingness/inability to contain in any way the spread of his voracious analyticity, his denial of incompleteness, his exhaustive devotion to failure. The truth of our predicament, though heard, is destined to remain unprocessed. Like the revelations of B.S. Johnson’s Haakon (“We rot and there’s nothing that can stop it / Can’t you feel the shaking horror of that?” 12 ) the pessimist’s truths are somehow too obvious to listen to, as if something inside us were saying, “Of course, but haven’t we gotten over that?” Pessimism is simple and ugly, and has no desire to make itself more complex or more attractive. The true moral pessimist knows that the Utilitarian’s accounts will always be in the red. He can see that for all his computational containments, his only honest path is a negative one, and that such a path has but one logical destination: that of wholesale human oblivion. Thacker notes how at the core of pessimism lies the notion of “the worst,” through which death is demoted by the all-pervasive suffering of a life that easily eclipses its threat. And so with doom made preferable to gloom, death begins to glint with promise, “like beauty passing through a nightmare.” 13 But even among pessimists suicide is, for the most part, thought to be an error. Schopenhauer, for instance, regarded suicide a mistake grounded in some fundamentally naïve disappointment or other. Pessoa too thought suicide an onerous escape tactic: “To die is to become completely other. That’s why suicide is a cowardice: it’s to surrender ourselves completely to life.” 14 There is a call here to be accepting of and creative with the puppetry of your being, an insistence that it’s somehow a blunder to attempt to hide in death from the horrors you find inlife. 15 Tied up with this perseverance is the slippery notion of the good death, for maybe, as Blanchot warns, suicide is rarely something we can hope to get right, for the simple reason that “you cannot make of death an object of the will.” 16 “Even in cases where the entire corpus of an author is pessimistic, the project always seems incomplete,” 17 and this is not simply because the project itself belies something yet to be disclosed, but because the project itself is a thing waiting. It waits on a cure it knows will not come, but for which it cannot do anything (as long as it continues to do anything) but wait. NOTES 1. See Thomas Ligotti. The Conspiracy Against the Human Race . New York: Hippocampus Press. 2010. 91. 2. Ludwig Wittgenstein. “A Lecture on Ethics.” Philosophical Review . (74) 1. 1965. 8. 3. Vladimir Nabokov. Pale Fire . New York: Vintage. 1989. 221. 4. E. M. Cioran. The Book of Delusions . trans. Camelia Elias. Hyperion. 5.1. (2010): 75. 5. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation. vol. 2 . trans. E .F J. Payne. New York: Dover. 1966. 609. 6. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 67. 7. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 35. 8. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 68. 9. Ibid. 73. 10. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 341. 11. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation. vol. 2 . trans. E .F J. Payne. New York: Dover. 1966. 610-11. 12. B.S Johnson. “You’re Human Like the Rest of Them.” in Jonathan Coe. Like a Fiery Elephant: The Story of B.S. Johnson . London: Picador. 2004. 177. 13. Fernando Pessoa. The Book of Disquiet . trans. Richard Zenith. London: Penguin. 2002. 415. 14. Ibid. 199. 15. “Suicide is, after all, the opposite of the poem.” Anne Sexton. No Evil Star: Selected Essays, Interviews and Prose . ed. Steven Gould Axelrod. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1985. 92. 16. Maurice Blanchot. The Space of Literature . trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1989. 105. 17. Eugene Thacker. “Cosmic Pessimism.” continent. . 2.2 (2012): 75. (shrink)
Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)
We re-examine Mersenne's critique of Giordano Bruno concerning the question of the extension of the universe and the plurality of worlds as well as that of universal animation. For this, it is necessary to distinguish, especially in the examination of the first question, the strictly cosmological problem from its metaphysical and theological foundation in which the relation between God and the universe is resolved. Mersenne's critique fundamentally concerns this second side of our problem, according to his conviction that Bruno repeats (...) the age-old errors of philosophical paganism and reaffirms an 'impiety' completely incompatible with Christian doctrine.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------. (shrink)
This essay reconstructs Agamben’s theory of bare life as an example of an affirmative biopolitics, a politics of life that lies beyond sovereignty. The essay shows that his account of bare life constitutes a reworking of four central motifs found in Marx’s historical materialism: the facticity of alienated existence, the fetishism of commodities, the profanity of bourgeois society, and the nihilism of revolution. Agamben’s renewal of historical materialism explicitly turns on an innovative and controversial synthesis of Benjamin and Heidegger. This (...) essay argues that such a synthesis relies, implicitly, on the negative dialectics developed by Adorno. If correct, this interpretation suggests a way of understanding Agamben’s political thought as a particularly radical and consequent continuation of the project of critical theory. (shrink)
The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so-called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at (...) the core of which lies the thesis that there are quasi-emotions. Moreover, since Robinson's theory is compatible with Walton's solution, I show how it can be used as a model to empirically test whether quasi-emotions exist. (shrink)
(2005). Science and Ontology. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 109-122.
A sample of students from a private, multicampus, midsize university completed 2 copies of Gardner and Melvin's (1988) Attitudes Toward Cheating Scale a semester before the implementation of a modified honor code. The authors instructed students to complete 1 copy of the scale according to their own opinions and the other copy according to what they thought would be the opinion of a "typical college professor." During the following semester when the honor code went into effect, the authors recruited a (...) second sample of 1st-year students and asked them to complete the 2 scales in the same manner. Although both samples of students reported attitudes toward cheating that were significantly more tolerant than the attitudes they ascribed to professors, scores were virtually identical for both samples. The authors speculate that variables associated with how the honor code was implemented, together with certain demographic characteristics of the institution, mediated the results obtained. (shrink)
Esta es una introducción al volumen especial de Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication enfocada en estudios latinoamericanos. Los trabajos que a continuación se presentan forman parte de una selección minuciosa llevada a cabo a propósito de varias conversaciones sobre Latinoamérica llevadas a cabo durante el último año. Los artículos en cuestión recorren transversalmente diversas áreas del pensamiento latinoamericano en la actualidad, particularmente las relacionadas con la filosofía, el arte, la literatura y los estudios visuales. Del mismo modo, (...) proponen lecturas alternativas de la realidad latinoamericana atendiendo a su autenticidad, su contexto y a la forma en la cual se interpretan y critican, implícita y explícitamente, categorías tradicionales como representación, poder, modernidad o género entre otras. (shrink)
In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)
Fitch´s problem and the "knowability paradox" involve a couple of argumentations that are to each other in the same relation as Cantor´s uncollected multitudes theorem and Russell´s paradox. The authors exhibit the logical nature of the theorem and of the paradox and show their philosophical import, both from an anti-realist and from a realist perspective. In particular, the authors discuss an anti-realist solution to Fitch´s problem and provide an anti-realist interpretation of the problematic statement "It is knowable that r is (...) known and yet unknown". Then, it is argued that the knowability paradox has a solution even if one adopts a realist point of view. The authors provide a solution that takes into account the ambiguity of the term 'knowability' by deploying a temporal possible world semantics for epistemic modalities. (shrink)
This paper is concerned with the semantics of bare plural I-generics such as ‘Tigers are striped’, ‘Chickens lay eggs’, and ‘Kangaroos live in Australia’. In a series of recent papers, Bernhard Nickel has developed a comprehensive view of a certain class of bare plural I-generics, which he calls characterizing sentences :629–648, 2009. doi:10.1007/s10988-008-9049-7; Linguist Philos 33:479–512, 2010a. doi:10.1007/s10988-011-9087-4; Philos Impr 10:1–25, 2010b). Nickel’s ambitious proposal includes a detailed account of their truth-conditions, an account of certain pragmatic phenomena that they give (...) rise to, a metaphysical picture of their truth-makers in terms of mechanisms, and an epistemological story connecting characterizing sentences to such concepts as induction and explanation. This paper offers an extended critique of the central truth-conditional component of Nickel’s proposal. In a nutshell, his account has it that ‘Tigers are striped’ is true iff, for tigers, there is a way of being normal with respect to fur-pattern such that all tigers that are normal that way are striped. I begin by explaining what characterizing sentences are and distinguish several readings that are available for sentences with bare plurals in subject position. I then introduce Nickel’s account and discuss some of its predictions which, in my view, seem highly problematic. Moreover, I argue that Nickel’s principle of Homogeneity does not go together well with his proposed truth-conditions, and that his truth-conditional account violates a plausible principle about the logic of generics, a principle I call generic non-contradiction. (shrink)
The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies, the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic differences in intuitions, then, in line with the CCD, there would be good reason to challenge philosophical (...) views that rely on those intuitions for evidential support. I argue that philosophical views that rely on demography-specific intuitions for evidential support need not be threatened by such findings. I first provide a detailed analysis of the epistemological principles driving the CCD and distinguish three formulations of this challenge. I then show that there are good reasons to reject all such formulations of the CCD. (shrink)
The aim of the present paper is to reinforce some of the affirmations made by Vera Lucia Raposo in a recent paper published by the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. According to her, germline gene editing does not violate human dignity at all. This article offers some complementary ideas supporting her statement. In particular, four main arguments are stressed. Firstly, not only is the idea of human dignity unclear, but the idea of the human genome suffers from a general lack of (...) concreteness, which has dramatic consequences for the debate. Secondly, it is highlighted that if we believe that the immutability of the human genome underpins human dignity, then it should be our duty to use the tools of genetic modification to reverse any accidental changes that occur in nature. Thirdly, it is showed that if the alteration of germline constitutes an attack on human dignity, then we should also refrain from performing medical practices such as chemotherapy, which cause precisely this effect. Finally, we argue that modification of germline is not contrary to human dignity but an excellent expression of our autonomy. (shrink)
Fred Sanger, the inventor of the first protein, RNA and DNA sequencing methods, has traditionally been seen as a technical scientist, engaged in laboratory bench work and not interested at all in intellectual debates in biology. In his autobiography and commentaries by fellow researchers, he is portrayed as having a trajectory exclusively dependent on technological progress. The scarce historical scholarship on Sanger partially challenges these accounts by highlighting the importance of professional contacts, institutional and disciplinary moves in his career, spanning (...) from 1940 to 1983. This paper will complement such literature by focusing, for the first time, on the transition of Sanger's sequencing strategies from degrading to copying the target molecule, which occurred in the late 1960s as he was shifting from protein and RNA to DNA sequencing, shortly after his move from the Department of Biochemistry to the Laboratory of Molecular Biology, both based in Cambridge (UK). Through a reinterpretation of Sanger's papers and retrospective accounts and a pioneering investigation of his laboratory notebooks, I will claim that sequencing shifted from the working procedures of organic chemistry to those of the emergent molecular biology. I will also argue that sequencing deserves a history in its own right as a practice and not as a technique subordinated to the development of molecular biology or genomics. My proposed history of sequencing leads to a reappraisal of current STS debates on bioinformatics, biotechnology and biomedicine. (shrink)
The orthodox account of the morality of war holds that the responsibility for resorting to war rests on the state’s political authorities and the responsibility for how the war is waged rests only on the state’s army and, thus, business firms have no special obligations in wartime. The purpose of this article is to reconsider the ethical responsibilities of business firms in wartime. I defend the claim that a plausible standard of liability in war must integrate the degree of the (...) agent’s contributions to posing an unjust threat, the nature of agent's behavior, and his/her intentions. If these premises are correct, it follows that the moral obligations of civilians and business corporations are fundamentally altered by war. Taking into consideration their relative contributions to the war effort, a taxonomy of business firms is developed. (shrink)
Schoolgirls writing short stories have surrendered themselves to some rules of a game, which, according to Ricoeur and Gadamer, delimits a field where everything ’is played’, and thereby, ’shatters the seriousness’ of ’the self-presence of a subject’. This article proposes that this field has a serious side of its own that reveals something true about the everyday reality of being a girl. The proposed worlds in the girls’ short stories are places from which research on women’s lives should begin is (...) a central argument, along with the contention that for the researcher to be able to take the seriousness of this playful writing into account, she also has to assume the position of a playful figure. The article suggests that the empirical data of schoolgirl writing invited the researcher to think Ricoeur and feminist epistemology together. Further, a suggestion is that the roles of reading given by the texts have consequences for a ’new’ process-oriented writing pedagogy and the teacher of writing as well. (shrink)
Tomada desde Artaud por Deleuze ya desde la redacción de Lógica del sentido (1969), la expresión de cuerpo sin órganos (CsO) no deja de causar al menos perplejidad. En su enunciación se traman puntos cruciales de la filosofía de Deleuze desde su teoría del acontecimiento y de la diferencia, pasando por una definición y una analítica del deseo, hasta una determinada noción de vida que articularía el proceso de su generación. Sin desestimar lo anterior y los profusos usos y determinaciones (...) actuales que ha cobrado esta noción, nuestro propósito es vincular al CsO con la concepción de vida,que según nuestra lectura, se halla en la base de su formulación. Esto permanece en el texto como subyacente, y nuestra propuesta se inscribe en determinar el grado de influjo que posee el vitalismo de Bergson en la concepción de esta fórmula: desde este punto de vista es plausible sostener que el CsO es una operación que se funda de modo crucial en una lectura atenta al élan vital de bergsoniano. En suma, si el CsO es una involución creadora por definición de su proceso, no es sino porque supuesta en marcha significa y se efectúa en una constante y radical lucha que implica cada vez el desmontaje o desmembramiento de la idea de organismo. (shrink)
The presence of premises expressing comparison is a problem for the Aristotelian theory of the dialectical method, first because there is no general theory of comparison in the Organon and secondly because along with propositions on the opposition and inflexion of the terms, comparative statements seem to fall outside the explicit description which Aristotle gives of possible premises. The purpose of this paper is to offer a synthetic theory of comparisons according to Aristotle’s Topics , in an attempt both to (...) supply the aforementioned absence and to highlight the importance of the second problem. There are three main types of premises on the more, the less and the similar : some comparing the degree of possession of a predicate, others comparing the plausibility of a predication and finally, others expressing an analogy. Once expounded the very marked differences that occur between these three classes of propositions, the paper analyses the various kinds of argumentation based on comparative premises and offers a formalization of its logical laws. The complexity of this theory and the volume of topoi involved in the comparisons show the magnitude of a problem that has not been sufficiently studied. (shrink)
Fred Sanger, the inventor of the first protein, RNA and DNA sequencing methods, has traditionally been seen as a technical scientist, engaged in laboratory bench work and not interested at all in intellectual debates in biology. In his autobiography and commentaries by fellow researchers, he is portrayed as having a trajectory exclusively dependent on technological progress. The scarce historical scholarship on Sanger partially challenges these accounts by highlighting the importance of professional contacts, institutional and disciplinary moves in his career, spanning (...) from 1940 to 1983. This paper will complement such literature by focusing, for the first time, on the transition of Sanger’s sequencing strategies from degrading to copying the target molecule, which occurred in the late 1960s as he was shifting from protein and RNA to DNA sequencing, shortly after his move from the Department of Biochemistry to the Laboratory of Molecular Biology, both based in Cambridge (UK). Through a reinterpretation of Sanger’s papers and retrospective accounts and a pioneering investigation of his laboratory notebooks, I will claim that sequencing shifted from the working procedures of organic chemistry to those of the emergent molecular biology. I will also argue that sequencing deserves a history in its own right as a practice and not as a technique subordinated to the development of molecular biology or genomics. My proposed history of sequencing leads to a reappraisal of current STS debates on bioinformatics, biotechnology and biomedicine. (shrink)
John Locke's philosophy was deeply affected by medicine of his times. It was specially influenced by the medical thought and practice of Thomas Sydenham. Locke was a personal friend of Sydenham, expressed an avid interest in his work and shared his views and methods. The influence of Sydenham's medicine can be seen in the following areas of Locke's philosophy: his “plain historical method”; the emphasis on observation and sensory experience instead of seeking the essence of things; the rejection of hypotheses (...) and principles; the refusal of research into final causes and inner mechanisms; the ideal of irrefutable evidence and skepticism on the possibilities of certainty in science. The science which for Locke held the highest paradigmatic value in his theory of knowledge was precisely medicine. To a great extent, Locke's Essay on Human Understanding can be understood as an attempt to justify, substantiate, and promote Sydenham's medical method. This method, generalized, was then proposed as an instrument for the elaboration of all natural sciences. (shrink)
Phenomenology in medicine’s main contribution is to present a first-person narrative of illness, in an effort to aid medicine in reaching an accurate disease diagnosis and establishing a personal relationship with patients whose lived experience changes dramatically when severe disease and disabling condition is confirmed. Once disease is diagnosed, the lived experience of illness is reconstructed into a living-with-disease narrative that medicine’s biological approach has widely neglected. Key concepts like health, sickness, illness, disease and the clinical encounter are being diversely (...) and ambiguously used, leading to distortions in socio-medical practices such as medicalization, pharmaceuticalization, emphasis on surveillance medicine. Current definitions of these concepts as employed in phenomenology of medicine are revised, concluding that more stringent semantics ought to reinforce an empirical phenomenological or postphenomenological approach. (shrink)
Should we be allowed to refuse any involvement of artificial intelligence technology in diagnosis and treatment planning? This is the relevant question posed by Ploug and Holm in a recent article in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. In this article, I adhere to their conclusions, but not necessarily to the rationale that supports them. First, I argue that the idea that we should recognize this right on the basis of a rational interest defence is not plausible, unless we are willing (...) to judge each patient’s ideology or religion. Instead, I consider that the right must be recognized by virtue of values such as social pluralism or individual autonomy. Second, I point out that the scope of such a right should be limited at least under three circumstances: if it is against a physician’s obligation to not cause unnecessary harm to a patient or to not provide futile treatment, in cases where the costs of implementing this right are too high, or if recognizing the right would deprive other patients of their own rights to adequate health care. (shrink)
RESUMEN En la Ciencia de la lógica, Hegel analiza las dos antinomias matemáticas kantianas, realiza una crítica interna de sus pruebas y concluye que son meras peticiones de principio. A pesar de ello, reconoce la legitimidad del descubrimiento kantiano. En este artículo se analiza cómo se integran y complementan esas dos miradas, para mostrar cómo se apropia Hegel de la antinomia de la razón pura para reconducirla a su fundamento conceptual, y despojarla así de todo contenido empírico, para lo cual (...) tendrá que desactivarla mediante una crítica a la formulación kantiana. ABSTRACT In the Science of Logic, Hegel analyzes Kant's two mathematical antinomies; carries out an internal critique of their proof; and concludes that they are mere examples of petitio principii. Nevertheless, he recognizes the legitimacy of Kant's discovery. The article analyzes how these two approaches come together and complement each other. The purpose of this analysis is to show how Hegel takes the antinomy of pure reason back to its conceptual foundation, thus stripping it of all empirical content and dissolving it through a critique of Kant's formulation. (shrink)
This paper is an attempt to identify the source of Deleuzian thought, that is, the "plane" or "image" from which it unfolds despite its many twists and turns. This, I believe, is immanence. The thread of immanence appears most clearly in What Is Philosophy? but can be shown to have been at work from the very start. But immanence is not just the plane of Deleuzian thought. It is also, and above all, that of philosophy itself, especially in its difference (...) from religion and onto-theology. This in turn means that, following Spinoza and his univocal ontology, Deleuzian thought can be seen as completing or realizing the conditions of philosophy itself. (shrink)
General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)
The Vegan Society is one of the most influential vegan organisations worldwide. In 1990 VS created a trademark, The Vegan Trademark, which certifies products as being suitable for vegans. While this, without doubt, has been beneficial in many ways, a change in their present labelling practice is in order. This, I argue, is due to inobservance of a simple coherence requirement to treat morally similar cases alike: the fundamental moral reason that is precluding some products from vegan certification is not (...) precluding other products from such certification. I start by presenting the standard definition of veganism and briefly describing the two relevant cases. I then go on to argue that the treatment of such cases involves incoherence of the labelling practice. In addition, I propose a way of removing the incoherence that fits better with veganism’s future-orientedness. I finally consider and respond to some objections. (shrink)
The development of nineteenth-century geodetic measurement challenges the dominant coherentist account of measurement success. Coherentists argue that measurements of a quantity are epistemically successful if their numerical outcomes converge across varying contextual constraints. Aiming at numerical convergence, in turn, offers an operational aim for scientists to solve problems of coordination. Geodesists faced such a problem of coordination between two indicators of the earth’s ellipticity, which were both based on imperfect ellipsoid models. While not achieving numerical convergence, their measurements produced novel (...) data that grounded valuable theoretical hypotheses. Consequently, they ought to be regarded as epistemically successful. This insight warrants a dynamic revision of coherentism, allowing to judge the success of a metric based on both its coherence and fruitfulness. On that view, scientific measurement aims to coordinate theoretical definitions and produce novel data and theoretical insights. (shrink)
