It is shown, first, that Georgius Benignus [Juraj Dragišić, ca 1445-1520] at the end of the 15th century almost fully disposed with the theory of the fourth syllogistic figure. Prantl's view on Benignus' logic is critically examined. Besides, Benignus' doctrines on the supposition of terms and logical consequences are examined with respect to his two versions of logic (1488/1489 and 1519) and to the main influences (e.g., Strodus, Paulus Venetus, Ferebrich, Paulus Pergolensis). A reduction of the rules of consequences of (...) Benignus' logic 1488/1489 to the rules of logic 1519 is reconstructed. Benignus rejects the reasoning ex impossible quodlibet and e quolibet necessarium in what he defines as material consequences. (shrink)

The paper aims to present Spinoza’s understanding of the ontological status of finite beings, which was heavily influenced by mathematics, i.e. geometry. Spinoza stratified finite beings into two fairly incompatible layers: the one subjectively conceived, while the other is the objective level. The first level is related to the essence of being that is caused by God through immanent causality: here, we speak of entailment on the logical and epistemological level, and not the level of reality. Unlike essence, existence represents (...) the second level of being: existence is caused by the real finite being through transeunt cause. The first level, by its ontological status, is very close to mathematical entities, therefore the qualification that Spinoza ‘geometrized reality under a species of the essences’. Namely, he geometrized the segment under the scope of ontology, i.e. the essences of finite modes. The final part of the paper is dedicated to one of the main reasons why Spinoza failed to provide a satisfactory solution to this ontological problem, which is not the only such problem of his system. This would be that Spinoza paid too much attention on ethics, to the detriment of metaphysics, i.e. ontology as general metaphysics. For Spinoza, ontology is subjected to epistemology and ethics, therefore the name ‘functional metaphysics’. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science. (shrink)

The article considers the idea of astronomy as useful theoretical science as it was promoted by Federik Grisogono, Croatian renaissance philosopher, astrologist and physician in his work Astronomical Mirror. U ntill the Renaissance, theoretical science in principle could not be useful since this followed from the very aristotelian-platonic notion of theoretical science whose assignment was only to consider what is eternal and unchangeable. Theoretical science in any case could not be “useful science”. Grisogono considers possibility of a theoretical science – (...) mathematics – being the highest theoretical and at the same time useful science. For us, of course, astrology is none of this. However, by means of his groundbreaking notion of theoretical science, Grisogono worked towards suspending the traditional notion of the theoretical science, as well as towards opening of new possibilities of establishing the modern idea of science.Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der Idee der Astrologie als nützlicher theoretischer Wissenschaft, wie sie der kroatische Renaissance-Philosoph, Astrologe und Arzt Federik Grisogono in seinem Werk Der astronomische Spiegel vertrat. Bis zur Renaissance vermochte die theoretische Wissenschaft grundsätzlich keine nützliche Wissenschaft zu sein, was aus dem aristotelisch-platonischen Begriff der theoretischen Wissenschaft selbst hervorging, deren Aufgabe es war, nur das Ewige und Unveränderliche zu betrachten. Grisogono erörtert die Möglichkeit, dass eine theoretische Wissenschaft – die Mathematik – sowohl die höchste theoretische als auch zugleich eine nützliche Wissenschaft ist. Obgleich die Astrologie dies für uns heute keinesfalls darstellt, hatte Grisogono mit dem grundlegenden Begriff der nützlichen theoretischen Wissenschaft Anteil an der Aufhebung des traditionellen Begriffes der theoretischen W issenschaft und somit auch an der Wegbereitung für die Konstituierung der neuzeitlichen Idee der Wissenschaft.U članku se razmatra ideja o astronomiji kao korisnoj teorijskoj znanosti koju je u djelu Astronomsko zrcalo zastupao Federik Grisogono, hrvatski renesansni filozof, astrolog i liječnik. Do renesanse teorijska znanost načelno nije mogla biti korisna znanost jer je to proizlazilo iz samog aristotelovsko-platoničkog pojma teorijske znanosti čiji je zadatak bio da tek motri ono vječno i nepromjenljivo. Teorijska znanost ni na koji način nije mogla biti “korisna znanost”. Grisogono sagledava mogućnost da teorijska znanost – matematika – bude i najviša teorijska i istodobno korisna znanost. Astrologija to, dakako, za nas nije. No Grisogono je svojim temeljnim shvaćanjem korisne teorijske znanosti radio na dokidanju tradicionalnog pojma teorijske znanosti, pa tako i na otvaranju mogućnosti za konstituiranje novovjekovne ideje znanosti. (shrink)

U članku se analizira Petrićeva usporedba Aristotelove podjele na supralunarni i sublunarni svijet s morskim bićem koje Petrić naziva Marinus Glaucus. Tu usporedbu, s bićem koje je dijelom riba, a dijelom kamen, rabi Petrić kako bi eksplicirao neprirodnost, monstruoznost spomenute Aristotelove podjele. Postavlja se pitanje što je ili tko je Marinus Glaucus. U članku se izlaže da Petrićev Marinus Glaucus najvjerojatnije u sebi ujedinjava i svojstva grčko-rimskog morskog polubožanstva koje se zove Glauko i osobine jedne vrste otrovnih riba koje se (...) u nekim europskim jezicima zovu kamene ribe, a svojstvena im je mimikrija, prilagodba okolišu u kojem žive, kamenu.Im Aufsatz wird der Petrić´s Vergleich der Aristotelischen Aufteilung in die sublunare und supralunare Welt, mit einem Wesen, das er als Marinus Glaucus bezeichnet, analisiert. Diesen Vergleich mit dem Wesen, das er als halb Fisch, halb Stein bestimmt, unternimmt Petrić um die Widernatürlichkeit, ja Monstruosität der genannten Aristotelischen Aufteilung darzulegen. Es wird die Frage gestellt, was, oder, wer ist Marinus Glaucus. Es wird vermutet, dass Petrić’s Marinus Glaucus zwei verschiedene Beschaffenheiten in sich birgt: die einer griechisch-römischen Halbgottheit namens Glauco und die einer Art giftigen Mittelmeerfische, die in einigen europäischen Sprachen Steinfische heißen und die eine Mimikry auszeichnet, die Fähigkeit sich der Welt in der sie leben, dem steinigen Meerboden, anzugleichen. (shrink)