During the period of conflict that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the Serbian healthcare system suffered greatly; as a result, relationships between physicians and their patients reached an all-time low. After cessation of the various wars, a group of medical students attempted to assess the state of the patient–physician relationship in Serbia. Their study showed a relationship characterised by very meek patients and rather arrogant physicians. Empowered by their engagement, the medical students constructed a set of standards (...) for achieving a proper patient–physician relationship; physicians should be capable of hearing and understanding patients, with the result that the ensuing empowerment can enable patients and physicians to create a tool for changing the relationship between both parties. (shrink)

Marxism is often claimed to be incompatible with any kind of ethical theory, because of its assumptions of economic determinism, of the class character of morals, and of the subordination of morality to politics. But the author proposes that these assumptions can be interpreted in such a flexible way as not to rule out the freedom of choice and responsibility, die relative independence of morals from economic conditions and political ends, and concepts of universal human value and a specifically moral (...) ideal. A humanist philosophy, centered in Marx's analysis of alienation, provides a sufficiently rich theoretical basis for the solution of both ethical and meta-ethical' problems. (shrink)

Doppelt argues that the democratic socialist conception of human freedom expressed in some recent works of mine lacks philosophical justification and fails to get to the roots of the socialist ideals of dignity, human worth, and self-respect. Doppelt claims to provide a new approach to the grounding of human freedom which allows him to avoid what he regards as the narrowness of my own conception. Not only does Doppelt fail to show that my own conception of freedom is confined to (...) self-management and cannot embrace the dimensions of social life his own paradigm is claimed to take care of, his article fails to raise or resolve the question of the conflict between the democratic socialist and the Rawlsian components that make up his 'new' paradigm. In this reply I discuss the issues Doppelt himself raises in connection with my own work: (1) how to ground human freedom; (2) whether my conception of freedom in democratic socialism is rationally preferable to the conception embodied in contemporary capitalist society; and (3) whether my idea of freedom does indeed exclude those dimensions of life to which Doppelt refers. (shrink)

Although the concept of "reason" acquired a precise meaning and clearly defined field of validity only in Kant's critical philosophy, the term has a long genesis in European intellectual history. The roots of the concept lie in the Greek concept of the logos and may be reduced to six basic meanings. The earliest Greek thinkers used the word logos to denote the logical structure of the human thought and the rational structure of the world. Anaxagoras considered the all-embracing spiritual principle (...) of the nous the source of overall rationality. In the philosophy of the Stoa the term - logos spermaticos is the active principle acting on passive matter in order to create the world. For the Stoics, the concept of logos is the fundamental principle of entire morality. In Christian theology, the God is logos, Holy Spirit - pneuma the soul. In modern philosophy the basic meanings of the Greek logos were taken over by Latin terms "intellectus" and "ratio". These concepts chart quite clearly two basic lines of European thought, one characterized by immediate and the other by mediated discursive understanding of the truth. Kant was the first in the history of philosophy to introduce the essential distinction between understanding and reason. According to this distinction, understanding is analytical and abstract, while reason is the source of apriori principles connecting and grounding the whole of our knowledge and volition. Therefore Kant distinguishes theoretical from practical reason. Though practical reason applies the concepts and principles of theoretical reason, it has priority over the latter because it bestows practical reality also on what is theoretically unknowable. The primacy of practical reason was especially emphasized by Fichte in his Doctrine of Science. Reason is for him a purely purposeful activity. The idea of reason attains full articulation in Hegel's philosophy of the absolute spirit. For Hegel, reason is first of all a world principle rather than a human capacity. Unlike Kant, whose reason is basically static, a substantial novelty of Hegel's conception of the objective reason is its dynamism, enabling it to reach an increasing awareness "of itself" in its dialectical development. By including the idea of progress in his conception of reason, Hegel introduced an evaluative element in the concept of rationality and thus enabled a connection between reason and ethos in the era of modernity. The deepest cleavage between reason and ethos was opened by the modern science. On one hand, it improved human life by its discoveries and new knowledge, liberating man from religious superstition and other forms of subordination, but on the other it displayed a restrictive attitude not only toward all sorts of value judgments but also toward many dimensions of reason. The positive knowledge of modern science with no ethos lacks any critical self-awareness of the purpose of knowledge, of how it can be used to the benefit of mankind or abused. Thus for establishing a humanistic scientific culture the connection between reason and ethos must be reaffirmed in modern science. Iako je tek u Kantovoj kritickoj filozofiji pojam "uma" dobio precizno znacenje i jasno omedjeno podrucje svog vazenja, ovaj termin ima dugu genezu u evropskoj duhovnoj istoriji. Koreni pojma uma nalaze se u grckom pojmu logosa i mogu se svesti na sest osnovnih znacenja kojima se oznacava logicka struktura ljudskog misljenja i racionalna struktura sveta. Anaksagora je sveopsti duhovni princip nus smatrao izvorom svekolike racionalnosti. Kod filozofa Stoe izraz logos spermaticos predstavlja aktivni princip koji deluje na pasivnu materiju da bi se stvorio svet. Za Stoike pojam logosa cini temeljni princip celokupnog morala. U hriscanskoj teologiji bog je logos, sveti duh - pneuma, dusa. U novovekovnoj filozofiji osnovna znacenja grckog logosa preuzeli su latinski termini "intellectus" i "ratio". Ovi pojmovi sasvim jasno ocrtavaju dve glavne linije evropskog misljenja koje karakterise neposredno i posredovano diskurzivno shvatanje istine. Kant je prvi u istoriji filozofije uveo bitnu razliku izmedju razuma i uma. Razum je analitican i apstraktan, a um je izvor apriornih principa kojima se povezuje i utemeljuje celokupno nase saznanje i volja. Stoga Kant razlikuje teorijski i prakticki um. Za razliku od teorijskog uma, cije pojmove i nacela primenjuje, prakticki um ima primat jer za njega ima prakticki realitet i ono sto je teorijski nesaznatljivo. Primat praktickog uma u svom Ucenju o nauci posebno je naglasio Fihte. Um je za njega cista svrsishodna delatnost. Potpunu artikulaciju ideja uma dobija u Hegelovoj filozofiji apsolutnog duha. Kod Hegela um je pre svega svetski princip a ne samo ljudska sposobnost. Za razliku od Kanta ciji um je u osnovi statican, bitna novina Hegelovog shvatanja objektivnog uma jeste njegov dinamizam koji mu omogucava da u svom dijalektickom razvitku sve vise dolazi do svesti o "samom sebi". Ukljucujuci ideju progresa u svoje shvatanje uma Hegel je uneo jedan vrednosni elemenat u pojam umnosti i time omogucio povezivanje uma i etosa u epohi moderne. Najdublji razdor izmedju uma i etosa izazvala je moderna nauka, koja je s jedne strane svojim otkricima i novim saznanjima unapredila ljudski zivot, oslobadjajuci coveka od religijskog sujeverja i drugih oblika potcinjenosti, ali je s druge strane pokazala restriktivan odnos, ne samo prema svim vrstama vrednosnih sudova, vec i prema mnogim dimenzijama uma. Pozitivno znanje novovekovne nauke bez ikakvog etosa liseno je bilo kakve kriticke samosvesti o svrsi znanja, o tome kako se ono moze upotrebiti na dobro coveka i kako moze biti zloupotrebljeno. Za uspostavljanje humanisticke naucne kulture neophodna je reafirmacija veze uma i etosa u modernoj nauci. (shrink)

The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of power. (...) In the light of existing historical experiences the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined. (shrink)

The elementary, liberal form of democracy has been criticized for being purely political, predominantly representative, centralistic, involving struggle for power among oligarchic political parties, maintaining professional politics and domination of wealthy classes. A more rational and radical form, the council democracy, is projected as a historically possible and better alternative. It extends democratic principles to economy and culture, combines direct participation with representation, replaces centralism with federalism, develops political pluralism without ruling parties, deprofessionalizes politics, and dismantles any monopoly of power. (...) In the light of existing historical experiences the structure of council-democracy is analyzed, possible solutions of crucial practical problems indicated, and different strategies of its realization are examined. (shrink)

There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate (...) purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal. (shrink)

There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate (...) purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal. (shrink)

Using the categories of the epistemic and epistemological field of theory the author is trying to show on the basis of Bled presentations of Mihailo Markovic and Milan Kangrga that their conceptions belong to two separated theoretical fields, which are incompatible with each other. Therefore even in that period we could not speak about a common praxis-philosophy nor a common vision of Marxism. Koristeci kategorije epistemickog i epistemoloskog polja teorije autorica na osnovu bledskih referata Mihaila Markovica i Milana Kangrgi (...) pokusava pokazati da njihove koncepcije pripadaju dvema razlicitim filozofskim poljima koje se ne mogu sloziti, tako da ni u to vreme se nije moglo govoriti o nikakvoj zajednickoj praxis-filozofiji ni zajednickoj viziji marksizma. (shrink)

In every sense this is a major critical and scholarly work, amply supplied with footnotes, bibliographies of and about Mihailo Markovic and Svetozar Stojanovic, other sources in Marxism and social philosophy, and indexes of both names and subjects. Introducing these scholars to a wider Anglo-American audience, Crocker makes a major contribution not only to the literature about “the Praxis Group” or “Praxist Marxists” but also to critical social ethics and social philosophy in general. By making a particular vision of (...) Praxis central to their interpretation of Marx, these Yugoslav Marxists unite with other humanistic philosophers by outlining an original theory of democratic socialism as a distinctive quality of personal and social activity. Praxis is not only a critical and constructive version of Marxist socialism, it is a normative concept which expounds socialist personalism, or personalistic socialism. (shrink)

This study elucidates and appraises a conception of praxis developed by the Yugoslav Marxist Mihailo Markovi . This notion is first distinguished from everyday and alternative theoretical uses of 'practice', 'practical', and 'praxis' . Markovic's view is then characterized as a normative, pluralistic theory of both human being and doing. Praxis , for Markovi , is activity which realizes one's best potentialities: (i) the humanly generic dispositions of intentionality, self-determination, creativity, sociality, and rationality, and (ii) one's relatively distinctive abilities (...) and bents compatible with (i). Following a critical analysis of Markovic's attempts to justify praxis as norm, two substantive criticisms are advanced. The theory needs (i) priority rules for the relative weighting of praxis components when they cannot all be (fully) realized in an action, and (ii) a specification of the genus praxis so as to recognize important differences among optimal activities which shape things, construct theories, rear children, and share with mature persons. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the genesis and evolution of geometric ideas and techniques in investigations of movable singularities of algebraic ordinary differential equations. This leads us to the work of Mihailo Petrović on algebraic differential equations and in particular the geometric ideas expressed in his polygon method from the final years of the nineteenth century, which have been left completely unnoticed by the experts. This concept, also developed independently and in a somewhat different direction by Henry Fine, generalizes (...) the famous Newton–Puiseux polygonal method and applies to algebraic ODEs rather than algebraic equations. Although remarkable, the Petrović legacy has been practically neglected in the modern literature, although the situation is less severe in the case of results of Fine. Therefore, we study the development of the ideas of Petrović and Fine and their places in contemporary mathematics. (shrink)

The year that has seen the overturn of established orders and the opening in Eastern Europe, symbolized most powerfully by the fall of the Berlin Wall, is a most appropriate year for the publication and reissue of the works of Raya Dunayevskaya. She was a Marxist humanist who dared to criticize exploitation by both the right and the left. When she died in 1987, Mihailo Markovic wrote of her.

One of the more historically significant developments among efforts to achieve socialism in various places in the world is the Yugoslav case of "self-managing" socialism. This effort at revolutionary social transformation had before it the model of Stalinist Russia and the latter's claim, subsequently backed by force, that it was both the paradigm and the keeper-of-the-definition of Marxian socialism and communism, and of revolutionary practices guided by Marxian theory. But the Yugoslav revolutionaries rejected both this claim and the model in (...) favor of a Marxian socialism in which democracy was to be concretely realized in decentralized forms throughout the society. The theoretical foundations of this rejection lay in a critical reappropriation of the works of Marx and Engels, particularly the early works of Marx, which led to decisive contributions to the Marxian legacy, namely, the development of a tradition of humanistic critical social theory. At the center of this reinterpretation of Marx was the articulation of a philosophical anthropology in which praxis is the definitive characterization of human being, and it thus provides the normative foundations for socialist revolution. Leading the way in this critical reappropriation of Marx was a group of social and political philosophers, among whom are Mihailo Markovic and Svetozar Stojanovic, the focus of Crocker's discussion. (shrink)