In this article I will develop the ﬁrst steps of a wholly general theory of how indexical and reﬂexive pronouns function in propositional attitude ascriptions. This will involve a theory of ascriptions of de se beliefs and de se utterances, which can probably be also generalized so as to apply to ascriptions of other attitudes. It will also involve a theory about the ascriptions of beliefs or other attitudes a person has at a time about what happens then (attitudes de (...) praesente, as they are sometimes called) and the beliefs of a person concerning the one whom he is addressing (which I might call beliefs de recipiente) etc.. The most distinctive aspect of the theory will be that I will argue that many phenomena associated with such ascriptions that are nowadays most often viewed as pragmatic are semantic. I will use a system of symbolic logic to formalize such ascriptions. I will start from David Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives and generalize it into a logic I call Doxastic Logic of Demonstratives, DLD. Crucial to the semantics of the logic will be an exact deﬁnition of the adjustments of a character from one context to another. (shrink)
In this article I want to investigate the concept of reliability employed in process reliabilist theories of justiﬁcation and knowledge. What is essential to process reliabilist theories of justiﬁcation is that there is a sense of the word ”justiﬁ- cation” (a strong or an objective concept of justiﬁcation) such that a belief is justiﬁed only if it is produced by a reliable process. Diﬀerent versions of reliabilism may add diﬀerent suﬃcient conditions to this to get a complete deﬁnition of justiﬁcation (...) or knowledge, and disagree about whether there are other interesting concepts of justiﬁcation, but all agree that reliability (global or local) is necessary for both justiﬁcation (in some sense) and knowlede. This of course, raises the question of what reliability is. Reliabilist theories of justiﬁcation cannot be said to have a very secure foundation if they do not address this question. However, reliabilists have not done very much to answer it as has of course been often pointed out by their opponents. The most famous reliabilist, Alvin Goldman, has in one place [6, page 63] suggested that the concept of reliability he uses should be understood so that reliability is a propensity; however, he does not formulate this idea very exactly nor develop it very far. However, I think that his suggestion is correct, and important; in this article I will try to clarify it by linking it to formal analyses of propensities that are found in the literature (as well as the whole discussion about interpretations of probability) and explore its consequences. (shrink)
A probabilistic and counterfactual theory of causality is developed within the framework of branching time. The theory combines ideas developed by James Fetzer, Donald Nute, Patrick Suppes, Ming Xu, John Pollock, David Lewis and Mellor among others.
In this article1 I will examine a metaontological problem, which has lately been thematized for example in : what is the problem of universals? I will argue for a diﬀerent solution from the one that has recently been popular, a solution that represents a return to an older view.