The cyclical theory f time, which is better known under the name of the 'theory of eternal recurrence,' is usually associated with certain ancient thinkers--in particular, Pythagoreans and Stoics. The most famous among those who have tried to revive the theory in the modern era is unquestionably Friedrich Nietzsche. It is less well known that the theory was defended also by C.S. Peirce and, as late as 1927, by the French historian of science, Abel Rey. The contemporary discussion of the (...) problem of the direction of time has a direct bearing on the problem of eternal recurrence. The primary purpose of this paper is to evaluate critically the theory itself and then to show how this critical analysis can be applied to Peirce's own version of this theory. (shrink)
The article surveys the development of james' views on the status of the psychological subject (self); the uncertainties and hesitations in james' views are pointed out. But, Contrary to the prevailing view, Upheld especially by john dewey and ralph b perry, James' article "does consciousness exist?" in 1904 does not represent the final stage of his thought. This can be found only in his last book "a pluralistic universe" six years later in which the existence of the "full self" is (...) reasserted. James reached this conclusion after the period of intense intellectual struggle which can be traced in the private notes and drafts published by r b perry. The idea of dynamic self was consonant with the process philosophy which james finally adopted. (shrink)
The term “fallacy of simple location” was coined by A. N. Whitehead in 1925 in his book Science and the Modern World; the two passages of the book that deal with this problem are worth being quoted in full and may serve as an introduction into our topic.
The merging of space and time proposed by Minkowski in 1908 is still sometimes misinterpreted as a sort of four-dimensional hyperspace of which time is the fourth dimension, analogous to the other, spatial dimensions. An inevitable consequence of this view is that the future events somehow exist prior to, and independently of, human awareness and that what we call “becoming” is “merely a coming into our awareness” (A. Grünbaum). However, an attentive inspection of the space-time diagram and of Minkowski's formula (...) for the constancy of the world interval shows that the events contained in the absolute future of any frame of reference areintrinsically unobservable not only within this system, but also by any other conceivable observer: consequently, there is no reason to postulate their existence. (shrink)
It is true that there were some important dissenting voices among physicists as well as among philosophers. Paul Langevin was one of the first who protested against calling time "the fourth dimension of space. Einstein himself admitted that the asymmetry of time is preserved even in its relativistic fusion with space when he recognized that "we cannot send wire-messages into the past." When Meyerson in the session of the French Philosophical Society of April 6, 1922 insisted on the distinction of (...) space and time even in the theory of relativity, Einstein, who attended the session, explicitly agreed. Meyerson's argument was fully developed in his book, La Déduction Relativiste, and Einstein in his highly favorable comment about it again praised Meyerson's criticism of the spatialization of time. According to Einstein, the spatialization of time is a misinterpretation of the theory of relativity, a misinterpretation committed not only by popularizers, but even by many scientists, though it is often present in their minds only implicitly. Hermann Weyl, when he was in a less Kantian mood of thought, warned against a facile confusion of space and time when he claimed that it is more accurate to speak about the 3 + 1-dimensional continuum instead of the four-dimensional entity. In the same decade, Eddington among the physicists and Whitehead, Bergson and Reichenbach among the philosophers issued similar warnings. (shrink)
It is generally agreed that Kant's first Critique was merely a codification of the Newtonian physics. Kant not only had no doubt about the principles of classical mechanics, but he even tried to prove that no other principles of physics are possible. According to the principles of his epistemology, no matter how much the "material" of experience may increase, its form will remain forever the same, since it is determined by the fixed and static character of the perceiving subject. More (...) concretely: it is inconceivable that in some distant future facts will be discovered which would contradict the Euclidian character of space, the principle of the constancy of material substance, the principle of spatio-temporal continuity of all changes, or the principle of strict causality. Why this alleged impossibility? Kant's answer was simple: because the principles just mentioned are not empirical generalizations; they do not stem from experience at all. On the contrary, they precede experience because they make every experience possible; or, in Kant's jargon, they are transcendental conditions of experience. They belong to the innate structure of the epistemological subject, and it is due to their action that the structured and organized perception arises. It is true--and Reichenbach did not fail to notice it--that Kant hypothetically considered the possibility of beings endowed with a different cognitive apparatus. This, according to Reichenbach, would imply the possibility of some cognitive forms intermediate between such hypothetical beings and human beings. But this evolutionist interpretation of Kant is very questionable; the fact that this was done by Helmholtz should not blind us to the fact that it is completely foreign to the whole spirit of the Kantian philosophy. Evolution and change in general were regarded by Kant as legitimate concepts only within our sensory and introspective experience; from the transcendent realm of "things-in-themselves" they were completely excluded. This view was a natural and inevitable consequence of the Kantian claim that time is merely a form of our perception, whether external or internal; hence the timelessness of the transcendental Ego and the utter impossibility of any kind of evolution in our cognitive faculties. (shrink)