The present paper is devoted to a detailed presentation of a new Military Ethics doctrine of fighting terror. It is proposed as an extension of the classical Just War Theory, which has been meant to apply to ordinary international conflicts. Since the conditions of a fight against terror are essentially different from the conditions that are assumed to hold in the classical war (military) paradigm or in the law enforcement (police) paradigm, a third model is needed. The paper (...) proposes such a model in the form of principles that should govern the activity of a democratic state when faced with terror. Eleven principle are proposed. Two are on the level of the state, including the Principle of Self-Defense Duty. Six are related to military preventive acts against activities of terror, including new formulations of a Principle of Military Necessity, a Principle of Distinction, and a Principle of Military Proportionality. Principles of Low Probabilities, Time Span Considerations and Professional Understanding are also included. Finally, three principles that are related to consciousness-directed activities against terror are added: a Principle of Permanent Notice, a Principle of Compensation, and a Principle of Operational Deterrence. The exposition of the principles is accompanied by arguments about their moral justification. The doctrine has been developed on the background of the IDF fight against acts and activities of terror performed by Palestinian individuals and organizations. (shrink)

This article presents an analytic critique of the predominant revisionist theoretical paradigm of just war (henceforth: revisionism). This is accomplished by means of a precise description and explanation of the practicability problem that confronts it, namely that soldiers that revisionism would deem “unjust” are bound to fail to fulfil the duties that revisionism imposes on them, because these duties are overdemanding. The article locates the origin of the practicability problem in revisionism’s overidealized conception of a soldier as an individual rational (...) agent analogous to the aggressor or defender in a case of lethal self-defense, who is capable of reflecting on the morality of his status in war and of the killing he performs and thus of recognizing his revisionist duties. Revisionism, however, ignores the following fact: Killing in war is not a natural human behavior. This is why training soldiers to kill is—and arguably always has been—a necessity for the existence of war and the killing that occurs in it. Moreover, this training involves a certain level of moral desensitization to violence whose goal is to prevent soldiers from thoroughly reflecting on the morality of the killing they engage in. Hence, war and killing can only exist if soldiers are trained in such a way that they do not reflect on whether they could be addressees of revisionist duties in the first place. This means that military training is a “constitutive condition” of soldiers and war, which is why it cannot excuse their noncompliance with revisionist duties, thus making these duties categorically overdemanding. The argument here draws on the paradigmatic example of modern US military killing conditioning (MC), but embeds it into a broader military-historical perspective that describes how soldiers have always needed to be mentally and morally influenced in order to enable war and killing. The article’s explanation of revisionism’s practicability problem has a constructive consequence for future theory-building in the ethics of war: It implies that a potentially revised ethical theory of war must necessarily analyze the institutions that allocate belligerent resources, if it aims to morally assess battlefield behavior in a practicable manner. (shrink)

The goal of military medicine is to conserve the fighting force necessary to prosecute just wars. Just wars are defensive or humanitarian. A defensive war protects one's people or nation. A humanitarian war rescues a foreign, persecuted people or nation from grave human rights abuse. To provide medical care during armed conflict, military medical ethics supplements civilian medical ethics with two principles: military-medical necessity and broad beneficence. Military-medical necessity designates the medical means required to (...) pursue national self-defense or humanitarian intervention. While clinical-medical necessity directs care to satisfy urgent medical needs, military-medical necessity utilizes medical care to satisfy the just aims of war. Military medicine may therefore attend the lightly wounded before the critically wounded or use medical care to win hearts and minds. The underlying principle is broad, not narrow, beneficence. The latter addresses private interests, while broad beneficence responds to the collective welfare of the political community. (shrink)

The purpose of the present document is to briefly present principles that constitute a new doctrine within the sphere of Military Ethics : The Just War Doctrine of Fighting Terror.The doctrine has been developed by a team we have headed at the Israel Defense Force College of National Defense. However, the work has been done on the general levels of moral, ethical and legal considerations that should guide a democratic state when it faces terrorist activities committed against its citizens. (...) Accordingly, the proposed principles are meant to be justified and practically applicable under any parallel circumstances. Moreover, those principles are intended to be universal in the sense that the justification of none of them rests on any particular stance with respect to the desired solution of the conflict under consideration. (shrink)

We are grateful to Professors Nick Fotion, Bashshar Haydar and David L. Perry for their illuminating discussions of our paper, ?Military ethics of fighting terror: An Israeli perspective?, published in the present issue of the Journal of Military Ethics. We also thank the editors of the Journal for allowing us to add the present response. Professors Fotion, Haydar and Perry raise many significant issues. We will, however, presently address just a few of them, leaving the discussion of the (...) other interesting points to other occasions. (shrink)

The phenomenon of war occupies one of the leading places in socio-philosophical and cultural studies. War also has an ambiguous position in human life. On the historical map we see the ongoing waves of armed conflicts, which inevitably lead to fatal consequences for countries, peoples and human beings. War mainly appears in the form of horrors and tragedies. However, in philosophical studies, war is considered from different angles. Philosophers often emphasize the ambiguity and multidimensionality of war. In this work, the (...) authors analyze the phenomenon of war, given a certain “attractiveness” and even the “necessity” of this phenomenon for humans. The authors also summarize the available range of answers to the question of where the desire for violence comes from, that is, the so-called “thirst for war”. It is this desire that gives rise to a constant stay of people in a state of war. The results of this study show that war is indeed an important phenomenon, which can also be considered one of the fundamental attributes of human nature. Analyzing various approaches that explain the causes of war the authors note that the source of any armed conflict is precisely the “militancy” in the very essence of homo sapiens. Human beings must constantly fight for their existence. And such a struggle often takes various forms, which can be considered as concrete variants of the same phenomenon. This phenomenon at the theoretical and philosophical level is fixed in the concept of war. Despite the natural sense of horror that the word “war” evokes at the level of everyday consciousness, pain and hope, death and freedom, faith in human and the justice of the universe, as well as a willingness to fight for this justice, are simultaneously hidden under this “ language shell”. All these internally contradictory meanings are united within the framework of the philosophically processed concept of war, and are also embodied in many different “wars” that a person constantly wages due to his / her specific “being structure”. Human, therefore, is a “warring creature,” or, as the authors propose to denote this feature, “homo militaris”. (shrink)

In one common type of hybrid war states intervene on behalf of insurgents who represent a repressed identity group, but without ‘putting boots on the ground’. Such cases may be regarded as hybrids which contain elements of both ‘old’ and ‘new wars’. In ‘old wars’ victory in combat is sought and non-combatants do not need to be targeted. ‘New wars’ are identity conflicts in which civilians on the opposing side themselves become the hated objects of attack. This poses problems for (...) an intervening state which would not wish to tolerate such behaviour. One question to ask is whether the state owes the insurgents medical assistance if they require it. While they have a prima facie claim as combatants, their bad behaviour, it is argued, leads them to forfeit it. In ‘old wars’ civilians expect those fighting on their behalf to avoid attacks on enemy non-combatants, and states will wish insurgents to do likewise. Were military medics to treat insurgents who breach the laws of armed conflict and return them to service and probable re-offending they would arguably be accomplices. Medics should not be placed in this position for their role is not only ‘to conserve the fighting strength’ and to mitigate the horrors of war but also to facilitate its being fought justly. For, were they not to be deployed to treat wounded civilians and prisoners when possible, more suffering would ensue than necessity required, contrary to the cardinal principle of jus in bello. But similarly, if they allowed this sort of suffering to occur by treating lawless insurgents who go on to cause it, then the same principle is breached. Therefore, they should not be deployed when this would happen. (shrink)

Necessity is a notoriously dangerous and slippery concept-dangerous because it contemplates virtually unrestrained killing in warfare and slippery when used in conflicting ways in different areas of international law. Jens David Ohlin and Larry May untangle these confusing strands and perform a descriptive mapping of the ways that necessity operates in legal and philosophical arguments in jus ad bellum, jus in bello, human rights, and criminal law. Although the term "necessity" is ever-present in discussions regarding the law (...) and ethics of killing, its meaning changes subtly depending on the context. It is sometimes an exception, at other times a constraint on government action, and most frequently a broad license in war that countenances the wholesale killing of enemy soldiers in battle. Is this legal status quo in war morally acceptable? Ohlin and May offer a normative and philosophical critique of international law's prevailing notion of jus in bello necessity and suggest ways that killing in warfare could be made more humane-not just against civilians but soldiers as well. Along the way, the authors apply their analysis to modern asymmetric conflicts with non-state actors and the military techniques most likely to be used against them. Presenting a rich tapestry of arguments from both contemporary and historical Just War theory, Necessity in International Law is the first full-length study of necessity as a legal and philosophical concept in international affairs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article argues that new forms of conducting military information activities using the Internet require renewed consideration of the ethical frameworks in which conduct of such activities can be grounded: frameworks that require these operations to be considered on their own terms rather than as a subset of wider categories. In this online context the article explores the interlinked areas of proportionality and privacy, delineations between combatant and non-combatant, and limits to acceptable deceptive practices. The article argues that the (...) “soft” effects that online information activities promise may reduce destruction and loss of life in the pursuit of military objectives. This context creates new reference points from which necessity and proportionality tests are conducted: tests that justify collection of online data to support online military information activities, and the conduct of the actual activities. The article outlines the possibility that such activities may facilitate potenti... (shrink)

In this article we focus on the jus in bello principle of necessity for guiding the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We begin our analysis with an account of the principle of necessity as entailing the requirement of minimal force found in Just War Theory, before highlighting the absence of this principle in existing work on AWS. Overlooking this principle means discounting the obligations that combatants have towards one another in times of war. We argue that the (...) requirement of minimal force is an important requirement for considering ethical uses of force. In particular, we distinguish between lethal and non-lethal purposes of use of force and introduce the prospect of non-lethal AWS before reviewing a number of challenges which AWS pose with respect to their non-lethal use. The challenges arise where AWS generate unpredictable outcomes impinging upon the situational awareness required of combatants to ensure that their actions meet the requirement of minimal force. We conclude with a call for further research on the ethical implications of non-lethal uses of AWS as a necessary contribution for assessing the moral permissibility of AWS. (shrink)

In this article we focus on the jus in bello principle of necessity for guiding the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We begin our analysis with an account of the principle of necessity as entailing the requirement of minimal force found in Just War Theory, before highlighting the absence of this principle in existing work on AWS. Overlooking this principle means discounting the obligations that combatants have towards one another in times of war. We argue that the (...) requirement of minimal force is an important requirement for considering ethical uses of force. In particular, we distinguish between lethal and non-lethal purposes of use of force and introduce the prospect of non-lethal AWS before reviewing a number of challenges which AWS pose with respect to their non-lethal use. The challenges arise where AWS generate unpredictable outcomes impinging upon the situational awareness required of combatants to ensure that their actions meet the requirement of minimal force. We conclude with a call for further research on the ethical implications of non-lethal uses of AWS as a necessary contribution for assessing the moral permissibility of AWS. (shrink)

This article argues that the traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria are fully capable of providing the ethical guidance needed to legitimately conduct military cyber operations. The first part examines the criteria’s foundations by focusing on the notion of liability to defensive harm worked out by revisionist just war thinkers. The second part critiques the necessity of alternative frameworks, which its proponents assert are required to at least supplement the traditional just war criteria. Using the (...) latter, the third part evaluates ethical issues germane to responding to cyber force, including casus belli, moral aspects of “the attribution problem,” and respective rights and duties when attacks involve innocent third-party states. The fourth part addresses in bello issues, including compliance with discrimination, necessity, and civilian due care imperatives; whether civilians may be targeted with sub-“use of force” cyber-attacks and the permissibility of using civilian contractors to conduct cyber-attacks. Throughout these analyses, conclusions are brought into conversation with those of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. (shrink)

Although Plato writes less about war than we might expect--especially considering the fact that his dialogues are historically set during the Peloponnesian War--the right conduct of war constitutes a crucial concern for Plato. In both the Alcibiades and Laches dialogues, rightful conduct of war is linked to the practice of virtue. Neither a good statesman nor a good military man can ignore this link, which joins military pursuits not only to courage, but to the whole of virtue, including (...) justice. In the Republic , the passage from a luxurious city to a well-ordered and virtuous city is described by means of the proper education of the city's military guardians, and a teaching of ius in bello --to use a just-war term--for wars between Greeks is outlined. Finally, in the Laws , peace, not war, is presented as the true aim of good laws, and the importance of legitimate authority in war-making is duly emphasized. (shrink)

Introduction. War as a social phenomenon has always been an object of philosophical reflection, since its results largely determine the further de- velopment of society and have a profound impact on all spheres of social life. In connection with the ongoing so-called special military operation which Russia is conducting in Ukraine and which is at the same time a proxy war of the collective West against our country, the modern philosophical discourse of war is clarified. One of the important (...) aspects of the ontology of war is considering its chronotopos. The space-time factor has a signifi- cant impact on the course and outcome of hostili- ties in modern warfare, which makes its study very relevant. The purpose of the study is to describe the chrono- topos of modern warfare, to show the influence of the space-time factor on the course and result of hostilities. Methods. Being supporters of the relational concept of space and time, the authors consider the chronotopos of war as its internal attributive property. In addition, they rely on the methodology of synergetics, which makes it possible, in addition to the external universal space-time, to single out the internal space-time of open complex non-equi- librium systems. The authors apply structural-func- tional analysis to study material and ideal objects that influence the characteristics of space and time in modern warfare. They also use general scientific methods: abstraction, comparison, description and explanation. Scientific novelty of the research. The authors give characteristics of the war chronotopos at the beginning of the 21st century, and consider the tendencies of its changes. The necessity of taking into account spatio-temporal changes in planning and conducting hostilities in modern warfare is substantiated. Results. New means of warfare, as well as the cor- responding changes in tactics, operational art and strategy, will significantly reformat the chronoto- pos of war. The space of modern warfare is being radically transformed due to the fact that the confrontation simultaneously takes place not only on the plane, but also in the air, in space, under water, and even in social networks. New capabili- ties of strike systems are changing the perception of such characteristics of the war space as the front and rear. What was previously considered a deep safe rear, in the era of using missiles and combat drones, is no longer such. The time of war is also changing. An increase in the flight speed of ammu- nition, aircraft, and missiles increases the dynamics of battles and intensifies all processes on the bat- tlefield. Hypersonic systems are changing the pace of war, space satellites, reconnaissance drones and new technologies make it possible for the com- mander officer of the battle to see everything that happens on the battlefield in real time, regard- less of the distance from objects. Each new war is fought in its own space-time continuum. To win the war, all this must be taken into account. Conclusions. The chronotopos of war within the framework of the relational concept of space and time prevailing in modern philosophy is changing due to the emergence of fundamentally new means of warfare with new capabilities, which requires a significant adjustment in combat management, ensuring the adequacy of human behavior in war, training troops, taking into account the character- istics of the space-time continuum of a particular war, understanding on the part of the command staff of the essence of changes in the space and time of modern war. Old stereotyped ideas about the chronotopos of war can cause disorientation of a person on the battlefield, which requires not only a philosophical reflection of the ongoing spatio- temporal changes, but also the practical consid- eration of new knowledge in training troops, in planning and conducting combat operations. (shrink)

The article states the core thesis about two asymmetric modes of existence of war – physical and discursive. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the analytical and practical necessity of distinguishing between two modes of existence of hybrid warfare as a phenomenon of physical reality and as a discursive construct, as well as to raise questions about the value specificity of the relationship between them. The methodology of work represents the implication of two asymmetric modes of war (...) existence – physical and discursive. The relationship between the two modes can be described in particular through modern cognitive-semantic and communicative approaches. Analysis, synthesis, description, distinction, historical perspective, forecasting and hermeneutic tools of comprehension are the core methods of this work. In the military dimension, any military confrontation in general is localized, while the discourse of this hybrid war has become global. The interpretive component of hybrid warfare is implemented through discursive verbal-semiotic means. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the concept of victory. The Ukrainian dimension embodies the postmodern practical representation of the analysis of the problem of hybrid warfare as a war of interpretations. (shrink)

There is no denying that international human rights norms are enforced selectively. Some oppressive governments become the targets of military intervention, while the political sovereignty of other, equally oppressive regimes is left intact. My aim in this paper is to determine whether a military operation to defend human rights can possibly be made morally illegitimate by the fact that the state prosecuting it has failed, is failing or will fail to defend human rights under relevantly similar circumstances elsewhere.

In 1925, Russian philosopher Ivan Il'in published a book entitled On Resistance to Evil by Force . The book generated a bitter polemic among @migré Russian thinkers, which constitutes probably the most thorough debate on the justification of the use of force ever conducted among Russian scholars. This paper analyses Il'in's work and places it into the context of Russian history and philosophy. Il'in argued that war was sometimes necessary, but never 'just'. On occasions, the only way of fulfilling one's (...) obligation to resist evil is to fight. At such times one must do so. But one must understand that what one is doing, though necessary, is unjust, because one is always at least partially responsible for the situation which made violence necessary. While not shirking one's responsibilities, it is only by facing up to the guilt of one's deeds that one can prevent war from undermining one's moral equilibrium. This paper shows that most of those who took part in the debate provoked by Il'in's book agreed with the fundamentals of his argument. This fact illustrates that there is a distinctive Russian philosophy regarding the use of force which in important aspects differs from Western just war theory. (shrink)

My starting point is the first major American military action in World War II in Europe, “Operation Torch.” The action was controversial because the American military regarded it as militarily useless, if not counterproductive. But the military was overruled by President Roosevelt on the grounds that, while it was not militarily necessary, it was politically justified. This indifference to military necessity seems to violate standard rules about the legitimacy of military force. The larger question (...) it raises is the relation between military concerns and political ones in warfare. Much of this essay explores the relation between these two dimensions in war: the military dimension and the political dimension. I argue that the second dimension is the most important one, as well as the most problematic one for the legitimacy of war. Yet it is ignored by standard just war theories. I then return at the end to consider again the problems raised by “Operation Torch,” and especially the question of the harms inflicted on a country’s own soldiers – in the name of killing and dying for public relations. (shrink)

War has major health consequences and poses significant ethical dilemmas for health professionals. In caring for victims of armed conflicts, health providers are obliged to put medical ethics before military aims. While the normative framework of warfare is clear and accepted by almost all countries, in practice, restrictions on violence are continuously broken, and the safety and independence of health professionals are not ensured. In bioethics, the issue of war has not been treated as a major concern. The field (...) can do more to articulate the responsibilities of health practitioners and scientists, arguing that Red Cross founder Henri Dunant's principle of humanity and the principles of professional and global ethics reject the idea of military necessity. Bioethics should focus on strategies to prevent war, encouraging the collective action of health professionals. Bioethics should also stress—as, so far, one national medical association has—that war is a man‐made public health problem. (shrink)

Both trolleys and war leave innocent victims to suffer death and injury. Trolley problems accounting for the injured, and not only the dead, tease out intuitions about liability that enhance our understanding of the obligation to provide compensation and medical care to civilian victims of war. Like many trolley victims, civilians in war may suffer justifiable, excusable, or negligent harms that demand compensation. Chief among these is collateral harm befalling civilians. Collateral harm is endemic to war and comprises permissible but (...) unavoidable death or injury following necessary and proportionate military operations. Although state armies sometimes offer condolence payments for civilian death, injury, and property loss, they deny liability. Instead, they use compensation to enhance counterinsurgency efforts and assuage feelings of agent regret. As part of the medical rules of eligibility, Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan also provided medical care to victims of collateral harm. However, they denied care to similarly sick or injured civilians. While compensation is often justified to cure the harm civilians suffer, the differential use of medical resources is not. Rather, medical care remains subject to the principle of beneficence and medical need. The duty to provide civilian healthcare in war, particularly in wars of humanitarian intervention, is far-reaching and imposes significant costs that military and medical ethics are yet to recognize. (shrink)

Medical rules of eligibility permit severely injured Iraqi and Afghan nationals to receive care in Coalition medical facilities only if bed space is available and their injuries result directly from Coalition fire. The first rule favors Coalition soldiers over host-nation nationals and contradicts the principle of impartial, needs-based medical care. To justify preferential care for compatriots, wartime medicine invokes associative obligations of care that favor friends, family, and comrades-in-arms. Associative obligations have little place in peacetime medical care but significantly affect (...) wartime medicine. The second rule suggests liability for collateral harm that is unsupported by international law and military ethics. Absent liability, there are pragmatic reasons to offer medical care to injured local civilians if it quells resentment and cements support for Coalition forces. In contrast to peacetime medicine, military necessity and associative obligations outweigh distributive principles based on medical need during war. (shrink)

Medical ethics in times of war are fundamentally different from those in times of peace. War brings military and medical values into conflict, often overwhelming other moral obligations, such as a doctor's charge to relieve suffering, in the face of military necessity.

Medical ethics in times of war are fundamentally different from those in times of peace. War brings military and medical values into conflict, often overwhelming other moral obligations, such as a doctor's charge to relieve suffering, in the face of military necessity.

Efforts to ban Autonomous Weapon Systems were both unsuccessful and controversial. Simultaneously the need to address the detrimental aspects of AWS development and proliferation continues to grow in scope and urgency. The article presents several regulatory solutions capable of addressing the issue while simultaneously respecting the requirements of military necessity and so attracting a broad consensus. Two much stricter solutions – regional AWS bans and adoption of a no first use policy – are also presented as fallback strategies (...) in case achieving AWS’ compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict proved elusive. Together, the solutions presented form an outline of a flexible regulatory strategy able to adjust to different technological outcomes and providing a sensible compromise to solve the current deadlock on the AWS issue. (shrink)

How does a country repair its harm to a vulnerable minority targeted during times of national fear because of race? How did the United States redress its then popular yet unconstitutional WWII incarceration of 120,000 innocent Japanese Americans in desolate barbed wire prisons without charges, hearings, or bona fide evidence of military necessity? In response to a Congressional inquiry, political lobbying, and lawsuits, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 directed the President to apologize and authorized over one billion (...) dollars in reparations. Congress also created a fund to educate the public about the government’s false assertion of “national security” to restrict civil liberties. Some considered redress a tremendous victory — rewriting history and personal healing. Others questioned reparations for one U.S. group but not others. Japanese American Redress served as a catalyst for reparations movements worldwide. This paper examines its genesis, legal implementation, and apparent effects. It also explores wide-ranging political mobilization and social meanings of redress and “unfinished business”. Reparations cannot be measured by laws alone. Diverse communities must engage contested questions of history, justice, and belonging. Reparations claims face often unforeseen benefits and limitations. The paper concludes with these “lessons learned” to date. (shrink)

Abstract The circumstances in which the decisions to bomb the Abbey and town of Monte Cassino in 1944 were taken were complex and difficult, and complicated by factual uncertainties. It is possible to make a case for excusing the bombing of the Abbey on grounds of military necessity without justifying it. It is not possible to excuse the manner in which the bombing was conducted, which deprived the attack of its intended military utility and had an effect (...) on the Allied cause the reverse of that anticipated. The bombing of the town cannot be challenged on laws of war grounds, but may be criticised because the effects were damaging to the progress of the Allied forces, and foreseeably so. (shrink)

Just war theory distinguishes between jus ad bellum (whether the war itself is just) and jus in bello (whether the conduct of the war is just). I argue, against the traditional view, that modern warfare has made it impossible to separate the two in practice. Specifically, I argue that modern war is a techno-cultural system which requires its participants to violate the primary criterion of jus in bello—noncombatant immunity. From this it follows that even a war of self-defense is not (...) a just war. I consider several challenges to my position: the doctrine of double effect and the claim that noncombatant immunity can be suspended on the basis of military necessity or supreme emergency. I argue that neither of these challenges is acceptable and that to suspend the rule of noncombatant immunity is to suspend the moral point of view. Finally, I consider alternatives which would change the techno-cultural system of modern war. (shrink)

This article examines the events in Thanh Phong, Vietnam, on the night of 25.26 February 1969, when Lieutenant (junior grade) Bob Kerrey led a squad of U.S. Navy SEa-Air-Land (SEAL)s on a mission to capture a Viet Cong district chief. It studies the events at an outlying hooch the SEALs encountered as they approached the village, and what happened in Thanh Phong, examining several sources, most notably Gregory Vistica’s New York Times Magazine article and Kerrey.s recent memoir, When I Was (...) a Young Man. The article explains the differing accounts at the hooch and in the village, and considers whether military necessity, fear for their own lives, or obedience to superior orders can justify what these accounts offer. It concludes that neither Gerhard Klann.s nor the combined conflicting versions offered as his “best memory” by Kerrey gives sufficient reason to justify the deaths of about two dozen Vietnamese civilians. (shrink)

This paper discusses the creation and use of the new Macquarie Laws of War Corpus. The corpus consists of the 110 documents of international war law stored in the International Committee of the Red Cross treaties database, starting with the 1856 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law and ending with the most recent amendment to the Rome Statute. The new MQLWC is hosted at the Sydney Corpus Lab, via its CQWeb interface, which allows for searching of frequencies, concordance lines, and collocations. The (...) corpus can also be downloaded for offline processing in other popular concordance programs, such as #Lancsbox and AntConc. This paper introduces the corpus, describes the process of assembling the data, and explains its limitations. The paper then demonstrates some of the ways the data can be explored using the concept of 'military necessity'. The MQLWC contributes to the growing use of corpus linguistics in legal studies, and will be of particular relevance to scholars in the field of international war law. (shrink)

THIS ESSAY ARGUES AGAINST LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL JUSTIFICAtions for torture. In the expository sections of the essay, I juxtapose international prohibitions against torture with the current U.S. administration's justifications for harsh interrogation methods on the basis of military necessity and presidential prerogative. I examine the systematic and individual causes of the specific abuses at Abu Ghraib that were tantamount to torture. In the constructive sections of the essay, I retrieve the evolving standards of decency from Supreme Court (...) cases and jus cogens peremptory norms from international law. I contend that torture is deontologically wrong and that the administration's arguments on solely teleological grounds are ethically flawed and contradictory. Engaging numerous interlocutors in law, philosophy, and Christian ethics, I reconceptualize the rule of law in terms of moral vision and an emerging moral consensus, and I hold that these terms provide a more adequate framework for evaluating and repudiating the practice of torture. (shrink)

A novel method of teaching military medical ethics, medical ethics and military ethics in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) Medical Corps, essential topics for all military medical personnel, is discussed. Very little time is devoted to medical ethics in medical curricula, and even less to military medical ethics. Ninety-five per cent of American students in eight medical schools had less than 1 h of military medical ethics teaching and few knew the basic tenets of the (...) Geneva Convention. Medical ethics differs from military medical ethics: the former deals with the relationship between medical professional and patient, while in the latter military physicians have to balance between military necessity and their traditional priorities to their patients. The underlying principles, however, are the same in both: the right to life, autonomy, dignity and utility. The IDF maintains high moral and ethical standards. This stems from the preciousness of human life in Jewish history, tradition and religious law. Emphasis is placed on these qualities within the Israeli education system; the IDF teaches and enforces moral and ethical standards in all of its training programmes and units. One such programme is ‘Witnesses in Uniform’ in which the IDF takes groups of officers to visit Holocaust memorial sites and Nazi death camps. During these visits daily discussions touch on intricate medical and military ethical issues, and contemporary ethical dilemmas relevant to IDF officers during active missions. (shrink)

The article discusses the military schools activities and educational aspects of the officer corps formation of the Russian Empire in the Ukrainian lands of early ХХ century. The armed forces of each state in the world cannot be imagined without a command structure. The efficiency of the army depends on training and moral character of the officer contingent. Graduates of military schools were considered the elite society of Imperial Russia, they were role models for the younger generation and (...) a reliable pillar of the monarchical regime. However, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, many officers went into the national military forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic, West Ukrainian People's Republic, Ukrainian state. The necessity of search of new conceptual bases of officer training in the Ukrainian Armed Forces dictates the feasibility of a comprehensive analysis of the main trends, characteristics of positive and negative features of training and education of officers in the past. The author analyzes the system of training, the daily routine of military schools on the territory of Ukraine. The activities of state institutions Imperial Russia on the Ukrainian lands in our time is of interest to the public. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Uchena Okeja, inspired by sources in African philosophy and military ethics, argued that war by agreement is the only morally justified war. The present piece is a response to Okeja's contention that agreement is both necessary and sufficient for waging war. Contrasting with Okeja, I contend that agreement is neither necessary nor sufficient for initiating a war. Regarding necessity, I contend that there may be overriding values at risk in a conflict (...) and protecting these values may require engaging in war without agreement. Further, I contend that in cases of self-defense, it is not necessary to have consensus for defending oneself from an attacker. With respect to sufficiency, I uphold that Okeja's perspective fails because his model does not provide just cause, conditions for meaningful consent, or the tools with which to avoid exclusion, elitism, and manipulation in deliberative settings. I conclude that Okeja's arguments are indeed valuable and provide inspirational ideas for how to avoid war, but overall, they do not hold up as a full-fledged theory. (shrink)

War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should affect assessments of the justice of military actions. In this article, we propose a way in which concern for animals can be included within the just-war framework, with a focus on necessity and proportionality. We argue that counting animals in war will not make just-war theory excessively demanding, but it will make just-war theory more humane. By showing how animals can be included in our proportionality (...) and necessity assessments, we provide a crucial first step towards developing an animal-inclusive account of just-war theory. (shrink)

This article examines soldier performance optimisation, enhancement, and augmentation across the three dimensions of physical performance, cognitive performance, and socio-cultural understanding. Optimisation refers to combatants attaining their maximum biological potential. Enhancement refers to combatants achieving a level of performance beyond their biological potential through drugs, surgical procedures, or even gene editing. Augmentation refers to a blending of organic and biomechatronic body parts such as electronic or mechanical implants, prosthetics, and brain–machine interfaces. This article identifies that soldier optimisation is a (...) class='Hi'>necessity to protect individual combatants and to give them the ability to make legal and morally justifiable decisions in battle. While enhancement and augmentation of military personnel can lead to accelerated and more destructive warfare, it can also be argued that there is an ethical and moral responsibility to provide combatants the best opportunity for survivability, and that better functioning, less fatigued, and better informed military personnel can make better decisions in battle. There is also a moral responsibility of the state for the combatants themselves, and short-term military success must be balanced against the short- and long-term health and wellbeing of the personnel. This article concludes that it is both the intent and the degree that decide the acceptability. (shrink)

As new military technologies change the character of war by empowering agents in new ways, it can become more difficult for our ethics of war to achieve the right balance between moral principle and necessity. Indeed, there is an ever-growing literature that seeks to apply, defend and / or update the ethics of war in light of what is often claimed to be an unprecedented period of rapid advancement in military robotics, or warbots. To increase confidence that (...) our approach to this development finds success in appropriately constraining war, this article compares our current discourse to the ethical debate over the rise of air power during the interwar period. As moral norms largely failed to constrain air power in World War II, by highlighting the interrelated processes of technological change, ethical debate, and the eventual reconciliation of war practice and war ethics, this historical case offers insights that can help military ethicists maintain their “critical edge” as remote and autonomous robotic weapons continue to mature and proliferate. (shrink)

RFID tags, small microchips no bigger than grains of rice, are currently being embedded in product labels, clothing, credit cards, and the environment, among other sites. Activated by the appropriate receiver, they transmit information ranging from product information such as manufacturing date, delivery route, and location where the item was purchased to (in the case of credit cards) the name, address, and credit history of the person holding the card. Active RFIDs have the capacity to transmit data without having to (...) be activated by a receiver; they can be linked with embedded sensors to allow continuous monitoring of environmental conditions, applications that interest both environmental groups and the US military. The amount of information accessible through and generated by RFIDs is so huge that it may well overwhelm all existing data sources and become, from the viewpoint of human time limitations, essentially infinite. What to make of these technologies will be interrogated through two contemporary fictions, David Mitchell's Cloud Atlas and Philip K. Dick's Ubik. Cloud Atlas focuses on epistemological questions — who knows what about whom, in a futuristic society where all citizens wear embedded RFID tags and are subject to constant surveillance. Resistance takes the form not so much of evasion (tactical moves in a complex political Situation) but rather as a struggle to transmit information to present and future stakeholders in a world on the brink of catastrophe. Ubik, by contrast, focuses on deeper ontological questions about the nature of reality itself. Both texts point to the necessity to reconceptualize information as ethical action embedded in contexts and not merely as a quantitative measure of probabilities. (shrink)

Warfare is becoming increasingly automated, from automatic missile defense systems to micro-UAVs (WASPs) that can maneuver through urban environments with ease, and each advance brings with it ethical questions in need of resolving. Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provide varied arguments in their favor; robots are capable of better identifying combatants and civilians, thus reducing "collateral damage"; robots need not protect themselves and so can incur more risks to protect innocents or gather more information before using deadly force; (...) robots can assess situations more quickly and do so without emotion, reducing the likelihood of fatal mistakes due to human error; and sending robots to war protects our own soldiers from harm. However, these arguments only point in favor of autonomous weapons systems, failing to demonstrate why such systems need be made *lethal*. In this paper I argue that if one grants all of the proponents' points in favor of LAWS, then, contrary to what might be expected, this leads to the conclusion that it would be both immoral and illegal to deploy *lethal* autonomous weapons, because the many features that speak in favor of them also undermine the need for them to be programmed to take lives. In particular, I argue that such systems, if lethal, would violate the moral and legal principle of necessity, which forbids the use of weapons that impose superfluous injury or unnecessary harm. I conclude by highlighting that the argument is not against autonomous weapons per se, but only against *lethal* autonomous weapons. (shrink)

The nature of warfare is changing. Increasingly, developments in military technology are removing soldiers from the battlefield, enabling war to be waged from afar. Bombs can be dropped from unmanned drones flying above the range of retaliation. Missiles can be launched, at minimal cost, from ships 200 miles to sea. Micro Air Vehicles, or 'WASPS', will soon be able to lethally attack enemy soldiers. Though still in the developmental stage, progress is rapidly being made towards autonomous weaponry capable of (...) selecting, pursuing, and destroying targets without the necessity for human instruction. These developments have a profound — and as yet under-analysed — impact on just war theory. I argue that a state under attack from remote weaponry is unable to respond in the traditional, just war sanctioned, method of targeting combatants on the battlefield. This restriction of options potentially creates a situation whereby a state is either coerced into surrender, or it must transgress civilian immunity. Just war theory in conditions of remote warfare therefore either serves the interests of the technologically advanced by demanding the surrender of targeted states, or else it becomes redundant. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the highly contested Israeli restrictions on the importation of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip, with reference to a wide range of principled questions within military ethics regarding sieges, sanctions and blockades. Beginning with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and culminating in its recent easing of sanctions, the paper attempts to bring out the central issues of principle embedded in the political polemic: unilaterally terminated occupation; the responsibilities of a former, though recent, occupier; (...) the semantic distinction between siege and sanction and their respective ramifications; harm to civilians; necessity and proportionality. Overall, it argues in the specific case that Israel's restrictions on Gaza were not indefensible from the start as a first attempt to halt terrorism while avoiding full-scale conflict. In view of their ineffectiveness in achieving these goals, however, the harm they inflicted on civilians increasingly proved unnecessary and therefore excessive. There could then be no justification for continuing to restrict the flow of civilian goods into Gaza, as Israel itself eventually recognized. Nonetheless, Israel retains the right to search and regulate the passage of all relief supplies into Gaza, whether by land or by sea, as well as to secure its own borders for the safety of its citizens. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper focuses on the opening of a discursive space: the emergence of informational and scriptural representations of life and their self-negating consequences for the construction of biological meaning. It probes the notion of writing and the book of life and shows how molecular biology's claims to a status of language and texuality undermines its own objective of control. These textual significations were historically contingent. The informational representations of heredity and life were not an outcome of the internal cognitive (...) momentum of molecular biology; they were not a logical necessity of the unravelling of the base-pairing of the DNA double-helix. They were transported into molecular biology still within the protein paradigm of the gene in the 1940s and permeated nearly every discipline in the life and social sciences. These information-based models, metaphors, linguistic, and semiotic tools which were central to the formulation of the genetic code were transported into molecular biology from cybernetics, information theory, electronic computing, and control and communication systems — technosciences that were deeply embedded with the military experiences of world war II and the Cold War. The information discourse thus became fixed in molecular biology not because it worked in the narrow epistemic sense (it did not), but because it positioned molecular biology within postwar discourse and culture, perhaps within the transition to a post-modern information-based society. (shrink)

This paper suggests that certain characteristics of resourcerelated conflict reveal areas of contemporary Just War Theory that are insufficiently rigorous or robust in their current form. Water security in particular, reveals ambiguity in the Just War framework’s treatment of the jus ad bellum criteria of ‘just cause,’ which in turn challenges the credibility of the entire system. The insufficiency that is exposed has consequences for the effectiveness and cogency of the bodies of international law and global community, which are fundamentally (...) based, and function according to, this predominantly Western moral framework. Key problem areas relating to flexible notions of ‘aggression,’ coincide with a persistent dilemma of simultaneously advocating responsibility to a global community while maintaining sovereign rights and security. Focusing on the ‘just cause’ criteria, justification for acts of war over certain resources is evaluated. Worryingly, the same powerful strategic reasons that might motivate a state to engage in what would otherwise be labelled a ‘realist’ war over certain resources, appear to gain moral merit through interpretation of the jus ad bellum in the specific case of water security, while argument against military action appears increasingly absolutist and impractical. The aim here then is to show the vulnerability of a dangerous prescriptive void in the Just War framework itself. Central to this is the question of the moral weight and significance, if any, of vital resources, as defined by strategic and humanitarian necessity. (shrink)