This is a book of guidance rooted in the wisdom of ancient China. Bestselling author Deng Ming-Dao provides key poetic lines that distill the essence of Taoism, organizing them in the form of a journey. The material here is drawn from a variety of sources, including, the Yijing, 300 Tang Poems, and the full text of the Daodejing. As Deng Ming-Dao notes, "We walk the Way each day. We don't know what's ahead, and so it's helpful to have (...) the wisdom of others to guide us. They have left us a message to encourage us. They have spoken of the joys, griefs, and purity that we should embrace. Like good pathfinders, they give us direction and prepare us for what we might encounter. They let us walk for ourselves. We have a wonderful companion for the journey." This profound collection of ancient wisdom is the resource for those looking for daily sustenance and guidance on the path of life. -- inside front cover. (shrink)

The Wisdom of the Tao is filled with 144 ancient stories that express profound truth by fusing delightful anecdotes with philosophy. Here are stories that lead people to do the following: flow with life, live from the heart, develop an openness to possibilities, live in balance, drop expectations, embrace acceptance...[Stories] help us make sense of who we are and how we got here. They keep us sane as we try to absorb our experiences, our aging, and our emotions. Stories help (...) us visualize the future by taking the messages of yesterday and helping us get tomorrow right."--Page 2 of cover. (shrink)

Zen/Chan 禪 occupies a unique position in world intellectual history. This article argues that there is a trend in the development of Chan thought which significantly reduces the innovative nature of Huineng’s 慧能 original thought and evinces an institutional effort to realign Huineng’s school of Chan with the Buddhist establishment. Its main objective is to locate the original sources of Huineng’s Chan and restore the revolutionary ideas of his thought. Adopting an approach that integrates historical materials with psychology, neuroscience with (...) philosophy, and close reading of Huineng’s interpretation of the Diamond Sutra and his innovative ideas and methods of cultivation in the Platform Sutra in relation to Laozi’s 老子 and Zhuangzi’s 莊子 Daoist ideas, it works out insights into the originality and universal appeal of Chan and the hitherto unpenetrated secret of Chan enlightenment. It concludes that the core of Huineng’s Chan thought is his idea of wunian 無念 (no-thinking), and satori 悟り is not the Buddhist enlightenment. (shrink)

Among the four reading-levels, the textual and exegetical levels of Zhuangzi ’s Hundun-story are problem-free, and so we focus expository-wise on its conspicuous hospitality with nine implications. Then, hermeneutically, we see Hundun instructing us against clarity toward unclarity—cosmological, self-composing, cognitive, and communal—of kindly humus, in cosmic confusion, sleep and idleness, mist and pond-dragonfly, and non-ruling people-sovereignty. Pan-hospitality is our Emperor Hundun’s non-arbitrary imperative to nurture life.

In classical Chinese wu 吾 is commonly employed as the first-person pronoun, similar to wo 我 that retains its use in modern Chinese. Although these two words are usually understood as stylistic variants of “I,” “me,” and “myself,” Chinese scholars of the Zhuangzi 莊子 have long been aware of the possible differences in their semantics, especially in the philosophical context of discussing the relation between the self and the person, as evinced by their occurrences in the much-discussed line “Now I (...) have lost myself” in the chapter “Discussion on Making All Things Equal”. In this essay, I first provide an exegesis of the proffered explanations of the semantical differences between wu and wo as an introduction to two ways of understanding them in the Zhuangzi literature, viz. the single-reference view and the double-reference view. Then I shall argue against these two views in favor of the no-reference view, meaning that both pronouns in “Now I have lost myself” do not function referentially, given the peculiarity of the verb “lose.” I believe the no-reference view has not been explicitly articulated and defended in the literature, although some scholars who want to read the no-self view into the Zhuangzi might have implied it. My argument is supported by a close reading of the targeted passage in the Zhuangzi, premised on the assumption that the part on the “piping of Heaven” immediately following the discussion of losing oneself is an indirect explanation rather than a digression. My explanation is framed within a similar discussion of “I” by the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. This comparative interpretation, I believe, not only provides the grounds for understanding Zhuangzi’s ideal of attaining the state where “the ten thousand things are one with me,” but also demonstrates how metaphysics and the philosophy of language are two interwoven threads in Zhuangzi’s reasoning. (shrink)

The moral commonly drawn from Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream is that there is no distinction between the subjectivity of the dreamer and the awake. It is, however, tenuous to incorporate this insight into an overall view of Zhuangzi, whether as a perspectival relativist, a mystic, or an anti-rationalist, just to name the more popular positions. The parable, despite its brevity and clarity, is difficult because the assertion about metaphysical distinction in the last two lines does not cohere with the preceding text (...) about knowledge. To cope with this problem, there are recent interpretations that advocate textual revision or adumbrate a non-skeptical Zhuangzi. In this article, I shall evaluate these strategies and explain the discrepancy in understanding the butterfly dream. Besides employing the concept of self-locating belief to account for the paradox of waking and not-knowing, I shall also argue for an epistemic grounding of the metaphysical distinction. (shrink)

In contrast to the traditional and ordinary interpretation of Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which considers Xunzi’s theory as claiming that human nature is bad or evil, this article aims at, first, arguing that the interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete and, second, constructing a new interpretation that, according to Xunzi’s text, there are some factors in human nature that are able to promote good behaviors. I shall demonstrate that some major paragraphs in Xunzi’s text were misinterpreted and misarranged, (...) analyze that the word wei in the chapter of “Zhengming” has two different but related senses, one of which designates some of the potential capacities of human nature, and argue that the 23 words in the chapter of “Rongru” should not be deleted as redundant, as was done by the two famous philologists in Qing dynasdy, Wang Niansun and Wang Xianqian. (shrink)

Yangming’s theory of the original knowing (liangzhi 良知). In the 1950s there was a debate between Taiwanese liberals and the New Confucians over the relationship between the traditional Confucianism and modern democracy. Like Liu Shipei, the New Confucians justified modern democracy by means of Confucian philosophy (including that of Wang Yangming). For liberals, however, the Confucian tradition encompassed only the concept of positive liberty, which was irrelevant to or even incompatible with modern democracy. In this article, I try to argue (...) for the position of the New Confucians by reconstructing Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing from a communitarian perspective. (shrink)

There exists a widely accepted opinion in Chan/Zen 禪 studies that Chan enlightenment is a mysterium ineffabile, impenetrable by human intellect. Reviewing the debate between Hu Shi 胡適 and D. T. Suzuki over Chan enlightenment and accounts of testimony by Chan masters and practitioners in history, this essay argues that Chan enlightenment can be understood rationally and intellectually. By analyzing the time-honored Chan practices that have led to enlightenment, it seeks to understand the mystery as an extraordinary mental condition in (...) which an enlightened person temporarily blocks thinking in terms of language, consciousness, and intellect, and experiences a momentary “erasing” of what has been impressed on the psyche since birth. (shrink)

Globalization consists of global interculture strengthening local cultures as it depends on them. Globality and locality are interdependent, and “universal” must be replaced by “inter-versal” as existence inter-exists. Chinese thinking thus must be Chinese, not Western, as Western thinking must be Western, not “universal”; China must help the West be Western, as the West must help China be Chinese. As Mrs. Tu speaks English in Chinese syntax, so “sinologists” logicize in Chinese phrases. English speakers parse her to realize the distinctness (...) of English; Chinese thinkers parse Western “sinologists” to realize the distinctness of China. Inter-versal parsing toward cultural inter-enrichment occurs in three stages. This is intercultural globalization. (shrink)

In the Chinese tradition, the relationship between art and philosophy is conceptually explored in terms of the relationship between dao and wen, which may respectively be viewed as representing philosophy and art. Over history, discourses on dao 道 and wen 文 are central to studies of Chinese literature, art, culture, and civilization. But just as dao holds a range of ideas in Chinese philosophy, wen is also one of the most complex terms in Chinese tradition, whose denotations and connotations are (...) multifaceted and open to interpretations. This article argues that the elusive nature of wen can be understood adequately from the perspective of language philosophy and aesthetics via its relationship to the metaphysical principle of the Dao. By examining the discourses on wen and dao, this article advances a thesis with three interrelated ideas: wen as manifestations of the Tao is an instance of “humanized nature”; the birth of wen marked the beginning of reflections on literature and art, hence inaugurating aesthetics in the Chinese tradition; and the early discourses on wen have determined the distinctiveness of Chinese aesthetic consciousness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Universal "One"Toward a Common Conceptual Basis for Chinese and Western StudiesMing Dong GuIn the world today, rapid globalization has drastically shrunk the geographical distance between the East and the West and greatly facilitated exchanges between different cultures and traditions. In the comparative studies of Eastern and Western literatures and cultures, however, an opposite trend characterized by the anxiety of cultural relativism prevails. It has been aptly reduced to (...) this claim: "[T]he East and the West are so distinctly different that ways of thinking and expression cannot be made intelligible from one to the other, and therefore the knowledge of one must be kept apart from that of the other" [Longxi Zhang xvii]. The viability of comparative studies, as is recognized, rests on the fundamental notion that two cultural objects juxtaposed for comparison should share some common ground, or that a valid frame of reference be applicable to both of them. In the comparative studies of Chinese and Western traditions, because these traditions are recognized as founded on different and often unique ontological premises and epistemological assumptions, it is difficult to locate a common conceptual entry point for a two-way dialogue, let alone a common conceptual basis undergirded by Chinese and Western philosophical thought, to establish a viable paradigm of comparison. The current absence of such a conceptual basis in the international context of globalization, which calls for dialogues between different cultures and traditions, cannot but force us to ask: is there a Chinese philosophical concept that signifies, as another Western philosophical concept does, the ontological and epistemological conditions of human existence, one that can be used as a conceptual premise upon which to build a bridge across the divide between the Chinese and Western traditions?Undaunted by the seemingly unbridgeable gap between Chinese and Western traditions, some scholars have made valiant efforts to locate a common conceptual ground. Following the lead of Qian Zhongshu, a Chinese erudite of the twentieth century, some scholars have also noted that the Dao (Tao) in Chinese philosophical thought and Logos in Western philosophical thought are remarkably comparable [Qian 408]. The compatibility of the Dao and Logos, however, has been problematized by other scholars, who argue that the differences between the Dao and Logos are more profound than their apparent similarities. James J. Y. Liu, for example, questions the universality of logocentrism as claimed by Longxi Zhang in both the Dao and Logos: "Zhang's comparison of dao to logos fails to take into account an important difference: in the West, logos is identified with God, but Lao Zi took great pains to say that dao is not the true name of the ultimate" [Liu 25]. Moreover, while in Lao Zi's conception, the Dao is a [End Page 86] feminine concept, the Western Logos, through its emphasis on presence, is obviously masculine in nature. More significantly, the pairing of the Chinese concept of Dao with the Western concept of Logos as a conceptual common ground has a fundamentally incommensurable point: namely, while the former is predicated on a fundamentally monistic view of the universe as a spontaneously self-generating entity, the latter, like Plato's Idea, is founded on a dualistic view of the universe as constituted by one world of essence and another of appearances, created by a powerful personal god.To establish a model for cross cultural studies, it is of little value to simply juxtapose a Chinese concept and a Western concept and find their similarities. In comparative studies, we need to find a conceptual model based on the pairing of similar concepts from different traditions that may yield promises of paradigms and methodologies. For this reason, my exploration is not concerned with the question of whether it is viable to pair the Dao and Logos together. I am more concerned with another question: Is it possible to build a conceptual and methodological model based on the near commensurability between the Dao and Logos? Some scholars suggest that the striking similarity invites and encourages further exploration. But in which direction or directions should we pursue the subject further? In my view, previous scholars' preliminary explorations have been promising, but too narrowly focused on the local... (shrink)

Literary pneuma is a foundational idea in Chinese literary thought and the theory of literary pneuma one of the major aesthetic theories in Chinese literature and art. Since its first appearance, however, this aesthetic has remained an elusive concept despite its central importance. This article adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine major statements of wenqi in Chinese thought in relation to similar ideas in modern philosophy, aesthetics, psychoanalysis, and literary criticism. It attempts to understand its rationale, locate its conceptual groundings, (...) and reconceptualize it into an aesthetic theory for our time. (shrink)

Contemporary interpretations of Zhuangzi’s 莊子 philosophy as adumbrating a relativist position are legion. However, what is the scope and nature of the relativism that can be gleaned from a comprehensive analysis of relevant passages in the Zhuangzi? In this essay, I shall explain Zhuangzi’s alleged relativist position as motivated from a primary concern about disagreement. He in effect claims that since any disputant can foresee her assertion to be refuted by an opponent, the recourse to a higher tribunal in adjudicating (...) the debate is futile. The consequence of an apparent lack of justification for assertion is, in my opinion, what needs elucidation. For example, is “truth relativism” an apt label for the nature of assertion in a debate without the verdict of a judge? Or, is it more appropriate to shun the concept of truth altogether in our explanation? I deem the contemporary explanation of Zhuangzi’s relativism either trivializes disputation or fails to account for the difference between a claim’s being right and being acceptable. Hence, I shall argue that without the intrusion of a judge as an arbiter of truth, the kind of disputation Zhuangzi practices promulgates faultless disagreement, which does not appeal to the correctness of any perspective in a comparative or absolute sense. In this understanding, Zhuangzi’s advice of harmonizing with both right and wrong is indeed a viable alternative to relativism and dogmatism, both of which do not properly take heed of the point of disagreeing in a disputation. (shrink)

In contrast to the traditional and ordinary interpretation of Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which considers Xunzi’s theory as claiming that human nature is bad or evil, this article aims at, first, arguing that the interpretation is wrong or at least incomplete and, second, constructing a new interpretation that, according to Xunzi’s text, there are some factors in human nature that are able to promote good behaviors. I shall demonstrate that some major paragraphs in Xunzi’s text were misinterpreted and misarranged, (...) analyze that the word wei (artifice) in the chapter of “Zhengming” has two different but related senses, one of which designates some of the potential capacities of human nature, and argue that the 23 words in the chapter of “Rongru” should not be deleted as redundant, as was done by the two famous philologists in Qing dynasdy, Wang Niansun and Wang Xianqian. (shrink)

All along, many commentators stressed the differences of Chinese and Western philosophy and method of Qi, that philosophy and approach to the Western emphasis on analysis, argumentation and logic, and China's philosophical method is longer than intuition, and permits will be realized. Different methods by which they believe will give different results: the knowledge of the outside world through Western methods may be, can be obtained through the French inner truth. The former purpose we got outside, after all is also (...) in the contented. The authors believe that this orthodoxy and popular opinion is a great problem. One problem is: with or without the so-called intrinsic truth, they say, intuitive method of physical certificates but not feasible. In addition to resorting to a very small number of believers of the first-person authority, they can not explain the methods and procedures, they can not prove its effectiveness. In addition, they oppose the West, although on the surface of the speculative method, which emphasizes the importance of reflexivity within the card, but when their faith in order to convince the people off the outer ring of authenticity Wuzhen Dao, in fact, they unwittingly use on the Western speculative methods, but not the logic of Western speculative, but now the speculative. The purpose of this article, first through a thought experiment of the anti-theory, went on to argue that the orthodox view of the popular errors and false. The authors believe that: this say just false, but logically self-denial. (shrink)

The present chapter sketches the adoption of logic in late nineteenth and early twentieth century China. Addressing both conceptual and institutional aspects of this process, it contextualizes the raising interest in the discipline among Qing scholars and Republican intellectuals. Arranged largely chronologically, it delineates the successive periods in the reception of major works of and intellectual trends in the field. It introduces the most influential scholars promoting a public discourse on logic in the final years of the empire, but also (...) the ever more professional agents who participated in the ensuing establishment of a modern institutional framework for studies in logic like universities, departments of logic, academic societies, journals etc. While at the beginning, these people were mostly no trained logicians, progress in the establishment of academic logic in the 1930s provided the conditions for the formation of the first Chinese specialists in the field who were often internationally trained and soon to engage in cutting-edge research. In some contrast, academic discourse on logic well into the 1930s was dominated by exaggerated social and political expectations, not least due to the successive influence on intellectuals of inductionist scientism in the first decades of the twentieth century, of an inflated pragmatist notion of logic in the 1920s, and of an overly simplistic “antiformalist” notion of logic propagated by (vulgar-)Marxist historical dialecticians in the 1930s. The arrival of scientific logic also went in tandem with a renewed interest in studies in the traditional Buddhist “science of reasons” (yinming, hetuvidyā, “Buddhist logic”) and spurred the search for contributions to the field of logic in the record of inherited Chinese literature, a development which soon led to the common acceptance of the existence of genuinely Chinese traditions of logic. It is eventually a peculiarity of the Chinese reception of logic that since around 1920, less than two decades after the first modern translations of textbooks on traditional syllogistics, the visit of Bertrand Russell – one of the fathers of mathematical logic – fueled the spread of this new approach to logic which has eventually changed its face for good. Designed as a historical survey, this chapter is a general account on the major contributions to the field by Chinese scholars of the time and has to forego detailed discussions. (shrink)

Résumé Avec La Source aux fleurs de pêchers, et d’autres œuvres poétiques écrites par Tao Qian au V e siècle, est née une vision de l’utopie qui reste à tout jamais gravée dans l’imaginaire collectif chinois. Treize siècles plus tard, Cao Xueqin s’en inspirera pour donner forme au « Jardin aux sites grandioses », univers aux traits foncièrement féminins et l’un des noyaux de l’intrigue de L’histoire de la pierre, chef d’œuvre de la fiction romanesque chinoise également connu sous le (...) titre « Rêves au pavillon rouge ». Une lecture des deux œuvres en parallèle, tant au sens figuré que littéral, met en lumière le message du Dao De Jing selon lequel l’utopie ne se planifie pas, ne s’impose pas. Elle émerge au contraire d’un esprit de disponibilité, d’une attitude d’attente, d’une écoute affûtée. Cette intuition conduit à une réflexion sur la différence, fondée sur le rêve du Papillon de Tchouang Tseu. (shrink)

This essay accounts for Mengzi’s 孟子 failure in persuading King Xuan of Qi (Qi Xuan Wang 齊宣王) to act morally. We argue that the distinction between internal and external reasons in contemporary philosophy helps to highlight the nature of the failure. The problem of nontransmission of the compassionate impulse within a person despite moral persuasion, which Mencians need to address in order to enhance the success of moral conversion, is now explained as a result of misdirecting the advisee to the (...) lofty ideal of sagehood. We conclude by proposing a proleptic understanding of external reasons within a pragmatic model of giving moral advice. (shrink)

There is a view that Ruists never put much emphasis on qing and even saw it in a negative light. This is perhaps a misunderstanding, especially in regard to pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu, the passage "dao begins in qing" (dao shi yu qing) plays an important role in our understanding of the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article concentrates on the "theory of qing" in both pre-Qin Ruism and Daoism and attempts a philosophical interpretation (...) of "dao begins in qing," and in the process offers philosophical interpretations of a number of important notions. (shrink)

There is a view that Ruists never put much emphasis on qing and even saw it in a negative light. This is perhaps a misunderstanding, especially in regard to pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu, the passage "dao begins in qing" plays an important role in our understanding of the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article concentrates on the "theory of qing" in both pre-Qin Ruism and Daoism and attempts a philosophical interpretation of "dao begins in (...) qing," and in the process offers philosophical interpretations of a number of important notions. (shrink)

本书介绍了导论——道教的道与术;唐末至北宋时期的道教思想;南宋至明代中期的道教思想等内容。.

本书共分八章,主要内容包括建构宇宙模式、初创中的分歧、本体论的完成、认知的主体性、顺应生命意题、情的普遍意义、意志主宰生命、历史性的总结。.