Who Needs Stories if You Can Get the Data? ISPs in the Era of Big Number Crunching Content Type Journal Article Category Special Issue Pages 371-390 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0041-8 Authors Mireille Hildebrandt, Institute of Computer and Information Sciences (ICIS), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433 Journal Volume Volume 24 Journal Issue Volume 24, Number 4.
Law, Human Agency and Autonomic Computing interrogates the legal implications of the notion and experience of human agency implied by the emerging paradigm of autonomic computing, and the socio-technical infrastructures it supports. The development of autonomic computing and ambient intelligence âe" self-governing systems âe" challenge traditional philosophical conceptions of human self-constitution and agency, with significant consequences for the theory and practice of constitutional self-government. Ideas of identity, subjectivity, agency, personhood, intentionality, and embodiment are all central to the functioning of modern (...) legal systems. But once artificial entities become more autonomic, and less dependent on deliberate human intervention, criteria like agency, intentionality and self-determination, become too fragile to serve as defining criteria for human subjectivity, personality or identity, and for characterizing the processes through which individual citizens become moral and legal subjects. Are autonomic âe" yet artificial âe" systems shrinking the distance between (acting) subjects and (acted upon) objects? How âe~distinctively humanâe(tm) will agency be in a world of autonomic computing? Or, alternatively, does autonomic computing merely disclose that we were never, in this sense, âe~humanâe(tm) anyway? A dialogue between philosophers of technology and philosophers of law, this book addresses these questions, as it takes up the unprecedented opportunity that autonomic computing and ambient intelligence offer for a reassessment of the most basic concepts of law. (shrink)
This Article takes the perspective of law and philosophy, integrating insights from computer science. First, I will argue that in the era of big data analytics we need an understanding of privacy that is capable of protecting what is uncountable, incalculable or incomputable about individual persons. To instigate this new dimension of the right to privacy, I expand previous work on the relational nature of privacy, and the productive indeterminacy of human identity it implies, into an ecological understanding of privacy, (...) taking into account the technological environment that mediates the constitution of human identity. Second, I will investigate how machine learning actually works, detecting a series of design choices that inform the accuracy of the outcome, each entailing trade-offs that determine the relevance, validity and reliability of the algorithm’s accuracy for real life problems. I argue that incomputability does not call for a rejection of machine learning per se but calls for a research design that enables those who will be affected by the algorithms to become involved and to learn how machines learn — resulting in a better understanding of their potential and limitations. A better understanding of the limitations that are inherent in machine learning will deflate some of the eschatological expectations, and provide for better decision-making about whether and if so how to implement machine learning in specific domains or contexts. I will highlight how a reliable research design aligns with purpose limitation as core to its methodological integrity. This Article, then, advocates a practice of “agonistic machine learning” that will contribute to responsible decisions about the integration of data-driven applications into our environments while simultaneously bringing them under the Rule of Law. This should also provide the best means to achieve effective protection against overdetermination of individuals by machine inferences. (shrink)
In this contribution, I will argue that the image of a balance is often used to defend the idea of a trade-off. To understand the drawbacks of this line of thought, I will explore the relationship between online security technologies and fundamental rights, notably privacy, nondiscrimination, freedom of speech and due process. After discriminating between three types of online security technologies, I will trace the reconfiguration of the notion of privacy in the era of smart environments. This will lead to (...) an inquiry into the metaphor of the scale, building on the triple test regarding the justification of the limitation of fundamental rights such as privacy. The conclusion will be that in the case of a trade-off, infringing measures will have to be balanced by effective safeguards. No trade-off without balance. (shrink)
Euthanasia remains controversial in Canada and an issue of debate among physicians. Most studies have explored the opinion of health professionals regarding its legalization, but have not investigated their intentions when faced with performing euthanasia. These studies are also considered atheoretical. The purposes of the present study were to fill this gap in the literature by identifying the psychosocial determinants of physicians’ intention to practice euthanasia in palliative care and verifying whether respecting the patient’s autonomy is important for physicians.
Both corporate and global governance seem to demand increasingly sophisticated means for identification. Supposedly justified by an appeal to security threats, fraud and abuse, citizens are screened, located, detected and their data stored, aggregated and analysed. At the same time potential customers are profiled to detect their habits and preferences in order to provide for targeted services. Both industry and the European Commission are investing huge sums of money into what they call Ambient Intelligence and the creation of an ‘Internet (...) of Things’. Such intelligent networked environments will entirely depend on real time monitoring and real time profiling, resulting in real time adaptation of the environment. In this contribution the author will assess the threats and opportunities of such autonomic profiling in terms of its impact on individual autonomy and refined discrimination and indicate the extent to which traditional data protection is effective as regards profiling. (shrink)
. Three logical squares of predication or quantification, which one can even extend to logical hexagons, will be presented and analyzed. All three squares are based on ideas of the non-traditional theory of predication developed by Sinowjew and Wessel. The authors also designed a non-traditional theory of quantification. It will be shown that this theory is superfluous, since it is based on an obscure difference between two kinds of quantification and one pays a high price for differentiating in this way: (...) losing the definability between the existence- and all-quantifier. Therefore, a combination of non-traditional predication and classical quantification is preferred here. (shrink)
In this contribution we will explore some of the implications of the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for law and legal philosophy. AmI creates an environment that monitors and anticipates human behaviour with the aim of customised adaptation of the environment to a personâs inferred preferences. Such an environment depends on distributed human and non-human intelligence that raises a host of unsettling questions around causality, subjectivity, agency and (criminal) liability. After discussing the vision of AmI we will present relevant research (...) in the field of philosophy of technology, inspired by the post-phenomenological position taken by Don Ihde and the constructivist realism of Bruno Latour. We will posit the need to conceptualise technological normativity in comparison with legal normativity, claiming that this is necessary to develop democratic accountability for the implications of emerging technologies like AmI. Lastly we will investigate to what extent technological devices and infrastructures can and should be used to achieve compliance with the criminal law, and we will discuss some of the implications of non-human distributed intelligence for criminal liability. (shrink)
Les notions de «mort» et de «mourir», parfois utilisées sans distinctions dans la littérature, font référence à deux dimensions fort différentes pour la personne en fin de vie, de même que pour toutes les personnes appelées à en prendre soin . Alors que la personne malade voit venir la mort, elle doit vivre son mourir. La mort succède ainsi au mourir, dans le temps. Par ailleurs, une réflexion d’ordre philosophique permet de préciser que la mort s’avère une ordonnance de la (...) nature, elle est privation de la vie et un mystère. Et en tant que mystère, elle prendra forme selon les différentes croyances attribuées à l’immortalité de l’âme. Quant au mourir, il est l’épreuve par excellence d’une situation-limite. De plus, en dépit du caractère unique et individuel de cette expérience nouvelle pour tous, il assume différents visages. Si l’espoir de «connaître une belle mort» se conçoit aisément, le mourir n’en demeure pas moins le moment le plus tragique de l’existence humaine. (shrink)
In this contribution I address the type of emergency that threatens a stateâs monopoly of violence, meaning that the stateâs competence to provide citizens with elementary security is challenged. The question is, whether actions taken by the state to ward off these threats (should) fall within the ambit of the criminal law. A central problem is the indeterminacy that is inherent in the state of emergency, implicating that adequate measures as well as constitutional constraints to be imposed on such measures (...) cannot easily be determined in advance. This indeterminacy raises two interrelated issues. Firstly, the issue of whether it makes sense to speak of criminal jurisdiction when the existing jurisdiction is challenged as such. To what extent does the indeterminacy call for inherently unlimited powers of the state, implying there can be no such thing as criminal jurisdiction during a state of emergency? Secondâif criminal jurisdiction is not in contradiction with the state of emergencyâthe issue of what criminal liability could mean in such a state needs to be confronted. To what extent does the indeterminacy inherent in the state of emergency jeopardise criminal liability because such indeterminacy engenders severe legal uncertainty regarding the standards against which the relevant actions are to be judged? Both issues will be discussed from the perspective of constitutional democracy, assuming that what is at stake in times of emergency is both the competence to sustain the monopoly of violence and the possibility to constrain the powers of the state. (shrink)
Mireille Hadas-Lebel shines a spotlight on the complex life and works of Philo, the illustrious Alexandrian Jewish philosopher, offering a fascinating insight into a seminal religious thinker at the crossroads of Judaism and Hellenism.
The essays in Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy all trace different aspects of the mutually supporting histories of philosophical thought and colonial politics in order to suggest ways that we might decolonize our thinking. From psychology to education, to economic and legal structures, the contributors interrogate the interrelation of colonization and philosophy in order to articulate a Fanon-inspired vision of social justice. This project is endorsed by his daughter, Mireille Fanon-Mendès France, in the book's preface.
In recent years, the sharing economy has attracted considerable attention, both scholarly and popular, relating to its capacity to enforce or undermine extant economic conventions. However, the process through which technological developments can effectively have this outcome of altering extant conventions on what is morally acceptable or desirable is still unclear. In this paper, we draw on the work of Boltanski and Thévenot and the notion of agencement to investigate the moral and performative dimension of controversies related to the SE. (...) The research stems from a qualitative case-based study of the controversy following Uber’s implementation in Montréal’s taxi market. We contribute to the literature on the SE through an empirical study of the moral debates entailed in the unfolding in situ of a SE device. We also add to the literature using the ‘Orders of Worth’ framework by showing how a compromise is solidified. We find that beyond discursive strategies, it is the concrete recomposition of laws, conventions, devices, persons, etc. that harmonised different definitions of the common good. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the relationship between technology, ethics, and social change by capturing the specific values that legitimise Uber, and by following their unfolding throughout a controversy. (shrink)
We emphasize the relevance to cognitive psychology of Feldman and Levin's theoretical position. Traditional views of motor control have failed to clearly separate “production control” at the level of motor command, based on task-independent CV, from intentional “product control” based on task-dependent parameters. Because F&L's approach concentrates on the first process, it can distinguish the product control stage.