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Mitchell S. Green [32]Mitchell Green [28]Mitchell Shepherd Green [1]
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Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
  1. Self-Expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Mitchell S. Green presents a systematic philosophical study of self-expression - a pervasive phenomenon of the everyday life of humans and other species, which has received scant attention in its own right. He explores the ways in which self-expression reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience, and he defends striking new theses concerning a wide range of fascinating topics: our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts. He draws on (...)
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  2.  10
    Assertion and Convention.Mitchell Green - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion.
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  3. Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
  4. Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
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  5. Speech Acts.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Speech acts are a staple of everyday communicative life, but only became a topic of sustained investigation, at least in the English-speaking world, in the middle of the Twentieth Century.[1] Since that time “speech act theory” has been influential not only within philosophy, but also in linguistics, psychology, legal theory, artificial intelligence, literary theory and many other scholarly disciplines.[2] Recognition of the importance of speech acts has illuminated the ability of language to do other things than describe reality. In the (...)
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  6.  90
    Conversation and Common Ground.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1587-1604.
    Stalnaker’s conception of context as common ground possesses unquestionable explanatory power, shedding light on presupposition, presupposition accommodation, the behavior of certain types of conditionals, epistemic modals, and related phenomena. The CG-context approach is also highly abstract, so merely pointing out that it fails to account for an aspect of communication is an inconclusive criticism. Instead our question should be whether it can be extended or modified to account for such a phenomenon while preserving its spirit. To that end, this essay (...)
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  7. Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line.Nuel Belnap & Mitchell Green - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:365 - 388.
  8.  68
    Imagery, Expression, and Metaphor.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):33--46.
    Metaphorical utterances are construed as falling into two broad categories, in one of which are cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content, speaker meaning, and satisfaction conditions, and where image-construction is permissible but not mandatory. I call these image-permitting metaphors, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors comprising a second category and whose understanding mandates the construction of a mental image. This construction, I suggest, is spontaneous, is not restricted to visual imagery, and its result is typically somatically marked (...)
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  9.  18
    Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Mitchell S. Green - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):613.
    Frege was the grandfather of analytical philosophy, Husserl the founder of the phenomenological school, two radically different philosophical movements. In 1903, say, how would they have appeared to any German student of philosophy who knew the work of both? Not, certainly, as two deeply opposed thinkers: rather as remarkably close in orientation, despite some divergence of interests. They may be compared with the Rhine and the Danube, which rise quite close to one another and for a time pursue roughly parallel (...)
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  10.  25
    II—Mitchell Green: Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
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  11.  5
    Ii—Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
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  12. Introduction.Mitchell Green & John N. Williams - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
     
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  13. Illocutionary Force and Semantic Content.Mitchell S. Green - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):435-473.
    Illocutionary force and semantic content are widely held to occupy utterly different categories in at least two ways: Any expression serving as an indicator of illocutionary force must be without semantic content, and no such expression can embed. A refined account of the force/content distinction is offered here that does the explanatory work that the standard distinction does, while, in accounting for the behavior of a range of parenthetical expressions, shows neither nor to be compulsory. The refined account also motivates (...)
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  14. Frege Making Sense. [REVIEW]Mitchell Green - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):567-570.
     
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  15. Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States.Mitchell S. Green - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
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  16. Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.
    G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better (...)
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  17.  20
    Irony as Expression (of a Sense of the Absurd).Mitchell Green - 2017 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 12 (1).
    Situational irony is, first, explained as a severe violation of one or more established, non-moral norms; such violation constitutes that situation’s absurdity. The classical “inversion” theory of communicative irony associated with Cicero and Quintilian, as well as its refinement in terms of the notion of conversational implicature (Grice 1989), are then shown to be inadequate. The echoic (Sperber 1984, Wilson 2006, Wilson and Sperber 2012) and pretence (Currie 2010) theories are also shown to fail to account for the broad range (...)
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  18.  10
    Extreme Intentionalism Modestly Modified.Mitchell Green - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2):197-201.
    1. On at least one usage of ‘mean’, performing an action that leads someone else to think that P, is not, on its own, sufficient for meaning that P. Nor is performing an action that is intended to get someone to think this. Instead one must make one’s intention overt. Grice’s way of developing this overtness requirement requires audience-directed intentions: for an agent, on this approach, to mean that P, she must perform a publicly accessible action with the intention of (...)
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  19. Direct Reference and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90.
    On some formulations of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of a rigid singular term is just its referent. In response to the apparent possibility of a difference in truth value of two sentences just alike save for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms, some proponents of Direct Reference have held that any two such sentences differ only pragmatically. Some have also held, more specifically, that two such sentences differ by conveying distinct conversational implicata, (...)
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  20. Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning.Dorit Bar-On & Mitchell Green - 2010 - In James R. O'Shea & Eric Rubenstein (eds.), Self, Language, and World: Problems From Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg. Ridgeview Publishing Co.. pp. 89--106.
  21. Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge.Mitchell Green - 2018 - Routledge.
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  22. Empathy, Expression, and What Artworks Have to Teach.Mitchell Green - 2008 - In Garry Hagberg (ed.), Art and Ethical Criticism. Blackwell.
     
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  23.  17
    Illocution and Empathy.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):881-893.
    Slote has argued that empathy plays a crucial role in such speech acts as questions and assertions. After clarifying some of the aims and limitations of speech act theory, providing an account of empathy and its potential epistemic value, and sketching the role that some speech acts play in expressing psychological states, we consider Slote’s argument for the place of empathy in questions and assertions. We show that the most that Slote has established is that some cases of questioning and (...)
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  24. Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  25. Direct Reference Empty Names and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-37.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  26. Narrative Fiction as a Source of Knowledge.Mitchell Green - 2017 - In Paula Olmos (ed.), Narration as Argument. Springer Verlag.
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  27. Expression, Indication and Showing What’s Within.Mitchell S. Green - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):389-398.
    This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without (...)
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  28.  69
    Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning.Mitchell Green - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:4.
    In recent years the view that understanding a language requires knowing what its words and expressions mean has come under attack. One line of attack attempts to show that while knowledge can be undermined by Gettier-style counterexamples, language understanding cannot be. I consider this line of attack, particularly in the work of Pettit and Longworth, and show it to be unpersuasive. I stress, however, that maintaining a link between language understanding and knowledge does not itself vindicate a cognitivist view of (...)
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  29.  93
    Quantity, Volubility, and Some Varieties of Discourse.Mitchell S. Green - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (1):83 - 112.
    Grice's Quantity maxims have been widely misinterpreted as enjoining a speaker to make the strongest claim that she can, while respecting the other conversational maxims. Although many writers on the topic of conversational implicature interpret the Quantity maxims as enjoining such volubility, so construed the Quantity maxims are unreasonable norms for conversation. Appreciating this calls for attending more closely to the notion of what a conversation requires. When we do so, we see that eschewing an injunction to maximal informativeness need (...)
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  30. Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-92.
    An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon the aim of the conversation taking place, (...)
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  31. On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning.Mitchell S. Green - 1997 - Mind 106 (422):217-243.
    Frege and many following him, such as Dummett, Geach, Stenius and Hare, have envisaged a role for illocutionary force indicators in a logically perpspicuous notation. Davidson has denied that such expressions are even possible on the ground that any putative force indicator would be used by actors and jokers to heighten the drama of their performances. Davidson infers from this objection a Thesis of the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning: symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with extra-linguistic purpose. A modified (...)
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  32. Reflections on Reflection: Van Fraassen on Belief.Mitchell S. Green & Christopher R. Hitchcock - 1994 - Synthese 98 (2):297 - 324.
    In Belief and the Will, van Fraassen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. There and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability are undertakings of commitments) that he espouses as an alternative to descriptivism (first-person reports of subjective probability are merely self-descriptions). Christensen and others have attacked Reflection, taking it to have (...)
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  33. How and What We Can Learn From Fiction.Mitchell Green - 2010 - In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Wiley-Blackwell.
  34.  90
    How Do Speech Acts Express Psychological States?Mitchell Green - 2007 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    forthcoming in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge).
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  35. Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within.Mitchell Green - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
    Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Virginia and at Texas A&M University. I thank audiences at both institutions for their insightful comments. Special thanks to John Williams for his illuminating comments on an earlier draft. Research for this paper was supported in part by a Summer Grant from the Vice Provost for Research and Public Service at the University of Virginia. That support is here gratefully acknowledged.
     
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  36.  90
    The Inferential Significance of Frege's Assertion Sign.Mitchell S. Green - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2).
  37.  14
    Illocutions, Implicata, and What a Conversation Requires.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):65-91.
    An approach is provided to the prediction and explanation of quantity implicata that, unlike the majority of approaches available, does not construe Quantity as requiring speakers to make the strongest claim that their evidence permits. Central to this treatment is an elaboration of the notion of what a conversation requires as appealed to in the Cooperative Principle and the Quantity maxim. What a conversation requires is construed as depending, at any given point, upon the aim of the conversation taking place, (...)
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  38.  26
    Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning.Mitchell Green - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    In recent years the view that understanding a language requires knowing what its words and expressions mean has come under attack. One line of attack attempts to show that while knowledge can be undermined by Gettier-style counterexamples, language understanding cannot be. I consider this line of attack, particularly in the work of Pettit and Longworth, and show it to be unpersuasive. I stress, however, that maintaining a link between language understanding and knowledge does not itself vindicate a cognitivist view of (...)
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  39.  6
    Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London. He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fines, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fiction; he's a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fictions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ from Angle Grinder (...)
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  40.  80
    Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement.Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to (...)
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  41.  89
    The Status of Supposition.Mitchell S. Green - 2000 - Noûs 34 (3):376–399.
    According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence (...)
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  42.  33
    Introduction to Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - unknown
  43.  45
    Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory.Mitchell S. Green - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):241-244.
    I recall reading a critical notice of Grices’ Studies in the Way of Words, in which the author remarked that while Grice’s analysis of speaker meaning is the subject of considerable controversy, Grice’s account of conversational implicature is, “…money in the philosophical bank.” This assessment was optimistic at best: Grice’s remarks on implicature offer a program not a theory, and in relation to the amount of discussion it has received in philosophy and allied disciplines such as linguistics and psycholinguistics, rather (...)
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  44.  93
    How to Express Yourself: Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Protosociology Forum.
    This articles gives an overview of the main themes and arguments of _Self-Expression_ (OUP,2007; paper, 2011), and responds to some recent publications in which that book is discussed. In the process of these responses, the article provides refinements and elaborations on some of the book's central claims.
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  45.  31
    Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 175.
  46.  52
    Philosophy in High Schools: Guest Editors' Introduction to a Special Issue of Teaching Philosophy.Jana Mohr Lone & Mitchell Green - 2013 - Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):213-215.
  47.  59
    Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore.Mitchell S. Green - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.
    I reply to the main criticisms and suggestions for further clarification made by the contributors to this symposium on my book, Self-Expression . These replies are organized into the following sections: (1) What's in the name?, (2) Showing, expressing and indicating, (3) Expressing and signaling, (4) Perceiving emotions, (5) Voluntary/involuntary, (6) Expression and handicaps, (7) Expression and aesthetics, and (8) Looking ahead.
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  48. "You Perceive with Your Mind": Knowledge and Perception.Mitchell S. Green - 2005 - In D. Darby and T. Shelby (ed.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.
    A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know whats going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes (...)
     
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  49. "You Don't See with Your Eyes, You Perceive with Your Mind": Knowledge and Perception.Mitchell S. Green - 2005 - In D. Darby & T. Shelby (eds.), Hip Hop and Philosophy. Open Court.
    A major theme in rap lyrics is that the only way to survive is to use your head, be aware, know what’s going on around you. That simple idea packs a lot of background. The most obvious ideas about knowledge turn out if you look at them close up to be pretty questionable. For example: How do we get knowledge about the world? A natural and ancient answer to this question is that much if not all of our knowledge comes (...)
     
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  50. Truthtelling.Mitchell S. Green - unknown
    From the point of view of ethics, truthtelling is not a matter of speaking the truth but is rather a matter of speaking what one believes to be the truth. So too liars do not necessarily say what is false; they say what they believe to be false. Further, one can mislead without lying. An executive answering in the affirmative the question whether some employees are in excessive danger on the job will mislead if he knows that in fact most (...)
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