Recently Lafont [6] showed the finite model property for the multiplicative additive fragment of linear logic (MALL) and for affine logic (LLW), i.e., linear logic with weakening. In this paper, we shall prove the finite model property for intuitionistic versions of those, i.e. intuitionistic MALL (which we call IMALL), and intuitionistic LLW (which we call ILLW). In addition, we shall show the finite model property for contractive linear logic (LLC), i.e., linear logic with contraction, and for its intuitionistic version (ILLC). (...) The finite model property for related substructural logics also follow by our method. In particular, we shall show that the property holds for all of FL and GL - -systems except FL c and GL - c of Ono [11], that will settle the open problems stated in Ono [12]. (shrink)

Proof-theory has traditionally been developed based on linguistic (symbolic) representations of logical proofs. Recently, however, logical reasoning based on diagrammatic or graphical representations has been investigated by logicians. Euler diagrams were introduced in the eighteenth century. But it is quite recent (more precisely, in the 1990s) that logicians started to study them from a formal logical viewpoint. We propose a novel approach to the formalization of Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in which diagrams are defined not in terms of regions as in (...) the standard approach, but in terms of topological relations between diagrammatic objects. We formalize the unification rule, which plays a central role in Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in a style of natural deduction. We prove the soundness and completeness theorems with respect to a formal set-theoretical semantics. We also investigate structure of diagrammatic proofs and prove a normal form theorem. (shrink)

Recently Lafont [6] showed the finite model property for the multiplicative additive fragment of linear logic and for affine logic, i.e., linear logic with weakening. In this paper, we shall prove the finite model property for intuitionistic versions of those, i.e. intuitionistic MALL, and intuitionistic LLW. In addition, we shall show the finite model property for contractive linear logic, i.e., linear logic with contraction, and for its intuitionistic version. The finite model property for related substructural logics also follow by our (...) method. In particular, we shall show that the property holds for all of FL and GL$^-$-systems except FL$_c$ and GL$^-_c$ of Ono [11], that will settle the open problems stated in Ono [12]. (shrink)

The paper traces the development and the role of syntactic reduction in Edmund Husserl’s early writings on mathematics and logic, especially on arithmetic. The notion has its origin in Hermann Hankel’s principle of permanence that Husserl set out to clarify. In Husserl’s early texts the emphasis of the reductions was meant to guarantee the consistency of the extended algorithm. Around the turn of the century Husserl uses the same idea in his conception of definiteness of what he calls “mathematical manifolds.” (...) The paper argues that the notion anticipates the notion of reduction in term rewrite theory in computer science. The role of the reduction for Husserl is, however, primarily epistemological: its purpose is to impart clarity to formal mathematics. (shrink)

We introduce a simple inference system based on two primitive relations between terms, namely, inclusion and exclusion relations. We present a normalization theorem, and then provide a characterization of the structure of normal proofs. Based on this, inferences in a syllogistic fragment of natural language are reconstructed within our system. We also show that our system can be embedded into a fragment of propositional minimal logic.

La thèse selon laquelle la signification d’un énoncé mathématique est donnée par sa preuve a été soutenue à la fois par Wittgenstein et par les intuitionnistes, à la suite de Heyting et de Dummett. Dans ce texte, nous nous attachons à clarifier le sens de cette thèse chez Wittgenstein, afin de montrer en quoi sa position se distingue de celle des intuitionnistes. Nous montrons par ailleurs que cette thèse prend sa source chez Wittgenstein dans sa réflexion, durant la période intermédiaire, (...) sur la notion de preuve par induction. Nous esquissons aussi les grandes lignes de la réponse que Wittgenstein fait à un certain nombre d’objections, dont celle selon laquelle cette thèse, dans le sens qu’il lui donne, remet en question la possibilité même de formuler une conjecture en mathématique. Nous terminons en montrant comment les propos de Wittgenstein trouvent un écho favorable dans le paradigme contemporain de la “proposition comme type” et les extensions de l’isomorphisme de Curry-Howard dont il est issu.The thesis according to which the meaning of a mathematical sentence is given by its proof was held by both Wittgenstein and the intuitionists, following Heyting and Dummett. In this paper, we clarify the meaning of this thesis for Wittgenstein, showing how his position differs from that of the intuitionists. We show how the thesis originates in his thoughts, from the middle period, about proofs by induction, and we sketch his answers to a number of objections, including the idea that, given the particular meaning he gives to this thesis, he cannot account for mathematical conjectures. We conclude by showing how his views find a favourable echo today in the paradigm of “proposition-as-type” and extensions of the Curry-Howard isomorphism from which this paradigm originates. (shrink)

We present some ideas on logical process descriptions, using relations from the DIO (Drug Interaction Ontology) as examples and explaining how these relations can be naturally decomposed in terms of more basic structured logical process descriptions using terms from linear logic. In our view, the process descriptions are able to clarify the usual relational descriptions of DIO. In particular, we discuss the use of logical process descriptions in proving linear logical theorems. Among the types of reasoning supported by DIO one (...) can distinguish both (1) basic reasoning about general structures in reality and (2) the domain-specific reasoning of experts. We here propose a clarification of this important distinction between (realist) reasoning on the basis of an ontology and rule-based inferences on the basis of an expert’s view. (shrink)

We shall give a direct proof of the independence result of a Buchholz style-Hydra Game on labeled finite trees. We shall show that Takeuti-Arai's cut-elimination procedure of $(\Pi^{1}_{1}-CA) + BI$ and of the iterated inductive definition systems can be directly expressed by the reduction rules of Buchholz's Hydra Game. As a direct corollary the independence result of the Hydra Game follows.

We first note that Gentzen's proof-reduction for his consistency proof of PA can be directly interpreted as moves of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game, which implies a direct independence proof of the game . Buchholz's Hydra Game for labeled hydras is known to be much stronger than PA. However, we show that the one-dimensional version of Buchholz's Game can be exactly identified to Kirby-Paris' Game , by a simple and natural interpretation . Jervell proposed another type of a combinatorial game, by abstracting (...) Gentzen's proof-reductions and showed that his game is independent of PA. We show that this Jervell's game is actually much stronger than PA, by showing that the critical ordinal of Jervell's game is φω = ϵ0) in the Veblen hierarchy of ordinals. (shrink)

This paper presents a new correctness criterion for marked Danos-Reginer graphs of Multiplicative Cyclic Linear Logic MCLL and Abrusci's non-commutative Linear Logic MNLL. As a corollary we obtain an affirmative answer to the open question whether a known quadratic-time algorithm for the correctness checking of proof nets for MCLL and MNLL can be improved to linear-time.

We introduce subsystems WLJ and SI of the intuitionistic propositional logic LJ, by weakening the intuitionistic implication. These systems are justifiable by purely constructive semantics. Then the intuitionistic implication with full strength is definable in the second order versions of these systems. We give a relationship between SI and a weak modal system WM. In Appendix the Kripke-type model theory for WM is given.

This paper presents a new correctness criterion for marked Danos-Reginer graphs (D-R graphs, for short) of Multiplicative Cyclic Linear Logic MCLL and Abrusci's non-commutative Linear Logic MNLL. As a corollary we obtain an affirmative answer to the open question whether a known quadratic-time algorithm for the correctness checking of proof nets for MCLL and MNLL can be improved to linear-time.