Having entered into the problem structuring methods, system dynamics (SD) is an approach, among systems’ methodologies, which claims to recognize the main structures of socio-economic behaviors. However, the concern for building or discovering strong philosophical underpinnings of SD, undoubtedly playing an important role in the modeling process, is a long-standing issue, in a way that there is a considerable debate about the assumptions or the philosophical foundations of it. In this paper, with a new perspective, we have explored theory of (...) knowledge in SD models and found strange similarities between classic epistemological concepts such as justification and truth, and the mechanism of obtaining knowledge in SD models. In this regard, we have discussed related theories of epistemology and based on this analysis, have suggested some implications for moderating common problems in the modeling process of SD. Furthermore, this research could be considered a reword of system dynamics modeling principles in terms of theory of knowledge. (shrink)

RESUMO O filme Coringa (2019), de Todd Phillips, é a representação cinematográfica mais recente do notório príncipe palhaço de Gotham City. Embora as adaptações anteriores do filme usualmente o representassem como um vilão do herói do Batman, esta versão o descreve como um homem solitário que tem de lidar com a depressão e luta para ser aceito e se encaixar na sociedade. Portanto, esta versão do personagem carrega uma aura marcada de consciência sociopolítica. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar (...) o filme Coringa de Todd Phillips através das lentes do ritual de carnaval apresentado por Mikhail Bakhtin. O trabalho discutirá os diferentes elementos carnavalescos presentes no filme Coringa, e ilustrará como o filme aproveita ao máximo para montar um ataque contra a cultura predominante e oficial de Gotham. Além disso, ele argumentará como o filme Coringa forma uma condição utópica em que a anarquia constante resulta em liberdade. (shrink)

This paper scrutinizes the dialogical character of knowledge from the perspectives of Hegel’s and Davidson’s philosophies. First, it outlines their analogous trains of thought, particularly their “anti-representational” and “intersubjective” accounts of knowledge. Second, it draws a parallel between the two by discussing their contrasting views of the structure and goal of knowledge, showing that while Davidson advocates an open-ended, scheme-less empirical knowledge, Hegel maintains the notion of a (universal-rational) scheme and a goal-oriented dialectical process in which “the true is the (...) whole.” This section then critically traces their underlying disagreement to their divergent views on the nature of meaning, language, and thought. Finally, it argues that their views can be seen as complementary to two versions of dialectic, showing that while Hegel’s approach, akin to Platonic dialectic, focuses on the self-contained and “Truth”-oriented “negotiational” movement of ideas, Davidson’s, reminiscent of Socratic elenchus, emphasizes the truth-oriented ‘conversational’ interaction of subjects exchanging concepts. (shrink)

This essay examines the different fates of philosophy in Bloor’s and Rorty’s post-epistemological inquiries, tracing their sharp disagreement to their distinct conceptions of ‘naturalism’ and ‘language.’ To this end, the first section outlines their main reasons for overcoming the epistemologically-centered philosophy, as well as theirreassessments of key concepts such as objectivity. The second section draws a comparison between their proposed post-epistemological inquiries, i.e., Bloor’s empirically-informed ‘sociologism’ and Rorty’s pragmatist ‘conversationalism,’ emphasizing that while the former implies the ‘end’ of philosophy in (...) a scientific culture, the latter proposes a ‘new role’ for philosophy in a conversational culture. The third section shows how, in contrast to Bloor’s dismissive attitude toward philosophy and the potential of intervocabulary discourse, which can chiefly be attributed to his scientific naturalism and his Wittgensteinian rule-governed view of language, Rorty’s conception of philosophy as a cross-cultural, conversational practice is enabled and sustained by his non-scientific naturalism coupled with his Davidsonian communicative view of language. Finally, as opposed to Rorty’s attempt to completely dismantle the ‘epistemology industry,’ the fourth section briefly explores the extent to which Bloor’s ‘theory’-oriented viewpoint is still affected by it. (shrink)

The issue of the article is whether the experience of Beauty or love in Plato can be considered as some kind of religious experience. First, the article describes different views on the religious experience. Then it deals with Plato's view on beauty and love and their relationship. finally, demonstrating the divinity of Beauty in Plato, the article shows that if religious experience is an encounter of the experiencer with the divine being, or in religious term God, that manifests itself in (...) various forms, and that encounter is accompanied by a direct conscious of the divine being, then the experience of Beauty or love in Plato can be considered as a kind of religious experience. The article merely claims that the experience of Beauty or love is an instance of religious experience, and it does not have any epistemological view on religious experience, however, any epistemological view on religious experience logically includes the experience of Beauty or love. -/- Key words: religious experience, beauty, love, divinity, Plato . (shrink)

Sunlight carried an extensive tapestry of significance in Mithraism, indicating divine strength, illumination, spiritual rebirth, and ethical instruction. It was a deep metaphor for the riddles of life, death, and the search for heavenly understanding, not just a physical phenomenon. With its sophisticated rituals and symbolic language, the Mithraic Mysteries employed sunlight as a potent tool to transmit spiritual concepts and assist initiates on their transformational journey from the dark into the bright light of Mithras. While Mithraism’s exact practices have (...) mostly gone into history, the symbolic importance of sunshine in this ancient religion remains brilliant in religious studies, shedding light on the continuing human yearning for spiritual illumination and enlightenment. One of the most prominent and recurring symbols in Mithraism was sunlight, which held deep symbolic meaning for its practitioners. In this paper, we will explore the significance of sunlight in Mithraism, examining how it represented various aspects of this enigmatic faith. This study investigates the symbolic meaning of sunshine in the context of Mithraism, examining its various interpretations and functions in this mysterious faith’s spiritual and intellectual landscape. (shrink)

Human skin detection is an essential phase in face detection and face recognition when using color images. Skin detection is very challenging because of the differences in illumination, differences in photos taken using an assortment of cameras with their own characteristics, range of skin colors due to different ethnicities, and other variations. Numerous methods have been used for human skin color detection, including the Gaussian model, rule-based methods, and artificial neural networks. In this article, we introduce a novel technique of (...) using the neural network to enhance the capabilities of skin detection. Several different entities were used as inputs of a neural network, and the pros and cons of different color spaces are discussed. Also, a vector was used as the input to the neural network that contains information from three different color spaces. The comparison of the proposed technique with existing methods in this domain illustrates the effectiveness and accuracy of the proposed approach. Tests were done on two databases, and the results show that the neural network has better precision and accuracy rate, as well as comparable recall and specificity, compared with other methods. (shrink)

It is necessary to seek out the origins of the modern world’s problems in their theoretical and intellectual infrastructures, which are based on concepts. This paper aims to study the modern crisis of identity from the viewpoint of the evolution of the Subject. The Subject is one of philosophy’s more complex concepts, and its complexity can be analyzed through its historical evolution. It has been connected with meanings such as subjectness, subjectivity, subjugation, and subjection, and each of these meanings contain (...) a part of the Subject’s complicated definition. In addition to calling the concept of the human subject into question, this paper demonstrates that we are witnessing a rise in feelings of insecurity and meaninglessness. The paper will analyze three main concepts of the Subject, and an explanation of each with reference to history’s great philosophers. (shrink)

In this article, our aim is to examine the place of “reality” in Richard Rorty’s thought in view of the important and key discussion of language in the philosophy of this thinker. In other words, we know that with the occurrence of the “linguistic turn” in the middle of the twentieth century, the relationship between language and reality has become one of the central debates of philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, and has become of particular importance. Is it language that determines (...) the external reality for us? Is knowing the world outside the mind possible only through the possibilities that language gives us? And to what extent does the structure of language affect our cognitive pattern? These are only a part of the linguistic concerns that have occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers. The main concern and problem of the present article, which has been approached using a descriptive-analytical method, is to examine the relationship between language and reality in Richard Rorty’s thought and to show how he defends the linguistic structure of having reality. Rorty, following an analytical philosophy that, in addition to detailed analyses of traditional philosophical concepts, like the concepts of truth, meaning, necessity, etc. and by changing the discussion from experience to discussion from language in the direction of pragmatizing the basic principles of positivism, believes that it is trans-lingual and trans-temporal. The common denominator that Plato found in the outside world and transferred to man in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is sought in analytic philosophy in language, and so analytic philosophers continue to pursue the traditional philosophy project of providing a trans-historical and eternal framework for the accurate representation of the world. Rorty tries to overcome this view of analytical philosophers with a Darwinist and pragmatic view of language and under the influence of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.For Darwinists, language is a tool among other tools that gives its users the ability to better and more efficiently adapt to their environment and meet their needs. For the likes of Wittgenstein and like-minded people, despite their many and sometimes profound differences, language had an important and pivotal place with its eventual and possibility feature. Influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, and in the context of his Darwinist and pragmatic approach to language, Rorty attributes certain characteristics to language that can be said to influence his whole thought. Firstly, he considers language as a tool like other tools and, therefore, considers it to have no fixed nature and identity. Given that it is not possible to leave the language and on the other hand language has a poetic and metaphorical character, the function of language cannot be a representation of reality and reality can never be available to us naked and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, from Rorty’s point of view, reality is a linguistic and constructed matter of language that we humans have invented in cooperation with each other and in accordance with our historical-cultural situation and needs. Of course, Rorty’s point in saying that reality is made by language is by no means that we create reality arbitrarily and as we wish; rather, what is happening is that we are responding to an external stimulus, a response of various sentence types that manifests itself as linguistic reactions. (shrink)

ID: 89 / Parallel 4k: 2 Single paper Topics: Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science Keywords: Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Mechanistic explanations, Reductionism, Normativity, Generality, Emerging School of Philosophers of Science. The role of philosophy in cognitive science: mechanistic explanations, normativity, generality Mohammadreza Haghighi Fard Leiden University, Netherlands, The; [email protected] Introduction -/- Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, seeks to explain mental activities such as reasoning, remembering, language use, and problem solving, and the explanations it advances commonly involve (...) descriptions of the mechanisms responsible for these activities. Cognitive mechanisms are distinguished from the mechanisms invoked in other domains of biology by involving the processing of information. Many of the philosophical issues discussed in the context of cognitive science involve the nature of information processing. For philosophy of science, a central question is what counts as a scientific explanation. But what is a mechanistic explanation and how does it work, how can philosophy of science use it as a solution for the problem of integration in cognitive science? By answering these questions and merging my answers with discussion of concepts of philosophy, normativity and generality, I will investigate the following claim. -/- I claim that philosophy by using strength concepts such as normativity, generality, and a mechanistic philosophy of explanations, can be a most important contributor to cognitive science. I also investigate how philosophy of science could be (can be) a bridge between psychology and neuroscience. We need a distinction between philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy in cognitive science; I am talking about the latter. -/- This claim is very important for the integration and the future of the interdisciplinary field known as cognitive science. -/- Philosophy as a true cognitive science -/- When the Cognitive Science Society was founded, in the late 1970s, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology were playing smaller roles. The three disciplines that formed the core group were artificial intelligence, psychology, and linguistics. The curious thing is that George Miller, a psychologist and an important founder of cognitive sciences in a hexagon diagram that he presented, put philosophy at the top of the diagram and neuroscience at the very bottom. There is enough agreement now that neuroscience is the most important contributor to cognitive science and there are fair connections between philosophy and neuroscience. In that diagram there was almost no connection between philosophy and neuroscience. -/- The developments and rise of cognitive science in the last half-century has been accompanied by considerable amount of philosophical activity. Perhaps no other area within analytic philosophy in the second half of that period has attracted more attention or produced more publications. (Bechtel and Graham, 1998. Rumelhart and Bly 1999. Bechtel, Mandik, Mundale 2001. Thagard, 2007. Bennett and Dennett et al, 2007. Bennett and Hacker, 2008. Andler, 2009. Frankish and Ramsey, 2012.) -/- Many philosophers of science offer conclusions that have a direct bearing on cognitive science and its practitioners can profit from closer engagement with the rest of cognitive science. For example, William Bechtel has discussed three projects, two in naturalistic philosophy of mind and one in naturalistic philosophy of science that have been pursued during the past 30 years, that he contends, can make theoretical and methodological contributions to cognitive science (Bechtel, 2009). Paul Thagard is another example of the mentioned emerging school of philosophers of science that define cognitive science as the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence (Thagard, 2006). Thagard by presenting some general but important philosophical questions such as, “What is the nature of the explanations and theories developed in cognitive science?”, and by providing answers to these central questions has showed how philosophy of science can help cognitive science by the advantage of its generality. Andrew Brook, however, believes that philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive science but he is listed in a group of the philosophers of science that they are contributing very closely the cognitive science (Brook, 2009). Daniel Dennett , as well as being a member the mentioned naturalistic philosophers of science, believes that there is much good work for philosophers to do in cognitive science if they adopt the constructive attitude that prevails in science. -/- What are mechanisms? Let us begin abstractly before considering an example. Mechanisms are collections of entities and activities organized together to do something (cf. Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Craver & Darden, 2001; Bechtel &Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996). These explanations are known as ‘mechanistic explanations’. By using and developing these mechanistic explanations of philosophy of science one can draw normative consequences for cognitive science. Paul Thagard (Thagard, 2006 and 2009), William Bechtel (Bechtel, 2008 and 2009), Andrew Brook (Brook, 2008) investigated and promoted using the ‘normativity’ in philosophy to show a better and crucial role for philosophy of science in an interdisciplinary known as cognitive science. Some philosophers have thought that, in order to pursue this normative function, philosophy must distance itself from empirical matters, but there are examples where the investigations of descriptive and normative issues go hand in hand. ( Thagard, 2009). -/- I will investigate how we can reduce a higher-level science such as psychology to neuroscience without the problems of reductionism but via mechanistic explanations. By problem I mean psychology does not lose its autonomy. -/- Conclusion -/- If cognitive science is all about understanding the human mind, or if cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence, since the whole life of philosophy was involving with the ways of knowing (epistemology) and conceptions of reality (metaphysics), also philosophy has considered the so-called mind-body problem ( identity theory, functionalism, and heuristic identity theory) , then philosophy could be the most deserved discipline to be a most contributor in cognitive science. I tried to discuss this by using the three advantages in philosophy, normativity, and generality and by introducing an emerging school of mechanistic (not mechanical) philosophers. One thing left, as cognitive science is a two-way street, philosophers need also to stop in a station of cognitive science and learn from the most important advances in brain and neuroscience. Key references : Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Mechanistic explanations, Reductionism, Normativity, Generality, Emerging School of Philosophers of Science. (shrink)