31 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Mona Simion [26]Mona3 Simion [5]Mona Ioana Simion [1]
See also
Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews
  1.  96
    Assertion: Knowledge is Enough.Mona Simion - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
    Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion. This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and Lackey’s purported (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  2.  59
    Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):76-93.
    In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  3. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering.Mona Simion - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):914-928.
    ABSTRACTSeveral philosophers have inquired into the metaphysical limits of conceptual engineering: ‘Can we engineer? And if so, to what extent?’. This paper is not concerned with answering these questions. It does concern itself, however, with the limits of conceptual engineering, albeit in a largely unexplored sense: it cares about the normative, rather than about the metaphysical limits thereof. I first defend an optimistic claim: I argue that the ameliorative project has, so far, been too modest; there is little value theoretic (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  35
    Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption.Mona Simion - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim. Extant arguments in defence of the view are scrutinized and found to rest on value-theoretic inaccuracies. First, the belief-assertion parallel is shown to lack the needed normative strength. Second, I argue that the claim that assertion inherits the norm of belief in virtue of being an expression thereof rests on a failed instance of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  18
    Knowledge‐First Functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.
    This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  82
    Norms of Belief.Mona3 Simion, Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7.  11
    Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge‐First Social Epistemology.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Noûs.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  32
    Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma.Mona Simion - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):503-517.
    Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 503-517, September 2019.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  34
    The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - In S. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  91
    Commodious Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Mona3 Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.
    This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11.  31
    Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel.Mona Simion - 2018 - Analysis:any048.
    Several prominent philosophers assume that the so-called ‘Belief–Assertion Parallel’ warrants epistemic norm correspondence; as such, they argue from the epistemic norm governing one to the epistemic norm governing the other. This paper argues that, in all its readings, the belief–assertion parallel lacks the desired normative import.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  22
    The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion.Mona Simion - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):477-488.
    In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13.  27
    Perception, History and Benefit.Mona3 Simion - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):61-76.
    In recent literature, several authors attempt to naturalize epistemic normativity by employing an etiological account of functions. The thought is that epistemic entitlement consists in the normal functioning of our belief-acquisition systems, where the latter acquire the function to reliably deliver true beliefs through a history of biological benefit.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14.  43
    Epistemic Norms and ‘He Said/She Said’ Reporting.Mona Simion - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):413-422.
    ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the permissibility of exclusively relying on a procedural objectivity model for news reporting, from the perspective of the normativity of informative speech acts. It is argued that, with the exception of urgency situations, the paradigmatic application of procedural objectivity is in breach of the relevant norms.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  35
    Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2019 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  45
    Conceptual Innovation, Function First.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Noûs.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back.Mona3 Simion - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391.
    According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  26
    Testimonial Contractarianism.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Noûs.
    According to anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti-reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie. This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti-reductionist answers to this question and argues that they fail. Second, it goes on a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  14
    The C Account of Assertion: A Negative Result.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):125-137.
    According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  41
    How to Be an Anti-Reductionist.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    One popular view in recent years takes the source of testimonial entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social character of testimonial exchanges. This paper looks at two extant incarnations of this view, what we dub ‘weak’ and ‘modest’ social anti-reductionism, and questions the rationales behind their central claims. Furthermore, we put forth an alternative, strong social anti-reductionist account, and show how it does better than the competition on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21.  44
    Epistemic Norms, Closure, and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology.Mona Ioana Simion, Johanna Schnurr & Emma C. Gordon - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  37
    A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs.Mona Simion - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4679-4689.
    In recent literature, a very popular position about the normativity of assertion claims that standards for epistemically proper assertion vary with practical context, while standards for knowledge do not. This paper shows this claim is strongly incompatible with the received value-theoretic view regarding the relationship between the axiological and the deontic: one of the two has to go.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  52
    Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman'.Mona Simion - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):91-98.
    This paper puts forth a functionalist difficulty for Sally Haslanger’s proposal for engineering our concept of ‘woman.’ It is argued that the project of bringing about better political function fulfillment cannot get off the ground in virtue of epistemic failure.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  12
    Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard.Mona Simion - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 137-164.
  25.  31
    Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure.Mona Simion - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.
    This paper defends a novel view of hermeneutical epistemic injustice. To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is too restrictive: hermeneutical epistemic injustice is more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, contra Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HEI: hermeneutical epistemic injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. Further on, I unpack hermeneutical epistemic injustice as unjustly brought about basing failure. Last, I show that, if this view (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  30
    Moral Virtues with Epistemic Content.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp, Cameron Boult & Johanna Schnurr - forthcoming - In C. Kelp & J. Greco (eds.), Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
  27.  17
    Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Veil.Mona Simion - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):557-572.
  28.  12
    Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce’s Style.Mona3 Simion - 2014 - Contemporary Pragmatism 11 (2):107-121.
    Contemporary ‘Fitting Attitude’ axiological frameworks – defining value in terms of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes – struggle with the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons problem. That is, they fail to offer a coherent account as to what reasons are fitted to enter our evaluative endeavors in the first place. Furthermore, WKR opens FA to charges regarding intransitivity of value ordering. I argue that revisiting Josiah Royce’s ‘plan of life’ mediating principle offers a promising reasons’ aggregation recipe, and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Reasons, Justification, and Defeaters.Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard.Mona Simion - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 137-164.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.