Many philosophers apparently still accept the proposition that there is such a thing as intrinsic value, i.e., that some part of the value of some things (objects, events, or states of affairs) is intrinsic value. John Dewey's attack seems not to have dislodged this proposition, for today it is seldom questioned. I propose to press the attack again, in terms that owe a great deal to Dewey, as I understand him.
"For those of us who want to know what philosophers have said about beauty and the arts, this book will be especially useful.”—The Philosophical Review At once a treatise for professionals and a guide for newcomers to the subject, ...
For the events "e" and "f" to be identical, They must have the same subject and spatio-Temporal location, And their (participial) property-Descriptions must belong to the same "modification set" (e.G., Reddening, Reddening slowly, Reddening in july). The same criterion applies to actions, Which are here treated strictly as a proper subclass of events (john's closing the door = the door's being closed by john = the door's becoming closed). Actions related by goldman's "causal generation" are therefore distinct, But those related (...) by his other three types of act-Generation are not. This conclusion requires abandonment of the view--Questionable on other grounds--That causal contexts are thoroughly extensional. (shrink)
What implications does goodman's "languages of art" have for the theory and practice of art criticism? to account for the cognitive value of pictorial representations, It apparently requires to be supplemented by a concept of depiction, Or indefinite reference. For goodman's theory of expression to be convincing, Criteria are needed to discriminate exemplification in goodman's sense from the mere possession of labels. Some of the fundamental criteria of evaluation very widely used by art critics do not seem to be those (...) called for, Or authorized, By goodman's sketchy but highly significant theory of aesthetic value. (shrink)
This paper affirms the proposition, denied by albert hofstadter ("journal of philosophy", volume 59, 1962), that the study of the meaning and ground of value judgments is a proper branch of aesthetics. hofstadter objects that the use of 'aesthetic value' involves a "category mistake"; however, this objection is based on an apparent failure to understand a derivative or instrumental definition. hofstadter's own position is also criticized. it is argued (a) that his theory of aesthetic validity, while commendable in some respects, (...) is too abstract and too general; and (b) that beauty is not a necessary condition of aesthetic value, a proposition strongly objected to by hofstadter. (staff). (shrink)
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