Results for 'Moral Encroachment'

925 found
Order:
See also
  1. Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.
    Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  2. Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.
    According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, including moral considerations that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. Defenders of moral encroachment face a central challenge: they must explain why the moral considerations they cite, unlike moral bribes for belief, are reasons of the right kind for belief (or withheld belief). This paper distinguishes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  3. Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
    This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  4. Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):86-100.
    Hilde Lindemann argues that personhood is the shared practice of recognizing and responding to one another. She calls this practice holding. Holding, however, can fail. Holding failure, by stereotyping for example, can inhibit others’ epistemic confidence and ability to recall true beliefs as well as create an environment of racism or sexism. How might we avoid holding failure? Holding failure, I argue, has many epistemic dimensions, so I argue that moral encroachment has the theoretical tools available to avoid (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence.Caroline von Klemperer - 2023 - Philosophical Studies (7).
    It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    According to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is epistemically rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open on Saturdays, can depend not only on the strength of the person’s evidence, but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open on Saturdays. In recent years, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1759-1779.
    Some claim that moral factors affect the epistemic status of our beliefs. Call this _the moral encroachment thesis_. It’s been argued that the moral encroachment thesis can explain at least part of the wrongness of racial profiling. The thesis predicts that the high moral stakes in cases of racial profiling make it more difficult for these racist beliefs to be justified or to constitute knowledge. This paper considers a class of racial generalizations that seem (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.
    Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  9.  28
    Social Group Moral Encroachment.Veli Mitova - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):894-911.
    According to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  44
    Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.
    According to the moral encroachment thesis, moral features of a situation can affect not just what we’re practically justified in doing but also what we’re epistemically justified in believing. This paper offers a new rationale for that thesis, drawing on observations about the role of reflection in agency.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  82
    The structure of moral encroachment.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1793-1812.
    According to moral encroachment facts about epistemic justification can vary with moral factors that are unrelated to the truth of the belief. Most of the literature on this topic has focused on how beliefs can wrong, and whether the data that moral encroachers offer in support of their view can be explained within a purist framework. A largely neglected question has been what kind of consequences moral encroachment would have for epistemic justification if the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12.  58
    Moral Encroachment under Moral Uncertainty.Boris Babic & Zoë Johnson King - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.
    This paper discusses a novel problem at the intersection of ethics and epistemology: there can be cases in which moral considerations seem to "encroach'' upon belief from multiple directions at once, and possibly to varying degrees, thereby leaving their overall effect on belief unclear. We introduce these cases -- cases of moral encroachment under moral uncertainty -- and show that they pose a problem for all predominant accounts of moral encroachment. We then address the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.
    Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  14. Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
    Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  15.  75
    Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions.Javiera Perez Gomez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9237-9256.
    A recent flurry of philosophical research on microaggression suggests that there are various practical and moral reasons why microaggression may be objectionable, including that it can be offensive, cause epistemic harms, express demeaning messages about certain members of our society, and help to reproduce an oppressive social order. Yet little attention has been given to the question of whether microaggression is also epistemically objectionable. This paper aims to further our understanding of microaggression by appealing to recent work on (...) encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the moral stakes of believing—to argue that microaggression can be irrational in a distinctively epistemic sense, as it can involve relying on an epistemically unwarranted belief. This view suggests that the notion of epistemic justification may come apart from the notion of epistemic blame. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.
    Subject-sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person’s knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person’s environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject-sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge-attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this (...) encroachment. This paper argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  17. A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.
    In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  18.  76
    Meta-Semantic Moral Encroachment: Some Experimental Evidence.Alex Davies, Lauris Kaplinski & Maarja Lepamets - 2019 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 12:7-33.
    This paper presents experimental evidence in support of the existence of metalinguistic moral encroachment: the influence of the moral consequences of using a word with a given content upon the content of that word. The evidence collected implies that the effect of moral factors upon content is weak. For instance, by changing the moral consequences of the sentence's truth, it was possible to shift judgements about the truth of the sentence "that's a lot of cake", (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
    A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  20. (1 other version)Morality Does Not Encroach.Zachary Goodsell & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen. Routledge.
    Moral encroachment is the thesis that morality has an effect---unrecognized by traditional epistemology---on which doxastic states are epistemically appropriate. The thesis is increasingly popular among those who, in opposition to Gendler (2011), desire harmony between epistemic and moral demands on belief. This paper has three main goals. First, drawing on attractive structural principles concerning belief and justification, it is shown that a thoroughgoing harmony between moral and epistemic demands is implausible. This weakens the motivation for positing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Part Three : Epistemic and Doxastic Wrongs. A Tale of Two Doctrines : Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging / Rima Basu ; Predatory Grooming and Epistemic Infringement.Lauren Leydon-Hardy - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Structural encroachment.Aliosha Barranco Lopez - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
    Moral encroachment states that moral factors can make a difference to what we are epistemically justified in believing. I present two motivating cases that resemble a common example in the moral encroachment literature to show that the agent's commitments and beliefs, and not the moral factors of the situation, influence epistemic justification. I call this view Structural Encroachment.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence.Anne Baril - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3929-3952.
    Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.
    This paper introduces a novel form of pragmatic encroachment: one that makes a difference to the status of emotion rather than the status of belief. I begin by isolating a distinctive standard in terms of which we can evaluate emotion – one sometimes called “subjective fittingness,” “epistemic justification,” or “warrant.” I then show how this standard for emotion could face a kind of pragmatic encroachment importantly similar to the more familiar encroachment on epistemic standards for belief. (...) on warranted emotion is a striking proposal that deserves attention. In fact, there are good reasons to think that encroachment on warranted emotion deserves to be considered the default view for those who already accept pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic status of belief. I support this parity claim by arguing for a principle that establishes a limited coordination between the conditions that warrant emotion and the conditions that justify belief. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. A Permissivist Alternative to Encroachment.Z. Quanbeck & Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and moral (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  26. Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.
    The pragmatism—anti-pragmatism debate concerns whether practical considerations can constitute genuinely normative wrong-kind reasons (WKRs) for and against doxastic attitudes, whereas the encroachment—anti-encroachment debate concerns whether practical considerations can affect what right-kind reasons (RKRs) one has or needs to have in order to enjoy some epistemic status. While these are two separate issues, my main aim is to show that pragmatists have a plausible debunking explanation to offer of encroachment cases: that the practical considerations in these cases only (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27.  17
    Borders, states, and armed conflicts in Europe and Northeast Asia since 1945: The moral hazard of great-power encroachments.Mark Kramer - 2024 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 50 (4):651-673.
    This article discusses the significance of international borders in Europe and Northeast Asia during the Cold War (1945–1989) and after. Using the concept of ‘moral hazard’, the article examines what happens when great powers frequently violate the borders of neighboring countries without suffering adverse repercussions. Norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity are viable only if large countries are willing to uphold them most of the time. The Soviet Union used or threatened to use military force against East European countries (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  56
    Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.
    Epistemic rationality seems to permit a more steadfast response to disagreements over our fundamental convictions than it does for our ordinary beliefs. Why is this? This essay explores three answers to this question: web-of-belief conservatism, moral encroachment, and hinge theories, and argues that hinge theories do a better job than the alternatives at vindicating the intuition that there is a rationally permissible asymmetry in our responses to disagreements over ordinary beliefs and fundamental convictions. The essay also shows how (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. Impartiality, Eudaimonic Encroachment, and the Boundaries of Morality.Errol Lord - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Many hold that morality is essentially impartial. Many also hold that partiality is justified. Susan Wolf argues that these commitments push us towards downgrading morality's practical significance. Here I argue that there is a way of pushing morality's boundaries in a partialist direction in a way that respects Wolf's insights.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.
    I defend the thesis that friendship can constitutively require epistemic irrationality against a recent, forceful challenge, raised by proponents of moral and pragmatic encroachment. Defenders of the “encroachment strategy” argue that exemplary friends who are especially slow to believe that their friends have acted wrongly are simply sensitive to the high prudential or moral costs of falsely believing in their friends’ guilt. Drawing on psychological work on epistemic motivation (and in particular on the notion of “need (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31.  74
    Moral Outrage: Territoriality in Human Guise.Ward H. Goodenough - 1997 - Zygon 32 (1):5-27.
    Moral outrage is a response to the behavior of others, never one's own. It is a response to infringements or transgressions on what people perceive to be the immunities they, or others with whom they identify, can expect on the basis of their rights and privileges and what they understand to be their reasonable expectations regarding the behavior of others. A person's culturally defined social identities and the rights and privileges that go with them in relationships to which those (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32.  30
    Conocimiento moral y justificación moral de la acción.Mariano Garreta - 2019 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 31 (1):105-127.
    El costo de tomar una decisión sobre la base de las creencias falsas varía en diferentes contextos de acción. En algunos casos el costo del error podría ser muy alto para el bienestar de los agentes afectados y en otros casos muy bajo. El contraste entre estos dos tipos de contextos ha sido recientemente objeto de atención en la epistemología. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es extender el análisis de algunas de las implicaciones de ese contraste al campo moral. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  41
    Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Is radical skepticism ethically problematic? This paper argues that it is. Radical skepticism’s strong regulation of our doxastic economy results in us having to forego doxastic commitments that we owe to others. Whatever skepticism’s epistemic defects, it is ethically defective. In turn, I defend Moralism, the view that the kind of extreme doubt characteristic of radical skepticism is a serious moral and eudaimonic weakness of radical skeptical epistemology. Whether this means that skepticism is false or incorrect, however, is a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.
    ABSTRACT Rima Basu and I have offered separate accounts of wokeness as an anti-racist ethical concept. Our accounts endorse controversial doctrines in epistemology: doxastic wronging, doxastic voluntarism, and moral encroachment. Many philosophers deny these three views, favoring instead some ordinary standards for epistemic justification. I call this denial the standard view. In this paper, I offer an account of wokeness that is consistent with the standard view. I argue that wokeness is best understood as ‘group epistemic partiality’. The (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):491-514.
    The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.
    Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37.  54
    Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency.Garrett Cullity - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
    In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  39. The Ethics of Belief (3rd edition).Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    This chapter is a survey of the ethics of belief. It begins with the debate as it first emerges in the foundational dispute between W. K. Clifford and William James. Then it surveys how the disagreements between Clifford and James have shaped the work of contemporary theorists, touching on topics such as pragmatism, whether we should believe against the evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, doxastic partiality, and doxastic wronging.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  14
    Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan.Richard M. Reitan - 2009 - University of Hawaii Press.
    This innovative study of ethics in Meiji Japan (1868–1912) explores the intense struggle to define a common morality for the emerging nation-state. In the Social Darwinist atmosphere of the time, the Japanese state sought to quell uprisings and overcome social disruptions so as to produce national unity and defend its sovereignty against Western encroachment. Morality became a crucial means to attain these aims. Moral prescriptions for re-ordering the population came from all segments of society, including Buddhist, Christian, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.
    In discussions of whether and how pragmatic considerations can make a difference to what one ought to believe, two sets of cases feature. The first set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic reasons for belief, is exemplified by cases of being financially bribed to believe (or withhold from believing) something. The second set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification, is exemplified by cases where acting on a belief rashly risks some disastrous outcome if the belief (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  42. Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.
    The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  43.  42
    Confronting Injustice: Moral History and Political Theory.David Lyons - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    David Lyons challenges us to confront grave injustices committed in the United States, from the colonists' encroachments on Indian lands to slavery and the legacy of racism. He calls upon legal and political theorists to take these social wrongs seriously in their approaches to moral obligation under law and the justification of civil disobedience.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  44. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism.James Fritz - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):98-116.
    This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46. Confronting Existential Risks With Voluntary Moral Bioenhancement.Vojin Rakić & Milan M. Ćirković - 2016 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 26 (2):48-59.
    We outline an argument favoring voluntary moral bioenhancement as a response to existential risks humanity exposes itself to. We consider this type of enhancement a solution to the antithesis between the extinction of humanity and the imperative of humanity to survive at any cost. By opting for voluntary moral bioenhancement; we refrain from advocating illiberal or even totalitarian strategies that would allegedly help humanity preserve itself. We argue that such strategies; by encroaching upon the freedom of individuals; already (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47.  46
    Not Excusing Rape: Silencing, Rationality, and Blame.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):390-404.
    Anti-pornography feminists have famously argued that pornography silences women: specifically, pornography causes women to be illocutionarily disabled in some real-life sexual contexts so that they are unable to refuse sex by saying ‘no’. Call this view Silencing. Some philosophers object to Silencing because it seems to entail that, in some cases, a rapist’s blameworthiness is significantly diminished. If the woman cannot refuse sex by saying ‘no’, and this allows the man’s belief, that she consents, to be rational, then the man’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  21
    On markets and morals—(re-)establishing independent decision making in healthcare.Stephan Sahm - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy:1-5.
    Medical practitioners owe much of the significant progress made in the diagnosis and treatment of disease to industrial research. Hence, co-operation between providers of medical services, most notably medical practitioners, and the pharmaceutical industry is in the best interest of patients. Yet, empirical evidence shows how well-directed influence exerted by the pharmaceutical industry impacts physicians’ decision-making. Profit-motivated inducement by the pharmaceutical industry may expose patients to considerable risks. Against what many think to be based on overwhelming evidence, Joao Calinas-Correia takes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  9
    Uncertain bioethics: human dignity and moral risk.Stephen Napier - 2019 - New York: Taylor & Francis.
    Bioethics is a field of inquiry and as such is fundamentally an epistemic discipline. Knowing how we make moral judgments can bring into relief why certain arguments on various bioethical issues appear plausible to one side and obviously false to the other. Uncertain Bioethicsmakes a significant and distinctive contribution to the bioethics literature by culling the insights from contemporary moral psychology to highlight the epistemic pitfalls and distorting influences on our apprehension of value. Stephen Napier also incorporates research (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  7
    Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals vol. 1.Iris Murdoch - 1994 - Penguin Publishing Group.
    The decline of religion and ever increasing influence of science pose acute ethical issues for us all. Can we reject the literal truth of the Gospels yet still retain a Christian morality? Can we defend any 'moral values' against the constant encroachments of technology? Indeed, are we in danger of losing most of the qualities which make us truly human? Here, drawing on a novelist's insight into art, literature and abnormal psychology, Iris Murdoch conducts an ongoing debate with major (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 925