Results for 'Moral Error Theory'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  2. Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  3.  14
    Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - 2018 - Londen, Verenigd Koninkrijk: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  4. Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
    The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  5. Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem.Jussi Suikkanen - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194.
    Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  6. Formulating Moral Error Theory.Caleb Perl - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (5):279-288.
    This paper shows how to formulate moral error theories given a contextualist semantics like the one that Angelika Kratzer pioneered, answering the concerns that Christine Tiefensee developed.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Moral Error Theory, Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.
    Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition.Wouter Floris Kalf - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):923-937.
    According to moral error theory, moral discourse is error-ridden. Establishing error theory requires establishing two claims. These are that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment to there being a moral reality and that there is no such reality. This paper concerns the first and so-called non-negotiable commitment claim. It starts by identifying the two existing argumentative strategies for settling that claim. The standard strategy is to argue for a relation of conceptual (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. In Defense of Moral Error Theory.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  10. Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics.Benjamin Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):1-18.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth ; the other in terms of justification. I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
    Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. Is Theism Compatible With Moral Error Theory?StJohn Lambert - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3):1-20.
    This paper considers whether theism is compatible with moral error theory. This issue is neglected, perhaps because it is widely assumed that these views are incompatible. I argue that this is mistaken. In so doing, I articulate the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible. According to it, these views are incompatible because theism entails that God is morally good, and moral error theory entails that God (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.
    The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  14.  40
    Nietzschean Moral Error Theory.Patrick Hassan - forthcoming - History of Philosophy Quarterly.
    Nietzsche has sometimes been interpreted as endorsing an error theory about moral judgements (most notably Hussain, 2007). There are a host of passages which provide prima facie reason for such an interpretation. However, the extent of the appropriateness of this interpretation is a matter of dispute. The parameters of his alleged error theory are unclear. This paper aims to re-consider the evidence for the view that Nietzsche is a moral error theorist, and makes (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  98
    Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.
    Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil.Chris Daly - 2009 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2):89 - 105.
    Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (nonvacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  15
    Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons.Robert Shaver - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-12.
    Most error theorists want to accept hypothetical reasons but not moral reasons. They do so by arguing that there is no queerness in hypothetical reasons. They can be reduced to purely descriptive claims, about either standards or ordinary standard-independent facts: when I say “I have a reason to take this flight, ” all I say is that “according to certain standards of reasoning, I have a reason to take this flight” or that “I have a desire such that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  46
    Moral Error Theory[REVIEW]Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):218-220.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  49
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Written by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW]Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):57-61.
  20.  35
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jeff Wisdom - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):217-220.
    © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Olson's Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence has four aims. First, the book aims to provide a historical background to the development of moral error theory prior to its appearance in Mackie's article, ‘A Refutation of Morals.’ Secondly, it provides a critical look at four (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  19
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. [REVIEW]Regina Rini - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):650-653.
  22.  46
    A Tension in the Moral Error Theory.Simon Kirchin - 2010 - In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory.
    I highlight a tension within the moral error theoretic stance. Although I do not show that it is fatal, I believe the tension is problematic. In stating the tension I outline a conception of the common moral background against which it arises. I also discuss aspects of the similar error theories developed by John Mackie and Richard Joyce in order to show the tension at work.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23.  37
    The Belief Problem for Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    ABSTRACTMoral error theorists think that moral judgments such as ‘stealing is morally wrong’ express truth-apt beliefs that ascribe moral properties to objects and actions. They also think that moral properties are not instantiated. Since moral error theorists think that moral judgments can only be true if they correctly describe moral properties, they think that no moral judgment is true. The belief problem for moral error theory is that this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24.  61
    Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):397-402.
    _ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary (...) beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral judgments uniformly untrue. Perhaps because of its kinship with moral realism, moral error theory is often considered the most notorious of moral scepticisms. While the view has been widely discussed, it has had relatively few defenders. _Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence_ examines the view from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective, and purports to respond to some of its most prominent challenges. This précis is a brief summary of the book’s content. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Debunking Morality: Evolutionary Naturalism and Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.
    The paper distinguishes three strategies by means of which empirical discoveries about the nature of morality can be used to undermine moral judgements. On the first strategy, moral judgements are shown to be unjustified in virtue of being shown to rest on ignorance or false belief. On the second strategy, moral judgements are shown to be false by being shown to entail claims inconsistent with the relevant empirical discoveries. On the third strategy, moral judgements are shown (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  26.  70
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique and Defence, by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW]Andrew Fisher - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):355-356.
  27.  41
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, by Jonas Olson: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Viii + 214 , £35.00. [REVIEW]Emma Wood - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):410-411.
  28.  26
    Moral Error Theory, Written by Wouter Floris Kalf.Matthew Lutz - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-7.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory.Toby Svoboda - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
    Philosophers should consider a hybrid meta-ethical theory that includes elements of both moral expressivism and moral error theory. Proponents of such an expressivist-error theory hold that all moral utterances are either expressions of attitudes or expressions of false beliefs. Such a hybrid theory has two advantages over pure expressivism, because hybrid theorists can offer a more plausible account of the moral utterances that seem to be used to express beliefs, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30.  11
    Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defencejonas Olson Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; VIII + 214 Pp.; $49.46. [REVIEW]Félix Aubé Beaudoin - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):594-596.
  31.  84
    Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake?Simon Keller - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):709-721.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory.Daan Evers - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):403-418.
    Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.
    Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic (...) theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory. (shrink)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  2
    The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.
    I introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts, but denies that there are categorical all (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  43
    The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    I introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts, but denies that there are categorical all (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Error Theory and the Concept of Morality.Paul Bloomfield - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):451-469.
    Error theories about morality often take as their starting point the supposed queerness of morality, and those resisting these arguments often try to argue by analogy that morality is no more queer than other unproblematic subject matters. Here, error theory (as exemplified primarily by the work of Richard Joyce) is resisted first by arguing that it assumes a common, modern, and peculiarly social conception of morality. Then error theorists point out that the social nature of morality (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37.  37
    Ethical Anti-Archimedeanism and Moral Error Theory.Mark Hanin - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (4):359-374.
  38.  77
    On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and Toppinen.Jonas Olson - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):461-473.
    This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39.  30
    Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. Reviewed By.David Kaspar - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):159-161.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  29
    Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry 2 (53):1-17.
    John P. Burgess has remarked that Mackie: “even though he talks of the need to invent morality … does not seem to think that this proposal could be worked into a revisionary meta-ethic”. In the first part of my paper, I argue that Mackie did propose a revisionary meta-ethic (conceptual reformism), and that Mackie was not a preservatist, abolitionist, or semantic pluralist. I also argue that interpreting Mackie as a conceptual reformist enables us to overcome a number of standard objections (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. A New Argument for Moral Error Theory.Christopher Cowie - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):276-294.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  73
    On The Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory.Kasper Højbjerg Christensen - 2016 - Humana Mente 24 (4):508-517.
    In The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce presents a simple and very influential argument for the truth of moral error theory. In this paper I point out that the argument does not have the form Joyce attributes to it, the argument is not valid in an extensional propositional logic and on the most natural way of explicating the meanings of the involved terms, it remains invalid. I conclude that more explanation is needed if we are to accept (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43.  50
    Mistaken Morality? : An Essay on Moral Error Theory.Emma Beckman - 2018 - Dissertation, Umeå University
    This dissertation explores arguments and questions related to moral error theory – the idea that morality inevitably involves a fundamental and serious error such that moral judgments and statements never come out true. It is suggested that the truth of error theory remains a non-negligible possibility, and that we for this reason should take a version of moral fictionalism seriously. I begin by defining error theory as the claim that (...) judgments are beliefs with moral propositions as content, moral utterances are assertions of moral propositions, and no positive moral proposition is true. Second, after giving an account of J.L. Mackie’s error theory, I argue that neither Richard Joyce’s nor Jonas Olson’s argument for error theory gives us strong reasons to believe it. According to Joyce, moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical requirements. I challenge this claim by arguing that morality can be understood as an institution, and that the assumption that there are non-institutional moral reasons and requirements can be understood as entering pragmatically into moral conversations. According to Olson, moral discourse involves a commitment to irreducibly normative favoring relations between facts and actions. I challenge this claim by challenging Olson’s response to Stephen Finlay’s argument against absolutist accounts of moral discourse. Third, I discuss two objections to error theory, and argue that neither gives us strong reasons to reject it. According to the first objection, which is suggested by Terence Cuneo, error theory entails epistemic error theory, which has problematic consequences. After indicating some possible responses on part of the epistemic error theorist, I challenge the entailment claim by defending Hilary Kornblith’s account of epistemic reasons as hypothetical reasons. According to the second objection, error theory entails normative error theory, which cannot be believed. Although he does not defend this objection, Bart Streumer has given an argument for the unbelievability claim. I challenge Streumer’s argument by suggesting that we might have hypothetical reasons to believe normative error theory and that, properly understood, Streumer’s conclusion is not as radical as it may first appear. Fourth, I discuss what practical implications the discovery that error theory is true would have for first-order moral thinking and discourse. I argue that if this practice is overall non-morally valuable to us, we ought to revise engagement in it on the model of role-playing in live action role-playing games if we find out that error theory is true. Some have claimed that Richard Joyce’s fictionalism encounters problems. I argue that by incorporating the suggestion that engagement in revised moral practice is modeled on role-playing, fictionalism can escape these problems and preserve the benefits of first-order moral practice. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  60
    Review: Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. [REVIEW]Matt Lutz & Stephen Finlay - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1219-1225.
  45.  52
    Review of Moral Error Theory, by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW]Daan Evers - 2014 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  21
    Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory.Wouter Kalf - 2019 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (2):175-191.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  7
    Wouter Floris Kalf, Moral Error Theory.Matthew Lutz - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):71-77.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  11
    Review: Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. [REVIEW]Review by: Matt Lutz and Stephen Finlay - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1219-1225,.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. The Error in the Error Theory.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
    Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  50. In Defence of Morality: A Response to a Moral Error Theory.Paul Barry - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):63-85.
    This paper responds to Richard Joyce’s argument for a moral error theory. Joyce claims that our moral discourse purports to speak of something objective in that it presupposes the existence of non-institutional, categorical reasons for action. Given this, he argues that a proper vindication of our moral discourse would be one carried out from a point of view that is objective inasmuch as it is external to the ‘institution of morality’. And since our moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000