Results for 'Moral Motivation'

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  1. Kant and Moral Motivation: The Value of Free Rational Willing.Jennifer K. Uleman - 2016 - In Iakovos Vasiliou (ed.), Moral Motivation (Oxford Philosophical Concepts). New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 202-226.
    Kant is the philosophical tradition's arch-anti-consequentialist – if anyone insists that intentions alone make an action what it is, it is Kant. This chapter takes up Kant's account of the relation between intention and action, aiming both to lay it out and to understand why it might appeal. The chapter first maps out the motivational architecture that Kant attributes to us. We have wills that are organized to action by two parallel and sometimes competing motivational systems. One determines us by (...)
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  2. Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with (...) content. There are both moral thoughts or opinions that intrinsically motivate, and moral thoughts or opinions that don’t. The thoughts that intrinsically motivate are moral intuitions – spontaneous and compelling non-doxastic appearances of right or wrong that both attract assent and incline us to act or react. I argue that there is good reason to think that these intuitions, but not moral judgments, are constituted by manifestations of moral sentiments. The moral thoughts that do not intrinsically motivate are moral beliefs, which are in themselves as inert as any ordinary beliefs. Thus, roughly, internalism is true about intuitions and externalism is true about beliefs or judgments. (shrink)
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  3. Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation.Owen Ware - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):727-746.
    Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of (...)
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  4.  8
    Moral Self-Determination: The Nature, Existence, and Formation of Moral Motivation.Randall Curren & Richard M. Ryan - 2020 - Journal of Moral Education 49 (3):295-315.
    This paper addresses three basic questions about moral motivation. Concerning the nature of moral motivation, it argues that it involves responsiveness to both reasons of morality and the value of persons and everything else of value. Moral motivation is thus identified as reason-responsive appropriate valuing. Regarding whether it is possible for people to be morally motivated, the paper relies on self-determination theory (SDT) to show how moral motivation is a likely product of (...)
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  5. Moral Motivation Pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
    Motivational externalists and internalists of various sorts disagree about the circumstances under which it is conceptually possible to have moral opinions but lack moral motivation. Typically, the evidence referred to are intuitions about whether people in certain scenarios who lack moral motivation count as having moral opinions. People’s intuitions about such scenarios diverge, however. I argue that the nature of this diversity is such that, for each of the internalist and externalist theses, there is (...)
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  6.  18
    Humean Moral Motivation.Andres Luco - 2013 - In Bert Musschenga & Anton van Harskamp (eds.), What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Springer. pp. 131-150.
    Moral motivation refers to the psychological causes that motivate or explain moral action. Moral action refers to action that complies with the requirements of morality. In this essay, I lay out alternative views on moral motivation, giving particular attention the way each view conceives of the explanatory link between practical reasoning and moral conduct. In trying to understand this link, philosophers look to moral judgment. The main rival accounts of the relationship between (...)
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  7. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation.Adam Lerner - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:123-144.
    People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. This chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such (...)
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  8. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
    One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view (...)
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  9. Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective.Joseph Heath - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 83 (4):595-614.
    The prevalence of white-collar crime casts a long shadow over discussions in business ethics. One of the effects that has been the development of a strong emphasis upon questions of moral motivation within the field. Often in business ethics, there is no real dispute about the content of our moral obligations, the question is rather how to motivate people to respect them. This is a question that has been studied quite extensively by criminologists as well, yet their (...)
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  10.  73
    Mapping Moral Motivation.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.
    In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that (...)
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  11. Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics.A. T. Nuyen - 2009 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):1-11.
    How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere (...)
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  12.  14
    Moral Motivation as a Dynamic Developmental Process: Toward an Integrative Synthesis.Ulas Kaplan - 2017 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 47 (2):195-221.
    The real-life complexity of moral motivation can be examined and explained by reintegrating time and development into moral inquiry. This article is one of the possible integrative steps in this direction. A dynamic developmental conception of moral motivation can be a useful bridge toward such integration. A comprehensive view of moral motivation is presented. Moral motivation is reconceptualized as a developmental process of self-organization and self-regulation out of which moral judgment (...)
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    Moral Motivation as a Dynamic Developmental Process: Toward an Integrative Synthesis.Ulas Kaplan - 2016 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (4).
    The real-life complexity of moral motivation can be examined and explained by reintegrating time and development into moral inquiry. This article is one of the possible integrative steps in this direction. A dynamic developmental conception of moral motivation can be a useful bridge toward such integration. A comprehensive view of moral motivation is presented. Moral motivation is reconceptualized as a developmental process of self-organization and self-regulation out of which moral judgment (...)
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  14. Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):249-260.
    In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of (...) motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses. (shrink)
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  15. Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can (...)
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  16. An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation.Christine Clavien - 2010 - Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive (...)
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  17. In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
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  18. Justice and the Tendency Towards Good: The Role of Custom in Hume's Theory of Moral Motivation.James Chamberlain - 2017 - Hume Studies 43 (1):117-137.
    In the Book of his Treatise devoted to morality, Hume gives more consideration to what he calls "artificial virtues" than to natural virtues.1 Artificial virtues rely on conventions which have arisen for non-moral reasons, but which come to be understood as beneficial to society so that, as a consequence, we come to see adherence to these conventions as being morally obligatory. The main such virtue which Hume discusses is "justice," by which he means primarily a respect for the conventions (...)
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  19. Moral Uncertainty and Fetishistic Motivation.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968.
    Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want (...)
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  20.  14
    Moral Theory and Moral Motivation in Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason.David J. Zoller - 2016 - Idealistic Studies 46 (1):97-118.
    Dilthey’s moral writings have received scant attention over the years, perhaps due to his apparent tendency toward relativism. This essay offers a unified look at Dilthey’s moral writings in the context of his Kantian-styled “Critique of Historical Reason.” I present the Dilthey of the moral writings as an observer of reason in the spirit of Kant, watching practical reason devolve into error when it applies itself beyond the bounds of possible experience. Drawing on moral writings from (...)
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  21.  18
    The Practicality of Pure Reason. A Normative Defence of Kant’s Theory of Moral Motivation.Triantafyllos Gkouvas - 2011 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 14:152-191.
    El propósito de este trabajo es defender la opinión que Kant ha propuesto sobre la teoría internalista de la motivación moral. En particular, argumentaré que la adopción de Kant de internalismo se evidencia en su afirmación de que la relación de la razón pura de la voluntad se basa en una práctica una proposición sintética a priori. Lo que se pretende demostrar es que Kant trata la sinteticidad práctica como un concepto fundamental para su relato de lo que significa (...)
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  22. Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2011 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
    For non-analytic ethical naturalists, externalism about moral motivation is an attractive option: it allows naturalists to embrace a Humean theory of motivation while holding that moral properties are real, natural properties. However, Michael Smith has mounted an important objection to this view. Smith observes that virtuous agents must have non-derivative motivation to pursue specific ends that they believe to be morally right; he then argues that this externalist view ascribes to the virtuous agent only a (...)
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  23. The Wrong Time to Aim at What's Right: When is De Dicto Moral Motivation Less Virtuous?Ron Aboodi - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):307-314.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 307-314, December 2015.
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  24.  51
    Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation.Julia Jorati - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):748-766.
    Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that (...)
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  25.  82
    Moral Judgments and Motivation: Making Sense of Mixed Intuitions.Denise Vigani - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (2):209-230.
    The debate between motivational judgment internalism and motivational judgment externalism focuses on whether a moral judgment is sufficient for motivation, or if an additional conative state is required. It is clear from the literature that internalists and exernalists have different intuitions regarding moral judgments. Most individuals, however, seem to hold a mix of internalist and externalist intuitions. My aim in this paper is to offer an approach to the issue that can account for this mix of intuitions. (...)
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  26.  22
    Reliability of Motivation and the Moral Value of Actions.Paula Satne - 2013 - Studia Kantiana 14:5-33.
    Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kant’s argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kant’s thesis is false. In (...)
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  27.  95
    Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
    According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In (...)
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  28.  31
    Moral Judgment and Motivation.Xiao Zhang - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    In this thesis, I explore motivational internalism and externalism, which concern the relationship between moral judgments and motivation. I first introduce the basic terms and different forms of internalism and externalism, including the externalist objections to internalism based on the famous counterexamples. I then argue against externalism by defending and developing Michael Smith’s fetishism argument. I not only respond to the externalist objections to the fetishism argument but also further argue against different externalist explanations of moral (...) that intend to avoid the fetishism charge. Finally, I re-examine different forms of internalism in order to argue for a new form of internalism that can better preserve our internalist intuitions whilst accommodating the externalist counterexamples. My ultimate conclusion will be that the most plausible form of internalism to accept is constitutional, unconditional, relatively strong, direct internalism that is formulated in terms of dispositional desires. (shrink)
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  29. Hume, Motivation and “the Moral Problem”.Charles R. Pigden - 2007 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 62 (3):199-221.
    Hume is widely regarded as the grandfather of emotivism and indeed of non-cognitivism in general. For the chief argument for emotivism - the Argument from Motivation - is derived from him. In my opinion Hume was not an emotivist or proto-emotivist but a moral realist in the modern ‘response-dependent’ style. But my interest in this paper is not the historical Hume but the Hume of legend since the legendary Hume is one of the most influential philosophers of the (...)
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  30.  68
    Whole-Hearted Motivation and Relevant Alternatives: A Problem for the Contrastivist Account of Moral Reasons.Andrew Jordan - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):835-845.
    Recently, Walter Sinott-Armstrong and Justin Snedegar have argued for a general contrastivist theory of reasons. According to the contrastivist account of reasons, all reasons claims should be understood as a relation with an additional place for a contrast class. For example, rather than X being a reason for A to P simpliciter, the contrastivist claims that X is a reason for A to P out of {P,Q,R…}. The main goal of this paper is to argue that the contrastivist account of (...)
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  31. From Desire to Subjective Value: On the Neural Mechanisms of Moral Motivation.Daniel Hartner - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):1-26.
    Increasingly, empirically minded moral philosophers are using data from cognitive science and neuroscience to resolve some longstanding philosophical questions about moral motivation, such as whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire to motivate. These empirical approaches are implicitly committed to the existence of folk psychological mental states like beliefs and desires. However, data from the neuroscience of decision-making, particularly cellular-level work in neuroeconomics, is now converging with data from cognitive and social neuroscience to explain (...)
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  32. Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (...)
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  33. Categorical Imperatives, Moral Requirements, and Moral Motivation.Xiaomei Yang - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):112–129.
    Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to (...)
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  34.  76
    One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.
    De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, (...)
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  35. Moral Motivation.Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a (...)
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  36. Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis.Sarah Catherine Byers - 2013 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and obscure sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo (...)
     
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  37.  26
    Defining Features of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Motivation: Pathways to Moral Reasoning in Medical Students.Kelly R. Morton, Joanna S. Worthley, John K. Testerman & Marita L. Mahoney - 2006 - Journal of Moral Education 35 (3):387-406.
    Kohlberg's theory of moral development explores the roles of cognition and emotion but focuses primarily on cognition. Contemporary post?formal theories lead to the conclusion that skills resulting from cognitive?affective integration facilitate consistency between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Rest's four?component model of moral development delineates these skills specifically. The components, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral reasoning and moral character, operate as multidimensional processes that facilitate moral development and subsequently promote (...) behaviour. The relationships between these components have been relatively unexplored, thereby missing the opportunity to unpack the processes underlying moral growth and development. In this study, moral motivation (spirituality), moral sensitivity (post?formal skills) and moral reasoning are operationalized to examine the mediational effects of moral sensitivity of medical students. In the complex moral environment of medical students opportunities arise to question values and develop cognitive?affective skills, among them spirituality and post?formal thinking which are linked to increases in post?conventional moral reasoning. The models tested indicate that moral sensitivity mediates the relationship between moral motivation and moral reasoning. (shrink)
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  38.  9
    Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation.Justin Klocksiem - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-14.
    Several prominent philosophers believe that moral facts are facts about what reasons we have, and that this entails that moral judgments are necessarily and inherently motivating. According to this argument, if morality cannot move us, then it is hard to understand how it could be sensibly regarded as action-guiding or normative. That is, they endorse a traditional argument for motivational judgment internalism based on moral rationalism. This paper criticizes this argument, and argues instead that there is no (...)
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  39. Moral Masquerades: Experimental Exploration of the Nature of Moral Motivation.C. Daniel Batson - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):51-66.
    Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have (...)
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  40.  51
    Development of Moral Motivation From Childhood to Early Adulthood.Gertrud Nunner‐Winkler - 2007 - Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):399-414.
    Luhmann, a prominent exponent of social systems theory, maintains that in modern, functionally differentiated societies morality is neither possible nor necessary. Against this claim it is argued that democracies want citizens with moral motivation. In contrast to Kohlberg, moral motivation is conceptualised as independent of stage of moral development, i.e. of the complexity of sociocognitive reasoning capacity. It is defined as willingness to do what one knows to be right even if that entails personal costs. (...)
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  41.  86
    Moral Coherence, Moral Worth and Explanations of Moral Motivation.Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.
    Moral internalism and moral externalism compete over the best explanation of the link between judgment and relevant motivation but, it is argued, they differ at best only verbally. The internalist rational-conceptual nature of the link’ as accounted by M. Smith in The Moral Problem is contrasted to the externalist, also rational, link that requires in addition support from the agent’s psychological-dispositional profile; the internalist link, however, is found to depend crucially on a, similarly to the externalist, (...)
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  42.  24
    Moral Motivation.Kenneth Pahel - 1976 - Journal of Moral Education 5 (3):223-230.
    Abstract: It is claimed that there is a highly contingent and often misleading relationship between (a) giving reasons on a questionnaire and (b) genuine moral understanding. Also, many of the causal factors in shaping moral attitudes are irrelevant to their rational?moral justification, thus creating a lack of harmony between the two. The solution is a balanced programme that gives equal stress to moral reasoning and to opportunities for relevant emotive and evaluative experience. Aspects of Kant and (...)
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  43. Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
    In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension (...)
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  44. Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral (...)
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  45. Moral Motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the (...)
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  46. Externalist Moral Motivation.Nick Zangwill - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):143-154.
    “Motivational externalism” is the externalism until they see more of what view that moral judgements have no motisuch a theory would be like. The mere posvational efficacy in themselves, and that sibility of such a theory is not sufficiently when they motivate us, the source of motireassuring, even given strong arguments vation lies outside the moral judgement in against the opposite position. For there may a separate desire. Motivational externalism also be objections to externalism. contrasts with “motivational internalism,” (...)
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    Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs?Simone De Colle & Patricia H. Werhane - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 81 (4):751 - 764.
    In this article we discuss what are the implications for improving the design of corporate ethics programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle's virtues of character, Kant's categorical imperative, and Mill's greatest happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to answer the question "What is the right thing to do?" We look at ethical theories from (...)
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    Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
    Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral (...)
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    Moral Motivation and the Affective Appeal.Jennifer Corns & Robert Cowan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Proponents of “the affective appeal” :787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66:104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicates a version of Motivational Internalism—roughly, the view that there is a necessary connection between moral (...)
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  50. Moral Motivation.R. Jay Wallace - 1998 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Questions about the possibility and nature of moral motivation occupy a central place in the history of ethics. Philosophers disagree, however, about the role that motivational investigations should play within the larger subject of ethical theory. These disagreements surface in the dispute about whether moral thought is necessarily motivating – ‘internalists’ affirming that it is,‘externalists’ denying this. [...] There are also important questions about the content of moral motivations. A moral theory should help us to (...)
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