Results for 'Moral Rationalism'

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  1.  18
    Derrida's differance and Plato's different, Samuel C. Wheeler III.Moral Rationalism - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1).
  2. Moral rationalism and rational amoralism.Mark van Roojen - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):495–525.
    This paper argues that moral rationalism can explain two plausible internalist theses. The first, judgement internalism, says that necessarily normally rational persons will be motivated to act on the moral judgements they accept. The second says that necessarily if an action is in fact right there is sufficient reason to do the action. Both of these theses face challenges from plausible examples of rational amoralism, though for somewhat different reasons. Rather than explain these examples away, the paper (...)
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  3. Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.
    I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.
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  4. Moral Rationalism on the Brain.Joshua May - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (1):237-255.
    I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful (...)
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  5. Moral Rationalism without Overridingness.Alfred Archer - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):100-114.
    Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. (...)
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  6. Moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism: Is morality more like math or beauty?Michael B. Gill - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):16–30.
    One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists — such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and John Balguy — held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists — such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume — held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In addition to arguments, the rationalists and sentimentalists (...)
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  7.  61
    Empirical moral rationalism and the social constitution of normativity.Joseph Jebari - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2429-2453.
    Moral rationalism has long been an attractive position within moral philosophy. However, among empirical-minded philosophers, it is widely dismissed as scientifically untenable. In this essay, I argue that moral rationalism’s lack of uptake in the empirical domain is due to the widespread supposition that moral rationalists must hold that moral judgments and actions are produced by rational capacities. But this construal is mistaken: moral rationalism’s primary concern is not with the relationship (...)
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  8. Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence.Patricia Marino - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):227-252.
    This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to (...)
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  9. Moral rationalism and empirical immunity.Shaun Nichols - manuscript
    With the rapid recent growth of naturalized metaethics, Richard Joyce’s paper sounds an appropriate cautionary note. It’s easy to be overwhelmed by sexy new data and to neglect the difficulties in using the data to draw major philosophical conclusions. One of the central views in the sights of naturalists has been moral rationalism. Jonathan Haidt (2001), Joshua Greene (this volume), Jesse Prinz (forthcoming), and I (2002, 2004b) have all used recent empirical findings to challenge moral rationalist views. (...)
     
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  10.  44
    Moral Rationalism and Moral Motivation.Justin Klocksiem - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):123-136.
    Several prominent philosophers believe that moral facts are facts about what reasons we have, and that this entails that moral judgments are necessarily and inherently motivating. According to this argument, if morality cannot move us, then it is hard to understand how it could be sensibly regarded as action-guiding or normative. That is, they endorse a traditional argument for motivational judgment internalism based on moral rationalism. This paper criticizes this argument, and argues instead that there is (...)
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  11.  28
    Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant.Marcel van Ackeren & Martin Sticker - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):407-428.
  12.  74
    Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.Zachary Bachman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):1-19.
    Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important (...)
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  13. Moral rationalism and moral commitment.James Doyle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
    Moral rationalism is identified as the view that moral constraints are rational constraints. This view seems implausible to many because it seems to involve belief in the fantastic-sounding possibility of egoist-conversion: that, in principle, an argument for moral constraints could be produced which would motivate a rational person who does not yet accept those constraints to observe them. Furthermore, the Humean want-belief model of motivation---the view that beliefs alone are incapable of motivating---seems to provide a good (...)
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  14.  15
    Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment.James Doyle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
    Moral rationalism is identified as the view that moral constraints are rational constraints. This view seems implausible to many because it seems to involve belief in the fantastic-sounding possibility of egoist-conversion: that, in principle, an argument for moral constraints could be produced which would motivate a rational person who does not yet accept those constraints (i.e., an egoist) to observe them. Furthermore, the Humean want-belief model of motivation---the view that beliefs alone are incapable of motivating---seems to (...)
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  15. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism.
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  16. Moral Rationalism.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (10):499-526.
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  17.  48
    Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions.Alan Donagan - 1982 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1):3-10.
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  18.  43
    Moral rationalism and psychopathy: Affective responses to reason.Allen Coates - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):855-877.
    Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of (...) rationalism. (shrink)
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  19. How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism.Shaun Nichols - 2002 - The Monist 85 (2):285-303.
    Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality (e.g., Gewirth 1978, Darwall 1983, Nagel 1970, 1986, Korsgaard 1986, Singer 1995; Smith 1994, 1997). According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many to be the best way of securing a kind (...)
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  20. Autonomy and Moral Rationalism: Kant’s Criticisms of ‘Rationalist’ Moral Principles (1762-1785).Stefano Bacin - 2019 - In Stefano Bacin & Oliver Sensen (eds.), The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48-66.
    This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy in his moral philosophy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that Kant discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and (...)
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  21. Modern moral rationalism.Charles Taylor - 2006 - In Santiago Zabala (ed.), Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
     
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  22. Do psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism?Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.
    It is often claimed that the existence of psychopaths undermines moral rationalism. I examine a recent empirically based argument for this claim and conclude that rationalist accounts of moral judgement and moral reasoning are perfectly compatible with the evidence cited.
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  23.  41
    How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism.Shaun Nichols - 2002 - The Monist 85 (2):285-303.
    Over the last twenty years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality. According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many to be the best way of securing a kind of objectivism about moral claims. Consider the following representative statements.
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  24.  41
    Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant: A Response to van Ackeren and Sticker.Roger Crisp - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):429-433.
  25. Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental Epistemology.Tristram McPherson - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-209.
    This paper takes up an important epistemological challenge to the naturalistic moral realist: that her metaphysical commitments are difficult to square with a plausible rationalist view about the epistemology of morality. The paper begins by clarifying and generalizing this challenge. It then illustrates how the generalized challenge can be answered by a form of naturalistic moral realism that I dub joint-carving moral realism. Both my framing of this challenge and my answer advertise the methodological significance of non-fundamental (...)
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  26.  50
    Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):217-224.
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  27.  9
    Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy.Charlotte R. Brown - 2008 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 217–239.
    This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Philosophical Background Arguments against Moral Rationalism The Moral Sentiments and Sympathy References Further Reading.
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  28.  3
    Modern Moral Rationalism.Charles Taylor - 2006 - In Santiago Zabala (ed.), Weakening philosophy: essays in honour of Gianni Vattimo. McGill-Queen's University Press. pp. 57-76.
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  29. Three kinds of moral rationalism.Michael Smith - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford Univerisity Press.
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  30.  52
    Rational Moralists and Moral Rationalists Value-Based Management: Model, Criterion and Validation.P. Michael McCullough & Sam Faught - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2):195-205.
    This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was (...)
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  31.  5
    Hutcheson’s Refutation on Moral Rationalism.Hyun Seok Ahn - 2019 - Journal Of pan-Korean Philosophical Society 95:87-116.
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  32. Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations upon the Moral Sense.John J. Tilley - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that (...)
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  33.  29
    Discourse Ethics and Moral Rationalism.Brian K. Powell - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (2):373.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper, I raise the following question: can the ethical thought of Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel provide us with a way of showing that morality is a rational requirement? The answer I give is that it cannot. I argue for this claim by showing that a decisive objection to Alan Gewirth’s line of thought in Reason and Morality also applies to discourse ethical arguments that try to show an inescapable commitment to a moral principle. RÉSUMÉ: La (...)
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  34.  11
    Kurt Bayertz and Kurt W. Schmidt.Reluctance Toward Scientific Rationalism - 2002 - In Kazumasa Hoshino, H. Tristram Engelhardt & Lisa M. Rasmussen (eds.), Bioethics and Moral Content: National Traditions of Health Care Morality: Papers Dedicated in Tribute to Kazumasa Hoshino. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 77.
  35.  86
    Teaching & learning guide for: Moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism: Is morality more like math or beauty?Michael B. Gill - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):397–400.
  36. End in Itself, Freedom, and Autonomy: The Place of the Naturrecht Feyerabend in Kant’s Moral Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2020 - In Margit Ruffing, Annika Schlitte & Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (eds.), Kants “Naturrecht Feyerabend”: Analysen und Perspektiven. Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 91–115.
    The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...)
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  37. Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2029-2052.
    The standard account of supererogation holds that Liv is not morally required to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing her life, to save the lives of five soldiers. Many proponents defend the standard account by appealing to moral rationalism about requirement. These same proponents hold that Bernie is morally permitted to jump on a grenade, thereby sacrificing his life, to spare someone a mild burn. I argue that this position is unstable, at least as moral rationalism (...)
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  38. Adams, David M." Objectivity, Moral Truth, and Constitutional Doctrine: A Comment on R. George Wright's' Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?'" Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 4 (1995): 489-500. Alexander, Larry, and Ken Kress." Against Legal Principles," in A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. [REVIEW]Robert L. Arrington & Realism Rationalism - 2001 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press. pp. 4--331.
  39.  40
    Moral motivation in early 18th century moral rationalism.Daniel Eggers - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):552-574.
    In the modern debate in metaethics and moral psychology, moral rationalism is often presented as a view that cannot account for the intimate relation between moral behaviour on one hand and feelings, emotions, or desires on the other. Although there is no lack of references to the classic rationalists of the 18th century in the relevant discussions, the works of these writers are rarely ever examined detail. Yet, as the debate in Kant scholarship between “intellectualists” and (...)
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  40. Under the Guise of the Good: Kant and a Tenet of Moral Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. de Gruyter. pp. 1705-1714.
    Both in historical debates and in recent discussions, the Guise of the Good Thesis represents a genuine dogma of rationalism in moral philosophy. Many influential commentators have maintained that Kant belongs in that camp, even that he “explicitly endorses” the Thesis. Attributing the Thesis to Kant, however, faces scarce textual support and amounts to a dubious understanding of the relationship of Kant’s moral philosophy to previous rationalist views. I suggest that, in Kant’s view, the Thesis only applies (...)
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  41.  79
    Hume and the Religious Significance of Moral Rationalism.J. B. Schneewind - 2000 - Hume Studies 26 (2):211-223.
    In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics. Such theories were morally unacceptable to many devout Christians. But deism, rationalist through and through, seemed to make revelation unnecessary, and with it most of Christianity. William Law, an influential divine command theorist of Hume's time, argued that Christians must consequently find rationalism unacceptable. Hume's effort to destroy moral rationalism functions to force his readers into a (...)
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  42.  2
    Smith’s Incoherence Argument for Moral Rationalism.Michael Lyons - 2015 - GSTF Journal of General Philosophy 1 (2):1-6.
    Defenders of Motivational judgment internalism (MJI) argue that in one sense or another, our moral judgments necessarily motivate us to some extent. One of the most prominent defenders is Michael Smith, who in his highly influential book The Moral Problem defends a form of moral rationalism, which is the view that moral reasoning is based on practical reasoning, and thus that moral facts can and are determined a priori. This form of rationalism Smith (...)
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  43. Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective.Lawrence A. Blum - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):287 - 302.
  44.  61
    Rationalism and Perfectionism [in 18-Century Moral Philosophy].Stefano Bacin - 2017 - In Sacha Golob & Jens Timmermann (eds.), The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 379-393.
    The chapter provides a brief survey of the moral views of some of the main writers advocating rationalist conceptions in philosophical ethics in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Germany, prior to Reid and Kant: Samuel Clarke, William Wollaston, John Balguy, Richard Price, Christian Wolff (along with his adversary Christian August Crusius), Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten.
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  45. On how to be a moral rationalist.Jonathan Dancy - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):103-110.
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  46.  31
    On How to Be a Moral Rationalist.Jonathan Dancy - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):103-110.
  47.  17
    Rationalism, Optimism, and the Moral Mind.Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    I welcome many of the conclusions of May's book, but I offer a suggestion – and with it what I take to be a complementary strategy – concerning the core commitments of rationalism across the domains of moral psychology in the hopes of better illuminating why a rationalist picture of the mind can deliver us from pessimism.
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  48. Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model (...)
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  49.  8
    Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.T. Horgan & M. Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model (...)
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  50.  7
    Rationalism, Realism, and Relativism: Perspectives in Contemporary Moral Epistemology.Robert L. Arrington - 1989 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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