Results for 'Moral Worth'

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  1.  10
    In Defense of Reading.Sarah E. Worth - 2017 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    In this fascinating book, Sarah Worth addresses from a philosophical perspective the many ways in which reading benefits us morally, socially and cognitively.
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  2.  10
    The Dangers of Da Vinci, or the Power of Popular Fiction.Sarah E. Worth - 2007 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (1):134-143.
    Philosophers of literature direct their studies to the moral, cognitive, and emotional aspects of our involvement with fiction. In spite of this, they rarely engage works of popular fiction. In this paper I use The Da Vinci Code as a case study of the impact of popular fiction on readers in terms of these three areas. Although this book will never be considered good literature, its impact is far reaching. l address concerns dealing with the fiction/non-fiction distinction as weIl (...)
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  3.  48
    The Dangers of Da Vinci, or the Power of Popular Fiction.Sarah E. Worth - 2007 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (1):134-143.
    Philosophers of literature direct their studies to the moral, cognitive, and emotional aspects of our involvement with fiction. In spite of this, they rarely engage works of popular fiction. In this paper I use The Da Vinci Code as a case study of the impact of popular fiction on readers in terms of these three areas. Although this book will never be considered good literature, its impact is far reaching. l address concerns dealing with the fiction/non-fiction distinction as weIl (...)
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  4.  8
    In critique of moral resilience: UK healthcare professionals’ experiences working with asylum applicants housed in contingency accommodation during the COVID-19 pandemic.Louise Tomkow, Gabrielle Prager, Kitty Worthing & Rebecca Farrington - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (1):33-38.
    This research explores the experiences of UK NHS healthcare professionals working with asylum applicants housed in contingency accommodation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a critical understanding of the concept of moral resilience as a theoretical framework, we explore how the difficult circumstances in which they worked were navigated, and the extent to which moral suffering led to moral transformation. Ten staff from a general practice participated in semistructured interviews. Encountering the harms endured by people seeking asylum prior (...)
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  5. Chapter outline.A. Human Worth, Dignity B. Publicity & D. Ultimate Accountability - forthcoming - Moral Management: Business Ethics.
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  6.  8
    Hell Is Other People's Tastes.Darren Hudson Hick & Sarah E. Worth - 2020-08-27 - In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 211–223.
    Much ink has been spilled in philosophy over the question of whether morality is an objective or subjective matter. In the world of The Good Place, the answer to the moral question seems fairly firmly determined: right and wrong are objective matters, and there is a fact about whether our actions are good or bad. The ancient Greek philosopher Pythagoras believed that beauty was a quantifiable principle of nature, and that we could find the source of beauty in the (...)
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  7.  12
    ¿Hegel filósofo de la diferencia? Reflexiones sobre la concepción hegeliana de la identidad 1.Camilo Andrés Morales - 2017 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 58 (138):491-508.
    RESUMEN La filosofía hegeliana en general, y en particular la “Ciencia de la lógica” y el tratamiento que en esta se hace sobre nociones como las de identidad y diferencia, generaron desde el momento mismo en que vio la luz, un sinnúmero de posiciones críticas tales como las de Schelling, los hegelianos de izquierda y, en general, de todos aquellos filósofos que, en virtud de las posibles implicaciones prácticas de una filosofía de la identidad buscaron “expurgar la semilla del dragón (...)
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  8. Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
    To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory ; it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a (...)
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  9. Moral Worth.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223.
    I argue that a right action has moral worth if and only if it is done for the right reasons - that is, for its right-making features. The reasons the agent acts on have to be identical to the reasons for which the action is right. I argue that Kantians are wrong in thinking that a right action has moral worth iff it is done because the agent thinks it is right, giving examples of morally worthy (...)
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  10. Moral Worth: Having It Both Ways.Jessica Isserow - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (10):529-556.
    It is commonly recognized that one can act rightly without being praiseworthy for doing so. Those who act rightly from ignoble motives, for instance, do not strike us as fitting targets of moral praise; their actions seem to lack moral worth. Though there is broad agreement that only certain kinds of motives confer moral worth on our actions, there is disagreement as to which ones are up to the task. Many theorists confine themselves to two (...)
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  11. Moral Worth and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Some right acts have what philosophers call moral worth. A right act has moral worth if and only if its agent deserves credit for having acted rightly in this instance. And I argue that an agent deserves credit for having acted rightly if and only if her act issues from an appropriate set of concerns, where the appropriateness of these concerns is a function what her ultimate moral concerns should be. Two important upshots of the (...)
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  12. Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.
    It’s one thing to do the right thing. It’s another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non-accidentality constraint: the first (...)
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  13. Moral worth and skillful action.David Horst - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):657-675.
    Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...)
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  14. Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident.Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):251-264.
    ABSTRACTKantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never ac...
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  15. Moral Worth and Normative Ethics.Arpaly Nomy - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5.
    According to Arpaly and to Markovits, actions have moral worth iff they are done for the reasons that make them right. Can this view have implications for normative ethics? I argue that it has such implications, as you can start from truths about the moral worth of actions to truths about the reasons that make them right. What makes actions right is the question of normative ethics. I argue from the moral worth view to (...)
     
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  16. Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality.Keshav Singh - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.
    This paper defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. First, I argue that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if (...)
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  17.  99
    Moral Worth and Supererogation.Amy Massoud - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):690-710.
    Morally supererogatory actions are traditionally conceived of as actions that are nonobligatory but distinctively morally worthy. Here I challenge the assumption that supererogatory actions are distinctively praiseworthy and offer an alternative definition of moral supererogation. This alternative definition complements, and is complemented by, a novel account of moral praiseworthiness, which I call the Two-Step view. My Two-Step view of moral worth, which I develop in some detail, accounts for currently underappreciated features of moral praiseworthiness.
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  18. Moral Worth Requires a Fundamental Concern for What Ultimately Matters.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    An act that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the same as what would have motivated a perfectly virtuous agent to perform it. On one of the two leading accounts of moral worth, an act that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the fact that it’s obligatory. On the other, an act that (...)
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  19.  39
    Moral Worth and Moral Responsibility.Matthé Scholten - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. De Gruyter. pp. 2165-2172.
  20. Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.
    Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in content and strength is a genuine possibility. But because motivating reasons (...)
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  21. Moral laws and moral worth.Elliot Salinger - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2347-2360.
    This essay concerns two forms of moral non-naturalism according to which general moral principles or laws enter into the grounding explanations of particular moral facts. According to bridge-law non-naturalism, the laws are themselves partial grounds of the moral facts; whereas according to grounding-law non-naturalism, the laws explain the grounding connections that obtain between particular natural facts and particular moral facts. I pose and develop an objection to BLNN concerning moral worth: as compared to (...)
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  22. The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    While it is tempting to suppose that an act has moral worth just when and because it is motivated by sufficient moral reasons, philosophers have, largely, come to doubt this analysis. Doubt is rooted in two claims. The first is that some facts can motivate a given act in multiple ways, not all of which are consistent with moral worth. The second is the orthodox view that normative reasons are facts. I defend the tempting analysis (...)
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  23. Class, moral worth, and recognition.Andrew Sayer - 2007 - In Terry Lovell (ed.), (Mis)Recognition, Social Inequality and Social Justice: Nancy Fraser and Pierre Bourdieu. Routledge.
     
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  24. Moral worth.Paul Benson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):365 - 382.
  25. Moral Worth and Consciousness: In Defense of a Value-Secured Reliability Theory.John W. Robison - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    What minimal role—if any—must consciousness of morally significant information play in an account of moral worth? According to one popular view, a right action is morally worthy only if the agent is conscious (in some sense) of the facts that make it right. I argue against this consciousness condition and close cousins of it. As I show, consciousness of such facts requires much more sophistication than writers typically suggest—this condition would bar from moral worth most ordinary, (...)
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  26.  40
    Moral Worth and Moral Belief.James Grant - 2022 - Ethics 133 (2):216-230.
    According to some, when you do the right thing, your moral beliefs make no difference to your act’s moral worth. Huckleberry Finn believes he is doing something wrong in helping Jim escape slavery. Yet his act reflects well on him. Some conclude that acting rightly reflects just as well on you whether you believe you are doing something right, wrong, supererogatory, or neutral. I argue against this. Doing the right thing with certain moral beliefs can diminish (...)
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  27.  93
    Moral worth, right reasons and counterfactual motives.Laura Fearnley - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2869-2890.
    This paper explores the question of what makes an action morally worthy. I start with a popular theory of moral worth which roughly states that a right action is morally praiseworthy if and only if it is performed in response to the reasons which make the action right. While I think the account provides promising foundations for determining praiseworthiness, I argue that the view lacks the resources to adequately satisfy important desiderata associated with theories of moral (...). Firstly, the view does not adequately capture the degree to which an action has moral worth, and secondly, the view does not identify if right actions produced from overdetermined motives have moral worth. However, all is not lost; I also argue that the account can satisfy the desiderata when it attends to the agent’s counterfactual motives in addition to their actual motives. By considering counterfactual motives, we can measure the robustness of the actual praiseworthy motive, and attending to motivational robustness allows the new proposal to fully satisfy the two desiderata. At the end of this paper, I respond to some criticisms typically brought against a counterfactual view of moral worth. (shrink)
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  28.  13
    Moral Worth and Inviolability of Unborn Children.Norman Ford - 2006 - Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin 11 (3):1.
    Ford, Norman The moral worth and dignity of the unborn child varies according to peoples' fundamental religious and personal beliefs on what constitutes a human person. The antithetical views on the moral value of the unborn child are due to different philosophies, which admits the existence and meaningfulness of nonmaterial reality and the other that practically denies both.
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  29.  91
    Moral worth and moral credit.Elizabeth Lane Beardsley - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):304-328.
  30.  93
    Moral worth and accidentally right actions.Allen Coates - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):389-396.
    The reasons view holds that morally worthy actions are right actions motivated by the reasons that make them right. Opponents object that such actions are only accidentally right, and it is widely held that morally worthy actions cannot be accidentally right. My aim here is to defend the reasons view from this objection by considering conditional reasons. Once these reasons are in view, actions motivated by the reasons that make them right will no longer appear accidentally right. Keywords: Moral (...)
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  31.  79
    Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics.Christian Onof - 2011 - Kant Studies Online 2011 (1).
    This paper addresses the issue of making sense of Kant’s notion of moral worth. Kant’s identification in GMM1 I of the good will as the unconditional good leads to understanding the moral worth of human agency in ways which, some critics claim, is at odds with our moral intuitions. By first focusing upon how Kant singles out action out of duty as characteristic of the good will, we shall show that a covert assumption about our (...)
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  32.  39
    Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives.Thomas E. Hill - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    Thomas Hill, a leading figure in the recent development of Kantian moral philosophy, presents a set of essays exploring the implications of basic Kantian ideas for practical issues. The first part of the book provides background in central themes in Kant's ethics; the second part discusses questions regarding human welfare; the third focuses on moral worth -- the nature and grounds of moral assessment of persons as deserving esteem or blame. Hill shows moral, political, and (...)
  33. Kant, Duty and Moral Worth.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2000 - New York: Routledge.
    _Kant, Duty and Moral Worth _is a fascinating and original examination of Kant's account of moral worth. The complex debate at the heart of Kant's philosophy is over whether Kant said moral actions have worth only if they are carried out from duty, or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be good. Philip Stratton-Lake offers a unique account of acting from duty, which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains (...)
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  34. The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  35.  70
    Moral Worth and Moral Hobbies.Jennifer Ryan Lockhart - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    won a shopping spree on her birthday, but the 99-year-old Californian wanted nothing for herself. Instead, she used the opportunity to make well-stuffed holiday stockings for children in need, which she plans to distribute through her church. “I’m going to cry, I’m so happy,” she said last week as she filled her cart with toys and candy, along with essentials like toothbrushes and socks, at a 99-cent store in Beverly Hills. “I feel bad that I can’t do it for every (...)
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  36.  18
    Autonomy, Moral Worth, and Right: Kant on Obligatory Ends, Respect for Law, and Original Acquisition.Jeffrey Edwards - 2017 - Boston: De Gruyter.
    This book examines the surprising ramifications of Kant’s late account of practical reason’s obligatory ends as well as a revolutionary implication of his theory of property. It thereby sheds new light on Kant’s place in the history of modern moral philosophy.
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  37.  47
    Moral Worth and Moral Motivation: Kant’s Real View.Paul Guyer - 2018 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Begehren / Desire. De Gruyter. pp. 19-38.
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  38. Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments.Stephen Napier (ed.) - 2011 - Springer.
    Given the issues discussed and that the arguments in critical focus are fairly new, the collection provides a novel, comprehensive, and rigorous analysis of contemporary pro-choice arguments.”.
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  39. Human welfare and moral worth: Kantian perspectives.Thomas E. Hill - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Thomas Hill, a leading figure in the recent development of Kantian moral philosophy, presents a set of essays exploring the implications of basic Kantian ideas for practical issues. The first part of the book provides background in central themes in Kant's ethics; the second part discusses questions regarding human welfare; the third focuses on moral worth-the nature and grounds of moral assessment of persons as deserving esteem or blame. Hill shows moral, political, and social philosophers (...)
  40. Is Moral Worth Compatible with Cooperating Inclinations?Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro - 2005 - Princípios 12 (17-18):05-18.
    la82 12.00 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} Algumas passagens bastante controversas dos Fundamentos da Metafísica dos Costumes sáo comumente interpretados como se Kant propusesse a tese de que as ações náo podem ter qualquer valor moral quando estiverem acompanhadas de inclinações ( Neigungen ) favoráveis (...)
     
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  41. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons.Sarah Stroud - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):449 - 456.
  42. Is Moral Worth Compatible with Cooperating Inclinations?Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro - 2005 - Princípios 12 (17):05-18.
    Algumas passagens bastante controversas dos Fundamentos da Metafísica dos Costumes sáo comumente interpretados como se Kant propusesse a tese de que as ações náo podem ter qualquer valor moral quando estiverem acompanhadas de inclinações ( Neigungen ) favoráveis a tais ações. O que resulta dessa interpretaçáo é uma retrato de Kant como um severo defensor de uma moralidade em que sentimentos de compaixáo e assemelhados nada acrescentam ao valor moral de uma açáo, e em vez disso, o solapam. (...)
     
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  43.  63
    Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos. A Critical Analysis of Pro-Choice Arguments.Grace Petkovic - 2021 - The New Bioethics 27 (4):371-374.
    That abortion is the unjust killing of an innocent human person is the contention of the authors of this book. It does not intend to be a comprehensive defence of a pro-life position; rather, it ad...
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  44. Moral Worth and Severe Intellectual Disability – A Hybrid View.Benjamin L. Curtis & Simo Vehmas - 2013 - In Jerome E. Bickenbach, Franziska Felder & Barbara Schmitz (eds.), Disability and the Good Human Life. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-49.
    Consider: You can save either a human or a normal adult dog from a burning building (with no risk to yourself and at little cost), but not both. However, the human is a human with a severe intellectually disability (or, as we shall say, a “SID”). -/- Which one should you save? There is disagreement in the literature about which this issue. Two opposing camps exist, which we call “the intrinsic property camp ” and “the special relations camp.” Those in (...)
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  45.  16
    The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott.Francisco Benzoni - 2009 - Environmental Values 18 (1):5-32.
    After showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's (...)
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  46. Does Information Have a Moral Worth in Itself?Luciano Floridi - 1998 - In CEPE 1998, Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry. London:
    The paper provides an axiological analysis of the concepts of respect for information and of information dignity from the vantage point provided by Information Ethics and the conceptual paradigm of object-oriented analysis (OOA). The general perspective adopted is that of an ontocentric approach to the philosophy of information ethics, according to which the latter is an expansion of environmental ethics towards a less biologically biased concept of a ‘centre of ethical worth’. The paper attempts to answer the following question: (...)
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  47. Effort and Moral Worth.Kelly Sorensen - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):89-109.
    One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness — his or her moral worth — is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explore and explain this pair of intuitions and the contour of our views about associated cases.
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  48. Kantianism, Moral Worth and Human Welfare.Allen W. Wood - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):587-595.
  49. Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.
    Sometimes, agents do the right thing for the right reason. What’s the normative significance of this phenomenon? According to proponents of the special status view, when an agent acts for the right reason, her actions enjoy a special normative status, namely, worthiness. Proponents of this view claim that self-effacing forms of consequentialism cannot say this plausible thing, and, worse, are blocked from having a perspicuous view of matters by the self-effacing nature of their consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  50.  15
    Weighing the moral worth of altruistic actions: A discrepancy between moral evaluations and prescriptive judgments.Inna F. Deviatko & Andrey Bykov - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):95-121.
    In this article, we consider the problem of a discrepancy between, on the one hand, lay prescriptive judgments on the necessity of altruistic actions and, on the other, attributing moral worth to these actions. Based on Kantian theory of morality, we hypothesized that lay attributions of the moral worth of altruistic actions would be inversely related to normative ought-judgments according to which these actions should be performed, as having positive evolutionary-based utilitarian externalities for the actors. To (...)
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