Results for 'Moral realism'

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  1.  16
    Postscript: Materialism and realism in metaethics.Moral Realist - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 343.
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  2. Quentin Smith.Moral Realism, Infinite Spacetime & Imply Moral Nihilism - 2003 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     
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  3. Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  4.  92
    Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine. Major new volume in our new series _New Directions in Ethics_ Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of (...)
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  5. Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.Louise Hanson - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):39-69.
    Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article challenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, (...)
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  6.  69
    Moral realism as moral motivation: The impact of meta-ethics on everyday decision-making.Liane Young & A. J. Durwin - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2):302-306.
    People disagree about whether “moral facts” are objective facts like mathematical truths (moral realism) or simply products of the human mind (moral antirealism). What is the impact of different meta-ethical views on actual behavior? In Experiment 1, a street canvasser, soliciting donations for a charitable organization dedicated to helping impoverished children, primed passersby with realism or antirealism. Participants primed with realism were twice as likely to be donors, compared to control participants and participants primed (...)
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  7. Moral Realism. A Critical Analysis of Metaethical Naturalism.Christine Tiefensee - 2008 - Marburg: Tectum.
    According to moral realists, ethics concerns matters of fact. According to naturalist moral realists, moral facts just are natural facts. In this book, I provide an in-depth analysis of moral naturalism's ontological, epistemological, semantic and psychological foundations.
     
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  8.  48
    Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11.
    This chapter explores the possibility of a metaphysically deflationist, explanatorily robust version of moral realism. The view has no truck with inquiries into the naturalness, constitution, or reducibility of moral properties, and purports to dissolve, rather than solve, the “placement problem.” But it offers a general explanation from outside the ethical domain of how we can accurately represent the world in moral thought and talk; this distinguishes it from some versions of expressivism and constitutivism, and from (...)
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  9. From Moral Realism to Axiarchism.Brian Cutter - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:73-101.
    Moral realism faces a well known genealogical debunking challenge. I argue that the moral realist’s best response may involve abandoning metaphysical naturalism in favor of some form of axiarchism—the view, very roughly, that the natural world is “ordered to the good.” Axiarchism comes in both theistic and non-theistic forms, but all forms agree that the natural world exists and has certain basic features because it is good for it to exist and have those features. I argue that (...)
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  10. Moral Realism and the Incompletability of Morality.Melis Erdur - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (2):227-237.
    If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that (...)
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  11.  18
    Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defense.Sami Pihlström (ed.) - 2005 - BRILL.
    This book examines the issue of moral realism from a pragmatist point of view, drawing attention to our human practices of ethical evaluation and deliberation. It defends the essentially ungrounded and humanly fundamental place of ethics in our thought and action. Ethics must remain beyond justification and ubiquitous in our human form(s) of life.
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  12. Evolutionary Moral Realism.John Collier & Michael Stingl - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.
    Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of (...)
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  13.  24
    (Hard ernst) corrigendum Van Brakel, J., philosophy of chemistry (u. klein).Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Realism, Normative Reasons, Rational Intelligibility, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Does Practical Deliberation, Crowd Out Self-Prediction & Peter McLaughlin - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):91-122.
    It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...)
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  14. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an (...)
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  15. Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
    This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying (...)
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  16.  15
    Moral realism in nursing.Steven D. Edwards - 2014 - Nursing Philosophy 15 (2):81-88.
    For more than 15 years Professor Per Nortvedt has been arguing the case for moral realism in nursing and the health‐care context more generally. His arguments focus on the clinical contexts of nursing and medicine and are supplemented by a series of persuasive examples. Following a description of moral realism, and the kinds of considerations that support it, criticisms of it are developed that seem persuasive. It is argued that our moral responses are explained by (...)
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  17. Moral Realism and Semantic Plasticity.David Manley - manuscript
    Are moral terms semantically plastic—that is, would very slight changes in our patterns of use have shifted their meanings? This is a delicate question for moral realists. A 'yes' answer seems to conflict with the sorts of intuitions that support realism; but a 'no' answer seems to require a semantics that involves hefty metaphysical commitments. This tension can be illustrated by thinking about how standard accounts of vagueness can be applied to the case of moral terms, (...)
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  18.  20
    Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations.Josep Corbí - 2010 - Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
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  19. Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
  20. Moral realism and semantic accounts of moral vagueness.Ali Abasnezhad - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):381-393.
    Miriam Schoenfield argues that moral realism and moral vagueness imply ontic vagueness. In particular, she argues that neither shifty nor rigid semantic accounts of vagueness can provide a satisfactory explanation of moral vagueness for moral realists. This paper constitutes a response. I argue that Schoenfield's argument against the shifty semantic account presupposes that moral indeterminacies can, in fact, be resolved determinately by crunching through linguistic data. I provide different reasons for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, (...)
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  21. Metasemantics, Moral Realism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2022 - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 189-204.
    In this paper, I consider the relationship between Matthew Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine and expressivism, understood as a distinctly non-representationalist metasemantic theory of moral vocabulary. More precisely, I will argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral realism as a moral doctrine does not stand in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, by submitting that advocates of moral realism as a moral doctrine must (...)
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  22.  74
    From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1996 - Critica 28 (83):3-39.
    In recent years, defenses of moral realism have embraced what we call new wave moral semantics', which construes the semantic workings of moral terms like good' and right' as akin to the semantic workings of natural-kind terms in science and also takes inspiration from functionalist themes in the philosophy of mind. This sort of semantic view which we find in the metaethical views of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, is the crucial semantical underpinning of a (...)
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  23.  48
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by Colin Marshall.Heidi L. Maibom - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):631-631.
    Compassionate Moral Realism, by MarshallColin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 265 + xi.
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  24. Adaptation and moral realism.William F. Harms - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):699-712.
    Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work (...)
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  25.  22
    Moral Realism, Supervenience, Externalism and the Limits of Conceptual Metaphor.Ron Wilburn - 2004 - ProtoSociology 20:320-373.
    In this paper, I articulate a form of moral realism that I take to be of special promise. I hope to show, not only that this realist position satisfies cognitivist, objectivist and success constraints, but also that this position is particularly commended by a number of recent apologetic strategies that have been more commonly deployed in the defense of other non-moral varieties of realism. To this extent, I aim to show that moral realism, far (...)
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  26. Moral Realism and Twin Earth.Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis & Angus Dawson - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):135-165.
    Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment has come to have an enormous impact on contemporary philosophical thought. But while most of the discussion has taken place within the context of the philosophy of mind and language, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (H8cT) have defended the intriguing suggestion that a variation on the original thought experiment has important consequences for ethics.' In a series of papers, they' ve developed the idea of a Moral Twin Earth and have argued that its (...)
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  27. Robust moral realism: an excellent religion.David Killoren - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):223-237.
    According to robust moral realism, there exist objective, non-natural moral facts. Moral facts of this sort do not fit easily into the world as illuminated by natural science. Further, if such facts exist at all, it is hard to see how we could know of their existence by any familiar means. Yet robust realists are not moral skeptics; they believe that we do know the moral facts. Thus robust moral realism comes with (...)
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  28.  8
    Moral realism and justification.Tapio Puolimatka - 1989 - Helsinki: Distributor, Akateeminen Kirjakauppa.
  29. Can Moral Realists Deflect Defeat Due to Evolutionary Explanations of Morality?Michael Klenk - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):227-248.
    I address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third-factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third-factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third-factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third-factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if (...)
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  30. Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics.Tim Henning - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):717-748.
    Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgments is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from our attitudes. Relative to worlds “considered as counterfactual,” moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our (...)
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  31. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism.Mark Warren & Amie Thomasson - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 526-53.
    Quietist Moral Realists accept that there are moral facts and properties, while aiming to avoid many of the explanatory burdens thought to fall on traditional moral realists. This chapter examines the forms that Quietist Moral Realism has taken and the challenges it has faced, in order to better assess its prospects. The best hope, this chapter argues, lies in a pragmatist approach that distinguishes the different functions of diverse areas of discourse. This paves the way (...)
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  32.  34
    Moral Realism: A Defence.David Merli - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):778-782.
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  33. Moral realism and moral judgments.Frederik Kaufman - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112.
    For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.
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  34. Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma.Philippa Foot - 2002 - In Moral Dilemmas: And Other Topics in Moral Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first, Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here (...)
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  35. Reductionist Moral Realism and the Contingency of Moral Evolution.Max Barkhausen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):662-689.
    Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.
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  36.  12
    Aristotle's Moral Realism Reconsidered: Phenomenological Ethics.Pavlos Kontos - 2011 - New York: Routledge.
    This book elaborates a moral realism of phenomenological inspiration by introducing the idea that moral experience, primordially, constitutes a perceptual grasp of actions and of their solid traces in the world. The main thesis is that, before any reference to values or to criteria about good and evil—that is, before any reference to specific ethical outlooks—one should explain the very materiality of what necessarily constitutes the ‘moral world’. These claims are substantiated by means of a text- (...)
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  37.  2
    Moral Realism and Indeterminacy.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - In Stephen R. Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The account of indeterminacy is brought to bear on normative, and especially moral, discourse. Cognitivism is easily secured by the theory of pleonastic propositions, but facts about moral discourse conjoined with the theory of indeterminacy entail that moral realism is neither determinately true nor determinately false, that no substantive moral propositions have determinate truth values.
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  38. Compassionate Moral Realism.Colin Marshall - 2018 - Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, drawing inspiration from a wide range of philosophers, including John Locke, Arthur Schopenhauer, Iris Murdoch, Nel Noddings, and David Lewis. The core claim is compassion is our capacity to perceive other creatures' pains, pleasures, and desires. Non-compassionate people are therefore perceptually lacking, regardless of how much factual knowledge they might have. Marshall argues that people who do have this form of compassion thereby fit a familiar paradigm of moral goodness. His (...)
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  39.  3
    Moral Realism.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the attractions, problems, and prospects of moral realism. Special attention is given to Moore’s Open Question Argument, internalism, noncognitivism, and error theories. The final section sketches a research program for moral realism that takes on and pursues Hume’s aim of explaining the ability to think in moral, and more broadly, normative, terms in a way that shows that the successful exercise of this ability is neither metaphysically nor epistemically mysterious.
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  40. Moral realism, face-values and presumptions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):158-179.
    Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that (...)
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  41.  7
    Moral Realism and Political Decisions. Practical Rationality in Contemporary Public Contexts.Gabriele De Anna & Riccardo Martinelli (eds.) - 2015 - Bamberg: Bamberg University Press.
    Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, (...)
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  42. Moral realism and political decisions.Anna G. De & R. Martinelli - 2014 - Etica E Politica 2014 (16, 2):517-525.
    Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, (...)
     
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  43.  75
    Defining Moral Realism.Jennifer Foster & Mark Schroeder - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-17.
    Wherever philosophers disagree, one of the things at issue is likely to be what they disagree about, itself. In addition to asking whether moral realism is true, and which forms of moral realism are more likely to be true than others, we can also ask what it would mean for some form of moral realism to be true. The usual aspiration of such inquiry is to find definitions that all can agree on, so that (...)
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  44. Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations.Josep Corbí - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2):155-172.
    In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
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  45. Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2017 - In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 155-178.
    After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue (...)
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  46. Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  47. Moral realism and teleosemantics.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):723-31.
    In a recent article, William F. Harms (2000) argues in a novel way for a form of moral realism. He does not actually argue that moral realism is true, but rather that if morality is the product of natural selection.
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  48.  6
    Constructivist Moral Realism.J. K. Swindler - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 42:147-153.
    We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social (...)
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  49. Meaning, moral realism, and the importance of morality.Michael Zhao - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):653-666.
    Many philosophers have suspected that the normative importance of morality depends on moral realism. In this paper, I defend a version of this suspicion: I argue that if teleological forms of moral realism, those that posit an objective purpose to human life, are true, then we gain a distinctive kind of reason to do what is morally required. I argue for this by showing that if these forms of realism are true, then doing what is (...)
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  50.  7
    Heidegger and moral realism.Anoop Gupta - 2015 - Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications.
    Is it possible to found a Heideggerian ethic around the notion of a relationship to being (Bezug zum Seyn)? Going against much of the Western tradition, Gupta considers if the being-relationship could result in a feeling or mystical experience that is the basis of ethics. Along the way, such an affective and embodied approach to ethics brings us into dialogue with a range of thinkers, such as Kant and Schweitzer. Further, it is suggested that an environmental philosophy is consistent with (...)
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