Results for 'Moral rightness'

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  1.  61
    Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters.Re'em Segev - 2014 - University of Toronto Law Journal, Forthcoming 64:36-63.
    The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding (...) rightness under uncertainty, the nature of law and the moral significance of law, entail a positive answer to this question. Specifically, I consider this argument: (1) one (subjective) sense of moral rightness depends on the (epistemically justified) belief of the agent concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant; (2) a law is (partly) a non-moral fact; (3) a legal fact might be morally significant; (4) therefore an action that is compatible with an applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (justified) belief of the agent concerning a morally significant law, is (subjectively) right or less wrongful; (5) the (subjective) moral rightness of an action counts against criminal liability for this action; (6) therefore an action that is compatible with the applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (epistemically justified) belief of the agent, counts against criminal liability for the action if the law is morally significant. (shrink)
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  2. The Evolution of Moral Intuitions and Their Feeling of Rightness.Christine Clavien & Chloë FitzGerald - forthcoming - In Joyce R. (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy.
    Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an (...)
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  3. Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Marcus Arvan - 2016 - Palgrave MacMillan.
    This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform to them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel (...)
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  4.  21
    Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Charlotte A. Newey - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):230-235.
    Marcus Arvan’s Rightness as Fairness is a highly ambitious book. In fewer than 230 pages, hopes to demonstrate that we ought to evaluate moral theories in a similar manner to sciences, that existing moral theories fall short on that evaluation, that moral normativity reduces to instrumental rationality, and that a new theory of ‘rightness as fairness’ meets the scientific evaluative standards better than any of the alternatives.
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  5.  25
    Consent: Moral Rightness Versus Non-Moral Goodness.Jacqueline L. Colby - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (3):69-71.
  6.  74
    Capital Punishment, Restoration and Moral Rightness.Gary Colwell - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (3):287–292.
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  7.  14
    Does Moral Rightness Come in Degrees?Martin Peterson - 2016 - The Philosophers' Magazine 74:34-38.
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  8.  8
    Moral Rightness.G. M. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (3):480-481.
  9.  2
    Moral Rightness.R. G. Frey - 1977 - Philosophical Books 18 (3):120-121.
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  10. Moral Rightness.D. W. Haslett - 1974 - Martinus Nijhoff.
  11. Moral Rightness[REVIEW] M. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 31 (3):480-481.
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  12. D. W. Haslett, Moral Rightness[REVIEW]David L. Norton - 1977 - Journal of Value Inquiry 11 (4):315.
     
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  13. Errata - Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Marcus Arvan - manuscript
  14.  13
    Marcus Arvan. Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory. Reviewed By.Fritz McDonald - 2017 - Philosophy in Review 37 (2):44-46.
    Review of Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness.
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  15.  7
    Discourse, Justification, and Education: Jürgen Habermas on Moral Epistemology and Dialogical Conditions of Moral Justification and Rightness.C. Okshevsky Walter - 2016 - Educational Theory 66 (6):691-718.
    In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's affirmative answer as presented in his discourse theory of morality. Habermas's position is articulated as a moral epistemology and is developed through his critique of the “monologism” of certain aspects of (...)
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  16.  15
    Piety and Individuality Through a Convoluted Path of Rightness: Exploring the Confucian Art of Moral Discretion Via Analects 13.18.Huaiyu Wang - 2011 - Asian Philosophy 21 (4):395 - 418.
    This essay presents an in-depth interpretation of the controversial dialogue in Analects 13.18 through careful and critical investigation of its historical background and philosophical significations. With a clarification of the multifaceted connotations of the word zhi (?, upright, forthright), my study brings out the play of irony in Confucius's words in Analects 13.18. According to my interpretation, not only is Confucius's reaction not inappropriate but it also demonstrates the art of early Confucian moral discretion that was informed by the (...)
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  17.  71
    Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection.Holly S. Goldman - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):449-487.
  18.  18
    Moral Responsibility and the Interpretive Turn: Children's Changing Conceptions of Truth and Rightness.Michael J. Chandler, Bryan W. Sokol & Darcy Hallett - 2001 - In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 345--365.
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  19.  25
    A Critical Review of Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Liam Moore - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):523-529.
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  20.  44
    Rightness, Moral Obligation, and Goodness.Oliver A. Johnson - 1953 - Journal of Philosophy 50 (20):597-608.
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  21.  3
    Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, Xi + 271 Pp., £88.39 , ISBN 978‐1‐137‐54180‐2, eBook ISBN 978‐1‐137‐54181‐9. [REVIEW]François Jaquet - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):315-320.
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  22.  8
    Arvan, Marcus. Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Pp. Xi+271. $100.00. [REVIEW]Charlotte A. Newey - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):230-235.
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  23.  28
    Erratum: Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection.Holly S. Goldman - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (2):281 -.
  24.  22
    John Balguy on Rightness and Moral Goodness.Robert L. Schwager - 1974 - Journal of Value Inquiry 8 (4):289-301.
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  25.  8
    Moral Moments: Rightness and Rewards.Joel Marks - 2002 - Philosophy Now 37:47-47.
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  26. Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Degrees of Rightness.Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):711-731.
    In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes (...)
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  27.  22
    Accounting for Moral Conflicts.Thomas Schmidt - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):9-19.
    In his recent book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson defends, amongst other things, the claim that moral rightness and wrongness come in degrees and that, therefore, the standard view that an act’s being morally right or wrong is a one-off matter ought to be rejected. An ethical theory not built around a gradualist conception of moral rightness and wrongness is, according to Peterson, unable to account adequately for the phenomenon of moral conflicts. I argue (...)
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  28.  51
    Accidental Rightness.Liezl van Zyl - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):91-104.
    In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with (...) obligation.’ One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs to—present an account of moral obligation. (shrink)
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  29. De Dicto Desires and Morality as Fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
    Abstract It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto . If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a fetish, then (...)
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  30.  39
    The Morality-Welfare Circularity Problem.William Lauinger - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1959-1981.
    Various moral theories are essentially welfare-involving in that they appeal to the promotion or the respect of well-being in accounting for the moral rightness of at least some acts. Further, various theories of well-being are essentially morality-involving in that they construe well-being in a way that essentially involves morality in some form or other. It seems that, for any moral theory that is essentially welfare-involving and that relies on a theory of well-being that is essentially morality-involving, (...)
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  31.  57
    Risk and Mid-Level Moral Principles.Nicolas Espinoza & Martin Peterson - 2012 - Bioethics 26 (1):8-14.
    We discuss ethical aspects of risk-taking with special focus on principlism and mid-level moral principles. A new distinction between the strength of an obligation and the degree to which it is valid is proposed. We then use this distinction for arguing that, in cases where mid-level moral principles come into conflict, the moral status of the act under consideration may be indeterminate, in a sense rendered precise in the paper. We apply this thought to issues related to (...)
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  32. Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant's Ethics.Mark Timmons - 1997 - In B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka & Jan C. Joerdan (eds.), Jahrbuch Für Recht Und Ethik. Duncker Und Humblot.
    I argue that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative is best interpreted as a test or decision procedure of moral rightness and not as a criterion intended to explain the deontic status of actions. Rather, the Humanity formulation is best interpreted as a moral criterion. I also argue that because the role of a moral criterion is to explain, and thus specify what makes an action right or wrong, Kant's Humanity formulation yields a theory (...)
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  33. Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
    In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that (...)
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  34.  28
    Rightness, Parsimony, and Consequentialism: A Response to Peterson.Roger Crisp - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):39-47.
    This paper argues against Martin Peterson in favour of the ‘standard view’ of rightness, according to which rightness does not come in degrees. It begins with a defence of the standard view against the charge that it is committed to ‘deontic leaps’. It goes on to claim that greater conceptual parsimony would allow Peterson to avoid certain problems involving equality and related matters that arise out of his conception of moral value, and that Peterson should take the (...)
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  35. Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.
    To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory ; it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative (...)
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  36. Moral Uncertainty and Fetishistic Motivation.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968.
    Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want (...)
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  37. Subjective Rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.
    Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to (...)
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  38. There’s Some Fetish in Your Ethics: A Limited Defense of Purity Reasoning in Moral Discourse.Dan Demetriou - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:377-404.
    Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the (...)
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  39.  18
    Ritual and Rightness in the Analects.Hagop Sarkissian - 2013 - In Amy Olberding (ed.), Dao Companion to the Analects. pp. 95-116.
    Li (禮) and yi (義) are two central moral concepts in the Analects. Li has a broad semantic range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that the li comprise strictures of correct behavior. The li are a distinguishing characteristic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and protocols that were thought to constitute the (...)
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  40. Moral Advice and Moral Theory.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):349 - 359.
    Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and (...)
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  41. Is Moral Motivation Rationally Required?Alan H. Goldman - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (1):1-16.
    The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement (...)
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  42.  23
    Six Forms of Variety in Students' Moral Reasoning: An Age-Old Distinction Enabling New Methods and Findings.Ylva Backman & Viktor Gardelli - 2015 - Ethics and Education 10 (2):227-240.
    In this study, the age-old distinction between decision method and criterion of rightness, commonly employed in normative ethics, was used to attain a detailed understanding of inter- and intrapersonal variety in students' moral reasoning. A total of 24 Swedish students, 12–15 years of age, were interviewed. Inter- and intrapersonal varieties in and between the two dimensions of moral reasoning were found, constituting six novel forms of varieties. We describe several explanations proposed within the field of social-cognitive domain (...)
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  43.  52
    Kant, Nonaccidentalness and the Availability of Moral Worth.Steven Sverdlik - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):293-313.
    Contemporary Kantians who defend Kant''s view of the superiority of the sense of duty as a form of motivation appeal to various ideas. Some say, if only implicitly, that the sense of duty is always ``available'''' to an agent, when she has a moral obligation. Some, like Barbara Herman, say that the sense of duty provides a ``nonaccidental'''' connection between an agent''s motivation and the act''s rightness. In this paper I show that the ``availability'''' and ``nonaccidentalness'''' arguments are (...)
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  44.  10
    Reliability of Motivation and the Moral Value of Actions.Paula Satne - 2013 - Studia Kantiana 14:5-33.
    Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kant’s argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kant’s thesis is false. In (...)
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  45.  56
    ¿Es posible formular un juicio moral válido? La respuesta de Adam Smith.Enrique Ujaldón - 2005 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 36:117-130.
    The problem of the rightness of moral judgment is central for ethics. The main point of this article is Adam Smith´s answer to this problem. I am going to argue that Smith did not think that moral judgment depends on private sentiments, but on the judgment of the impartial spectator. I will defend that the smithian´s answer is beetwen the humean scepticism and the kantian criticism.
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  46. The Neutrality of Rightness and the Indexicality of Goodness: Beyond Objectivity and Back Again.Iskra Fileva - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):273-285.
    My purpose in the present paper is two-fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that (...)
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  47.  4
    Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy.John Ramsey - 2018 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
    We explore the central analogy behind Mengzi’s view of ethical cultivation. -/- Philosophers sometimes ask what makes a person’s life worthwhile or what conditions make for a good life. Mengzi’s answer involves cultivating our innate moral senses into fully ripened virtues of ren (humaneness), yi (rightness), li (propriety), and zhi (wisdom). This cultivation neither is individualistic nor can it happen in isolation: it requires a lifetime of meaningful interactions with other people. In short, one’s ethical cultivation is interdependent (...)
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  48.  32
    Nuclear Power is Neither Right Nor Wrong: The Case for a Tertium Datur in the Ethics of Technology.Rafaela Hillerbrand & Martin Peterson - 2014 - Science and Engineering Ethics 20 (2):583-595.
    The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral (...)
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  49. An African Religious Moral Theory.Motsamai Molefe - manuscript
    Abstract This article reconstructs an under-explored conception of African religious ethics qua vitality – a spiritual energy emanating and maximally inhering in God. Much of the literature in African morality takes a historical or anthropological approach to morality. By use analytic philosophy, I advocate, note, not defend, an African religious ethics. By ‘religious ethics’, I mean, firstly, a meta-ethical theory, an account about the nature of moral properties that they are spiritual. ‘Rightness’ is definable as an instance of (...)
     
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  50.  24
    What Is The Basis of Moral Obligation?H. A. Prichard - 2002 - In Jim MacAdam (ed.), Moral Writings. Clarendon Press.
    To the question ‘What is the basis of moral obligation?’, argues that there is no general answer. It is improper to imply that all right acts are right for the same reason. Before defending this view, considers two possible grounds for moral obligation: 1) the goodness of the effects of an action, and 2) the goodness of the act itself. Whereas the former, which is broadly utilitarian, fails to comply with our real moral convictions, the latter does (...)
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