The importance of developmental agendas -- A capability framework for development goals -- A Republican account of local authority in development -- Third wave development expertise -- Selecting capabilities for a development agenda -- Methods for the selection of capabilities and functionings -- An inclusive framework for setting development agendas.
A key task within the capability approach is the selection of relevant capabilities. The question of how to select capabilities has divided capability theorists into two camps: those who argue that it is a philosophical task and those who argue that it is a matter for the public. In this paper, I argue that this distinction between philosophy and democracy is counterproductive to the operationalization of the capability approach. On the one hand, proponents of the philosophical position overestimate the need (...) for philosophical theorizing when selecting capabilities. On the other hand, proponents of the democratic positions can benefit from addressing issues raised by philosophers. I conclude that rather than making the philosophical position more democratically sensitive, we should search out ways in which philosophy can reinforce democratic processes in general and in relation to the selection of capabilities in particular. (shrink)
Indigenous peoples are disproportionally vulnerable to climate change. At the same time, they possess valuable knowledge for fair and sustainable climate adaptation planning and policymaking. Yet Indigenous peoples and knowledges are often excluded from or underrepresented within adaptation plans and policies. In this paper we ask whether the concept of epistemic injustice can be applied to the context of climate adaptation and the underrepresentation of Indigenous knowledges within adaptation policies and strategies. In recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has (...) gained prominence, indicating that someone has been unfairly discriminated against in their capacity as a knower. We argue that many climate adaptation policies are epistemically unjust towards Indigenous peoples because of the underrepresentation of Indigenous knowledges by showing how the case of Indigenous knowledges in climate adaptation planning and policy satisfies five conditions of epistemic injustice. We further consider what challenges there are to integrating local and Indigenous knowledges within development in general, and climate adaptation strategies in particular and how these can be addressed. Whether the lack of Indigenous knowledges in climate adaptation policies constitutes an epistemic injustice matters because an injustice denotes an unfair advantage to one group – whether by design or default – that ought to be remedied and redressed. (shrink)
Extreme impacts from climate change are already being felt around the world. The policy choices that we make now will affect not only how high global temperatures rise but also how well-equipped future economies and infrastructures are to cope with these changes. The interests of future generations must therefore be central to climate policy and practice. This raises the questions:Whoshould represent the interests of future generations with respect to climate change? And according to whichcriteriashould we judge whether a particular candidate (...) would make an appropriate representative for future generations? In this essay, we argue that potential representatives of future generations should satisfy what we call a “hypothetical acceptance criterion,” which requires that the representative could reasonably be expected to be accepted by future generations. This overarching criterion in turn gives rise to two derivative criteria. These are, first, the representative'sepistemic and experiential similarity to future generations, and second, his or hermotivation to act on behalf of future generations. We conclude that communities already adversely affected by climate change best satisfy these criteria and are therefore able to command the hypothetical acceptance of future generations. (shrink)