During the last twenty-five years or so there has been a remarkable growth in the interdisciplinary field bordering on cognitive psychology, linguistics, neurobiology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. The book under review makes a belated but significant contribution to the literature of cognitive science, since it provides the first detailed comparison of the views of two of the field's most influential figures, Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget. The text is based on a conference which was held in October (...) of 1975 at the Abbaye de Royaumont near Paris. Besides Chomsky and Piaget, the participants at the conference included such notables as Jacques Monod and Gregory Bateson, the philosophers Jerry Fodor and Stephen Toulmin, psychologists Norbert Bischof, David Premack and Bärbel Inhelder, as well as distinguished representatives from the fields of biology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. The major focus of the discussion concerned the differences between Chomsky's and Piaget's views on the nature/nurture question in psychology. (shrink)
This paper contests the view that the events which have taken place in linguistics following the syntactic theories of N. Chomsky conform to the pattern of scientific development described in Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Specifically, it is argued that neither Kuhn's claims about the nature of 'normal science', nor those about the necessity of crisis preceding periods of revolutionary change, nor those about 'paradigms' succeeding one another in the history of a science, find any confirmation in the case (...) of the generative revolution in linguistics. (shrink)
The main point of this book is to stake out an information-processing view of perception which does not commit itself to the prevailing computational interpretation of organisms' perceptual and cognitive states. According to the prevailing view, perceiving is a matter of constructing an internal representation of the world on the basis of relatively meager sensory information. The construction is thought to proceed formal-causally by means of computational algorithms realized by the neural machinery of the brain and central nervous system. The (...) operation of these "perceptual analysers" is largely biologically determined and is "modular" in the sense that their activity is "sealed off" from consciousness, and only their outputs, perceptual representations, are available to higher order cognitive systems, controlling concepts, beliefs, language, and behavior. (shrink)
In his response to "The Politics of Rescue," Winston argues that the real dilemma facing the international system is not a question of what form intervention will take, but rather a question of the existence of political will to act on the humanitarian impulse.
This paper defends the claim that the contemporary canon of human rights forms an indivisible and interdependent system of norms against both "Western" and "Asian" critics who have asserted exceptionalist or selectivist counterclaims. After providing a formal definition of human rights, I argue that the set of particular human rights that comprises the contemporary canon represents an ethical-legal paradigm which functions as an implicit theory of human oppression. On this view, human rights originate as normative responses to particular historical experiences (...) of oppression. Since historically known experiences of oppression have resulted from practices that function as parts of systems of domination, normative responses to these practices have sought to disarm and dismantle such systems by depriving potential oppressors of the techniques which enable them to maintain their domination. Therefore, human rights norms form a systematic and interdependent whole because only as parts of a system can they function as effective means for combatting oppression and domination. (shrink)
The trend of much of recent moral philosophy has been to question the adequacy of traditional deontological and utilitarian views which place universal moral rights and duties at the center of ethical theory. Robert Goodin's book continues this trend and attempts to break new ground in ethical theory by proposing a general theory of special moral responsibilities. He argues that such responsibilities, though diverse in many ways, all derive from a common underlying moral principle, the vulnerability principle, according to which (...) moral agents acquire special responsibilities to the extent to which others are dependent upon them or are specially vulnerable in some way or ways to their choices and actions. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: ARISTOTELIAN AND CARTESIAN LOGIC AT HARVARD -- by Rick Kennedy -- I. Introduction --II. Religiously-Oriented, Dogmatically-Inclined Humanistic Logics from the Renaissance to the Seventeenth Century -- A. Melanchthon and Aristotelianism 01 -- B. Richardson and Ramism 16 -- C. Aristotelianism, Ramism, and Schematic Thinking 25 -- D. Puritan Favoritism From Ramus to Descartes 32 -- E. Cartesian Logic and Christian Skepticism 37 -- F. The Religious and Dogmatic Orientation of The Port-'Royalfogic 42 -- G. Cartesian Logic (...) in British Textbooks 52 -- III. Charles Morton and c A; logick System -- A. Charles Morton 62 -- B. Morton's cAfogick System 78 -- IV. William Brattle and the Compendium of logick -- A. Intellectual Reform in the Puritans' Collapsing World 91 -- B. The Compendium ofJogick 93 -- c. Brattle: Tutor and Unofficial Professor of Divinity 108 -- V. Epilogue: Later Constituencies of Religious Logics and 133 -- The Separation of Logic and Divinity at Harvard. (shrink)
In “Libertarian Natural Rights,” Siegfried Van Duffel endeavors to illuminate shortcomings in libertarian defenses of natural‐rights theory. Noting that defenses based on freedom beg the question, Van Duffel explores whether libertarians can find salvation in the concept of the sovereignty of the will, and concludes that this approach leads to incoherence. But because his arguments ignore the actual moral basis of natural rights, they at best fell a straw man, not libertarianism. They do, however, call into question the viability of (...) the entire moral enterprise. (shrink)