Recent research has suggested that both the Honesty-Humility dimension, psychopathic traits and cheating attitudes are important predictors of academic dishonesty. The present study examined: a) the incremental role of triarchic psychopathic traits in academic cheating over the Honesty-Humility dimension; b) the incremental role of cheating attitudes over personality; c) the mediating role of cheating attitudes in the relationship between different psychopathic components and academic cheating. Two-hundred-and-ninty-seven students (59% female, 23 years on average) completed several questionnaires: the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM), (...) The HEXACO-PI-R Honesty-Humility scale, Attitudes Toward Cheating Scale, and the Academic Cheating Behaviours Scale. As expected, triarchic psychopathy added incremental variance in explaining academic cheating, after controlling for Honesty-Humility. Cheating attitudes explained additional 24% after controlling for personality traits. Meanness lead to more lenient attitudes toward cheating, which lead to more academic cheating behaviours. On the other hand, the effects of boldness and disinhibition were not mediated by attitudes towards cheating. Overall, the results suggest that the psychopathic traits display the effects on the academic cheating via several different mechanisms. The findings have both important theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

Novel and emerging technologies can provide users with new kinds and unprecedented amounts of information about themselves, such as autobiographical information, neurodata, health information, or characteristics inferred from online behavior. Technology that provides extensive personal information (PI technology) can impact who we understand ourselves to be, how we constitute ourselves, and indeed who we are. This paper analyzes how PI technology’s external, quantified perspective on us affects identity based on a narrative identity theory. Disclosing the intimate relationship between PI technology (...) and identity sheds light on a whole new range of ethical issues that have received insufficient attention so far. Personal information provided by technology is not just information that belongs to individuals but also changes them. (shrink)

Novel and emerging technologies can provide users with new kinds and unprecedented amounts of information about themselves, such as autobiographical information, neurodata, health information, or characteristics inferred from online behavior. Technology providing extensive personal information (PI technology) can impact who we take ourselves to be, how we constitute ourselves, and indeed who we are. This paper analyzes how the external, quantified perspective on us offered by PI technology affects identity based on a narrative identity theory. Disclosing the intimate relationship between (...) PI technology and identity sheds light on a whole new range of ethical issues that have so far not received sufficient attention. Personal information provided by technology is not just information that belongs to individuals but that changes them. (shrink)

Authenticity has been recognized as a central concept in the ethics of human enhancement. In the last decade, a plethora of novel distinctions, specifications, and definitions of authenticity have been added to the debate. This chapter takes a step back and maps the different accounts of authenticity to provide a nuanced taxonomy of authenticity and reveal the emerging underlying structures of this concept. I identify three kinds of conditions for authentic creation and change of the true self (coherence, endorsement, and (...) relations) as well as ways how the true self should be expressed (in one’s self-conception, self-presentation, and one’s body, emotions, and actions). Based on this analysis, I discuss the hopes and concerns human enhancement raises for authenticity. Enhancement technologies do not threaten or foster authenticity across the board but affect different dimensions of authenticity individually. Finally, I turn to the value of authenticity and argue that the debate on authenticity in the ethics of human enhancement would profit from a more extended discussion on the comparative value of the individual dimensions of authenticity. (shrink)

Noir -- House -- Train -- Dead -- Ipseity -- Habeas corpus.

An accessible yet rigorous introduction to the influential French philosopher Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation. Gilbert Simondon, one of the most influential contemporary French philosophers, published only three works: L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective, both drawn from his doctoral thesis, and Du mode d'existence des objets techniques. It is this last work that brought Simondon into the public eye; as a consequence, he has been considered a “thinker of technics” and cited often in pedagogical reports (...) on teaching technology. Yet Simondon was a philosopher whose ambitions lay in an in-depth renewal of ontology as a process of individuation—that is, how individuals come into being, persist, and transform. In this accessible yet rigorous introduction to Simondon's work, Muriel Combes helps to bridge the gap between Simondon's account of technics and his philosophy of individuation. Some thinkers have found inspiration in Simondon's philosophy of individuation, notably Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Combes's account, first published in French in 1999, is one of the only studies of Simondon to appear in English. Combes breaks new ground, exploring an ethics and politics adequate to Simondon's hypothesis of preindividual being, considering through the lens of transindividual philosophy what form a nonservile relation to technology might take today. Her book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand Simondon's work. (shrink)

A partir de la divergencia de M. Foucault con Th. Hobbes con respecto a la guerra como principio y fundamento del poder, se muestra la importancia de esa diferencia conceptual para los análisis políticos contemporáneos. Foucault sostiene que, en las sociedades modernas de Occidente, la comunidad política, y más precisamente la política misma, ha sido el terreno de la guerra librada por otros medios. Por extensión, esta tesis significa invertir el principio de von Clausewitz; a saber, que la guerra es (...) la continuación de la política por otros medios. (shrink)

An historical review of authorship definitions and publication practices that are embedded in directions to authors and in the codes of ethics in the fields of psychology, sociology, and education illuminates reasonable agreement and consistency across the fields with regard to (a) originality of the work submitted, (b) data sharing, (c) human participants’ protection, and (d) conflict of interest disclosure. However, the role of the professional association in addressing violations of research or publication practices varies among these fields. Psychology and (...) sociology provide active oversight with sanction authority. In education, the association assumes a more limited role: to develop and communicate standards to evoke voluntary compliance. With respect to authorship credit, each association’s standards focus on criteria for inclusion as an author, other than on the author’s ability to defend and willingness to take responsibility for the entire work. Discussions across a broad range of research disciplines beyond the social sciences would likely be beneficial. Whether improved standards will reduce either misattribution or perceptions of inappropriate attribution of credit within social science disciplines will likely depend on how well authorship issues are addressed in responsible conduct of research education (RCR), in research practice, and in each association’s ongoing efforts to influence normative practice by specifying and clarifying best practices. (shrink)

La obra del poeta Alberto Caeiro, “maestro” heterónimo de Fernando Pessoa, es una filosofía sin filosofía que pone en tela de juicio la tradición cultural que “viste” el pensamiento: filosofía, oesía, mística, religión. Lo hace ejerciendo un retorno a la Naturaleza en el que se implican la ausencia de significación, de conceptos, de estructuras de conocimiento y de prejuicios que tergiversan la mirada de las cosas, la vivencia de la Naturaleza y la sensación de la Realidad. Por tratarse de un (...) desaprendizaje, Caeiro torna a lo simple, a lo tautológico, al no-pensamiento, casi a la ausencia de la palabra. (shrink)

Muriel Briançon | : Afin d’éclairer le sens de la religiosité de la philosophie de Lévinas et d’écarter le soupçon d’une soumission de celle-ci à des dogmes ou à des croyances incompatibles avec un principe de laïcité, notre contribution vise à clarifier le sens de son projet général. L’intention lévinassienne, ambitieuse et visionnaire, consiste en l’explicitation philosophique, métaéthique et phénoménologique, de l’idée cartésienne de l’Infini, transcendance non idolâtrique surgissant de la relation humaine. Cette quête philosophique de l’extrême conscience suppose (...) un athéisme ou du moins une mise en question de l’idolâtrie, du sacré et des dogmes. Cette spiritualité laïque universelle réalisée dans un judaïsme repensé conduit à des questions philosophiques essentielles et à un changement paradigmatique. | : To enlighten the sense of the religiosity of the Lévinas’ philosophy and rule out the suspicion of a submission of this one in dogmae or in incompatible faiths with a principle of secularism, our contribution aims at clarifying the sense of its general project. The Lévinas’ intention, ambitious and visionary, consists of the philosophic explicitation, métaéthique and phenomenological, of the Cartesian idea of Infinity, the not idolatrous transcendence appearing from the human relation. This philosophic quest of the extreme consciousness supposes an atheism or at least a questioning of the idolization, the sacred and the dogmae. This universal laic spirituality realized in a rethought Judaism leads to essential philosophic questions and to paradigmatic change. (shrink)

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of (...) how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity. (shrink)

Marx the Humanist presents Marx’s writings in a different light. Instead of malicious demagnification, which makes him responsible for everything done in his name after his death, it is recognised that he was not a prophet and could not have foreseen the changes that have occurred since then. His early writings reflect his humanism, and represent his long-term revolutionary appeal. Although the focus is on Marx’s humanism, the first two parts initiate the reader and provide an introduction to basic Marxist (...) ideas, both philosophical and economic. This provides the context for his condemnation of the dehumanising impact of capitalism on workers through exploitation. (shrink)

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, (...) feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience. (shrink)

Admirador da metafísica de Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner expressou em sua obra, de modo congenial ao filósofo, sua própria visão pessimista de mundo. O presente ensaio busca apontar - na obra O Anel dos Nibelungos - este parentesco e nele as diferenças essenciais que enlaçam de modo poderoso e fascinante os dois autores.

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...) minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism. (shrink)

Among the people who have been hailed for being particularly authentic are notorious liars. But this seems like a contradiction. Can you be authentic if you lie about what you value, believe, or feel? This brief article explores this question and the unique stances on honesty that different notions of authenticity take.

Cet article étudie les évolutions significatives de la théorie des crises économiques « à retour périodique » chez Juglar entre ses premières formulations, peu avant 1860, et les toutes dernières versions quelque quarante ans plus tard. Les progrès analytiques et empiriques sont soulignés et l’article signale la montée en généralité de la vision du cycle chez Juglar qui, à la fin de sa vie, décelait dans ce phénomène régulier la « clé de tout le mouvement social ». Des raisons économiques, (...) politique, morales, mais surtout religieuses permettent de rendre compte de cette évolution dans l’œuvre de Juglar. L’article pointe, en particulier, l’importance du jansénisme dans la vision économique du « prophète des crises ». (shrink)

How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...) goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and (...) technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests. (shrink)

Can associative learning take place without awareness? We explore this issue in a sequence learning paradigm with amnesic and control participants, who were simply asked to react to one of four possible stimuli on each trial. Unknown to them, successive stimuli occurred in a sequence. We manipulated the extent to which stimuli followed the sequence in a deterministic manner (noiseless condition) or only probabilistically so (noisy condition). Through this paradigm, we aimed at addressing two central issues: first, we asked whether (...) sequence learning takes place in either condition with amnesic patients. Second, we asked whether this learning takes place without awareness. To answer this second question, participants were asked to perform a subsequent sequence generation task under inclusion and exclusion conditions, as well as a recognition task. Reaction times results show that amnesic patients learned the sequence only in the deterministic condition. However, they failed to be able to reproduce the sequence in the generation task. In contrast, we found learning for both sequence structures in control participants, but only control participants exposed to a deterministic sequence were successful in performing the generation task, thus suggesting that the acquired knowledge can be used consciously in this condition. Neither amnesic nor control participants showed correct old/new judgments in the recognition task. The results strengthen the claim that implicit learning is at least partly spared in amnesia, and the role of contextual information available for learning is discussed. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...) not enough to prevent the reliability challenge from arising, given that quasi-realists also hold that normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs. To defuse this challenge, we need to isolate a deeper sense in which normative thought is not representational. I propose that we rely on the negative functional thesis of expressivism: normative thought does not have the function of tracking normative facts, or any other kind of facts. This thesis supports an argument to the effect that it is misguided to expect an explanation of our access to normative facts akin to the explanations available in regions of thought that have a tracking function. We should be content with explanations of our reliability that take for granted certain connections between our psychology and the normative truths. (shrink)

Nombreux couples arrivent en thérapie avec une demande d’amélioration de leur communication. Or les mots semblent dangereux, investis d’un pouvoir sur l’autre. Quel danger représente le fait de dire? L’exposition de la situation d’un couple recomposé permet d’évoquer différentes dimensions de la thérapie psychanalytique en couple dont celle du discours. Contradictions et paradoxes mettent en lumière les conflits identitaires d’appartenance constitutifs du lien du couple. L’usage du verbe et ses effets fâcheux montrent combien au nom du discours s’organisent les résistances (...) en groupe. C’est au thérapeute que revient la tâche de rendre possible le passage par le verbe, en travaillant les interactions et projections inconscientes dans l’interrelation, de cette difficulté à dire pour chacun. (shrink)

Nombreux couples arrivent en thérapie avec une demande d’amélioration de leur communication. Or les mots semblent dangereux, investis d’un pouvoir sur l’autre. Quel danger représente le fait de dire? L’exposition de la situation d’un couple recomposé permet d’évoquer différentes dimensions de la thérapie psychanalytique en couple dont celle du discours. Contradictions et paradoxes mettent en lumière les conflits identitaires d’appartenance constitutifs du lien du couple. L’usage du verbe et ses effets fâcheux montrent combien au nom du discours s’organisent les résistances (...) en groupe. C’est au thérapeute que revient la tâche de rendre possible le passage par le verbe, en travaillant les interactions et projections inconscientes dans l’interrelation, de cette difficulté à dire pour chacun. (shrink)

L’auteure présente une thérapie en couple de personnes sourdes. Les spécificités inhérentes à leur langue dont les modalités sont visuelles, où signifiant et signifié sont si proches, génèrent un sentiment d’appartenance groupale à une culture. Comment s’articule la problématique du couple avec les divers modes de communication à l’œuvre, les identités et identifications au sein de ce néo-groupe? Les aspects transférentiels et contretransférentiels serviront de fil rouge dans le déroulement de cette thérapie particulière. Le recours à la métaphore constitue pour (...) le thérapeute un point d’appui vers l’interfantasmatisation. Il contribue à créer une enveloppe, une pensée métaphorique, celle-ci permettant de surmonter les représentations inhibantes qui faisaient obstacle au travail d’élaboration. (shrink)

Normative naturalism holds that normative properties are identical with, or reducible to, natural properties. Various challenges to naturalism focus on whether it can make good on the idea that normative concepts can be used in systematically different ways and yet have the same reference in all contexts of use. In response to such challenges, some naturalists have proposed that questions about the reference of normative terms should be understood, at least in part, as normative questions that can be settled through (...) normative inquiry. In this paper I have two goals. First, I argue that these naturalist proposals do not yet allow for radical disagreement on normative matters, or at least do not explain how such disagreement is possible. Secondly, I argue that, in order to account for radical disagreement, naturalists should not only treat normative reference as a normative issue but also adopt a non-representationalist account of normative concepts, on which such concepts are individuated through their practical role. I illustrate this point by showing how a view that combines naturalism and expressivism about normative discourse can vindicate the elasticity of normative concepts, their referential stability, and the objectivity of normative truths. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of (...) our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as (...) internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. (shrink)